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Abstract 
 
This study uses Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory in order to provide an 
original account of the German verb form known as the reportative subjunctive, 
which occurs exclusively in indirect-speech contexts. It is argued that the German 
reportative subjunctive encodes procedural meaning, whose purpose is to reduce 
the amount of processing effort that a hearer must expend in inferring that an 
instance of indirect speech is to be understood to conform to a specific prototype of 
indirect speech. This procedural meaning is able to account for three phenomena 
which are characteristic of the German reportative subjunctive. Firstly, it accounts 
for the range of verba dicendi to which the reportative subjunctive may be 
subordinate. Secondly, it explains the fact that the matrix clause to which an 
instance of indirect speech needs to be understood to be subordinate does not 
always have to be explicitly stated. Thirdly, this procedural meaning accounts for the 
range of attitudes that a reporter may imply contextually towards a reported 
proposition. 
Ultimately, this study aims to improve on existing accounts by identifying a 
single function for this verb form which is capable of accounting fully for its uses and 
distribution. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Preliminary remarks 
 
Over the last fifty years or so a number of accounts of the German reportative 
subjunctive have been written (Flämig 1959; Jäger 1970, 1971; Bausch 1975, 1979; 
Kaufmann 1976; Poulsen 1984; Melenk 1985; Starke 1985; Eisenberg 1986, 2004; 
Thieroff 1992; Zifonun et al. 1997; Diewald 1999; Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 
2004; Fabricius-Hansen 2006). Our purpose is to provide a fresh account of the 
reportative subjunctive from the point of view of relevance theory (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/95), a theory which seeks to explain how human beings habitually 
recover the meaning which a communicator intends to convey by means of a 
linguistic (or non-linguistic) stimulus. Relevance theory is predicated on the notion 
that human cognition has evolved such that the search for relevance in our 
surroundings, including the language that we hear, is an intrinsic property of it. As 
such, it offers a more plausible explanation of utterance comprehension than Grice’s 
theory of conversational implicature (Grice 1989). For with its reliance on a 
descriptively and explanatorily inadequate Cooperative Principle and attendant 
maxims which are arguably not universal, Grice’s theory ultimately fails to explain 
how hearers understand the speaker’s intended meaning. 
 
 
1.2 Primary vs. reported discourse 
 
It can be claimed that there are two principal types of discourse. On the one hand, 
we frequently say and write things for which we are ourselves willing to claim 
responsibility. This is the type of discourse to which Fairclough (1995: 54-55) refers 
as primary discourse. There will be no linguistic devices which indicate that the 
opinions, ideas and propositions expressed are to be understood to be attributed to 
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anyone other than the speaker.1 On the other hand, we can quote, refer to and use 
the utterances of others in our discourse, utterances for which we ourselves do not 
claim responsibility and which we wish our hearer to understand to be attributed to a 
third party. This is secondary, or, to use our preferred term, reported discourse, and 
that a stretch of discourse is to be understood as such will often be indicated by 
explicit linguistic devices. In English such devices include quotation marks which 
mark direct speech in writing, indirect speech and adverbials such as ‘allegedly’. 
There is also a third, hybrid, type of discourse in which the boundaries between 
primary and secondary discourse are to some extent obscured such that it is not 
necessarily clear whether the author of a text herself is speaking or whether she is 
quoting the words of a third party. The focus of this study is that variey of discourse 
to which the German reportative subjunctive is restricted: reported discourse.  
 
 
1.3 Means of marking reported discourse in German 
 
The German language possesses a wide range of linguistic devices which serve to 
make explicit that a stretch of discourse is to be understood to be reported. Here we 
shall review some of the more salient. First of all there are adverbials to which we 
shall refer as discourse representative adverbials. These consist of a preposition 
such as laut, nach and zufolge (all of these correspond roughly to English ‘according 
to’) and a noun phrase which indicates the source of the attributed utterance. The 
following example is taken from Carlsen (1994: 467): 
 
(1a) Sechs Iraker  haben laut                einer Meldung  der      Nachrichtenagentur 
 six      Iraqis   have   according to  a        report      of the  news agency 
 
PARS  im        Iran  um  politisches  Asyl       nachgesucht. 
PARS  in the   Iran  for  political       asylum   applied 
 
‘According to a report of the news agency PARS six Iraqis have applied for 
political asylum in Iran.’ 
 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this study we use the term ‘speaker’ to refer to a person who is engaged in an act of 
speaking or writing, and ‘hearer’ to refer to a person who is engaged in an act of hearing or reading. 
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Thus the proposition which is reported can be said to resemble that in (1b), whilst 
the discourse representative adverbial laut einer Meldung der Nachrichtenagentur 
has been selected by the reporter and thus belongs to the primary discourse: 
 
(1b) Sechs Iraker haben im Iran um politisches Asyl nachgesucht. 
 
Reported discourse in German can also be marked as such by modal verbs. 
Sollen, which may be said to correspond to some extent to English ‘should’, may be 
used with the meaning ‘it is said that’, as in example (2a) (from Durrell (2011: 349)). 
This reports a (rumoured) proposition which is assumed to resemble (2b): 
 
(2a) Er  soll         steinreich             sein. 
 he  should   enormously rich   be 
 
 ‘He is said to be enormously rich.’ 
 
(2b) Er  ist   steinreich.  
 he  is   enormously rich 
 
 ‘He is enormously rich.’ 
 
 Another modal verb which may be used to indicate reported discourse is 
wollen, whose basic meaning is ‘want’. The original speaker is understood to be the 
subject of wollen, and Durrell (2011: 352) remarks that ‘[i]n this sense wollen is 
usually linked with a perfect infinitive, typically with the implication that the claim is 
false’. An example from Durrell: 
 
(3a) Er  will       eine  Villa  auf  Mallorca  gekauft  haben. 
 he  wants  a       villa   on   Majorca   bought   have 
 
 ‘He claims to have bought a villa on Majorca.’ 
 
The purported original utterance will be: 
 
(3b) Ich  habe    eine  Villa  auf   Mallorca  gekauft.  
 I      have    a       villa  on     Mallorca  bought 
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 ‘I have bought a Villa on Majorca.’ 
 
 A particularly important and common type of reported discourse is direct 
reported speech, which, according to Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1203), ‘[…] 
purports to give the actual wording of the original […]’. Direct speech is restricted to 
cases where: 
 
[…] perhaps one has access to a written or recorded version of the original, perhaps 
the original was short enough for one to have been able to memorise it, or perhaps 
one is composing fiction, where the author can decide what the characters say. 
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1203) 
 
In cases of direct speech, the alleged actual words of the original speaker are 
placed inside quotation marks and are typically introduced by some sort of verbum 
dicendi, or verb of saying. In the example below this verbum dicendi is flüstern 
(‘whisper’): 
 
(4) [CONTEXT] Oskar raises his right arm and suddenly stands still. The guide 
makes throaty noises. Then he uses his binoculars to search for the leafy 
canopy of the jungle.2 
 
 "Er   ist    hier     irgendwo",     flüstert      er. 
  he   is     here    somewhere   whispers   he 
 
 ‘“He’s here somewhere”, he whispers.’ 
(Mannheimer Morgen: 17.09.2005) 
 
Since the words purport to be exactly the same as those of the original utterance, all 
deixis (personal, spatial and temporal) will reflect the point of view of the original 
speaker.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Oskar hebt den rechten Arm und bleibt abrupt stehen. Der Guide stößt kehlige Laute aus. Dann sucht 
er mit dem Fernglas das dichte Blätterdach des Urwaldes ab. 
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1.4 Indirect speech 
 
There is an important type of reported discourse which deserves a section of its own 
in this chapter because it is the one which is of the greatest interest to us: indirect 
reported speech. (5) is an example of German indirect speech: 
 
(5) Australiens Aussenminister  Smith  sagte  jedoch     dem     
 Australia’s  foreign minister  Smith  said    however   to the      
             
Fernsehsender           Sky News,  er   gehe         davon  aus,  dass   der    
television broadcaster Sky News   he  assumes  from it  SP    that     the 
    
27-Jährige   in   Australien ebenso  warmherzig  empfangen   werde             
27-year-old  in   Australia   just as   warmly         received        becomes   
 
wie  in   Neuseeland. 
as   in    New Zealand 
 
‘However, Australia’s foreign minister Smith told the television broadcaster 
Sky News he assumed that the 27-year-old would be just as warmly received 
in Australia as he was in New Zealand.’  
 (St. Galler Tagblatt: 20.01.2010) 
 
On a basic level, indirect speech in German consists of a matrix verbum-dicendi 
clause and a subordinate clause, which may or may not be introduced by the 
subordinating conjunction dass (‘that’). Additionally, certain changes must be made 
to deixis in the subordinate clause: the reporter must choose pronominal deixis from 
her own point of view, whilst other deixis may reflect the point of view of either the 
reporter or the original speaker. Tenses are usually selected from the point of view 
of the original speaker, but may be chosen from the reporter’s own point of view. 
However, there is another property which arguably attends many instances 
of indirect speech and will prove to be of central importance to this study since, as 
we shall suggest in later chapters, it is a consistent feature of German indirect 
speech whose finite verb is a reportative-subjunctive form. This concerns 
indirectness, or, to use the German term, Indirektheit. Zifonun et al. consider 
Indirektheit to be a property of indirect contexts, which latter they define as follows: 
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INDIRECT CONTEXTS are contexts […] in which the speaker does not directly 
address a piece of propositional knowledge as though it is valid for himself at the 
time of speaking, rather he reports it by referring to another source.
3
 
(Zifonun et al. 1997: 1753) 
 
For Zifonun et al., in the case of indirectness the reporter’s attitude, or degree of 
commitment (Verbindlichkeitsanspruch) to the reported proposition, can be 
formulated as ‘I, B, say that A says that P, but I leave open whether I say that P’4 
(1997: 1762).  
In our view, indirectness may be linked to non-presupposition of the reported 
proposition. Presupposition is a broad concept and a given proposition may possess 
a number of presuppositions. The following example has been adapted from 
Levinson (1983: 179-180): 
 
(6a) John stopped doing linguistics before he left Cambridge. 
 
According to Levinson, (6a) has the following presuppositions: 
 
(6b) There is someone uniquely identifiable to the speaker and addressee as 
John. 
(6c) John was doing linguistics before he left Cambridge. (triggered by ‘stop’) 
(6d) John left Cambridge. (triggered by ‘before’) 
(6e) John had been at Cambridge. (triggered by ‘leave’) 
 
However, it is presupposition specifically in the sense of Huddleston and Pullum 
(2002) that is of interest to us. They are concerned with the the status of a given 
proposition as a whole when embedded under a matrix verb. They remark that ‘[t]he 
information contained in a presupposition is backgrounded, taken for granted, 
presented as something that is not currently at issue’, before subsequently defining 
presupposition formally (2002: 41):   
 
X presupposes Y ≡ in saying X the speaker in the absence of indications to the 
contrary, takes the truth of Y for granted, i.e. presents it as something that is 
not at issue. 
 
                                                 
3
 INDIREKTHEITSKONTEXTE sind Kontexte [...], in denen der Sprecher ein Stück propositionalen 
Wissens nicht unmittelbar als für ihn selbst zum Sprechzeitpunkt aktuelles Wissen anspricht, sondern 
es wiedergibt, indem er sich auf eine andere Quelle rückbezieht. 
4
 Ich, B, sage, daß A sagt, daß p, aber ich lasse offen, ob ich sage, daß p. 
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Given that a speaker takes the truth of a presupposed proposition for granted, we 
hold that a reported proposition with the property indirectness will not typically be 
understood to be presupposed in Huddleston and Pullum’s sense. This type of 
presupposition would be inconsistent with Zifonun et al.’s understanding of 
indirectness, contradicting in particular the reporter attitude associated with the 
concept: ‘I, B, say that A says that P, but I leave open whether I say that P’.  
Indirect speech which possesses the property indirectness alongside 
concomitant non-presupposition of the embedded proposition is typically introduced 
by non-factive verbs such as ‘believe’, ‘say’ or ‘think’. For instance, neither (7a) nor 
its English translation (7b) presupposes its embedded clause, i.e. the proposition in 
(7c): 
 
(7a) Mein  Bruder   sagte,  dass  er    das  Jobangebot   angenommen   hat. 
 my     brother  said     that    he   the    job offer        accepted          has     
 
(7b) My brother said that he had accepted the job offer. 
(7c) My brother accepted the job offer. 
 
The speaker of (7a) and (7b), i.e. the reporter, reports (7c), but does not take its 
truth for granted: it is not necessary for the hearer to understand (7c) to be true in 
order for him to comprehend (7a) or (7b) as a whole.  
Other verbs which introduce indirect speech are factive which means that 
their ‘[…] content clause complement is normally presupposed […]’ (Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002: 1008). Such factive verbs include ‘admit’, ‘comment’, ‘emphasize’, 
‘mention’, ‘point out’ and ‘recognize’. As examples from German we provide the 
factive verbs bedauern (‘regret’) and zugeben (‘admit’) ((8a) and (9a)) alongside 
their English equivalents ((8b) and (9b)):  
 
(8a) Mein  Bruder  bedauerte,  dass  er   das  Jobangebot   nicht   angenommen   
 my     brother regretted     that   he   the   job offer         not     accepted 
 
 hat.        
 has 
 
(8b) My brother regretted that he did not accept the job offer. 
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(9a) Sie   gab zu,    dass  sie    die   Halskette  gestohlen  hat. 
 She  admitted  that    she  the   necklace  stolen         has 
 
(9b) She admitted that she had stolen the necklace. 
 
These seem to presuppose (8c) and (9c) respectively: 
 
(8c) My brother did not accept the job offer. 
(9c) She stole the necklace. 
 
Thus, examples (8a), (8b), (9a) and (9b) do not display the property indirectness. In 
fact, factive verbs will still presuppose their embedded proposition even if they are 
themselves embedded under a non-factive verb. Thus (8d) still presupposes (8c): 
 
(8d) My brother said he regretted that he did not accept the job offer. 
 
In view of the wide variety of verbs that may function as verba dicendi, many 
of which are factive, it cannot be claimed that indirectness is an essential feature of 
indirect speech: this would result in an unnecessarily narrow and essentially ad hoc 
definition of indirect speech – one on which the embedded proposition cannot be 
understood to be presupposed – and furthermore would be counterintuitive. Instead 
it seems that, in the case of German and English at least, indirectness should be 
considered a phenomenon that attends many instances of indirect speech but is not 
necessarily a constitutive property of it.  
 In the light of the foregoing considerations regarding how indirect speech 
should be defined, we propose the following preliminary working definition of the 
concept:5 
 
(i) Indirect speech consists of a matrix verbum-dicendi clause and a 
subordinate proposition which latter in German may or may not be 
introduced by dass. 
(ii) Pronominal deixis must be selected from the point of view of the reporter. 
Other deixis may be selected from the point of view of the original speaker. 
                                                 
5
 We do not claim that this characterization exhausts the properties of indirect speech. However, 
whether or not there are further properties will not ultimately influence the analysis of the import of the 
German reportative subjunctive which will be provided in Chapter 4. 
 17 
 
(iii) Indirect speech may exhibit the property indirectness. In such cases the 
reported proposition will not be understood to be presupposed. 
 
Since certain deixis are selected from the point of view of the reporter, 
indirect speech, unlike direct reported speech, cannot purport to report the exact 
words of the original speaker. In fact, the discrepancy between the actual words and 
the reported version may extend beyond deictic differences. In this connection 
Coulmas (1986) remarks that: 
 
[i]n indirect speech the reporter is free to introduce information about the reported 
speech event from his own point of view and on the basis of his knowledge about the 
world, as he does not purport to give the actual words that were uttered by the 
original speaker(s) or that his report is restricted to what was actually said. Indirect 
speech is the speech of the reporter: its pivot is the speech situation of the report. 
(Coulmas 1986: 3) 
 
Nevertheless, the reporter is not obligated to change anything beyond deixis. 
The result is that there are, broadly speaking, two chief types of indirect speech: de 
dicto and de re indirect speech. In the case of de dicto indirect speech, the 
reporter’s analysis ‘[…] consists in adjusting the original utterance to the deictic 
center of the report situation without changing any other part of its linguistic form’ 
(Coulmas 1986: 5). Pütz (1989: 189) and Zifonun et al. (1997: 1765) point out that 
German de dicto indirect speech is marked as such through the absence of the 
subordinating conjunction dass: the embedded clause thus has main-clause word 
order.6 Example (5) above exemplifies specifically German de dicto indirect speech 
and is repeated below as (5a): 
 
(5a) Australiens Aussenminister Smith sagt jedoch dem Fernsehsender           
Sky News, er gehe davon aus, dass der 27-Jährige in Australien ebenso 
warmherzig empfangen werde wie in Neuseeland. 
 
Thus the purported original utterance is (5b): since (5a) represents de dicto indirect 
speech the reporter intends the hearer to assume that the two versions differ only in 
terms of their pronominal deixis (though this is, of course, not necessarily the case): 
ich in the original utterance has been changed to er in order to reflect the deictic 
point of view of the reporter: 
                                                 
6
 In German verbs appear at the end of a clause which is introduced by a subordinating conjunction. 
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(5b) Ich gehe davon aus, dass der 27-Jährige in Australien ebenso warmherzig 
empfangen wird wie in Neuseeland.  
 
A de re analysis, on the other hand: 
 
[…] allows the reporter to alter the form of the original utterance in accordance with 
what it means on the basis of this knowledge of the world in such a way that it may 
include inferences of which the original speaker is unaware.  
(Coulmas 1986: 5) 
 
For Pütz (1989: 189) and Zifonun et al (1997: 1765), German de re indirect speech 
is characterized by the use of dass and concomitant changes to the word order of 
the embedded clause. An example:  
 
(10a) Ein  CNN-Korrespondent   berichtet  aus    Port-au-Prince,  dass    Präsident 
a     CNN correspondent    reports    from   Port-au-Prince   that      president 
 
René Préval   zwar     persönlich  am      Flughafen  die   ersten  Hilfsflüge 
  René Préval   indeed  personally  at the  airport        the  first      relief flights 
 
empfangen habe,  es  aber  keine  organisierte  Verteilung   der   
received     has      it    but    no       organized     distribution  of the   
 
Hilfsgüter        gebe.  
relief supplies gives 
 
‘A CNN correspondent reports from Port-au-Prince that President René 
Préval met the first relief flights personally, but there was no organized 
distribution of the relief supplies.’ 
(St. Galler Tagblatt: 15.01.2010) 
 
The original utterance which (10a) purports to report needs to resemble (10b) in 
terms of its propositional form if (10a) is to be considered faithful, but unlike (5a) and 
(5b), the propositional forms need not be identical: 
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(10b) Präsident René Préval hat zwar persönlich am Flughafen die ersten 
Hilfsflüge empfangen, es gibt aber keine organisierte Verteilung der 
Hilfsgüter. 
 
 Therefore, there will very often be a discrepancy between the original 
utterance that indirect speech purports to report and the actual original utterance: for 
this reason we shall continue to make frequent reference throughout this study to 
the ‘purported original utterance’. Even in cases where the reported utterance is 
identical to the original utterance (as is often true of direct reported discourse) or 
differs only in terms of certain deixis (de dicto indirect speech), a quotation will 
undergo a qualitative change as it is transferred from its original context to a new 
one. Here it will be subordinated to the overall discursive purpose of the producer of 
the host discourse, rather than to that of the text in which it originated. Of particular 
significance here is the role of the choice of verbum dicendi, for such a verb, 
including even the most neutral verb sagen (‘say’), will very often reflect the 
interpretive stance of the producer of the host discourse or indicate the relationship 
that the writer wishes the quotation to bear to her text as a whole. For the analyst, 
host-discourse considerations must always take priority. 
 
 
1.5 The German reportative subjunctive: Introductory remarks 
 
The German language possesses two types of subjunctive, each of which has a 
function with which it is more readily associated. The four forms gehe, werde, habe 
and gebe in examples (5a) and (10a) above are examples of a type of subjunctive 
which for all verbs (except sein (‘be’)) is formed from the stem of the present 
indicative. For this latter reason many authorities, for example Hentschel and Weydt 
(1994), Helbig and Buscha (1998) and Durrell (2002) refer to it as the ‘present 
subjunctive’. The chief function of the ‘present subjunctive’ is to mark indirect 
speech as in the examples above, although it is not restricted to this. For example it 
occurs in recipes (11) and formulaic wishes (12): 
 
(11) Man   nehme         drei     Eier   und  150   Gramm  Zucker.  Man  
 one    takes.SUBJ  three  eggs  and   150  grams    sugar     one  
 
 rühre            die   Eier   mit    dem   Zucker. 
 mixes.SUBJ  the  eggs  with   the     sugar 
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‘Take three eggs and 150 grams of sugar. Mix the eggs with the sugar.’ 
 
(12) Er   lebe             hoch! 
 he   lives.SUBJ  high 
 
 ‘May he live well!’ 
 
The other type of subjunctive most often has the function of a conditional. 
This is formed from the stem of the imperfect indicative and is accordingly referred 
to by many scholars, including those mentioned above, as the ‘imperfect 
subjunctive’. Its function as a conditional is illustrated by example (13) below: 
 
(13) Er   wäre                               erleichtert,   wenn er   keine  Hausaufgaben  
 he  is.SUBJ (i.e. ‘would be’) relieved        if       he   no       homework 
 
hätte. 
 has.SUBJ (i.e. ‘would have’) 
 
 ‘He would be relieved if he had no homework.’ 
 
However, the ‘imperfect subjunctive’ often appears in indirect speech where it has 
the same function as the ‘present subjunctive’. In this study, we use the term 
reportative subjunctive to refer to both types of subjunctive when they occur in 
indirect speech.  
How, precisely, are we to distinguish between instances of the reportative 
subjunctive and other uses, such as those in examples (11), (12) and (13)? To do so 
is not necessarily easy, as there are cases where, as we shall see, it is the function 
of the subjunctive as a reportative form to ensure that an utterance is understood as 
indirect speech. Thus one could easily become entangled in a circular argument: the 
reportative subjunctive can be employed only in indirect speech, whilst the 
reportative subjunctive has the function of marking – and is thus in a sense 
constitutive of – indirect speech. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to claim that a 
subjunctive form may be considered reportative when it occurs in an embedded 
clause and contextual considerations do not suggest a function other than marking 
indirect speech. For example, embedded ‘imperfect-subjunctive’ forms are clearly 
not reportative when they are to be analyzed as embedded conditionals, as in 
example (14): 
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(14)  Er sagte,   er   wäre                               erleichtert,   wenn er   keine   
 he said     he  is.SUBJ (i.e. ‘would be’)  relieved        if       he   no  
       
Hausaufgaben   hätte. 
 homework          has.SUBJ (i.e. ‘would have’) 
 
 ‘He said he would be relieved if he had no homework.’ 
 
Above we have so far used the traditional terms ‘present subjunctive’ and 
‘imperfect subjunctive’. In this study we shall follow the modern conventional 
practice (followed by Engel (1996), Fabricius-Hansen (2006), Durrell (2011) and 
Whittle et al. (2011)) of referring to the present subjunctive and the imperfect 
subjunctive as subjunctive 1 (henceforth S1) and subjunctive 2 (S2) respectively. 
This is because in modern standard German both the past and present (strictly non-
past) tenses may be formed from both types of subjunctive.7   
 
 
1.6 Relevance theory: Introductory remarks 
 
Relevance theory, which assigns crucial roles to both the semantic import of 
linguistic expressions and pragmatic considerations in utterance comprehension, 
provides an appropriate framework within which to investigate the German 
reportative subjunctive. On a superficial level, the relevance-theoretic framework 
seems suitable because the analysis of some aspects of the subjunctive may be 
said to fall within the domain of semantics, whilst the analysis of other aspects is 
rather a pragmatic pursuit. For example, the chief function of the reportative 
subjunctive is essentially semantic: we shall show in this study that it ensures that 
an utterance is understood as indirect speech. If the reportative subjunctive is 
present, then such an interpretation, unlike purely pragmatically recovered 
interpretations, cannot be cancelled. One pragmatic aspect of the subjunctive is as 
follows. We shall suggest in this study that the meaning which Zifonun et al. suggest 
for the subjunctive, i.e. ‘I, B, say that A says that P, but I leave open whether I say 
that P’, does not preclude the possibility of the reporter using it to imply any 
interpretive stance, or attitude, towards the proposition she is reporting. For 
example, she may imply that she holds the proposition to be true, untrue, or she 
                                                 
7
 In German the present tense is often used with future meaning. Alternatively the future tense may be 
formed periphrastically from the modal verb werden (‘shall’ or ‘will’) and the infinitive of the main verb. 
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may remain impartial. Recovering this attitude is therefore a pragmatic task. A 
hearer will also deploy a pragmatic process when interpreting instances of so-called 
berichtete Rede (‘reported speech’), in which reportative-subjunctive reported 
discourse lacks an explicit matrix clause, as in example (15). The tense of the 
second sentence is understood to be subordinate to the same matrix verbum 
dicendi as the subordinate clause of the first sentence: 
 
(15) Er  sagt,   er   sei      krank. Er   gehe        morgen     nicht   in  die   Schule. 
 he  says   he  is.S1   ill        he   goes.S1   tomorrow   not     to  the   school 
  
‘He says he is ill [and that] he isn’t going to school tomorrow.’ 
 
The fact that ‘er sagt’ (most likely) serves as the antecedent of ‘er gehe morgen 
nicht in die Schule’ is not (semantically) encoded. Instead, identifying it as the 
antecedent is a pragmatic process. 
 Relevance theory, however, does not merely provide a framework within 
which semantic phenomena can be analyzed on the one hand, and pragmatic 
phenomena on the other. Rather, linguistically encoded meaning is seen to be both 
subservient to, and to control, pragmatic processes. Linguistically encoded meaning 
delivers conceptual representations which are developed via pragmatic processes 
into those representations which are (assumed to be) intended by the speaker, i.e. 
what is (assumed) to be meant; the latter representations include the implicatures of 
an utterance. What is the nature of these pragmatic processes? Relevance theory’s 
central claim may be summarized as follows: a hearer is guided towards the 
speaker's intended meaning by his expectation that the speaker's utterance is 
optimally relevant, i.e., the utterance is expected to generate maximum meaning in 
return for minimum processing effort. The first plausible meaning the hearer 
recovers is thus expected to be the speaker’s intended meaning.  
Relevance theory recognizes that there is not merely a discrepancy between 
linguistically encoded meaning and the actual meaning which the speaker intends 
the hearer to recover: there is also a discrepancy between the linguistically encoded 
meaning and the proposition expressed. This phenomenon, which Carston terms 
the linguistic underdeterminacy thesis (2002: 15-93), is illustrated well by example 
(15) above. The linguistically encoded meaning, which tells us that a male says that 
a male is ill and that somebody says that a male is not going to the school on the 
day after the proposition is uttered, must be developed via pragmatic inference into 
the proposition expressed. For instance, referents must be identified for all three 
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instances of er, the precise day denoted by the temporal deictic adverbial morgen 
must be identified and even in die Schule gehen must be given a specific 
interpretation. The linguistically encoded meaning corresponds to ‘go to the school’, 
but this is a set phrase which like English ‘go to school’ refers to what children do 
every weekday morning.  
Now, if linguistic communication involved merely coding and decoding (we 
have in mind the pure form of the code model of communication, propounded by 
Aristotle right up to the modern semioticians) then hearers could be certain that the 
meaning they recover is the same as that conveyed by speakers. But in view of the 
above considerations, according to which pragmatic inference plays a considerable 
role in not just developing the proposition expressed into what is meant but also in 
developing linguistically encoded meaning into the proposition expressed, hearers 
do not have the benefit of this certainty. Instead, a crucial role is played in utterance 
comprehension by our innate ability to attribute intentions to others, in other words 
to use linguistic and non-linguistic clues in order to metarepresent the meanings that 
speakers (likely) intend.  
Sperber (1994) describes three increasingly sophisticated stages in 
pragmatic development which each require an additional layer of 
metarepresentation. The first stage is that of the Naively Optimistic hearer (1994: 
189-191), who takes utterances at face-value and assumes that the first acceptable 
interpretation of an utterance he recovers is the intended one. Concluding that this 
interpretation is that which the speaker intends involves a ‘second-order meta-
representational attribution of a first-order meta-representational intention’ (1994: 
192). The second stage is that of the Cautiously Optimistic hearer, (1994: 191-194), 
who assumes that the speaker is ‘benevolent, but not necessarily competent’ (1994: 
192). In other words, such hearers understand that speakers sometimes 
unintentionally do not quite say what they mean: speakers often make slips of the 
tongue, for example. The Cautiously Optimistic hearer will therefore recover what he 
assumes to be the speaker’s intended meaning by metarepresenting what the 
speaker is likely to have meant: here, ‘[…] second-order meta-representations may 
serve not just as conclusions, but also as premises’ (1994: 192). The final stage is 
that where the hearer deploys the strategy of Sophisticated Understanding (1994: 
194-196), whereby ‘[…] the speaker is not assumed to be benevolent or competent. 
She is merely assumed to intend to seem benevolent and competent’ (1994: 196). 
In her account of Sperber (1994), Wilson (1999) uses lying as an example to 
illustrate Sophisticated Understanding: 
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Using the strategy of Sophisticated Understanding, [the hearer] may be able to 
understand [the speaker’s] meaning even if he knows she is lying, by asking himself 
under what interpretation she might have thought she would think her utterance was 
relevant enough. In identifying the intended interpretation, he therefore has to 
metarepresent [the speaker’s] thoughts about her thoughts. 
(Wilson 1999: 138-139) 
 
Significantly, relevance theory has been employed substantially in recent 
years to investigate phenomena which relate to reported discourse. Reported 
discourse is viewed in relevance theory as involving a type of metarepresentation, 
but not the metarepresentation of other people’s intentions; rather it involves 
metarepresentation in the sense that ‘[…] the communicated information (the 
‘message’) itself contains a metarepresentational element, which is intended to be 
recognised as such’ (Noh 2000: 4). More specifically, varieties of reported discourse 
such as indirect speech (but not direct speech, see Chapter 3 section 3.4.2) are 
examples of a type of metarepresentational language known as interpretive use, 
which is defined by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 228-229) as language which 
represents ‘[…] some other representation which also has a propositional form – a 
thought, for instance – in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional 
forms’. Relevance theorists have analyzed linguistic expressions in some languages 
which serve to make explicit that an utterance is to be understood as an instance of 
interpretive use, for example the Japanese particle tte (Itani 1991, 1998) and Sissala 
rέ (Blass 1988, 1989). These interpretive use markers have in common the property 
that, like the German reportative subjunctive, they are compatible with any 
interpretive stance that the reporter may imply contextually towards the attributed 
proposition. The analysis which we shall provide for the German reportative 
subjunctive will proceed along the lines of those suggested for these particles. 
 
 
1.7 Overview of the thesis and research questions 
 
The first half of Chapter 2 will constitute a detailed overview of the use of the 
German reportative subjunctive in indirect speech, paying attention to its form, the 
use of the tenses that it is capable of forming and its function. At the end of the first 
half we shall pause and consider those phenomena for which in our view a fully 
adequate analysis of the reportative subjunctive should account. These will form the 
basis of the questions which we shall seek to address in Chapters 4 and 5. We 
provide an overview of these questions over the next few paragraphs. 
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The first question will concern the precise nature of the German reportative 
subjunctive and query why its occurrence is largely restricted to indirect speech.  
The second question will concern some of the types of verb under which the 
German reportative subjunctive may be embedded. We shall suggest that verba 
dicendi which introduce indirect speech with a reportative subjunctive are invariably 
understood non-factively. This being the case, how do we account for the fact that 
the subjunctive may be embedded under some essentially factive verbs? These 
factive verbs include verbs which report behabitives, such as kritisieren (‘criticize’) 
and verbs of emotional attitude such as bedauern (‘regret’). 
There is a group of verbs in the subordinate clause of which, for reasons 
which we shall elucidate, the German reportative subjunctive is at first glance a little 
unexpected. This group is made up of verbs such as bestreiten and verneinen, each 
of which corresponds (though each with its own nuance) to the English verb ‘deny’. 
Thus the third question to which we shall attempt to provide an answer over the 
course of this study will concern the use of the German reportative subjunctive in 
clauses that are subordinate to verbs of denial. Can we identify a common principle 
at work which accounts for the use of the subjunctive not only in clauses 
subordinate to conventional verba dicendi such as sagen, but also in clauses 
subordinate to verbs of denial?   
In Chapter 2 we shall also discuss cases of so-called berichtete Rede 
(‘reported speech’), mentioned briefly above. We shall suggest that the matrix 
clause to which an instance of reported speech is subordinate is not always as 
easily recovered from the preceding discourse as it is in example (15). Thus, as our 
fourth question, we shall enquire how the hearer of reported speech identifies the 
relevant matrix clause under which it needs to be understood to be embedded.  
 Our final question will concern the notion that the German reportative 
subjunctive is compatible with any interpretive stance held by the reporter towards 
the reported proposition. Our analysis will additionally suggest the mechanism by 
which the hearer recovers the reporter’s intended interpretation. 
 In the second half of Chapter 2 we shall review existing accounts of the 
German reportative subjunctive and assess the extent to which they provide 
satisfactory answers to the above questions.    
 Chapter 3 will be devoted to an overview of relevance theory, and we shall 
consider the cognitive and communicative principles of relevance as well as the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. We shall pay special attention to 
specific linguistic items which aid the hearer in his recovery of the speaker’s 
intended meaning. Such linguistic items, which include discourse markers such as 
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‘but’ and ‘nevertheless’ are said to encode procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987, 
1992, 2002, 2004; Wilson and Sperber 1993). We shall also consider interpretive 
use in detail and show how the Japanese and Sissala particles tte and rέ encode 
procedural meaning since they cut down the amount of processing effort that the 
hearer must invest in inferring that an utterance is to be understood interpretively. 
The chapter will end with a consideration of some of the devices German uses in 
order to mark instances of interpretive use. 
In the first half of Chapter 4 we shall attempt to answer the first and second 
questions mentioned above. We shall suggest that the German reportative 
subjunctive can, like Japanese tte and Sissala rέ, be analyzed as a marker of 
interpretive use, albeit one restricted to a specific type of interpretive use: indirect 
(and reported) speech. We shall propose that the restriction of the reportative 
subjunctive to indirect speech, in which it may be embedded under certain factive 
verbs but not others, can be attributed to a specific procedural feature which the 
reportative subjunctive possesses. This feature ensures that an utterance with the 
syntactic structure of indirect speech is understood to conform to a specific 
prototype of indirect speech. In the second half of Chapter 4 we shall investigate the 
role of this feature, alongside that of the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure, in prompting the hearer to recover inferentially the matrix clause to which 
an instance of reported speech is understood to be subordinate. Thus a solution to 
our fourth question will be proposed. 
Our concern in Chapter 5 will be our fifth question: how relevance theory 
accounts for the hearer’s inferential recovery of the interpretive stance which the 
reporter holds towards the reported utterance. When investigating such attitudes, it 
is necessary to understand precisely what is understood to be attributed to the 
matrix subject. We shall argue that in some cases it is the embedded proposition 
alone which is understood to be attributed to the matrix subject, whilst in other cases 
the matrix verbum dicendi also reports part of the original utterance. Our argument 
will rely to some extent on the relevance-theoretic distinction between 
communicated and non-communicated speech acts, so some space will be devoted 
to a discussion of these types of speech act. In the second half of the chapter we 
shall consider the attitudes which are contextually implied when the speech acts of 
concluding (schließen), criticizing (kritisieren), guaranteeing (garantieren) and 
agreeing (zustimmen) are reported. The chapter will end with a consideration of the 
fact that the reportative subjunctive may be embedded under verbs of denial such 
as bestreiten and verneinen. We shall suggest that such cases may be analyzed in 
the same terms as the report of the speech acts of guaranteeing and agreeing.  
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In the conclusion (Chapter 6) we shall summarize our findings of this study 
and make suggestions for further research. In doing so we shall make hypotheses 
regarding how our insights regarding the import of the reportative subjunctive can be 
applied to the report of interrogatives and imperatives, and consider other issues 
such as the implications of our findings for cases of indirect speech where the 
verbum dicendi is negated. We shall additionally use insights from this study in order 
to suggest a fundamental difference between cases of reported discouse marked as 
such by a discourse representative adverbial (see example (1a)) or a wie-clause 
(example (16) below) where the finite verb is an indicative form and similar cases 
where a reportative-subjunctive form is employed:  
 
(16) Wie  die  Thurgauer  Polizei  mitteilt,     schossen    die    Jugendlichen  
 as     the  Thurgau     police   informed  shot.IND      the    youths 
 
 aus     Langweile und   Übermut   auf   die   vorbeigehende  Frau.  
 out of  boredom  and    mischief    on    the  passing              woman 
 
‘As Thurgau police reported, the youths shot at the passing woman out of 
boredom and mischief.’ 
(SZ 1997) 
 
All these hypotheses may, in our view, form the basis of further research. 
 
 
1.8 The corpus 
 
The corpus of texts from which the examples analyzed in Chapter 5 are taken was 
compiled using COSMAS II of the Institut für Deutsche Sprache, Mannheim, which 
is the largest corpus of German texts in existence. A series of selective searches 
were performed to find exampes of indirect speech with an embedded subjunctive 
so that not only the grammatical/syntactic form could be investigated but also the 
contextual features that attended each occurrence. For each of the verbs schließen, 
kritisieren, garantieren and zustimmen, COSMAS II was used to find 200 texts, each 
of which contained one example of the verbum dicendi in question. In the case of 
verbs of denial, a single search was carried out for 200 texts, each of which 
contained one example of one of ableugnen, abstreiten, bestreiten, dementieren, 
leugnen and verneinen accompanied by the subordinating conjunction dass. Whilst 
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schließen, kritisieren, garantieren and zustimmen occur both with and without dass 
when they introduce indirect speech, verbs of denial occur almost invariably with 
dass. The total size of the corpus compiled was 186,745 words, the total number of 
texts 1000 and the average length of texts was 187 words. 
A difficulty was that most of these verbs occur in indirect-speech 
constructions of the type which is of interest to us, i.e. with an embedded 
subjunctive, only in a minority of cases. For example the verb kritisieren frequently 
governs a subordinate clause with an indicative finite verb, as in (17), it may 
accompany direct speech (18), and often takes a nominal direct object, as in (19): 
 
(17)  Die  SP  kritisiert,   dass    dafür     Geld      vorhanden   war,         für  die 
 the  SP  criticizes     that    for that  money  available      was.IND   for  the 
 
vorgeschlagene Schulstarthilfe                             aber     nicht. 
proposed            aid for children starting school   but        not 
 
‘The SP criticizes that money was available for that, but not for the proposed 
aid for children starting school.’ 
(Niederösterreichische Nachrichten: 06.10.2009) 
 
(18) "Für mich  ist  die   Haltung   des     Gremiums  oft      nicht   erkennbar",  
  for  me     is   the   position   of the  committee  often  not     recognisable  
 
kritisierte er. 
 criticized he 
 
‘He made the criticism that “for me the position of the committee is often not 
recognizable”.’ 
(Rhein-Zeitung: 24.01.1997) 
 
(19) Doch  auch   inhaltlich                    kann    man   den  Plan   kritisieren. 
 but     also     in terms of contents  can      one    the   plan   criticize 
 
 ‘But one can also criticize the plan in terms of its contents.’ 
(Mannheimer Morgen: 14.04.2011) 
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Therefore after the corpus had been compiled it was necessary to discard those 
examples which were not accompanied by a subjunctive embedded clause and thus 
could not be considered to be examples of the type of indirect speech which is of 
interest to us. Other real-life examples used in this study, particularly in Chapters 2 
and 4, are taken from the original COSMAS 186,745-word corpus, i.e. before 
examples such as (17) to (19) had been removed.  
The publications which the texts in the corpus come from are St. Galler 
Tagblatt, Braunschweiger Zeitung, Burgenländische Volkszeitung, Hannoversche 
Allgemeine, Hamburger Morgenpost, Berliner Morgenpost, Mannheimer Morgen, 
Niederösterreichische Nachrichten, Nürnberger Nachrichten, Die Presse, Rhein-
Zeitung and Die Südostschweiz. They all date from the period 1990 to 2011. The 
insights of this study thus relate principally to the use of the reportative subjunctive 
in media texts rather than to other types of discourse, such as spoken German.   
 
 
1.9 Some further preliminary considerations 
 
The reader is not assumed to be familiar with the German language to any great 
degree and therefore instances of German are either translated (in the case of 
quotations from scholarly texts) or both glossed and provided with a back translation 
(in the case of examples of German in use). Glossing has been kept simple: the 
morphological form of words is indicated only in the case of subjunctive and 
indicative forms (marked S1, S2 or IND). Back translations are not intended to be 
elegant: they aim merely at giving the sense of the German original and may at 
times read as slightly unidiomatic English. In each chapter the meaning of German 
words used in the text is provided in brackets only on the first occasion when they 
occur. 
German separable verbs present a difficulty, since the denotation of such a 
verb is often different from the meaning of the constituent root and separable prefix. 
Take the following examples which involve the verb ausschließen (‘to exclude’ or ‘to 
rule out’): 
 
(20a)  Ich schließe nicht aus, dass es zu Schwierigkeiten kommen könnte. 
 ‘I do not rule out the possibility that there could be difficulties.’ 
 
(20b)  Dass es zu Schwierigkeiten kommen könnte, bleibt nicht ausgeschlossen. 
‘That there could be difficulties is still not impossible.’ 
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Now the basic meaning of the root schließen is ‘conclude’, whilst that of the 
separable prefix aus is ‘out’. Thus (20a) could be glossed as (20c): 
 
(20c) Ich  schließe    nicht  aus,  dass  es   zu  Schwierigkeiten   kommen   könnte. 
I      conclude   not     out    that   it    to    difficulties            come        could 
 
This means that in order to be consistent we would have to gloss (20b) as (20d): 
 
(20d) Dass  es  zu   Schwierigkeiten  kommen   könnte,  bleibt         nicht 
that    it    to    difficulties            come       could      remains    not 
 
ausgeschlossen. 
out-concluded 
 
But in view of the fact that ausgeschlossen here means ‘excluded’ or ‘ruled out’, the 
glossing in (20d) is awkward. Our solution is to gloss cases of separable verbs 
where the root and prefix are written together with the denotation, and in cases 
where the root and prefix are separated the root is glossed with the denotation and 
the separable prefix is glossed SP. Hence (20a) is glossed as (20e) and (20b) as 
(20f): 
 
(20e) Ich  schließe  nicht   aus,  dass  es   zu  Schwierigkeiten    kommen   könnte. 
I      exclude   not      SP   that    it     to   difficulties             come        could 
 
(20f) Dass  es  zu   Schwierigkeiten  kommen   könnte,  bleibt         nicht 
that    it    to    difficulties            come       could      remains    not 
 
ausgeschlossen. 
excluded 
 
Our definition of ‘presupposition’ provided in section 1.4 above is in bold, and 
giving definitions in bold is a convention which we shall follow throughout this study. 
A further convention that we follow is one used by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95): 
we shall assume that the speaker of an utterance is female and the hearer male. 
This convention, however, is not always followed in citations from other works when 
quoted verbatim.   
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2 
 
The German reportative subjunctive: Form 
and function 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Before we embark on a relevance-theoretic analysis of the German reportative 
subjunctive it is necessary for us to give a thorough description of the rules and 
tendencies which characterize its use in indirect speech. Our task in the first half of 
this chapter (section 2.2) will be to provide such a description. At the end of this 
section we shall take stock and identify those phenomena of the German reportative 
subjunctive for which we would expect an adequate analysis of it to account. These 
phenomena will be presented as five research questions, proposing a solution to 
which within the relevance-theoretic framework will form the focus of Chapters 4 and 
5. In the second half of this chapter (section 2.3) we shall provide a survey of some 
existing approaches to the reportative subjunctive, and shall assess the adequacy of 
each analysis against the extent to which it accounts for the various phenomena 
described at the end of section 2.2.  
 
 
2.2 The subjunctive in German indirect speech 
 
2.2.1 Subjunctive 1, subjunctive 2 and their formation 
 
The German language has a special subjunctive conjugation whose endings 
resemble those of the present indicative. The endings of both verb forms are 
presented in the following table: 
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 ind. subj. 
ich -e -e 
du -(e)st -est 
er/sie/es -(e)t -e 
wir -en -en 
ihr -(e)t -et 
Sie -en -en 
sie -en -en 
     
Table 1: The endings of the non-past indicative and subjunctive 
 
Adding the subjunctive endings to the stem of the present indicative yields the form 
to which we refer as S1 (subjunctive 1), whilst adding the same endings to the stem 
of the imperfect indicative results in S2 (subjunctive 2).  
 Due to the similarity between the endings of the subjunctive and those of the 
present-indicative conjugations, there is a large amount of syncretism between S1 
and present-indicative forms. This is particularly the case with verbs such as finden 
(‘find’), which have the ending -est in the second-person singular and -et in the 
second-person plural in both the present indicative and S1. Consequently these 
verbs have just one unambiguous S1 form: the third-person singular (unambiguous 
forms are in bold): 
 
 ind. S1 
ich finde finde 
du findest findest 
er/sie/es findet finde 
wir finden finden 
ihr findet findet 
Sie finden finden 
sie finden finden 
 
Table 2: Finden in the non-past indicative and S1 
 
There is a group of verbs that end in -et in the second-person plural present 
indicative and S1 and undergo a vowel change in the second and third-person 
singular. As a result they have unambiguous S1 forms in just these latter two 
persons. Such verbs are raten (‘guess’) and werden (‘will’/‘become’). We use 
werden as an example:  
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 ind. S1 
ich werde werde 
du wirst werdest 
er/sie/es wird werde 
wir werden werden 
ihr werdet werdet 
Sie werden werden 
sie werden werden 
 
Table 3: Werden in the non-past indicative and S1 
 
All verbs with three unambiguous forms have the ending -t in the second-
person plural indicative but -et in the corresponding S1 form. They can be divided 
into two groups: those verbs such as fahren (‘go’ (by transport)) and geben (‘give’) 
which undergo a vowel change in the second and third-person singular indicative (-
a-  -ä- and -e-  -i- respectively), and those such as haben (‘have’) and schreiben 
(‘write’) which do not. These verbs have unambiguous S1 forms in the second- and 
third-persons singular and the second-person plural. We give geben and schreiben 
as examples: 
 
 
geben schreiben 
ind. S1 ind. S1 
ich gebe gebe schreibe schreibe 
du gibst gebest schreibst schreibest 
er/sie/es gibt gebe schreibt schreibe 
wir geben geben schreiben schreiben 
ihr gebt gebet schreibt schreibet 
Sie geben geben schreiben schreiben 
sie geben geben schreiben schreiben 
 
Table 4: Geben and schreiben in the non-past indicative and S1 
 
A total of seven verbs have unambiguous S1 forms in four persons. These 
are the six modal verbs dürfen (‘be allowed to’), können (‘can’), mögen (‘may’), 
müssen (‘must’), sollen (‘should’) and wollen (‘want’), plus wissen (‘know’), which 
have unambiguous forms throughout the singular and in the second-person plural. 
These verbs are characterized by a vowel change in the three singular persons in 
the indicative. Dürfen will serve to illustrate this: 
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 ind. S1 
ich darf dürfe 
du darfst dürfest 
er/sie/es darf dürfe 
wir dürfen dürfen 
ihr dürft dürfet 
Sie dürfen dürfen 
sie dürfen dürfen 
 
Table 5: Dürfen in the non-past indicative and S1 
 
One verb has no ambiguous S1 forms: sein (‘be’): this is to be attributed to 
the fact that its S1 forms are based on the stem sei- rather than the stem of the 
present indicative: 
 
 ind. S1 
ich bin sei 
du bist sei(e)st 
er/sie/es ist sei 
wir sind seien 
ihr seid seiet 
Sie sind seien 
sie sind seien 
 
Table 6: Sein in the non-past indicative and S1 
 
The S2 conjugation of weak (i.e. regular) verbs displays complete syncretism 
with that of the imperfect tense. The S2 conjugation of strong (i.e. irregular) verbs 
often differs from that of the imperfect tense in terms of a vowel change which 
affects the stem, and often this vowel change necessitates the addition of an umlaut 
in writing. The S2 of machen (‘do’ or ‘make’) (a weak verb), kommen (‘come’) (a 
strong verb) and the auxiliaries haben (‘have’) sein and werden are conjugated as 
follows: 
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 machen kommen haben sein werden 
ich machte käme hätte wäre würde 
du machtest kämest hättest wärest würdest 
er/sie/es machte käme hätte wäre würde 
wir machten kämen hätten wären würden 
ihr machtet kämet hättet wäret würdet 
Sie machten kämen hätten wären würden 
sie machten kämen hätten wären würden 
 
Table 7: S2 forms of machen, kommen, haben, sein and werden
8
 
 
 In Chapter 1 we mentioned that S1 and S2 do not differ in terms of the 
tenses which they may express: the past, present and future tenses may be formed 
from both types of subjunctive. The tenses of the reportative subjunctive will form 
the focus of the next section. Particular attention will be paid to the relationship 
between the tense of an original utterance and that employed in the reported 
version. 
 
 
2.2.2 The tenses of the subjunctive in indirect speech. 
 
German grammars (e.g. Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 535-537) and Durrell (2011: 325)) 
state that when the reportative subjunctive is used in indirect speech, its tense will 
correspond to that used in the original utterance. The reason for this is well-known: 
the tenses of the reportative subjunctive are understood in relation to the time at 
which the original utterance was produced. In this connection, Zifonun et al. (1997) 
describe the workings of the tenses of the reportative subjunctive as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The stems of the corresponding imperfect-indicative forms of kommen, haben, sein and werden are 
kam-, hatte-, war- and wurde- respectively.   
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It is not the time at which an utterance is reported by a speaker or writer which forms 
the reference point for the temporal interpretation [of a subjunctive form], but the time 
at which the original utterance was produced […]. This reported time t’ (= the time at 
which the action denoted by the reporting verb takes place) takes over the role of the 
temporal reference point for the indirect speech from […] t0 (= the time of reporting). 
This means that t’’, the tense of the verb in the subjunctive, takes t’ as its reference 
point.
9
 
(Zifonun et al. 1997: 1778) 
 
In the remainder of this study the temporal deictic centre, or time coordinate, of the 
matrix (reporting) context will be referred to as t0, and that to which the reportative 
subjunctive’s tenses are understood to be relative will be referred to as t1.  
Because its tenses are understood in relation to the same temporal deictic 
centre to which the original speaker wished them to be understood to be relative, a 
clause whose finite verb is a reportative-subjunctive form needs to be subordinate to 
a verbum dicendi.10 The tense of this verb is needed to fix t1 (the time of the original 
utterance) in time such that the relationship of t1 to t0 (the time of reporting) is 
explicit. In the first example below, the present tense of the original utterance (1a) is 
reproduced in the reported version with a corresponding present-tense subjunctive 
form (1b). (1a) is imagined to have been uttered in the past, so the past-tense 
verbum dicendi in (1b) locates t1, to which the tense of the subjunctive form is 
understood to be relative (t0 of the original utterance (1a)), at a time anterior to t0 of 
the matrix context:  
 
(1a) [uttered in the past] 
Ich   komme         morgen     um   zehn    Uhr         an. 
I       arrive.IND    tomorrow   at     ten       o’clock    SP 
 
‘I will arrive at ten o’clock tomorrow.’ 
 
(1b) Er  sagte,   er    komme       morgen       um   zehn    Uhr       an. 
 he  said      he   arrives.S1   tomorrow     at     ten      o’clock  SP. 
 
 ‘He said he would arrive at ten o’clock tomorrow.’ 
                                                 
9
 Als Bezugszeit der temporalen Interpretation gilt nicht die Referatzeit, also die Sprechzeit des 
aktualen Sprechers/Schreibers, sondern die Ereigniszeit der referierten Rede [...]. Diese referierte Zeit 
t’ (=Ereigniszeit des referatanzeigenden Verbs) übernimmt statt [...]t0 (=Referatzeit) die Rolle des 
temporalen Bezugspunktes für die indirekte Redewiedergabe, das heißt, t”, das Tempus des Verbs im 
Konjunktiv, wird auf t’ bezogen. 
10
 Throughout this study we use ‘verbum dicendi’ as an umbrella term to refer to all the types of verb 
under which the German reportative subjunctive may be embedded felicitously.  
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Example (2a) has a perfect-tense form, hat geschrieben (‘has written’ or ‘wrote’). 
This is a periphrastic form, composed of the present-tense indicative of haben or 
sein followed by the past participle. The corresponding S1 form habe geschrieben is 
employed in the reported version, (2b). Since (2a) is imagined to be uttered in the 
future, the future-tense verbum dicendi in (2b) locates t1 at a time posterior to t0: 
 
(2a) [uttered in the future] 
Meine  Mutter       hat           die   Urlaubspläne    berücksichtigt   
 my       mother      has.IND   the    holiday plans   considered. 
 
 ‘My mother has considered the holiday plans.’ 
 
(2b) Sie    wird   hoffentlich  schreiben,   ihre   Mutter     habe        die          
            she   will     hopefully    write            her    mother    has.S1     the           
 
Urlaubspläne   berücksichtigt. 
holiday plans   considered 
 
‘She will hopefully write and say that her mother has considered the holiday 
plans.’ 
 
In (3a), the future tense form wirst lesen (‘(you) will read’) is also periphrastic: here 
the modal verb werden is inflected for the present tense indicative and accompanied 
by the infinitive. The reported version (3b) contains the corresponding S1 werde 
lesen. This present-tense verbum dicendi indicates that t1 is coterminous with t0: 
 
(3a) [uttered in the present] 
Wirst         du    das   Buch    lesen? 
 will.IND     you   the    book    read 
 
 ‘Will you read the book?’ 
 
(3b) Sie    fragt   ihn,    ob           er    das  Buch     lesen    werde. 
            she   asks   him    whether  he   the   book     read      will.S1 
 
 ‘She asks him whether he will read the book.’ 
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In German direct discourse, it is possible to use the present tense with past-
time reference as an ‘historic present’. However, since the tense of the verbum 
dicendi locates t1 at a specific time relative to t0, such instances of temporal deictic 
projection in an original utterance cannot be reproduced in the reported version. In 
example (4a), in spite of the time adverbial 49 v. Chr (‘49 B.C.’) which locates the 
time of the action in the distant past, the verb is in the present tense (example 
adapted from Zifonun et al. (1997: 1778)): 
 
(4a) Im  Jahre      49  v. Chr.  überschreitet  Caesar    den  Rubikon. 
 in   the year  49 B.C.       crosses.IND     Caesar    the   Rubicon 
 
 ‘In 49 B.C. Caesar crosses the Rubicon.’ 
 
However, if the subjunctive is used in a report of this utterance, then a perfect-
subjunctive form must be employed in the embedded clause: 
 
(4b) In  diesem  Werk  wird         berichtet,  dass  Caesar  im        Jahre  49  
in  this        work   becomes reported   that    Caesar  in the   year    49  
  
v. Chr.  den   Rubikon   überschritten   habe. 
B.C.     the    Rubicon    crossed           has.S1  
 
‘In this work it is reported that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 B.C.’ 
 
If a present-subjunctive form (which corresponds to the tense of the original 
utterance) were used, then this present tense would be understood in relation to t1 
as fixed in time by the present-tense matrix verbum dicendi. This would have the 
effect of bringing this historical event into the time of reporting, and this time would 
clash with the time adverbial im Jahre 49 v. Chr. 
The fact that an historic present in direct discourse cannot be reproduced in 
the reported version can be said to constitute an exception to the (pedagogically 
motivated) rule which states that the same tense must be employed in indirect 
speech as was used in the original utterance. There are two other situations where 
the tense employed in indirect speech does not correspond exactly to that of the 
original when the subjunctive is used. The first exception is a consequence of the 
fact that finite subjunctive forms inflect only for non-past tense. Since there is no 
synthetic subjunctive form with a past-tense meaning, the perfect subjunctive, 
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formed from the subjunctive of haben or sein as appropriate, followed by the past 
participle is used suppletively in indirect speech to report not only an original perfect 
tense, but also an original imperfect or pluperfect tense. Thus both (5a) and (5b) 
may be reported as (5c):  
 
(5a) Ich   las             das   Buch. 
 I       read.IND   the    book 
 
 ‘I read the book.’ 
 
(5b) Ich    hatte       das   Buch    gelesen. 
 I        had.IND  das   book    read 
 
 ‘I had read the book.’ 
 
(5c) Er  sagte,  er      habe       das   Buch   gelesen. 
 he  said     he     has.S1    the    book   read 
 
 ‘He said he had read the book.’ 
 
However, in spite of the fact that a single subjunctive tense corresponds to 
three indicative tenses, the subjunctive is not necessarily to be seen as temporally 
impoverished vis-à-vis the indicative in terms of the tenses that it is capable of 
forming.  
The German indicative perfect has two functions. Firstly, as in English, it is 
employed for an action which took place in the past but is still of relevance at t0. 
Secondly, it can be used in exactly the same way as the (simple) past: to refer to 
past actions which do not have relevance to the present. According to Durrell (2011: 
287) this use is more common in speech than in writing, in which latter the past is 
more common. The subjunctive perfect corresponds to the indicative perfect and as 
such, significantly, is capable of functioning as both a perfect and as a past-tense 
form. Furthermore, it would be a little short-sighted to claim that the subjunctive is 
incapable of forming a pluperfect tense. Durrell (2011: 325) draws attention to the 
fact that ‘[c]omplex pluperfect forms are sometimes used if the original direct speech 
was in the pluperfect, e.g: Sie sagte, sie habe es nicht gewusst gehabt [‘She said 
she had not known’], although he concedes that ‘[s]uch constructions are not 
considered acceptable’. Engel (1996: 421) suggests that Sie hatte das Buch gekauft 
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(‘She had bought the book’) may appear in indirect speech as Sie habe das Buch 
gekauft gehabt, but makes no comment regarding its acceptability in standard 
German. For Zifonun et al. (1997: 1780) ‘Past-in-the-past can be expressed only in 
the colloquial language of certain regions, where highly complex forms are used’.11  
The second situation where the tense used in indirect speech is not 
(necessarily) the same as that employed in the original utterance is as follows. 
Engel (1996: 421) and Durrell (2011: 325) observe that if an original present tense 
refers to the future, then it is common for the future subjunctive (with werden) to be 
used when transposing this into indirect speech. Durrell’s example (2011: 325), 
whereby (6a) may be reported as either (6b) or (6c), is as follows:  
 
(6a) Sie       heiratet         bald. 
 she      marries.IND   soon 
 
 ‘She will be getting married soon.’ 
 
(6b) Sie   sagte,  sie      heirate        bald. 
 she  said     she     marries.S1   soon 
 
 ‘She said she would be getting married soon.’ 
 
(6c) Sie   sagte, sie     werde    bald    heiraten. 
 she  said    she    will.S1    soon   marry  
 
However, for Helbig and Buscha the opposite may be the case: an original future-
tense utterance which includes werden may be reported without werden. Helbig and 
Buscha’s (1998: 199) example, whereby (7a) may be reported as (7b), is the 
following: 
 
(7a) Ich   werde      den   Roman  in   nächster  Zeit     lesen. 
 I       will.IND    the    novel     in  nearest     time    read 
 
 ‘I will read the novel soon.’ 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Mit den nur in regionaler Umgangssprache gebräuchlichen superkomponierten Formen kann 
Vorvergangenheit ausgedrückt werden. 
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(7b) Sie   hat   mir  gesagt,  sie   lese         den  Roman  in   nächster  Zeit. 
 she  has  me   said       she reads.S1  the  novel      in   nearest    time 
 
 ‘She told me she would read the novel soon.’ 
 
 All the examples of the subjunctive in indirect speech given so far have used 
S1. In the next section we shall consider some aspects of the S1-vs.-S2 opposition 
in indirect speech. 
 
  
2.2.3 Subjunctive 1 or subjunctive 2 in indirect speech? 
 
German grammars assert that S1 is used to mark indirect speech whenever its form 
is morphologically distinct from that of the present indicative. Thus in all the 
examples considered above, the S1 form is used because it is distinct from the 
corresponding indicative form: the S1 desinence is -e, whilst that of the indicative is -
t. 
If the S1 form is identical with that of the present indicative, then the so-
called ‘replacement rule’ is often applied (Hentschel and Weydt 1994: 111; Engel 
1996: 419; Zifonun et al. 1997: 1773; Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 542; Durrell 2011: 
325-326; Whittle et al 2011: 122), whereby the corresponding S2 form, which always 
differs from the present indicative, is substituted.12 Thus, since the first-person plural 
S1 form kommen (‘come’) is identical with that of the indicative, the S2 form kämen 
is often used in indirect speech: 
 
(8a) Wir   kommen     morgen      um  zehn  Uhr        an. 
  we    arrive.IND   tomorrow   at     ten     o’clock  SP 
 
 ‘We’ll arrive at ten o’clock tomorrow. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Helbig and Buscha (1998: 196) state that there are no firm rules which dictate whether an S1 or S2 
form should be chosen in a given situation, and draw attention to the fact that the replacement rule is 
not always adhered to. Jäger (1971: 130) suggests that the replacement rule is problematic, and goes 
on to remark (1971: 136) that ‘[i]f an unambiguous S1 form can be formed, this does not mean that an 
S2 form would be superfluous; the absence of the possibility of forming an S1 form does not prove that 
S2 was chosen simply because of the ambivalence in form. (‘Kann eine eindeutige Konjunktiv-I-Form 
gebildet werden, so bedeutet das nicht, daß die Setzung des Konjunktiv II überflüssig wäre; das 
Nichtvorhandensein der Möglichkeit, einen Konjunktiv I zu bilden, ist kein Beweis dafür, daß der 
Konjunktiv II allein wegen der Ambivalenz der Form gewählt wurde.‘) 
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(8b) Sie    sagten,  sie     kämen      morgen      um   zehn   Uhr         an. 
 they   said       they  arrive.S2   tomorrow   at      ten      o’clock   SP 
 
 ‘They said they would arrive at ten o’clock tomorrow.’ 
 
    The past and future tenses of S2 are formed in exactly the same way as 
those of S1, employing the S2 forms of haben, sein and werden as appropriate. (9d) 
may constitute a report of (9a), (9b) and (9c): 
 
(9a) Wir   lasen         das    Buch. 
 we    read.IND   the     book 
  
‘We read the book.’ 
 
(9b) Wir   haben        das   Buch   gelesen. 
 we    have.IND   the    book   read  
 
 ‘We read/have read the book.’ 
 
(9c) Wir  hatten     das   Buch  gelesen. 
 we   had.IND  the   book   read 
 
 ‘We had read the book.’ 
 
(9d) Sie    sagten, sie     hätten      das   Buch    gelesen. 
 they  said       they   have.S2   the    book    read 
 
 ‘They said they had read the book.’ 
 
Likewise, (10b) may be understood as a report of (10a): 
 
(10a) Wir  werden   das   Buch     lesen. 
 we   will.IND   the    book     read  
 
 ‘We shall read the book.’ 
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(10b) Sie      sagten,   sie     würden   das    Buch   lesen. 
 they     said        they  will.S2      the    book    read  
 
 ‘They said they would read the book.’ 
 
     German grammars agree that the replacement rule is also applied in the 
second-person plural since the equivalent S1 forms, although often distinct from the 
indicative, are rarely used (Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 542; Weinrich 2007: 259-260; 
Durrell 2011: 242). This also applies to the second-person singular forms (Eppert 
1988: 88; Durrell 2011: 242). According to Fabricius-Hansen, however, the second-
person singular S1 forms of wissen and the six modal verbs are used (2006: 542). 
Weinrich (2007: 290-295) essentially concurs, although according to him S2 forms 
tend to be substituted for the S1 forms of dürfen and sollen (‘should’) (dürftest and 
solltest instead of dürfest and sollest respectively).   
 
 
2.2.4 The würde construction 
 
In the case of very many strong verbs the S2 form is considered to sound stilted and 
many are held to be obsolete. Examples are beföhle (from befehlen (‘order’)), hülfe 
(from helfen (‘help’)) and verdürbe (from verderben (‘spoil’)). Although such forms 
may be encountered in formal written German, they are avoided in speech and less 
formal registers. There is also a tendency to avoid the S2 forms of weak verbs due 
to the complete syncretism between the S2 and impresent-indicative forms. For 
example, as a result of the ambiguous S2 form the following has three possible 
interpretations outside a specific context if the wenn-clause is omitted: 
 
(11) Die   Schüler             sagten, dass   sie     ihre   Hausaufgaben   machten, 
 the  schoolchildren   said       that    they   their  homework          do.S2  
 
(wenn   sie     genug      Zeit      hätten). 
   if          they  enough    time     have.S213 
 
(i) ‘The schoolchildren said that they were doing their homework.’ (if machten is 
understood as a S2 form) 
                                                 
13
 The occurrence of S2 in this wenn-clause has the function of a conditional. 
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(ii) ‘The schoolchildren said that they did their homework.’ (if machten is 
understood as an impresent-indicative form) 
(iii) ‘The schoolchildren said that they would do their homework (if they had 
enough time).’ (if machten is understood as a S2 form with the force of a 
conditional)  
 
According to the first interpretation (i), the S2 form machten has been employed in 
accordance with the replacement rule. It is therefore to be understood as non-past 
subjunctive. The second possibility (ii) is that machten is an imperfect indicative. But 
it can also be understood as a conditional (iii), which becomes the only possible 
interpretation only if the wenn-clause is added.  
One way to avoid using an obsolete or ambiguous S2 form is to employ a 
periphrastic construction consisting of würde (the S2 of werden) and an infinitive. S2 
functions chiefly as a conditional form and this is how it is most likely to be 
understood if the context provides no evidence that it is to be understood as a 
marker of indirect speech. Therefore the primary function of the würde construction 
may also be deemed to be that of a conditional. An example from Durrell (2011: 
319):14 
 
(12) Die  Europäer      wären        erleichtert,  wenn   England   wieder   
 the  Europeans    would be   relieved       if          England   again 
  
 austreten  würde. 
 pull out       would 
 
 ‘The Europeans would be relieved if England pulled out again.’ 
 
However, like S2, the würde construction also often occurs in indirect speech, and 
for Engel (1996: 422), Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 547) and Durrell (2011: 327-328) 
this is frequent in two main circumstances: when the S2 form is the same as the 
imperfect indicative or if the S2 form is obsolete. For Helbig and Buscha (1998: 191-
192) this happens if the S2 form is obsolete as well as in any case where a 
subjunctive form is the same as an indicative form (including the present indicative). 
In the following example, from Helbig and Buscha (1998: 191), the würde form has 
                                                 
14
 In what follows we shall for the sake of simplicity gloss würde as ‘would’.  
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been used because the S1 form (leben (‘live’)) falls together with the present 
indicative: 
 
(13) Sie  hat  mir  erzählt,   ihre   Eltern     würden    auf  dem  Land            leben.  
 she has  me  told         her   parents   would       on   the    countryside  live 
 
 ‘She told me her parents lived in the countryside.’ 
 
The following exemplifies the use of a würde construction in cases where the 
corresponding S2 form (begänne or begönne) is obsolete: 
 
(14a) Wann      beginnen   die   Konzerte? 
 when      begin.IND   the   concerts? 
 
 ‘When do the concerts start?’ 
 
(14b) Sie    fragte,   wann  die    Konzerte   beginnen   würden.  
 she   asked    when  the   concerts    begin           would 
 
 ‘She asked when the concerts start.’ 
 
Although the würde construction as a replacement for obsolete and 
ambiguous S2 forms is frowned upon by purists, Helbig and Buscha point out that 
‘[…] in the spoken language the preference for the würde form can be seen as a 
general tendency’15 (1998: 192), whilst Fabricius-Hansen (2006) and Durrell (2011: 
327) recognize its increasing significance in the written language:  
  
In the spoken language this development has gone so far that one can view the 
würde construction as the normal means of forming the S2 ‘present tense’ of non-
modal and non-auxiliary verbs. This change is also taking place in the written 
language.
16
 
(Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 547) 
 
                                                 
15
 […] [...] in der gesprochenen Sprache [ist] die Bevorzugung der würde-Form als eine generelle 
Tendenz zu sehen. 
16
 Diese Entwicklung ist in der gesprochenen Sprache so weit vorangeschritten, dass man die würde-
Konstruktion als die normale Realisierungsform des »Gegenwartstempus« im Konjunktiv II von 
Vollverben betrachten kann. [...] Die Entwicklung [...] [ist] auch in der Schriftsprache zu beobachten 
[...]. 
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The literature indicates that there are a few restrictions on the use of S2 and 
würde forms. Firstly, verbs vary in terms of the extent to which their würde form is 
employed. The würde form of some verbs is almost never used; their S2 form is 
employed instead in both written and spoken German. German grammars agree 
that such S2 forms are wäre (from sein), hätte (from haben), würde (from werden) 
and those of the six modal auxiliaries. Weinrich (2007: 246) adds brauchte or 
bräuchte (from brauchen (‘need’)) to this list. According to Durrell (2011: 318) käme, 
täte (from tun (‘do’)) and wüsste (from wissen) are commonly heard in speech, as 
are their equivalents with würde. For Hentschel and Weydt (1994: 114) there are 
fixed expressions such as Das würd’ ich nicht behaupten wollen (‘I wouldn’t want to 
claim that’) in which modal verbs do occur in their würde form.  
Durrell provides a list of verbs whose S2 forms and würde forms are ‘roughly 
equally frequent in written German’ (2011: 318):  
 
infinitive S2 form 
finden (‘find’) fände 
geben (‘give’) gäbe 
gehen (‘go’) ginge 
halten (‘hold’) hielte 
heißen (‘be called’) hieße 
kommen (‘come’) käme 
lassen (‘let’) ließe 
stehen (‘stand’) stünde 
tun (‘do’) täte 
wissen (‘know’) wüsste 
 
Table 8: Durrell’s verbs whose S2 and würde forms are ‘roughly equally frequent in written 
German’ 
 
Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 547) essentially agrees with this list, although her text 
omits the S2 forms of halten and heißen. Weinrich’s corresponding list includes the 
following verbs not mentioned by Durrell: säße (from sitzen (‘sit’)) verstünde (from 
verstehen (‘understand’)), läge (from liegen (‘lie’)) and nähme (from nehmen (‘take’)) 
(2007: 247).  
 The notion that the würde forms of haben and sein are hardly ever used 
entails our second restriction on the use of the construction in question: the 
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subjunctive perfect is not formed using würde in indirect speech. The following 
unacceptable example is from Helbig and Buscha (1996: 192): 
 
(15) ? Er   erzählte,  er   würde   sie     auf  der   Straße  getroffen  haben. 
   he    told          he  would     her   on    the   street   met           have 
 
 ‘He told me he met her in the street.’ 
 
 Thirdly, Engel (1996: 424) draws our attention to the fact that the semantic 
properties of a verb can influence whether it can be used felicitously in its würde 
form in indirect speech. According to Engel, the würde construction is quite 
permissible in the case of verbs with perfective meaning. Aufhören (‘stop’) is such a 
verb: 
 
(16) Sie   schreibt,  sie    würde  jetzt  mit    dem  Rauchen   aufhören. 
 she  writes      she   would   now   with  the    smoking    stop 
 
 ‘She writes that she will stop smoking.’ 
 
However, durative verbs, such as liegen are less usually employed in indirect 
speech in their würde form: 
 
(17a) ? Sie   schreibt,  sie   würde   seit      drei     Tagen   im       Bett   liegen. 
    she  writes      she  would     since   three   days     in the  bed   lie 
 
 ‘She writes that she has been in bed for three days.’ 
 
With such verbs it would be more normal to employ an S1 form: 
 
(17b) Sie schreibt, sie liege seit drei Tagen im Bett. 
 
     Finally, Engel (1996) shows how the S2 form möchte (from mögen) is so 
strongly associated with the meaning ‘would like to’ that the würde form tends to be 
substituted in indirect speech: 
 
The form möchte has to a large extent become independent of mögen in the course 
of historical development. Today it only rarely functions as the S2 of mögen; 
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essentially it has assumed the role of the present tense of mögen. Therefore one 
usually says Möchtest du mitgehen (‘Would you like to come with us?’) and not 
Magst du mitgehen? As a rule the S2 of mögen is formed using the würde 
construction.
17
 
(Engel 1996: 422) 
  
     This is perhaps the place also to mention that in indirect speech würde tends 
to be used instead of werde in order to avoid such stylistically awkward 
combinations as werden werde. Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 545) gives the example: 
 
(18a)  Er   sagt,  dass  er   später  einmal   Chefarzt               werden   würde.   
 he   says  that   he   later     once      chief physician     become   would 
 
 ‘He says that he will eventually become a chief physician.’ 
 
which is preferable to: 
 
(18b)  Er sagte, dass er später einmal Chefarzt werden werde. 
  
although the latter is perfectly grammatical. However, the problem can be neatly 
resolved by leaving out dass:18 
 
(18c)  Er sagte, er werde später einmal Chefarzt werden. 
 
 
2.2.5 ‘Unexpected’ occurrences of subjunctive 2 in indirect speech 
 
This section will be concerned with those occurrences of S2 in indirect speech 
where, according to the tendencies described in section 2.2.3 above, we would 
expect an S1 form. Thus we consider here instances of S2 even when a distinct S1 
form exists. This usage is common in spoken German (Hentschel and Weydt 1994; 
Durrell 2011) where it is an alternative to the indicative, although, according to 
                                                 
17
 Die Form möchte hat sich allerdings im Laufe der geschichtlichen Entwicklung weitgehend 
verselbständigt. Heute fungiert sie nur selten noch als Konjunktiv II von mögen; im wesentlichen hat sie 
die Rolle der Präsensformen von mögen übernommen. Gewöhnlich sagt man also Möchtest du 
mitgehen? und nicht Magst du mitgehen? Der Konjunktiv II von mögen wird dann in der Regel durch 
die Umschreibung würde mögen wiedergegeben.  
18
 In German, verbs occur at the end of a clause introduced by a subordinating conjunction such as 
dass (‘that’). If a subordinate clause is introduced by no subordinating conjunction, as in (18c), then the 
finite verb will be the second constituent of the clause, i.e. it will occupy the same position as in a main 
clause. 
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Durrell (2011: 327) ‘[…] it is often preferred when the main verb is in the past tense’. 
The following examples are from Durrell (2011: 327):  
 
(19a) Ich  komme      heute   nicht. 
 I      come.IND  today    not 
 
 ‘I won’t be coming today.’ 
 
(19b) Sie  hat    gesagt,  sie    käme          heute     nicht. 
 she has   said       she    comes.S2   today     not 
 
 ‘She said she wouldn’t be coming today.’ 
 
(20a) Ich habe          es    verstanden. 
 I     have.IND   it      understood 
 
 ‘I understood it.’ 
 
(20b) Sie  hat   gesagt,  sie    hätte       es   verstanden. 
 she has  said        she  has.S2     it     understood 
 
 ‘She said she understood it.’ 
 
(21a) Ich  werde     den  Brief   noch  heute    schreiben. 
 I      will.IND   the   letter  still     today    write  
 
 ‘I will write the letter later today.’ 
 
(21b) Sie  hat    gesagt,  sie    würde    den    Brief    noch  heute    schreiben. 
 she has    said       she  will.S2    the      letter   still     today    write 
 
 ‘She said she would write the letter later today.’ 
 
     Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 542) and Durrell (2011: 327) both make reference 
to a significant inconsistency in literary texts in the application of the standard rules 
for subjunctive usage in indirect speech. Fabricius-Hansen, for example, remarks 
that:  
 50 
 
[…] in this respect many writers behave in an extremely individual way. The way in 
which the reportative subjunctive is used has developed into a stylistic feature of 
specific genres and writers.
19
 
 (Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 542)  
 
The following (from Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 542-543) exemplifies how in literary 
texts the interplay between S1 and S2 forms may be seen merely as a stylistic 
device; there is no reason for us to suggest that the preference for one verb form 
rather than another is semantically motivated. 
  
(22) Sie   klopfte,   Albrecht  sah  sie   erst,  als       sie   an   seinem   Bett   stand. 
 she  knocked  Albrecht  saw her   only  when   she  at    his          bed    stood 
 
[…] Sie  sagte,  sie   hätte      nur   Hallo   sagen  wollen.   Sie     käme     
               she said     she  has.S2   only hello    say      wanted   she     comes.S2 
 
gerade   von    Pete. […]   Ob           sie   etwas          tun    könne     für  ihn, 
            straight  from   Pete           whether   she something   do     can.S1    for   him 
 
fragte   Margarethe.  Ob            er     etwas           brauche.    Ob             sie           
asked   Margarethe   whether    he    something   needs.S1     whether    she   
 
Manon  etwas           bestellen  sollte.  
Manon  something    order       should.S2 
 
‘She knocked, but Albrecht did not notice her until she was standing by his 
bed. She said she only wanted to say “hello” and that she said she had come 
straight from Pete. Margarethe asked if she could do anything for him. 
Whether he needed anything. Whether he wanted her to order anything for 
Manon.’  
      (M. Streeruwitz). 
 
Not only does S2 sometimes occur in cases where an S1 form might be expected, 
as in (22) above, sometimes the indicative occurs in formal written German in places 
                                                 
19
 [...] viele Autoren verhalten sich in diesem Bereich außerordentlich individualistisch. Die Verwendung 
des Indirektheitskonjunktivs hat sich in der Literatursprache zu einem genre- und autorenspezifischen 
Stilmittel entwickelt. 
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where the prescriptive tradition might call for a subjunctive. We shall consider such 
uses of the indicative in section 2.2.6. 
 
 
2.2.6 The indicative in German indirect speech 
 
There are a number of contexts where the indicative is commonly used in indirect 
speech. In colloquial German, the indicative is the norm in indirect speech (S1 and 
S2 in its replacement function are hardly ever employed) and so here the indicative 
mood is viewed as unmarked in indirect speech in spoken German. Importantly, ‘[…] 
the verb in indirect speech is usually in the tense of the original direct speech’ 
(Durrell 2011: 328), a point also made by Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 521) who 
remarks that ‘[…] indicative tenses may be used as in the corresponding direct 
speech’.20 In other words, indicative tenses in indirect speech are usually 
understood in relation to t1 as fixed relative to t0 by the matrix tense. The use of the 
indicative in indirect speech in spoken German is illustrated by the (b) examples 
below. In each case the tense of the matrix verbum dicendi fixes t1 in time in relation 
to t0: 
 
(23a) Ich  komme       morgen       um  zehn   Uhr       an. 
 I      come.IND   tomorrow    at    ten      o’clock  SP 
 
 ‘I will arrive at ten o’clock tomorrow.’ 
 
(23b) Er  sagte,  er    kommt          morgen        um  zehn  Uhr        an. 
 he  said    he    comes.IND    tomorrow     at    ten     o’clock   SP 
 
 ‘He said he would arrive at ten o’clock tomorrow. 
 
(24a) Meine  Mutter       hat           die   Urlaubspläne    berücksichtigt   
 my       mother      has.IND   the   holiday plans    considered. 
 
 ‘My mother has considered the holiday plans.’ 
 
 
                                                 
20
 […] indikativische Tempora [können] wie in der entsprechenden direkten Rede gebraucht werden. 
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(24b) Sie    wird  hoffentlich  schreiben,   ihre   Mutter     hat           die          
             she   will   hopefully    write            her    mother    has.IND    the     
       
Urlaubspläne   berücksichtigt. 
holiday plans  considered 
 
‘She will hopefully write and say that her mother has considered the holiday 
plans.’ 
 
(25a) Wirst        du    das   Buch     lesen? 
 will.IND     you  the   book      read 
 
 ‘Will you read the book?’ 
 
(25b) Sie   fragt    ihn,     ob             er    das   Buch    lesen   wird. 
             she asks    him     whether    he   the    book    read     will.IND 
 
 ‘She asks him if he will read the book.’ 
 
However, it is also possible to apply a sequence-of-tense rule. Durrell (1991) 
remarks that: 
 
[i]f the main verb is in the past tense, the verb in the subordinate clause is usually in 
the present (i.e. the tense of the original direct speech), but it may be in the past, 
with the tense shifted as in English. 
(Durrell 1991: 314) 
 
And Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 521) suggests the justification for a sequence-of-tense 
rule: ‘The simple past in the dependent clause is justified from the point of view of 
the reporter insofar as the action described took place in his past’.21 Durrell’s 
example (26b) (1991: 314) is apparently to be understood as a report of an 
utterance which resembles (26a):  
 
(26a) Ich  bin    zu   weiteren  Verhandlungen   bereit. 
 I      am    to    further     negotiations        prepared 
 
                                                 
21
 Das einfache Präteritum im abhängigen Satz ist aus der Sicht des referierenden Erzählers insofern 
berechtigt, als das beschriebene Geschehen in dessen Vergangenheit fällt. 
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 ‘I am prepared to enter into further negotiations.’ 
 
(26b) Der  Kanzler       erklärte,   dass   er   zu   weiteren  Verhandlungen  bereit 
 der  Chancellor  declared   that    he   to   further      negotiations   prepared 
 
war. 
was 
 
‘The Chancellor declared that he was prepared to enter into further 
negotiations.’ 
 
     The indicative is also common, even in written German, if indirect speech is 
introduced by the subordinating conjunction dass (‘that’), ‘[h]owever if dass is 
omitted […] then the subjunctive is regarded as obligatory in writing […]’ (Durrell 
2011: 328). This rule likely exists in order to make explicit the distinction between 
direct and indirect speech, since otherwise, as Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004: 
220) point out ‘[…] the lack of formal embedding causes an […] ambiguity: the V2 
clause might be interpreted as direct rather than indirect speech.’ 
     According to Helbig and Buscha (1998: 196) and Durrell (2011: 328-329) it is 
normal to use the indicative when a first person is involved. Below is Durrell’s 
example: 
 
(27) Er  sagte  ihr,       von    wo        ich   gekommen   bin. 
 he  said    to her  from   where   I       come            am 
 
 ‘He told her where I come from.’ 
 
Nevertheless, the following example from Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 533), in which 
the first-person singular pronoun is accompanied by an S1 form (müsse), 
demonstrates that this cannot be viewed as a hard and fast rule:  
 
(28) Ich  habe   gestern        meiner   Tochter     gesagt,   dass   ich  sie     
  I      have   yesterday    my          daughter   said        that     I     she   
 
 leider                enttäuschen      müsse.   
unfortunately    disappoint         must.S1 
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‘Yesterday I told my daughter that I would unfortunately have to give her 
some disappointing news.’ 
 
According to Helbig and Buscha and Durrell, the first-person singular indicative form 
muss would be more usual in this example.  
 
 
2.2.7 Reported speech 
 
The instances of indirect speech considered so far have all been directly 
subordinate to a matrix verb of saying, thinking, or similar. However, German 
grammars and monographs on the subjunctive make a distinction between indirect 
speech (indirekte Rede) as discussed above and reported speech (berichtete 
Rede). Petrova describes reported speech as follows: 
 
In the case of reported speech we are dealing with the fixed (obligatory) use of the 
subjunctive in a succession of indirect utterances which are dependent on an 
introductory verb, without having to repeat this verb in every sentence.
22
 
 (Petrova 2008: 136) 
 
Therefore the introductory verb on which reported speech is dependent is supplied 
by the context. Example (29) illustrates what may be described as prototypical 
reported speech. The location in time of t1 relative to t0 needs to be made explicit. 
Therefore the reported speech (underlined) is understood as subordinate to the 
same matrix clause (sagte der Staatsanwalt (‘said the public prosecutor’)) to which 
the closest instance of indirect speech to the left is subordinate. It is the tense of this 
matrix verb which makes the relationship of t1 to t0 explicit: 
 
(29) Einen Tag  später  sei       sie     ins          Koma  gefallen,   sagte  der  
one    day   later     is.S1    she   into the   coma   fallen        said    the 
 
Staatsanwalt.         Daraus      sei       sie    im       Januar    erwacht.   Sie  
 public prosecutor  out of that   is.S1    she   in the  January  awoken    she 
 
                                                 
22
 […] [Es] handelt [...] sich bei der berichteten Rede um den festen (obligatorischen) Gebrauch des 
Konjunktivs in einer Aufeinanderfolge von indirekten Äußerungen, die von einem redeeinleitenden Verb 
abhängig sind, ohne dass dieses Verb notwendigerweise in jedem Satz wiederholt wird. 
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könne     bis      heute    nur     noch   verschwommen   sehen   und    sei 
 can.S1     up to  today    only    still     blurred                  see      and    is.S1 
 
vom           Hals   abwärts         gelähmt. 
from the    neck   downwards    paralyzed 
 
‘The next day she fell into a coma, said the public prosecutor. [He said that] 
she awoke from it in January. [He said that] today her vision is still blurred 
and that she is paralyzed from the neck downwards.’ 
(Mannheimer Morgen: 28.09.2004) 
 
However, as suggested by the next example (taken from Pütz (1994: 33)), the 
nature of the introductory verb on which the reported speech is dependent is not 
always so obvious from a casual glance:      
 
(30) Im   Kunartal         östlich    von  Kabul   sollen    sie    die     Felder  mit     
the  Kunar Valley  east       of     Kabul   should   they  the    fields    with  
  
ätzenden Chemikalien   unfruchtbar  gemacht,   Bewässerungsgräben   
corrosive chemicals      infertile          made,        irrigation canals            
    
planiert    und  Schafherden        mit    Maschinengewehren   niedergemäht    
 levelled   and   herds of sheep    with   machine guns             mown down 
 
haben.  20 Jahre   werde    es  dauern   bis     im       Kunartal   wieder   
     have     20 years   will.S1     it   last         until   in the  Kunartal   again     
  
 Menschen   leben   könnten. 
 people         live      can.S2 
 
‘In the Kunar Valley to the east of Kabul the fields are said to have been 
made infertile by corrosive chemicals, irrigation canals have been levelled 
and herds of sheep are said to have been mown down by machine guns. [It 
is said that] it will be twenty years before people can live in the Kunar Valley 
again.’ 
(Spiegel 1981(10)) 
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Sollen in the first sentence has in this context the meaning of ‘it is said that’, and this 
is understood as the introductory matrix clause on which the instance of reported 
speech is dependent. 
Something corresponding to reported speech can also be distinguished in 
spoken German since S2 ‘[…] tends to be used if there is a longer stretch of indirect 
speech covering more than one sentence’ (Durrell 2011: 327). Durrell’s example: 
 
(31)   Er  sagt,   er   hat   eben  einen neuen    Wagen gekauft.  Der  hätte      über  
            he  says   he  has  just    a        new        car       bought    it      has.S2    over  
 
80 000 Euro   gekostet  und    hätte      eine      Klimaanlage. 
          80,000 Euro   cost         and    has.S2    an         air conditioning unit 
 
‘He said he had just bought a new car. [He said] it cost over 80,000 Euro and 
has air conditioning.’ 
 
The second sentence is understood to be subordinate to the er sagt (‘he says’) 
which introduces the first instance of indirect speech.  
Thus reported speech requires a hearer to recover a matrix clause whose 
tensed verbum dicendi supplies t1 with a location in time relative to t0. In other 
words, the hearer is required to understand that a matrix verbum dicendi is implied, 
and this fact prompts Jäger (1971: 33) to suggest that reported speech is elliptical.   
We conclude this section on reported speech by mentioning examples of 
what Fabricius-Hansen (2002, 2006) terms Übergangsformen, i.e. cases which are 
intermediate between indirect speech and reported speech. In such cases, the 
matrix clause does not introduce the reported proposition, which is the case in more 
conventional indirect speech; rather this clause is either postposed, as in example 
(32), or interposed, as in (33). Both examples are taken from Fabricius-Hansen 
(2002: 22). In these examples the matrix clause, rather than the reported 
proposition, is underlined: 
 
(32) Gut     durchdachte         Konzepte  zur       Abfallmeidung    seien     bereits 
     good   thought-through   concepts   to the   avoiding waste   are.S1    already 
 
 vorhanden,  würden        aber  nicht   umgesetzt,              sagte   Roland
 available      become.S1  but    not      put into practice      said     Roland  
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 Schnell  von    der  Gruppe  Müllnetz. 
 Schnell  from  the  group     Müllnetz 
 
‘Well thought-through concepts for avoiding waste are already available but 
have not been put into practice, said Roland Schnell from the group 
Müllnetz.’ 
 
(33) Das  Unbehagen  an  der   CDU,  schreibt  Peter Basilius  Streithofen  in 
 the   discontent    on  the   CDU   writes      Peter Basilius  Streithofen  in 
 
 seinem   neuen  Buch    über     den  Niedergang  der        Kanzlerpartei, 
 his          new      book   about    the   decline         of the    Chancellor Party 
 
 lasse           sich   nicht   “durch       das  hektische    Hin- und Heragieren 
 allows.S1    itself   not       through    the  frantic         acting here and there 
  
des       Wolfgang  Schäuble   beseitigen”. 
 of the    Wolfgang  Schäuble   eliminate 
 
‘Discontent with the CDU, writes Peter Basilius Streithofen in his new book 
about the decline of the Chancellor Party, cannot be eliminated “by Wolfgang 
Schäuble’s frantic political zigzagging”.’   
 
Example (32) initially reads as conventional reported speech since, in spite of the 
lack of an opening matrix verbum dicendi, the reader encounters an S1 form. 
Example (33) is perhaps closer to conventional indirect speech – the verbum dicendi 
occurs before the S1 form – but because the verbum dicendi is not in sentence-
initial position, this example should also be considered an Übergangsform. 
 
 
2.2.8 What types of verb may function as verba dicendi? 
 
In German, a wide range of verbs may introduce indirect speech. On the one hand 
there are verba dicendi as sagen (‘say’), berichten (‘report’), mitteilen (‘inform’ or 
‘announce’), ankündigen (‘announce’) flüstern (‘whisper’) and schreien (‘shout’), all 
of which indicate that the purported original utterance was articulated, i.e. made 
‘public’ through some means. On the other hand, indirect speech may be introduced 
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by verbs which denote mental processes, such as denken (‘think’), glauben 
(‘believe’) hoffen (‘hope’) and meinen (‘think’). Verbs in this latter group do not 
explicitly indicate that the original utterance was actually articulated.  
 Many verba dicendi are non-factive and thus typically introduce indirect 
speech which exhibits the property indirectness as defined in the Introduction, 
regardless of whether an indicative or subjunctive form is embedded under them. 
There are, however, some essentially factive verbs23 which are understood to 
introduce indirect speech with the property indirectness, i.e. they are understood 
non-factively, if the verb of their subordinate clause is analyzable as a reportative-
subjunctive form.24 Such verbs, which are mentioned Jäger (1971), Wichter (1978), 
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) and Fabricius-Hansen (2006), include verbs of 
emotional attitude, such as sich ärgern (‘be angry’), bedauern (‘regret’) and sich 
freuen (‘be glad’). The following example is taken from Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 
(2004: 214): 
 
(34) Das  Gericht  bedauerte,  dass   es   nicht   ermächtigt    sei,     ein  
 the   court      regretted     that    it     not      empowered  is.S1   a 
 
 Berufsverbot  zu   verhängen. 
 work ban        to    issue 
 
‘The court regretted (i.e. said or announced with regret) that it did not have 
the authority to issue a work ban.’  
 
When they function as verba dicendi, the tense of these verbs, like that of more 
conventional verba dicendi, locates t1 in time in relation to t0. 
Other factive verbs which introduce indirect speech that displays indirectness 
when a reportative subjunctive is embedded under them include kritisieren 
(‘criticize’) and loben (‘praise’); such verbs are mentioned in Fabricius-Hansen 
(2006: 539) and are the subject of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s 2011 paper 
‘Behabitive reports’. The example below has been (slightly) adapted from Fabricius-
Hansen (2006: 539): 
 
                                                 
23
 It will be remembered from Chapter 1 that we follow Huddleston and Pullum in considering a factive 
verb to be one whose ‘[…] content clause complement is normally presupposed […]’ (Huddleston and 
Pullum 2002: 1008). 
24
 As we suggested in the Introduction, a subjunctive form may generally be considered to be 
reportative in cases where it occurs in an embedded clause and contextual considerations do not 
suggest a function other than marking indirect speech. 
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(35) Einstein  kritisierte   energisch,  dass  Bohr  voreilig           die   
 Einstein  criticized   energetic    that    Bohr  prematurely   the  
 
Erhaltungssätze          und   damit   die  Kausalität   aufgegeben  habe.  
 laws of conservation   and   with it   the  causality    abandoned    have.S1 
  
‘Einstein voiced with conviction the criticism that Bohr abandoned the laws of 
conversation and with them causality prematurely.’ 
 
These considerations provide evidence that indirectness along with 
concomitant non-presupposition of the embedded proposition is a consistent 
property of indirect speech whose embedded finite verb is a reportative-subjunctive 
form. As such it contrasts with indirect speech with an embedded indicative. The 
latter will be understood to exhibit indirectness if the matrix verb is non-factive. If, 
however, the matrix verb is understood factively then the indirect speech will not 
possess the property indirectness. 
On the other hand, there are many factive verbs, such as entschuldigen 
(‘excuse), vergessen (‘forget’), verstehen (‘understand’) and wissen (‘know’) under 
which an embedded subjunctive is ungrammatical. An example from Eisenberg 
(2004: 117): 
 
(36) Karl  versteht       / vergißt  / entschuldigt /  weiß,      daß   Egon   bleiben  
 Karl  understands/ forgets /  excuses     /   knows     that   Egon   stay 
 
will (*wolle). 
wants.IND (S1) 
 
‘Karl understands/forgets/excuses/knows that Egon wants to stay.’ 
 
 
2.2.9 Verbs of denial and the German reportative subjunctive  
 
There is one environment where the frequent occurrence of the German reportative 
subjunctive is in our view anomalous: clauses which are subordinate to verbs which 
indicate that the embedded proposition is held to be untrue by the matrix subject. 
German examples are ableugnen, abstreiten, bestreiten, dementieren, leugnen and 
verneinen, all of which have their own nuances but essentially correspond to the 
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English verb ‘deny’. We therefore refer to them using the term verbs of denial. The 
embedding of the subjunctive under such verbs has received little attention in the 
literature: to our knowledge it is mentioned only by Kaufmann (1976), Fabricius-
Hansen and Sæbø (2004), Schwager (2010) and they are the subject of Lilley 
(2012).  
In the case of indirect speech where the matrix verb is not a verb of denial, 
the semantics of the matrix verb does not contradict the polarity of the embedded 
proposition. Thus (37a) constitutes an accurate report of (37b): the original speaker 
uttered something that resembles Der neue Zug ist noch gar nicht ausreichend 
gestestet worden (‘The new train has not yet been sufficiently tested at all’) and she 
is reported as having said this: 
 
(37a) Der  «SonntagsBlick»  berichtete    in  seiner   letzten   Ausgabe, dass  der 
The   SonntagsBlick     reported      in  its         latest      edition     that   the 
 
neue  Zug   aber  noch   gar    nicht   ausreichend  getestet  worden    sei. 
 new   train  but     yet     at all  not      sufficient        tested     become   is.S1 
 
‘The SonntagsBlick reported in its latest edition that the new train has not yet   
been sufficiently tested at all.’ 
(Die Südostschweiz: 09.06.2009) 
 
(37b)   Der  neue  Zug   ist   noch   gar     nicht  ausreichend   getestet    worden. 
  the   new   train  is    yet      at all   not     sufficient        tested       become 
 
 ‘The new train has not yet been sufficiently tested at all.’ 
 
However, the matrix verb of denial in (38a) below indicates that the matrix subject 
considers the subordinate proposition to be untrue; the matrix subject is thus not 
understood to have uttered the embedded proposition herself. Therefore (38a) 
cannot be said to constitute a report of an utterance which resembles (38b) in terms 
of its propositional content in the same way that (37a) is understood as a report of 
an utterance which resembles (37b): 
 
(38a) Uhde  verneint   aber,  dass    eine   Prüfung    der       Räume  durch      die 
Uhde  denies      but     that     a        check       of the   rooms    through   the 
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  Heimaufsicht           der       Stadt   stattgefunden     habe.  
 home supervision    of the   town    took place          have.S1 
 
‘But Uhde denies that the rooms have been checked by the local authority.’  
(Braunschweiger Zeitung: 26.02.2009) 
 
(38b) Eine  Prüfung  der      Räume  durch      die  Heimaufsicht         der      Stadt 
 a       check      of the  rooms   through   the home supervision  of the   town 
 
hat   stattgefunden. 
 has  taken place 
 
 ‘The rooms have been checked by the local authority.’ 
 
Thus, when the matrix verb is a verb of denial, the relationship between the 
embedded proposition and the matrix verb differs from the equivalent relationship 
when the superordinate verb is a verbum dicendi such as berichten or sagen. 
In spite of these considerations, instances of the subjunctive when 
embedded under these verbs are clearly instances of the reportative subjunctive, 
and evidence for this is provided by the following example:  
 
(39) Vehement  dementierte  er,  dass  seine MDC  in  Botswana  oder  sonstwo 
 vehement  denied           he  that   his      MDC  in  Botswana  or     elsewhere 
 
in  Afrika  Militärausbildungslager  unterhalte    und  einen  gewaltsamen 
 in  Africa  military training camps   supports.S1  and  a         violent 
 
Sturz           des      Mugabe-Regimes  anstrebe,   wie  es   von  dessen  
overthrow   of the   Mugabe regime     aims at.S1   as    it    of     its 
 
Propaganda  behauptet  wird.         Die  MDC   sei      eine   demokratische 
 propaganda  claimed      becomes  the   MDC  is.S1   a         democratic  
 
Bewegung,  die       ihre   politischen  Ziele  auf  friedlichem  Wege  
 movement   which   its     political       aims  on   peaceful       way  
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verfolge. 
pursues.S1 
 
‘He [Morgan Tsvangirai] denied vehemently that his MDC party supports 
military training camps in Botswana or elsewhere in Africa and that he is 
planning to overthrow Mugabe regime in a violent fashion, as Mugabe’s 
propaganda claims. [He went on to say that] the MDC is a democratic 
movement that pursues its political aims peacefully.’ 
(St. Galler Tagblatt: 20/01/2009) 
 
Furthermore, the reportative nature of the construction verb of denial + subjunctive 
in (39) is such that er dementierte at the beginning renders the subsequent reported 
speech (which begins Die MDC sei eine demokratische Bewegung) pragmatically 
acceptable: both have the same subject (er, which refers to Morgan Tsvangirai). 
However, the verbum-dicendi under which the reported speech needs to be 
understood to be embedded will not be a verb of denial: Tsvangirai is understood to 
have said that ‘the MDC is a democratic movement that pursues its political aims 
peacefully’, rather than denied this. 
 Kaufmann (1976) and Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) both provide an 
analysis of cases where the subjunctive is embedded under a verb of denial which 
differs to some extent from the analysis that they provide for other verba dicendi. For 
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø, what differs is how the ‘semantically uniform’ 
reportative presupposition that the reportative subjunctive in their view carries is 
accommodated (see section 2.3.5 below). Kaufmann (1976) suggests that when the 
verbum dicendi is a verb of denial, the matrix subject is presented as denying that a 
proposition attributed to somebody else is true: 
 
If the inquit contains a verb like […] bestreiten, in Abrede stellen [‘deny’ or ‘dispute’], 
leugnen, ableugnen, then speaker S2 indicates that speaker S1 […] denies the 
content of an utterance produced by speaker S0.
25
 
(Kaufmann 1976: 88) 
 
Thus in (38a) above (repeated below), S0 (whose identity is not explicitly stated) is 
understood to have uttered a proposition which resembles (38b) in terms of its 
                                                 
25
 Enthält die Redeeinleitung Verben wie […] bestreiten, in Abrede stellen, leugnen, ableugnen, so 
erwähnt der Sprecher S2, daß ein Sprecher S1 den Inhalt der Äußerung eines Sprechers S0 […] 
bestritt. ‘Inquit’ is the term which Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) use to refer to the element which 
introduces indirect speech. 
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propositional content. S1, i.e. Uhde, has then denied this proposition. In (38a) S2, 
i.e. the reporter, says that Uhde denied (38b):  
 
(38a)  Uhde verneint, dass eine Prüfung der Räume durch die Heimaufsicht der 
Stadt stattgefunden habe.  
(38b) Eine Prüfung der Räume durch die Heimaufsicht der Stadt hat stattgefunden. 
 
 
2.2.10 The reportative subjunctive and the expression of reporter attitudes 
 
Scholars of the German language have often suggested that the reporter’s choice of 
mood (S1, S2 or indicative) indicates the attitude towards the embedded proposition 
that she intends to convey. Russ (1994: 209-210) provides a brief survey of some 
authorities who have held such views. According to him, the view is put forward by 
Flämig (1959: 56), Helbig and Buscha (1974: 165) and is expressed in earlier 
editions of DUDEN, i.e. those up to and including the third edition of 1973. This view 
is also accepted by Jäger (1970: 24, 1971: 172) who ‘[…] discusses these cases in 
detail’ and suggests that S2 may be used ‘[…] to express distancing on the part of 
the speaker’ (Russ 1994: 209). Russ finishes by pointing out that such views are no 
longer accepted, and remarks that: 
 
[t]he difficulty here is that a linguistic variant has been taken up by prescriptive 
grammarians and a distinction, possibly an artificial one, made and taught. This 
could then, in turn, influence linguistic usage.  
(Russ 1994: 209-210) 
 
For Durrell (2011) S1 is chiefly used in indirect speech in order to ‘[…] 
indicate that we are simply reporting what someone else said, without committing 
ourselves to saying whether we think it is true or not’ (2011: 326). In general, 
however, he does not recognize a semantic distinction between the indicative, S1 
and S2 in indirect speech. Ultimately, the choice between these verb forms is 
determined ‘[…] not by meaning, but by register, stylistic considerations and norms 
of usage […]’ (2011: 329). The function which Durrell assigns to the reportative 
subjunctive in indirect speech is essentially the same as that of Zifonun et al. (1997), 
with their claim that the reporter’s attitude to a reported proposition with the property 
indirectness can be summed up as ‘I, B, say that A says that P, but I leave open 
whether I say that P’ (1997: 1762).  
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However, this (in our view correct) default attitude does not preclude the 
possibility of (both forms of) the subjunctive and the indicative being compatible with 
any attitude towards the embedded proposition that the reporter might wish to imply 
contextually. In support of this statement we provide an example in which the 
reporter can be said to consider the embedded propositions to be false. In this 
example the hearer is told that the original speakers are tricksters who lie in order to 
be allowed into people’s homes: 
  
(40)  [CONTEXT] Mainz police are warning people of tricksters who pretend to be 
police officers in order to gain access to other people’s homes. The most 
recent victim was an 86-year-old woman who was spoken to by two men in 
Parcus Street, just before 17:50 on Tuesday.26 
 
  Die   falschen  Polizisten           gaben an,   in  ihre  Wohnung  sei 
  the   false        police officers     stated         in  her   flat            is.S1 
 
  eingebrochen  worden   und   sie     müssten   feststellen,  was    gestohlen 
  broken in         become  and   they   must.S2     establish     what   stolen 
   
  worden     sei. 
  become    is.S1 
 
‘The bogus police officers stated that her flat had been broken into and that 
they must establish what had been stolen.’ 
 (Rhein-Zeitung: 06.05.1999) 
 
 In summary, both S1 and S2 in indirect speech possess in our view the 
same semantic potential: they are both compatible with the contextual implication of 
any reporter attitude.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Die Mainzer Polizei warnt vor Trickdieben, die sich als Polizeibeamte ausgeben und sich so Eintritt in 
fremde Wohnungen verschaffen.Jüngstes Opfer war eine 86-jährige Frau, die am Dienstag gegen 
17.50 Uhr in der Parcusstraße von zwei Männern angesprochen wurde. 
 65 
 
2.2.11 What should be expected of a comprehensive account of the German 
reportative subjunctive? 
 
The foregoing considerations suggest that there are a number of phenomena for 
which a fully adequate analysis of the German reportative subjunctive needs to 
account. However, before we consider these phenomena, we need to describe 
some (relatively) uncontroversial assumptions which can be gleaned from the above 
account of the reportative subjunctive in indirect speech and on which a 
comprehensive account of this verb form needs to be predicated. 
Firstly, the reportative subjunctive has an arguably fully developed tense 
system. The only difference between the tense system of the indicative and that of 
the subjunctive is that the former possesses a (simple) past. Semantically, however 
the past is comparable to the perfect tense, the chief distinction between the two 
forms being stylistic: the past tense is more common in written German whilst the 
perfect is generally preferred in speech (Durrell 2011: 287). It is true that for the 
formation of one tense of the German indicative – the pluperfect – the past tense is 
necessary; this tense is composed of the past of haben and the past participle. 
However, we saw above that it is possible to form a pluperfect-subjunctive form 
such as Sie sagte, sie habe es nicht gewusst gehabt (‘She said she had not 
known’). Significantly, the restrictions on the occurrence of this form appear to be 
stylistic rather than semantic. Thus the German reportative subjunctive is ultimately 
capable of expressing exactly the same temporal relations as the indicative. 
Secondly, in spite of a great deal of variation in descriptive grammars 
regarding the use of mood in indirect speech, there is in practice little, if any, 
difference in function and meaning between the different subjunctive forms. If we 
accept that the ‘replacement rule’ is undermined by the notion that S2 frequently 
occurs where we might expect an S1 form, there seem to be only two restrictions 
regarding the subjunctive form that can be used in indirect speech, and these both 
concern würde forms. On the one hand there is the semantically motivated 
exclusion of the würde construction from reporting duratives (e.g. example (17a) 
above: ? Sie schreibt, sie würde seit drei Tagen im Bett liegen). On the other hand 
the S2 form of some verbs is preferred over the würde periphrasis. For example the 
S2 forms wäre and hätte are always used instead of würde sein and würde haben, 
as a result of which the subjunctive perfect is not formed using würde in indirect 
speech (e.g. example (15) above: ? Er erzählte, er würde sie auf der Straße 
getroffen haben). Other preferences, for example for the use of the würde form 
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instead of certain obsolete and obsolescent S2 forms, are arguably stylistically 
motivated. 
Thirdly, the tenses of the reportative subjunctive are always understood in 
relation to t1 and the relation of this to t0 is made explicit by the tense of the matrix 
verbum dicendi. In the case of indirect speech this verbum dicendi is explicitly 
encoded, whilst in that of reported speech it is supplied by the context. Because the 
tense of the verbum dicendi locates t1 at a specific point in time, the subjunctive is 
infelicitous if t1 clashes with a time adverbial, e.g. in cases of temporal deictic 
projection. 
Fourthly, all German indirect speech whose embedded finite verb is in the 
reportative subjunctive exhibits the property indirectness, i.e. the matrix verb is 
understood to be non-factive which means that the embedded proposition is not 
presupposed. Importantly, this does not mean that the subjunctive is excluded from 
any clause which is subordinate to a factive verb: some verbs, such as kritisieren 
and bedauern, are understood to be non-factive when the embedded verb is 
subjunctive. Thus the reportative subjunctive allows these verbs to introduce indirect 
speech with the property indirectness, like non-factive verba dicendi.  
Fifthly, we have seen that the reportative subjunctive may be embedded 
under verbs of denial, which we consider to be interesting because the reporter 
cannot be understood to be reporting the embedded proposition in the same way 
she does when the verbum dicendi is a verb such as sagen.  
Finally, the reportative subjunctive is used not only to indicate that the 
reporter wishes to withhold his opinion regarding whether the embedded proposition 
is true or false: it is compatible with any attitude that the reporter may wish to imply 
contextually towards the reported proposition. Evidence for this is provided by 
example (40) where we suggested that it can be inferred that the reporter holds the 
reported propositions to be untrue. 
This puts us in a position to enumerate those phenomena for which an 
adequate analysis of the German reportative subjunctive should, in our view, 
account. We present these phenomena in the form of five questions which this study 
ultimately seeks to address.  
Firstly, what is the precise nature of the German reportative subjunctive vis-
à-vis the indicative? How do we account for the fact that the German reportative 
subjunctive is restricted to indirect speech with the property indirectness, where its 
tenses are understood in relation to t1, even, as in the case of reported speech, if 
there is no explicit matrix clause? After all, the reportative subjunctive has, as we 
have suggested, a tense system which is as rich as that of the indicative. 
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Secondly, we might expect the fact that all reportative-subjunctive indirect 
speech displays the property indirectness to imply that the subjunctive is restricted 
to clauses which are subordinate to non-factive verba dicendi. However, the 
subjunctive has the effect of ensuring that some factive verbs (kritisieren, bedauern) 
are understood non-factively: the subjunctive thus allows them to introduce indirect 
speech with the property indirectness. Thus a fully adequate analysis of the 
subjunctive will account for this phenomenon in plausible terms.  
Thirdly, an adequate account of the German reportative subjunctive will 
account for the fact that it may be embedded under verbs of denial. Ideally, such 
cases will turn out not be be remarkable after all: the same principle which accounts 
for the occurrence of the reportative subjunctive in clauses which are subordinate to 
‘conventional’ verba dicendi will also explain its occurrence in clauses embedded 
under verbs of denial. 
 We observed in section 2.2.7 that in the case of reported speech a matrix 
clause needs to be constructed whose tense makes the relationship of t1 to t0 
explicit. However, we did not consider how a hearer does so. In example (29) above 
identifying the clause is a relatively straightforward process, but this cannot be said 
of example (30), where it is, on closer inspection, an instance of sollen which 
provides the necessary clue. Thus, in our view, a comprehensive account of the 
German reportative subjunctive will explain in plausible terms the mechanism a 
hearer deploys in recovering the ellipsed matrix clause. This nature of this 
mechanism forms the focus of our fourth question. 
Finally, a fully adequate account of the reportative subjunctive will recognize 
the circumstance that the subjunctive is compatible with any interpretive stance that 
the reporter may hold towards the reported proposition, and will also consider how 
this stance is recovered. 
The account of the German reportative subjunctive given in Chapter 3 and 
developed in Chapter 4 will show how the theory described in the next chapter, 
relevance theory, provides a framework within which a comprehensive analysis of 
the reportative subjunctive can be conducted. Importantly, relevance theory enables 
us to provide plausible answers to the five questions given above. The remainder of 
this chapter will comprise a review of some previous accounts of the reportative 
subjunctive.   
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2.3 The use and function of the subjunctive in indirect speech: Some existing 
views 
 
2.3.1 Introductory remarks 
 
In this section we shall look at the work of a number of authorities and shall consider 
their views regarding the use and function of the subjunctive in indirect speech. 
Firstly we shall consider the early ‘classics’, Flämig (1959) and Jäger (1971). This 
will be followed by a look at what contemporary grammars and reference works 
have to say: the texts we shall consider are Zifonun et al. (1997) Helbig and Buscha 
(1998), Fabricius-Hansen’s (2006) account in the seventh edition of the DUDEN 
grammar, Whittle et al. (2011) and Durrell (2011). We shall then review three texts 
which investigate questions of (non-)factivity: Thieroff (1992), Eisenberg 
(1986/2004) and Diewald (1999). Finally, we shall consider the semantic approach 
of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004). For each authority, an assessment will be 
provided of the extent to which the analysis provided is in our view adequate. As a 
yardstick to measure this adequacy we shall use, where appropriate, the extent to 
which it provides a plausible solution to the questions we posed in section 2.2.11.  
 
 
2.3.2 The early classics: Flämig (1959) and Jäger (1971) 
 
We shall suggest quite a lot of problems and shortcomings in the accounts of Flämig 
(1959) and Jäger (1971). However, they are included here for two reasons. Firstly, 
they enjoy a status as relative classics within the literature on the German 
subjunctive and have been cited regularly by other authors. Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, their influence, particularly with regard to the meanings that have 
been ascribed to S1 and S2, can be felt in many works which were subsequently 
written, including some that are mentioned in this chapter. 
  
 
2.3.2.1 Flämig (1959) 
 
A relatively early work is Flämig’s 1959 study Zum Konjunktiv in der deutschen 
Sprache der Gegenwart. The significance of this text lies in Flämig’s endeavour to 
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provide an ‘assessment of the meanings of the different moods in current German’27  
(1959: 3). To this end, Flämig bases his study on a selection of ‘[…] particularly 
interesting cases […] which will prove to be useful in accounting for the multi-layered 
modal system’28  (1959: 2). Flämig’s corpus is based on texts from the period 1896-
1947 (relatively recent at the time), ‘[…] which means that current intuitions about 
language are sufficient for its interpretation’29 (1959: 3). The corpus consists for the 
most part of the novels and short stories of Thomas Mann, and Flämig investigates 
both written and spoken standard German.  
Central to Flämig’s claims is the distinction he makes between subjunctive 
use that is determined by the linguistic system (systembedingt) and subjunctive use 
that is determined by the communicative situation (situationsbedingt) (1959: 171). 
S1 is considered to be the ‘normal mood’ (Normalmodus) in indirect speech, as is 
S2 in those cases where S1 and the indicative are identical in form; such uses of S1 
and S2 are said to be systembedingt. The corresponding use of these forms in 
reported speech (in the sense described in section 2.2.7 above) is also considered 
to be systembedingt, since in such cases the subjunctive is the only means of 
making explicit that an utterance is reported. In cases where the use of S1 (and S2 
as a replacement form) is systembedingt, it is held by Flämig to express: ‘[...] a 
generally indirect statement of the speaker: without guarantee’30 (1959: 55).   
Deviations from the above tendencies, for example the use of S2 or an 
indicative form in cases where an S1 form is expected are considered by Flämig to 
be situationsbedingt. For instance, ‘S2 indicates indirect speech alongside a 
speaker attitude of rejection’31 (1959: 57), and Flämig gives the following example of 
this:  
  
(41) Er   sagte,    er    tränke       Petroleum.  
 he   said      he    drinks.S2   paraffin  
 
 ‘He said he drank paraffin.’ 
 
Here the use of S2, as opposed to S1, supposedly indicates that the speaker does 
not believe that the original speaker really drinks paraffin. Flämig also considers 
                                                 
27
 ‘die Feststellung der heute geltenden Modusinhalte’. 
28
 ‘[…] besonders interessante Fälle […], die sich für die Darstellung des geschichteten Modussystems 
als fruchtbar erweisen’. 
29
 ‘[…] so daß es vom lebendigen Sprachgefühl her interpretiert werden kann’. 
30
 ‘eine allgemein mittelbare Stellungnahme des Sprechers: Ohne Gewähr’. 
31
 ‘Der Konj. II bezeichnet die mittelbare Wiedergabe, verbunden mit der ablehnenden Stellungnahme 
des Sprechers. 
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subjunctive use to be situationsbedingt in cases where the matrix verbum dicendi is 
in the present tense. In such cases, Flämig claims that the indicative is the 
Normalmodus, and a subjunctive form indicates that the reporter’s attitude to the 
reported proposition is one of rejection (ablehnende Stellungnahme) (1959: 70).  
     An obvious problem with Flämig’s analysis is the fact that he bases his 
study, which is intended to encompass both written and spoken German, on a 
corpus of works by Thomas Mann. Thus the result is, at best, a study specifically of 
Thomas Mann’s use of the subjunctive. At worst, it does not even provide profitable 
insights into that, since the functions he assigns to subjunctive forms in different 
situations, both systembedingt and situationsbedingt, appear to be based on his 
own individual intuitions rather than rigorous empirical investigation. This is 
particularly noticeable, for example, in the case of the meaning ablehnende 
Stellungnahme which he projects on to S2 forms where S1 is expected, and on to 
S1 where an indicative form is expected, i.e. when the superordinate verbum dicendi 
is present tense. In the absence of access to a given author’s own thoughts it is 
impossible to see how it can be proven that she intended through her decision to 
use, say, S2 instead of S1 to express such-and-such an attitude to the reported 
proposition.  
To what extent does Flämig address the questions posed above in section 
2.2.11? Flämig’s aim was to identify the essential semantic content of S1 and that of 
S2, and he was driven in this aim partly by the need he perceived to improve on the 
accounts of the German subjunctive which existed at the time. We would thus 
perhaps not be justified in criticizing Flämig for the fact that his analysis does not 
suggest why the subjunctive is restricted to indirect and reported speech where its 
tenses are understood only in relation to t1, does not acknowledge or account for the 
effect of the subjunctive when embedded under certain factive verbs, and does not 
consider the fact that the subjunctive may occur in clauses which are subordinate to 
verbs of denial. 
Flämig does, however, address in a sense the question of the attitudes that a 
reporter may hold towards a reported proposition. But, in suggesting specific modal 
nuances for S1 and S2, he undermines the role played by context: he sees the 
expression of different attitudes as the task of the verb form chosen rather than 
contextual features.  
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2.3.2.2 Jäger (1971) 
 
Another important text is Jäger’s 1971 study Der Konjunktiv in der deutschen 
Sprache der Gegenwart. He states his aims as follows: 
 
              (1) to show the distribution of subjunctive forms,  
              (2) to determine the syntactic meaning of subjunctive 1 and subjunctive 2 vis-à-
vis the indicative. Therefore the main question concerns […] how it is that 
two sentences, which apart from the difference in mood are completely 
identical, are different in meaning and also, of course, whether they are 
different in meaning.
32
 
(Jäger 1971: 25) 
 
For Jäger the principal function of S1 is the following: 
 
Subjunctive 1 does not denote the author’s judgement, neither is it primarily used in 
order to mark indirect discourse. It may establish the relationship between what is 
said and the original speaker because it indicates the distance between the current 
speaker (writer) and what is said and thus attributes what is said to another 
speaker.
33
  
(Jäger 1971: 127-128) 
 
 For Jäger, there are three types of indirect reported discourse. Reported 
discourse is marked as such three times (dreifach bestimmt) if it is subordinate to a 
verbum dicendi, if the subordinating conjunction dass is included and if the 
embedded verb is an S1 form. It is marked twice (zweifach bestimmt) if two of these 
elements are present, one of which needs to be the verbum dicendi, and it is 
marked once (einfach bestimmt) if the only indication of indirect discourse is 
provided by an embedded S1 form (i.e. reported speech as defined in section 2.2.7). 
However, Jäger claims that the presence of S1 is obligatory if an utterance is to be 
regarded as an instance of indirect discourse. This leaves him with the problem of 
how to treat those cases of indirect discourse which are zweifach bestimmt and 
whose finite verb is an indicative. He attempts to tackle this problem by introducing 
                                                 
32
‘1) die Distribution der Konjunktivformen aufzuzeigen, 2) die syntaktische Bedeutung des Konjunktiv I 
und des Konjunktiv II in Opposition zum Indikativ zu ermitteln. [...] Die Grundfrage lautet also, [...]  
wodurch zwei Sätze, die bis auf den Unterschied des Modus völlig identisch  sind, verschiedenes 
aussagen, natürlich auch, ob sie verschiedenes aussagen. 
33
 Der Konjunktiv I bezeichnet keine urteilende Stellungnahme des Autors, noch dient er primär zur 
Kennzeichnung mittelbarer Wiedergabe. Er kann die Beziehung zwischen Besprochenem und 
ursprünglichem Sprecher herstellen, weil er die Distanz zwischen dem jetzigen Sprecher (Autor) und 
dem Besprochenen kennzeichnet und so das Besprochene einem anderen Sprecher zuweist. 
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the rather nebulous concepts ‘indirect speech in a broader sense’34 and ‘report 
which is similar to (indirect) speech’35 for sentences that have finite verbs in the 
indicative but otherwise ‘[…] contain all the prerequisites for indirect speech’36  
(1971: 28). 
     Another spurious idea proposed by Jäger concerns the meaning of S2, since 
for him the latter always expresses greater distance between the current speaker 
and what is being reported. According to Jäger this is the case not only in 
unexpected cases of S2, where according to the standard rules a S1 form should be 
used, but also when S2 is employed as a replacement form. Jäger himself 
recognizes the (unhappy) consequence of this, but seems content to live with it; he 
gives an example in which S2 is used as a replacement form and then remarks:  
 
[s]ince no subjunctive 1 form is available, one needs to resort to the device 
associated with conscious distancing, although no reason for this can be discerned 
from the attitude of the reporter.
37
 
(Jäger 1971: 170) 
 
 Jäger understands that the tenses of the subjunctive are understood to be 
relative to the temporal reference point of the original: 
 
The time relations which are established are not, as can be shown easily, ones 
which hold between the utterance and speaking time of the reporter, rather they exist 
between the utterance and speaking time of the original […] speaker. Regardless of 
whether the temporal reference point is at some time in the past or future, using the 
different tenses of the subjunctive one can describe a situation as taking place in the 
past, present or future from the point of view of this reference point.
38
  
(Jäger 1971: 109-110) 
 
However, like Flämig, he does not explicitly account for the restriction of the 
reportative subjunctive to indirect-speech contexts. Jäger undermines the role 
played by context when specific reporter attitudes towards a reported proposition 
                                                 
34
 indirekte Rede im weiteren Sinne 
35
 redenaher Bericht 
36
 [...] [enthalten] alle Voraussetzungen für indirekte Rede [...] 
37
 [d]a dafür keine Konjunktiv-I-Form zur Verfügung steht, muss zum Mittel der bewussten 
Distanzierung gegriffen werden, obwohl sich dafür aus der Haltung des Berichtenden kein Grund 
ablesen lässt. 
38
 Die durch den Konjunktiv hergestellten zeitlichen Relationen sind nun nicht, wie leicht gezeigt 
werden kann, solche zwischen Aussage und Sprechzeitpunkt des Erzählers, sondern sie bestehen 
zwischen Aussage und Sprechzeitpunkt des ursprünglichen Sprechers. Ob dieser Sprechzeitpunkt 
irgendwo in der Vergangenheit oder in der Zukunft liegt: durch die verschiedenen Konjunktivtempora 
kann von diesem Zeitpunkt aus die Vergangenheit, Gegenwart oder Zukunft eines geschilderten 
Sachverhalts bezeichnet werden.   
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are implied, instead ascribing the expression of specific attitudes to the subjunctive 
form itself, e.g. scepticism in the case of S2. The other three phenomena for which 
in our view a comprehensive account of the German reportative subjunctive should 
account, i.e. how the hearer identifies the ellipsed matrix clause, the effect of the 
subjunctive when subordinate to certain factive verbs and the notion that the 
subjunctive may be embedded under verbs of denial, arguably do not fall within 
Jäger’s remit and thus are also not addressed.    
 
 
2.3.3 Reference works and grammars 
 
In this section we review five recent reference works and grammars which are 
based on current insights regarding the function and use of the German reportative 
subjunctive. The texts are Zifonun et al. (1997), Helbig and Buscha (1998), 
Fabricius-Hansen (2006), Durrell (2011) and Whittle et al. (2011). 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Zifonun et al. (1997) 
 
Central to Zifonun et al.’s (1997) account of the German reportative subjunctive is 
their concept of ‘indirect context’, which we first considered in Chapter 1. We repeat 
their definition: 
 
INDIRECT CONTEXTS are contexts […] in which the speaker does not directly 
address a piece of propositional knowledge as though it is valid for himself at the 
time of speaking, rather he reports it by referring to another source. 
(Zifonun et al. 1997: 1753) 
 
In indirect contexts, two principles are understood to operate. These are the 
‘propositional principle’ (Propositionsprinzip) and the ‘referential principle’ 
(Referatsprinzip). According to the former, only the proposition expressed by the 
original utterance can be transferred into indirect speech, whilst the speech act 
performed must be described: this is the task of the matrix verb and it will always 
provide an interpretation of the original utterance (1997: 1756). By ‘speech act’, 
Zifonun et al. seem to understand the status of the original utterance as a 
declarative, an interrogative or an imperative. They go on to suggest (1997: 1757) 
that the matrix verb may also describe the effect of the original utterance, such as 
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when the matrix verb is vorwerfen (‘reproach’), warnen (‘warn’) and zugeben 
(‘admit’). Alternatively, the verb may describe the place of the reported utterance 
within the original discourse: this is true in the case of antworten (‘answer’) and 
fortfahren (‘continue’). A third possibility is that the matrix verb may describe how the 
original utterance was articulated. The latter is the case when the matrix verb is, for 
example, keifen (‘nag’), jammern (‘moan’), stottern (‘stammer’) and flüstern 
(‘whisper’).  
 Zifonun et al. formulate the referential principle as follows: 
 
Referential identity must exist between the original utterance and reported discourse. 
This means that an expression which reports an expression which is used 
referentially in the original utterance must refer to the same object as the 
corresponding expression in the original utterance.
39
 
(Zifonun et al. 1997: 1760) 
 
Consequently, in order to ensure that the same objects are referred to, in indirect 
speech deixis (but not necessarily tenses) must be adjusted such that they are 
understood from the point of view of the reporter.   
 Importantly, for Zifonun et al. – and this is true specifically in the case of the 
report of assertions – in indirect contexts the reporter herself does not express her 
level of commitment to the original utterance, rather she leaves open whether it is 
true or not. Thus the attitude of the reporter towards the reported proposition can be 
expressed as follows: ‘I, B, say that A says that P, but I leave open whether I say 
that P’40 (1997: 1762). Significantly, this claim is made without any reference to the 
subjunctive-vs.-indicative opposition: it is seen as a ‘default’ feature of indirect 
contexts in German, and is in essence indifferent to mood. On the other hand, in 
direct discourse the attitude of a speaker towards what she is saying is typically ‘I, A, 
say that P’41 (1997: 1762). 
 Zifonun et al. go on to suggest that in indirect speech, the function of the 
subjunctive is consistently to indicate that the indirect context is of the default 
variety, i.e. the attitude of the reporter towards the reported proposition is ‘I, B, say 
that A says that P, but I leave open whether I say that P’. The function of the 
indicative, however, is more complex and how it is understood depends ultimately 
on contextual considerations. On the one hand, it may, like the subjunctive, be used 
                                                 
39
 Zwischen Originaläußerung und Redewiedergabe muß referentielle Identität gewährleistet sein. Das 
heißt, ein Ausdruck, der einen referentiell gebrauchten Ausdruck der Originaläußerung wiedergibt, muß 
auf denselben Gegenstand verweisen, wie der entsprechende Ausdruck der Originaläußerung. 
40
 Ich, B, sage, daß A sagt, daß p, aber ich lasse offen, ob ich sage, daß p. 
41
 Ich, A, sage, daß p. 
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in typical indirect speech; this will tend to be the case, for example, in everyday 
speech where the subjunctive is rarely used (1997: 1768-1769). This is also 
frequently the case in the formal written language where the minimum requirement 
is for just one linguistic device to be used in order to mark indirect speech. Thus, if 
dass is used, then the indicative might be used: the subjunctive could be considered 
redundant (1997: 1768). But Zifonun et al. suggest that in such formal language 
where the subjunctive is essentially the unmarked mood in indirect speech, the use 
of the indicative may indicate ‘X says that, and I say that as well’42 (1997: 1768). A 
third possibility is that the indicative marks the transition into a direct, factive context, 
in other words the indicative does not really mark indirect speech at all.  
 Zifonun et al. draw a distinction between ‘modality’ (Modalität) which for them 
indicates ‘possibly the case’ (möglicherweise der Fall) and ‘non-factivity’ (Nicht-
Faktizität) by which they mean ‘definitely not the case’ (keinesfalls der Fall) (1997: 
1773). They suggest that S2 may be used in indirect speech in order to indicate 
modality or non-factivity, as in example (42), which they quote from Kaufmann 
(1976: 55): 
 
(42) Mir      meldet   er   aus   Linz,  er  läge      krank.  Doch  hab    ich  sichre  
 to me  informs  he  from  Linz  he  lies.S2  ill          but     have  I      reliable  
 
Nachricht,  daß  er   sich       zu  Frauenberg  versteckt   beim       Grafen  
news         that   he  himself  to   Frauenberg  hidden       with the  count  
 
Gallas. 
Gallas 
 
‘He informs me from Linz that he is ill. But I have heard from a reliable 
source that he has hidden himself away in Frauenberg at the home of Count 
Gallas.’  
 
However, for Zifonun et al. this usage is by no means consistent, and they point out 
that ‘[…] even in contexts where non-factivity is signalled both the indicative and 
present subjunctive [i.e. S1] are possible’43 (1997: 1774). As an example where the 
                                                 
42
 X sagt das, und ich sage das auch. 
43
 [...] [A]uch in Kontexten mit signalisierter Nicht-Faktizität sind sowohl Indikativ als der Konjunktiv der 
Präsensgruppe möglich. 
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indicative is used, even though the context indicates that the reported proposition is 
false, they provide (43): 
 
(43) Die  meisten  „Kranken“,  die     eingewiesen  werden,  sind 
 the  most      patients        who   admitted        become  are  
 
kerngesund.             Die  Ärzte     haben  ihnen  nur    eingeredet,  dass  sie  
completely healthy   the  doctors  have    them   only   convinced   that    they 
 
krank   sind. 
ill          are.IND 
 
‘Most of the “patients” who are admitted are completely healthy. Only the 
doctors have convinced them that they are ill.’ 
 
Zifonun et al. recognize that the tenses of the reportative subjunctive are to 
be understood in relation to the same temporal deictic centre as that of the original 
utterance, and formulate the workings of the tenses as follows, quoted previously 
above in section 2.2.2: 
 
It is not the time at which an utterance is reported by a speaker or writer which forms 
the reference point for the temporal interpretation [of a subjunctive form], but the time 
at which the original utterance was produced […]. This reported time t’ (= the time at 
which the action denoted by the reporting verb takes place) takes over the role of the 
temporal reference point for the indirect speech from […] t0 (= the time of reporting). 
This means that t’’, the tense of the verb in the subjunctive, takes t’ as its reference 
point. 
(Zifonun et al. 1997: 1778) 
  
However, they do not address the question of the precise nature of the subjunctive 
vis-à-vis the indicative; they do not account for the restriction of the reportative 
subjunctive to indirect contexts. Furthermore, Zifonun et al. do not explicitly draw a 
distinction between indirect speech and reported speech: for them reported speech 
seems to be an example of an ‘indirect context’, marked explicitly as such by the 
subjunctive and thus does not warrant special attention. However, they do recognize 
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that in all cases ‘[…] indirectness must be explicitly indicated’44 (1997: 1787) before 
going on to claim that: 
 
[a] complete sentence in the present subjunctive such as Er habe sich stets richtig 
verhalten [‘He always behaves himself correctly’] is a correct indirect statement only 
if an indirect context with appropriate linguistic devices has been opened and not yet 
closed again.
45
 
(Zifonun  et al. 1997: 1786-1787) 
 
Thus they hint at the sort of environment in which examples such as Er habe sich 
stets richtig verhalten, are felicitous, without indicating how the hearer identifies the 
relevant linguistic devices that make such indirect discourse, as reported speech, 
possible. 
 Zifonun et al. acknowledge that a range of attitudes may be implied 
contextually towards a reported utterance. Importantly, whilst they hold that certain 
verb forms may be understood to communicate specific attitudes, e.g. ‘X says that, 
and I say that as well’ in the case of the indicative, and non-factivity and modality (as 
they understand the terms) in the case of S2, they do recognize the considerable 
role played by context, text type and register. Thus not only S2 but also S1 and the 
indicative may be used to indicate ‘non-factivity’. Ultimately, Zifonun et al. 
acknowledge that in cases of indirectness the default attitude towards the reported 
proposition, ‘I, B, say that A says that P, but I leave open whether I say that P’, does 
not preclude the possibility of implying contextually any attitude towards it.  
Finally, Zifonun et al. do not consider cases where the German reportative 
subjunctive is embedded under factive verbs, such as kritisieren or bedauern or 
verbs of denial. 
 
 
2.3.3.2 Helbig and Buscha (1998) 
 
Helbig and Buscha’s (1998) grammar is the only text we shall review which can be 
said to acknowledge explicitly not only that the tenses of the German reportative 
subjunctive are relative but also that the temporal reference point in relation to which 
they are understood is fixed by the tense of the matrix verb: 
 
                                                 
44
 [...] Indirektheit [muß] explizit angegeben werden. 
45
 Ein Vollsatz im Konjunktiv Präsens wie etwa Er habe sich stets richtig verhalten ist nur dann ein 
korrekter Aussagesatz der indirekten Redewiedergabe, wenn ein Indirektheitskontext mit geeigneten 
Sprachmitteln eröffnet und noch nicht wieder geschlossen wurde.  
 78 
 
One is dealing with relative tenses if the time of the action described by the 
[reported] utterance is referred to as being in the present, past or future in relation to 
the speech time stated in the matrix clause.
46
  
(Helbig and Buscha 1998: 195) 
 
They devote a small amount of space to the types of verb which may serve as verba 
dicendi, and divide these into four classes: verbs of saying, verbs of asking, verbs of 
telling and verba dicendi which report thoughts and feelings (1998: 197).   
Helbig and Buscha describe the use of the subjunctive as ‘obligatory’ 
(obligatorisch) in reported speech, ‘[…] otherwise the sentences would be 
understood […] to be independent and the utterance would be understood as […] a 
direct utterance of the speaker’47 (1998: 197). They imply that reported speech 
cannot occur in isolation; they state that in the case of reported speech ‘[…] several 
indirect utterances follow one another in succession and the matrix verb is not 
repeated’48 (emphasis mine) (1998: 197).   
This text does not recognize any semantic difference between S1 and S2 in 
reported discourse, claiming that ‘[i]t […] cannot be proven that specific forms are 
used to express a particular speaker intention (for example a greater distance to the 
content of the utterance)’ 49 (1998: 196). Thus, Helbig and Buscha’s view seems to 
be consistent with our own claim that the reportative subjunctive is compatible with 
any attitude that the reporter may wish to imply contextually towards the reported 
proposition. 
In summary, it is true that Helbig and Buscha recognize the relative nature of 
the tenses of the reportative subjunctive and have, in our view, a satisfactory 
approach to the issue of reporter attitudes in indirect speech. However, they do not 
mention the effect of the subjunctive when embedded under certain factive verbs, 
and they do not mention the fact that verbs of denial may be superordinate to a 
reportative-subjunctive embedded proposition. Ultimately, this text is intended for 
learners of German as an additional language, and so we should not be justified in 
criticizing it for its emphasis on describing German usage. The question as to the 
ultimate reason for the restriction of the reportative subjunctive to indirect speech is 
arguably justifiably not addressed. There is some attempt to addresss the question 
                                                 
46
 Um relative Zeiten handelt es sich, wenn man von Gleich-, Vor- oder Nachzeitigkeit der in der Rede 
gegebenen Aktzeit im Verhältnis zu der in der Redeeinleitung gegebenen Sprechzeit spricht. 
47
 [...] da sonst die Sätze [...] als selbständige Hauptsätze und die Rede [...] als direkte Äußerung des 
Sprechers verstanden würde. 
48
 [...] mehrere indirekte Äußerungen [...]folgen [aufeinander] und das redeeinleitende Verb nicht 
wiederholt wird. 
49
 Es ist […] nicht nachweisbar, daß mit bestimmten Formen eine besondere Sprecherintention (etwa 
eine größere Distanz zum Redeinhalt) ausgedrückt wird. 
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of reported speech. However, their account – according to which a series of 
subjunctive sentences follow each other and the matrix verb is not repeated – is in 
our view too simplistic: identifying the relevant matrix clause is often rather less 
straightforward.  
 
 
2.3.3.3 Fabricius-Hansen (2006) 
 
In her account in the 2006 DUDEN grammar, Fabricius-Hansen pays careful 
attention to the tenses of the subjunctive and makes remarks similar to those of 
Zifonun et al. (1997) regarding the temporal deictic centre to which they are 
understood to be relative: 
 
The tenses of the reportative subjunctive [Indirektheitskonjunktiv] take the original 
speaker’s ‘now’ – the time when the original utterance was produced – as a 
superordinate temporal reference point. In other words, they are used logophorically 
[…]. In this respect subjunctive 1 and subjunctive 2 are similar […].
50
  
                                                                          (Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 535) 
 
She believes that the subjunctive in reported speech essentially indicates that the 
speaker is merely reporting the words of another without expressing any specific 
level of commitment to the truth of the reported statement. Thus her account 
overlooks the role of context in prompting the hearer to infer the reporter’s attitude to 
the reported proposition. The role of the reportative subjunctive is summarized as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 Als übergeordneten zeitlichen Bezugspunkt nehmen die Tempora des Indirektheitskonjunktivs das 
Figuren-Jetzt – den Sprechzeitpunkt der wiedergegebenen Äußerung - ;d.h. sie werden logophorisch 
[...] verwendet. Der Konjunktiv I und der Konjunktiv II sind in dieser Hinsicht gleichwertig [...]. 
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With the subjunctive the speaker indicates that he wants the content of the sentence 
to be understood as an indirect report of another person’s utterance, and he [the 
reporter] himself does not indicate whether or not he considers the utterance to be 
valid at the time of the report. In appropriate contexts this can also apply to the 
thoughts of another person. Indirectness means that deictic pronouns are chosen 
from the point of view of the [reporting] speaker; other deictic categories in a broader 
sense can in certain circumstances reflect the point of view of the original speaker.
51
 
(Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 538) 
 
Fabricius-Hansen holds that the subjunctive has the same function as the indicative 
in indirect speech (2006: 538). Significantly, she considers the reportative 
subjunctive to be ‘superfluous’ (überflüssig) in indirect speech in dass-clauses when 
embedded under such verbs as sagen, behaupten, fragen (‘ask’) and schreiben: 
‘[e]ven with an indicative the dependent clause will be understood as indirect 
speech’52 (Fabricius-Hansen 2006: 539). Fabricius-Hansen provides the following 
example (2006: 539): 
  
(44) Um  18.57  Uhr    erwähnt    er   nebenbei,    dass  die   DDR   ihre  Grenzen 
 at    18.57  hour   mentions  he  in passing    that    the  GDR   its     borders 
 
 öffne          /   öffnet,          und   zwar        für  alle. (M. Wein) 
 opens.S1       opens.IND    and   it is true   for   everyone 
 
‘At 18.57 he mentions in passing that the GDR opened its borders, for 
everyone, in fact.’ 
 
As a result of the use of the conventional verbum dicendi erwähnt and the presence 
of the subordinating conjunction dass, for Fabricius-Hansen the meaning of (45) 
remains unchanged, regardless of whether the subjunctive form öffne or indicative 
öffnet is employed. 
 However, she describes the subjunctive as the ‘normal mood’ 
(Normalmodus) in indirect speech when dass is omitted because, since its tenses 
are understood unambiguously in relation to t1, the subjunctive rules out the 
possibility of the reported utterance being understood as direct speech (2006: 539). 
                                                 
51
 Mit dem Konjunktiv gibt der Sprecher (Erzähler) zu verstehen, dass er den Satzinhalt als indirekte 
Wiedergabe einer »fremden« Äußerung verstanden wissen will, für die er selber im Sprechzeitpunkt 
keinen Gültigkeitsanspruch erhebt. In geeigneten Kontexten kann es sich auch um »fremde 
Gedanken« handeln. Indirektheit bedeutet, dass deiktische Pronomen aus der Sprecher-
/Erzählerperspektive gewählt sind; andere i.w.S. deiktische Kategorien können unter Umständen die 
Figurenperspektive widerspiegeln. 
52
 Man wird den abhängigen Satz auch im Indikativ als indirekte Rede verstehen. 
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 Fabricius-Hansen does not mention cases where the reportative subjunctive 
is embedded under verbs of denial. However, she does address an important 
distinction that the subjunctive-vs.-indicative opposition makes to how verbs such as 
(dafür) tadeln (‘reproach’), loben (‘praise’), verantwortlich machen (‘make 
responsible’) and kritisieren (‘criticize’) are understood. In cases such as example 
(45), where the indicative is used, ‘[…] the hearer may – or must – assume that the 
speaker […] wants the content of the dependent clause to be considered to be 
given’53 (2006: 539): 
 
(45) […] und er kritisierte [...], dass  Bohr  voreilig          die  Erhaltungssätze 
      and he criticized         that   Bohr   prematurely  the  laws of conservation 
 
 und   damit           die  Kausalität  aufgegeben  hatte. 
 and   in so doing  the  causality    abandoned   had.IND 
 
‘[…] and he [Einstein] criticized […] the fact that Bohr had given up the laws 
of conservation prematurely and in doing so causality as well.’ 
 
If, however, the subjunctive is used, then ‘[the speaker] intends [the content of the 
subordinate clause] to be understood merely as the report of an utterance whose 
purpose is described by the matrix clause’54 (2006: 539): 
 
(46) […] und er kritisierte [...], dass  Bohr  voreilig          die  Erhaltungssätze 
      and he criticized         that   Bohr   prematurely  the  laws of conservation 
 
 und   damit           die  Kausalität  aufgegeben  habe. 
 and   in so doing  the  causality    abandoned   had.S1 
 
‘[…] and he made the criticism […] that Bohr had given up the laws of 
conservation prematurely and in doing so causality as well.’ 
 
                                                 
53
 [...] so darf – oder muss – der Hörer davon ausgehen, dass der Sprecher [...] den Inhalt des 
abhängigen Satzes als gegeben betrachtet wissen will. 
54
 Er [der Sprecher] will ihn [den im Nebensatz beschriebenen Sachverhalt] bloß als Inhaltswiedergabe 
einer Äußerung verstanden haben, deren kommunikativen Zweck der redekommentierende Satz 
beschreibt. 
 82 
 
Fabricius-Hansen goes on to suggest that a similar distinction can be made 
between verbs of emotional attitude such as bedauern, sich ärgern and sich freuen 
with an indicative in their embedded clauses and those with a subjunctive form.  
Fabricius-Hansen does not consider how the hearer recovers the ellipsed 
matrix clause in the case of reported speech, and why the tenses of the subjunctive 
cannot be understood in relation to t0. However, Fabricius-Hansen’s reticence in 
these matters can be attributed to the fact that the DUDEN grammar is ultimately a 
descriptive reference work rather than an explanatory text.  
 
 
2.3.3.4 Durrell (2011) 
 
Durrell’s purpose is to describe German grammar and usage to learners of German 
as a foreign language, which naturally influences how his claims are presented. He 
acknowledges implicitly that the tenses of the reportative subjunctive are understood 
in relation to t1, however this is presented in learner-friendly terms: ‘[t]he basic 
principle is that the same tense of Konjunktiv I is used for the indirect speech as was 
used in the indicative in the original direct speech […]’ (2011: 325). Naturally no 
explanation for why the subjunctive is restricted to indirect and reported speech is 
provided; this does not fall within his remit.   
Durrell’s remarks on reported speech are brief. He points out that ‘Konjunktiv 
I is such a clear indication of indirect speech that it can be used on its own to show 
that a statement is simply reported’ (2011: 326) and provides an example. However 
he does not suggest what sort of contextual information needs to be present to 
make an instance of reported speech pragmatically acceptable, thus he may be 
misunderstood as implying that reported speech may occur isolated.  
He pays some attention to the sort of attitude that the reporter may indicate, 
using the reportative subjunctive, that she holds towards the reported proposition. 
He comments on the distinction in meaning which is held to exist by some speakers 
between instances of indirect speech with S1, those with S2 and those which 
employ an indicative finite verb (2011: 329), a distinction that has likely been 
reinforced by the work of authorities like Flämig and Jäger. According to Durrell, 
whilst the use of S1 enables the speaker to report someone else’s statement 
neutrally, as in (47a) below, the use of S2, as in (47b), is sometimes understood to 
indicate that the speaker believes that Manfred’s utterance is not true:  
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(47a) Manfred  sagt,  dass   er    krank  gewesen   sei. 
 Manfred  says  that   he    ill         been         is.S1 
 
 ‘Manfred says that he has been ill.’ 
 
(47b) Manfred sagt, dass er krank gewesen wäre.  
 
The use of the indicative, however, ‘[…] would acknowledge that it is a fact that he 
had been ill’ (2011: 329): 
 
(47c) Manfred sagt, dass er krank gewesen ist. 
 
Durrell concludes by pointing out that this distinction is never consistently 
maintained and considers the choice between indicative and subjunctive to be 
determined primarily by stylistic considerations (2011: 329). His own point of view 
regarding the ‘meaning’ of the subjunctive is that ‘[b]y using Konjunktiv I we can 
indicate that we are simply reporting what someone else said, without committing 
ourselves to saying whether we think it is true or not’ (2011: 326). Thus Durrell 
appears to undermine the notion that the reportative subjunctive is in reality 
compatible with any interpretive stance that the reporter may hold towards a 
reported proposition. 
 
  
2.3.3.5 Whittle et al. (2011) 
 
Another pedagogical grammar is that of Whittle et al. (2011). Their comments 
concern primarily the form of the subjunctive in indirect speech; rather less is said 
about its tenses and function. Like Durrell (2011) their comments regarding the 
tense of the reportative subjunctive in indirect speech are presented in learner-
friendly terms: ‘German keeps the tense of the original but shifts the form of the verb 
into subjunctive I’ (2011: 125). No remarks at all are made about reported speech.  
 Particularly interesting are Whittle et al.’s remarks about the attitudes that 
different subjunctive forms may be used to imply towards a reported proposition. For 
them, S1 is used in neutral reports. However:  
 
[w]here German speakers use both subjunctive I and subjunctive II for reported 
speech, the use of the second subjunctive usually implies a greater distance 
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between the speaker and the truth of what is being reported, even an air of doubt 
and scepticism. 
(Whittle et al. 2011: 125) 
 
Their example is (48): 
 
(48) Actual words:   Ich   habe  keine   Zeit. 
     I       have  no        time 
 
Neutral report:   Er  sagte,   er   habe     keine  Zeit. 
     he  said     he   has.S1  no      time 
 
Report with possible doubt: Er  sagte,  er   hätte      keine  Zeit. 
     he  said    he   has.S2   no       time  
  
‘He said he didn’t have any time.’   
 
Later on (2011: 339) Whittle et al. reiterate this view about the function of S2 
in indirect speech, claiming that ‘[i]n order to imply severe doubts about the truth of 
what has been said, subjunctive II may be employed’ (emphasis mine). This time 
their example is:  
 
(49) Er   sagt,  er    hätte     kein  Geld  /  er   hätte      angerufen. 
 he   says  he   has.S2  no     money  he  has.S2   telephoned 
 
 ‘He says he has no money/he called (but I don’t believe it)’. 
 
But these claims are contradicted when they recognize the inconsistency which 
characterizes the use of S1 and S2: ‘[…] some speakers tend to favour subjunctive 
II as the preferred form for much reported speech, so usage varies considerably’ 
(Whittle et al. 2011: 123).  
Ultimately, Whittle et al. fail to consider the role played by context in 
determining the attitude which a reporter holds towards a proposition.  
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2.3.4 Issues of (non-)factivity 
 
In this subsection we look at the work of three authorities who assign particular 
importance to the question of (non-)factivity and indirect speech. We shall take 
Thieroff (1992) and Eisenberg (1986/2004) together, since they both consider the 
viewpoint of the host discourse and hold that the function of the German reportative 
subjunctive is to signal non-factivity. This will be followed by a consideration of 
Diewald (1999) who argues that the function of the reportative subjunctive is to 
signal that the original speaker assigned the value [-non-factive] to her original 
utterance.55 
 
 
2.3.4.1 Non-factivity: Eisenberg (1986, 2004) and Thieroff (1992)  
 
For Eisenberg the reportative subjunctive ‘[…] is not associated with indirect speech, 
it is rather more generally associated with non-factivity’56 (Eisenberg 2004: 119). He 
divides verbs which require a subordinate clause into three classes (2004: 117): 
 
a.  Karl  meint / behauptet / hofft  /  glaubt,    dass Egon  bleiben  
Karl  thinks  claims         hopes  believes  that Egon    stay  
 
will/wolle. 
wants.IND/S1 
 
‘Karl think/claims/hopes/believes that Egon wants to stay.’  
 
b. Karl  versteht     /    vergisst / entschuldigt / weiß,     dass  Egon  bleiben  
     Karl  understands  forgets     excuses         knows   that   Egon  stay 
 
will/*wolle 
wants.IND/*S1 
 
‘Karl understands/forgets/excuses the fact that/knows that Egon wants to 
stay.’ 
 
                                                 
55
 The small minus sign in [-non-factive] indicates ‘not non-factive’. 
56
 [...] ist nicht an die indirekte Rede, sondern allgemeiner an Nichtfaktivität gebunden. 
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c. Karl   berichtet / erzählt / teilt mit    /   sagt,  dass Egon bleiben will/wolle 
 Karl   reports      tells       announces  says  that  Egon  stay      wants.IND/S1 
 
    ‘Karl reports/tells/announces/says that Egon wants to stay.’ 
 
It is those verbs in classes A and C that are of interest to us, since class B verbs are 
by definition factive in the sense that they presuppose their complement proposition 
and thus, according to Eisenberg, can only be accompanied by indicative verbs. 
Eisenberg claims that there is no difference in meaning between an indicative dass-
clause following a class A verb and a dass-clause with a subjunctive finite verb in 
the same position, since these verbs are always non-factive (and thus do not 
presuppose their complement proposition): ‘Karl hofft, dass Egon bleiben will and 
Karl hofft, dass Egon bleiben wolle mean the same. The subjunctive has no 
function in the case of the verbs in group a.’57 (2004: 118). On the other hand, 
according to Eisenberg, it can make a difference whether a speaker uses an 
indicative or a subjunctive in a dass-clause following a class C verb. In the 1989 
edition Eisenberg holds that the presence of an indicative in such a dass-clause (as 
in (50a)) instructs the hearer to understand the matrix verb factively, while a 
subjunctive (as in (50b)) will indicate that the speaker intends the hearer to 
understand the matrix verb as non-factive (examples from page 131):  
 
(50a) Bild  berichtet,  dass  der  Graf     verhaftet   worden   ist. 
 Bild  reports      that    the  count   arrested    become  is.IND 
 
(50b) Bild  berichtet,  dass  der  Graf     verhaftet  worden   sei. 
 Bild  reports     that   the   count   arrested   become   is.S1 
 
 ‘Bild reports that the count has been arrested.’ 
 
Furthermore, Eisenberg claims that verbs with both a factive and a non-factive 
variant are those ‘[…] which are factive in their basic meaning’58 (1989: 132). 
However, in a critique of Eisenberg, Thieroff (1992: 254) points out that some verbs 
which are non-factive in their basic meaning (i.e. Eisenberg’s class C verbs) can be 
                                                 
57
 Karl hofft, dass Egon bleiben will und Karl hofft, dass Egon bleiben wolle bedeuten dasselbe. 
Der Konjunktiv ist bei den Verben in a. funktionslos. 
58
 [...] die in ihrer Grundbedeutung faktiv sind. 
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understood factively if accompanied by an indicative. An example of these verbs is 
schreiben: 
 
(51) Bild hat  jetzt endlich geschrieben, dass der  Graf   verhaftet  worden  ist. 
 Bild has now finally   written           that   the  count arrested   become is.IND 
 
 ‘Bild has at last written that the count has been arrested.’ 
 
The most plausible interpretation of (51) is that it is a known fact that the Graf has 
been arrested and that this fact is therefore presupposed. Thus the emphasis is on 
the fact that Bild has now reported this. This, according to Thieroff, becomes even 
clearer in the negative (1992: 254): 
 
(52a) Bild  hat   nicht  geschrieben, dass  der  Graf    verhaftet   worden   ist. 
 Bild  has  not     written           that   the  count  arrested    become  is.IND 
 
 ‘Bild has not written that the count has been arrested.’ 
 
The implication here is that the Graf is known to have been arrested, but Bild has 
not reported it. However, if we substitute a subjunctive: 
 
(52b) Bild hat nicht geschrieben, dass der Graf verhaftet worden sei. 
 
then (52b) should be understood ‘[…] as a contradiction of the claim that Bild has 
announced the arrest of the count’59 (Thieroff 1992: 254). Thieroff concludes this 
part of his comments on Eisenberg by remarking that: 
 
[f]rom this it follows that non-factive verbs can actually have a factive and a non-
factive variant in their basic meaning as well. Sentences with such verbs in their 
main clause are clearly ambiguous if their complement clause is in the indicative, 
and unambiguously non-factive when the complement clause is in the subjunctive.
60
 
(Thieroff 1992: 254) 
 
                                                 
59
 [...] als Widerspruch zu der Behauptung, ,Bild‘ habe die Verhaftung des Grafen gemeldet. 
60
 [d]araus folgt, dass in der Tat auch in ihrer Grundbedeutung nicht-faktive Verben eine faktive und 
eine nicht-faktive Variante haben können. Sätze mit solchen Verben im Obersatz sind offenbar ambig, 
wenn der Komplementsatz im Indikativ steht, eindeutig nicht-faktiv, wenn der Komplementsatz im 
Konjunktiv steht. 
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     In the 2004 edition of his text, Eisenberg revises his position and comes 
closer to that of Thieroff in assuming that class C verbs can be understood as either 
factive or non-factive if accompanied by an indicative: 
 
The indicative as the unmarked modal category does not force a factive reading, but 
it makes one possible. This is true of all verbs in group c. In the case of these verbs 
the function of the subjunctive is to signal non-factivity. These verbs are neither 
unambiguously factive nor non-factive, but they can be understood in both ways. 
Thus the signalling of non-factivity is marked.
61
 
(Eisenberg 2004: 118) 
 
Thus Eisenberg holds that the presence of a subjunctive in a complement 
clause ensures a non-factive reading, whilst in the case of an embedded indicative 
either a factive or a non-factive reading is possible; such cases are ambiguous.  
Eisenberg makes some valid insights regarding the function of the 
subjunctive in ensuring that an utterance is understood as indirect speech: his 
observations concerning the difference that the subjunctive can make when the 
matrix verb can be understood either factively or non-factively are particularly 
illuminating. Thus Eisenberg offers a possible response to our second question: how 
do we account for the fact that certain factive verbs can introduce indirect speech 
with the feature indirectness when the subjunctive is embedded under them. On 
Eisenberg’s account, verbs such as kritisieren and bedauern can be considered to 
have both a factive and a non-factive variant. However, Eisenberg apparently does 
not recognize the compatibility of the German reportative subjunctive with any 
interpretive stance of the reporter towards the reported proposition. Furthermore, he 
focusses on the function of the reportative subjunctive in indicating non-factivity to 
the extent that other crucial aspects, such as how its tenses are understood in 
indirect speech and the question of reported speech, are overlooked. In this latter 
connection Thieroff (1992) remarks: 
 
[The case of reported speech] is not considered at all in Eisenberg (1989), indeed 
one gets the impression that the subjunctive of non-factivity is restricted to 
complement clauses and that it does not mark indirect speech in any case.
62
 
(Thieroff 1992: 257) 
                                                 
61
 Der Indikativ als unmarkierte Moduskategorie erzwingt die faktive Leseart nicht, aber er macht sie 
möglich. Das gilt so für alle Verben aus der Gruppe C. Bei ihnen dient der Konjuktiv zur Signalisierung 
von Nichtfaktivität. Diese Verben sind weder einfach faktiv noch nichtfaktiv, sondern sie können auf 
beide Weisen verstanden werden. Dabei ist die Signalisierung von Nichtfaktivität markiert. 
62
 [Der Fall der berichteten Rede] bleibt in Eisenberg 1989 gänzlich unberücksichtigt, ja es steht der 
Eindruck, als sei der Konjunktiv der Nicht-Faktivität auf Komplementsätze beschränkt und er könne in 
keinem Fall indirekte Rede anzeigen. 
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We believe that Thieroff is right in his view that Eisenberg believes that the (chief) 
function of the subjunctive is to mark non-factivity in subordinate clauses. On our 
own view, the fact that reportative-subjunctive indirect speech is understood non-
factively is a consequence of the fact that the primary function of the subjunctive is 
to indicate indirect speech which bears the property indirectness. 
The account of Thieroff (1992), who in addition to questions of factivity 
considers the tenses of the German reportative subjunctive, is rather more 
satisfactory. He recognizes the relative nature of the tenses of the subjunctive, and 
remarks that ‘[…] in indirect speech the tenses of the subjunctive necessarily refer to 
the time of the original utterance (1992: 232).63 Later on, Thieroff (1992: 231-232) 
addresses the issue of temporal deictic projection, or rather the fact that it is not 
possible to reproduce temporal deictic projection in reportative-subjunctive indirect 
speech. According to him, (53a) with its present-tense forms can be reported as 
(53b) but not as (53c):  
 
(53a) Ich  wollte     gerade  klingeln,  da       springt     mich plötzlich   ein Hund  an. 
 I      wanted  just        ring         when  jumps at   me   suddenly  a     dog    SP 
  
 ‘I was just about to ring the bell when a dog suddenly jumps up at me’ 
 
(53b) S1  erzählte,     er   habe        gerade  klingeln  wollen,   da        habe      ihn  
 S1  explained    he  has.S1     just        ring        wanted  when    has.S1  him 
 
plötzlich     ein  Hund   angesprungen. 
 suddenly   a     dog      jumped at 
 
‘S1 [i.e. speaker 1] explained that he was just about to ring the bell when a 
dog suddenly jumped up at him.’ 
 
(53c) ? S1 erzählte, er habe gerade klingeln wollen, da springe ihn plötzlich ein 
Hund an. 
 
Thieroff’s explanation for the unacceptability of (53c) is as follows. Earlier in his 
1992 book, he claims that the basic meaning of the present tense is ‘E [event time] 
                                                 
63
 […] in der indirekten Rede […] [sind] die konjunktivischen Tempora notwendig auf den referierten 
Zeitpunkt bezogen. 
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not-before S (speech time)’64 (1992: 100). However, the fact that formulations such 
as that in (53a), i.e. with an historic present, are (depending on pronunciation) 
permissible is evidence that in the case of the indicative some deviations from ‘E 
not-before S’ are possible and that this is a ‘purely pragmatic phenomenon of use’ 
(1992: 232).65 But the unacceptability of (53c) shows that ‘E not-before S’ applies to 
the subjunctive without exception. However, in spite of his accurate observations 
regarding how the tenses of the subjunctive in indirect speech are understood, 
Thieroff does not suggest why ‘E not-before S’ always applies to the subjunctive 
present (or non-past). 
 In his discussion of reported speech, Thieroff, unlike the authorities 
mentioned so far, considers the question of what makes a stretch of reported 
speech acceptable. He claims that in some cases being able to infer who the 
original speaker is will make an instance of reported speech felicitous (1992: 258). 
He quotes  an example from Pütz (1989): 
 
(54) Manager    der       Neuen  Heimat      erledigen   Dienstliches    bisweilen  
 managers  of the   New     Homeland  carry out    official             occasionally 
 
auch   im        Puff   –    das    sei      im        Geschäftsleben  nicht    
 also    in the   brothel     that   is.S1    in the   business life       not       
 
ungewöhnlich. 
 unusual  
 
‘Managers of the New Homeland also occasionally perform ‘official’ duties in 
the brothel – [they say] that is not unusual for business life.’ 
 
In this case it is clear that the original speakers are the managers. However, Thieroff 
ultimately appears not to recognize the need for any specific sort of context that 
would make an instance of reported speech acceptable (1992: 258). He quotes the 
following example from Engel (1998: 113) (Thieroff 1992: 258):  
 
(55) Sein  Vater   war  Tuchhändler   gewesen, aber   schon    vor        dem  Krieg 
 his    father  was   draper            been         but     already  before  the    war 
 
                                                 
64
 E [Ereigniszeit] nicht-vor S [Sprechzeit]  
65
 rein pragmatische Verwendungsweise 
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  gestorben.  Die  Mutter   hatte  dann  als    Lehrer     gearbeitet   und    in 
 died            the  mother  had     then   as    teacher    worked       and    in 
 
dieser Funktion  vielen  in   Not     Geratenen  geholfen.   Nach   der  
this     function   many  in   need    ended up   helped       after    the 
 
Besetzung   sei      sie   in   die  galizischen Wälder  gegangen. Einmal  noch 
occupation   is.S1  she  in  the   Galician      woods   gone          once      still 
 
sei     sie   in  ihrer   Geburtsstadt   gesehen  worden. 
 is.S1  she in   her     town of birth    seen        become  
 
‘His father had been a draper but had died before the war. After that his 
mother worked as a teacher and in this capacity she helped many people in 
need. [They say that] after the occupation she went into the Galician woods 
and that she was seen one more time in the town where she was born.’ 
 
According to Thieroff the original speakers are ‘unnamed informants’ (ungenannte 
Informanten), and concludes that ‘[i]ndirect speech therefore even occurs (in the 
form of reported speech) completely independently of introductory verbs or other 
corresponding expressions’ (1992: 258).66    
Thieroff does not explain how the hearer understands the tenses of reported 
speech to be relative to t1. This is arguably the case because, due to the existence 
of examples such as (55) where the subjunctive occurs ‘in the absence of any 
supporting context’67 (Thieroff 1992: 258, quoting Engel (1988: 113)) he sees no 
need to do so. However, Thieroff does make some valid comments about the tenses 
of the reportative subjunctive specifically in relation to the concept of temporal 
deictic projection. Finally, as a consequence of emphasizing the role of the 
reportative subjunctive in signalling non-factivity, Thieroff, like Eisenberg, 
underestimates the range of attitudes, including factivity, with whose contextual 
expression the reportative subjunctive is demonstrably compatible. 
 
 
 
                                                 
66
 Indirekte Rede kommt also (in der Form der berichteten Rede) auch völlig unabhängig von 
redeeinleitenden Verben oder anderen entsprechenden Ausdrücken vor. 
67
 wenn kein stützender Kontext vorhanden ist 
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2.3.4.2 Diewald (1999) 
 
Diewald’s (1999) chief purpose is to describe the semantics of the German 
reportative subjunctive from an essentially modal point of view. She proceeds from 
the premise that ‘[t]he central function of S1 is […] the indication of indirect speech’68 
(1999: 182). She claims that the reporting speaker refers to the quoted speaker as 
the origin (Origo) of the quotation and ‘[…] presents the relationship between the 
quoted speaker and the quotation as factive, i.e. he [the reporter] maintains that the 
quoted speaker uttered the quotation’69 (1999: 182). For Diewald, the function of S1 
in indirect speech is to indicate the degree of factivity that the original speaker 
assigned to her utterance, namely the value [-non-factive]. Therefore, ‘[a] 
paraphrase for the meaning of the subjunctive is […]: the current speaker says that 
it is factive that the quoted speaker says that the proposition is factive’70 (1999: 183). 
From the point of view of the host context, the subjunctive is used to express 
the distance between the reporter and the alleged factivity of the reported 
proposition, ‘[…] and not, as is often assumed, the doubts of the current speaker 
regarding the degree of factivity assigned by the original speaker […]’71 (1999: 183). 
In this connection she points out that ‘[i]n scientific texts and reports […] the 
subjunctive provides an economical means of indicating the origin of utterances 
which are reported with no doubt as to their truth […]’ 72 (1999: 183). In other words,  
for Diewald the subjunctive may be used to signal factivity not only from the point of 
view of the original speaker, but also from that of the reporter, whilst still making 
explicit that the utterance concerned is to be understood as indirect speech. 
Interestingly, Diewald claims that reporter attitudes such as doubt regarding the truth 
of the reported proposition are recovered by the hearer via conversational 
implicature (1999: 183), although she does not suggest the nature of this process.  
 Diewald’s approach has a clear advantage over those of Flämig (1959), 
Jäger (1971), Eisenberg (1986, 2004), Thieroff (1992), Durrell (2011) and Whittle et 
al. (2011) in that it acknowledges the range of reporter attitudes that the reportative 
subjunctive may play a role in prompting the hearer to infer. More specifically, the 
                                                 
68
 Die zentrale Funktion des Konjunktivs I ist [...] die Kennzeihnung indirekter Rede. 
69
 […] stellt die Relation zwischen zitiertem Sprecher und Zitat als faktisch dar, d.h. er behauptet, daß 
der zitierte Sprecher das Zitierte gesagt hat. 
70
 Eine Umschreibung für die Bedeutung des Konjunktivs ist [...]: der aktuelle Sprecher sagt, es ist 
faktisch, daß der zitierte Sprecher sagt, die Proposition ist faktisch. 
71
 […] und nicht, wie oft angenommen, die Zweifel des aktuellen Sprechers an der Faktizitätsbewertung 
des zitierten Sprechers. 
72
 [i]n wissenschaftlichen und berichtenden Textsorten [...] dient der Konjunktiv als ökonomisches Mittel 
zur Kennzeichnung der Herkunft von Aussagen, die ohne Zweifel an ihrer Richtigkeit wiedergegeben 
werden [...] 
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‘default’ attitude is that of the original speaker from the point of view of the reporter, 
i.e. the reporter asserts the reported proposition is factive for the original speaker. 
This, however, does not preclude the possibility of the reporter implying her own 
attitude towards the reported proposition inferentially. On the other hand, her 
account does not address questions such as how the tenses of the subjunctive are 
understood, the effect of the subjunctive when subordinate to factives such as 
kritisieren and bedauern, the embedding of the subjunctive under verbs of denial 
and she does not consider reported speech. 
 
 
2.3.5 Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) 
 
One of the more important accounts of the German reportative subjunctive produced 
in recent years is that of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004), a complex analysis 
which is conducted within the framework of discourse representation theory.  
 For Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø those German indirect-speech contexts in 
which the reportative subjunctive may occur form a continuum with prototypical 
indirect speech at one extreme and totally independent reported speech without any 
explicit inquit in the context at the other. Between these two extremes there are 
intermediate cases, such as the subjunctive embedded under verbs of emotional 
attitude like bedauern and sich ärgern, as well as cases where the subjunctive 
occurs in clauses which are subordinate to verbs of denial, such as bestreiten and 
verneinen. Thus they aim to suggest a semantics for the reportative subjunctive 
which accounts for all these uses, and in their conclusion claim that ‘[…] the 
reportive [sic.] subjunctive emerges as a semantically uniform sign whose variability 
is a function of contextual variation’ (2004: 254). Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø claim 
that ‘[t]he RS [reportative subjunctive] performs two functions: It turns a DRS 
[discourse representation structure] into a DRS in intension – a proposition – and it 
introduces the presupposition that somebody says –normally, claims – that 
proposition’ (2004: 232-233).  
In prototypical indirect speech this reportative presupposition is verified: this 
means that the indicative can be substituted ‘[…] without a noticeable change in 
meaning: it seems redundant […]’ (2004: 213). In such cases the subjunctive 
receives a concord reading. This is the case in example (56): 
 
(56) Der  «SonntagsBlick»  berichtete  in   seiner letzten Ausgabe, dass der  neue 
 the     SonntagsBlick    reported    in   its        latest   edition     that   the  new 
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Zug    aber  noch  gar     nicht    ausreichend   getestet  worden   sei. 
train  but     yet     at all   not      sufficiently      tested     become   is.S1 
 
‘In the latest edition of SonntagsBlick it was reported that the new train has 
not yet been adequately tested at all.’ 
(Die Südostschweiz: 09/06/2009) 
 
Elsewhere the reportative presupposition must be partially accommodated. In the 
case of reported speech the sentence, which is syntactically independent, ‘[…] is 
understood as if it were, after all,  in a verbum dicendi context where the utterer and 
other aspects of the utterance situation are provided by the preceding context’ 
(2004: 226). Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø provide a complex explanation of two 
ways in which the reportative presupposition is accommodated. If there is no explicit 
inquit in the preceding discourse then the presupposition will be accommodated 
both intra- and intersententially: ‘The utterer (and utterance time […]) is verified in 
the preceding context [intersentential accommodation], whereas the utterance 
relation is accommodated on top of the sentence itself [intrasentential 
accommodation]’ (Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004: 247). If there is an explicit 
inquit in the context, then the reportative subjunctive’s reportative presupposition is 
accommodated intersententially alone: ‘[…] the speaker (and the speech time […]) 
is, as before, verified in the context […]’ and the speech relation already present is 
reused (Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004: 248).  
An example provided by Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø where the subjunctive 
is embedded under a verb of denial is the following (2004: 243): 
 
(57) Er   dementierte  nicht,  Geishas   für  Liebesbeziehungen bezahlt  zu haben, 
 he   denied          not      Geishas  for  love relations            paid      to  have 
 
 bestritt   aber,  dass   das   unmoralisch  sei. 
 denied   but     that     that   immoral        is.S1 
 
‘He did not deny that he had paid geishas for love relations, but he did deny 
that that was immoral.’ 
 
Their own explanation of this is the following: 
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Intrasententially, the presupposition is blatantly falsified: the assertion expresses the 
exact opposite of what it should to verify this presupposition. The reason the 
presupposition can still be justified is that it can transcend the sentence boundary, 
finding an antecedent in a piece of preceding discourse expressing that someone 
else has claimed what the subject disclaims. This shows that the RS presupposition 
is not so special after all; its relevant context is […] the merge of that sentence and 
the larger context. 
(Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004: 243) 
 
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø seem to be saying that in cases such as (57) the 
reportative presupposition which the subjunctive carries is accommodated globally.  
 There is evidence that the view that the reportative subjunctive carries a 
reportative presupposition is mistaken. Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø suggest (2004: 
240-241) that the occurrence of the subjunctive in example (58), where it is 
embedded under the first-person singular present-tense form ich teile die 
Auffassung, is to be explained in the same terms as its occurrence in clauses 
subordinate to verbs of denial (example from page 241): 
 
(58) Ich  teile    die   Auffassung,  dass  das  Gemälde   eine   Fälschung   sei. 
 I      share  the  view              that    the    painting    a       forgery         is.S1 
  
‘I share the view that the painting is a forgery.’ 
 
Thus, according to Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø, the presupposition is satisfied by 
the notion that someone else has claimed that the painting is a forgery. If they are 
right, then it ought to be possible to embed the subjunctive under a first-person 
singular present-tense verb of denial:  
 
(59) * Ich bestreite, dass das Gemälde eine Fälschung sei. 
 
Again, the fact that someone else has claimed that the painting is a forgery ought to 
motivate the subjunctive. However, like other cases where the subjunctive occurs in 
a clause which is embedded under a first-person singular present-tense matrix verb, 
(59) is ungrammatical.  
Schwager (2010) holds that if Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø were right then we 
would expect the instance of S1 in (60) both to be felicitous and to receive a global 
reading because the preceding context supposedly ‘[ensures] that the [reportative] 
presupposition attributed to the GRS [German reportative subjunctive] is satisfied 
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globally’ (Schwager 2010: 240):  
 
(60) (Hans  hat   gestern     behauptet,  dass   Legrenzi  sein  Lehrer    gewesen 
          Hans   has  yesterday  claimed       that    Legrenzi  his    teacher   been  
 
 sei.) ? Es  ist  jedoch     höchst   unwahrscheinlich,  dass  Legrenzi   sein  
  is        it    is   however   highly    improbable             that   Legrenzi    his  
 
Lehrer    gewesen  sei. 
 teacher  been         is.S1 
  
‘(Hans claimed yesterday that Legrenzi used to be his teacher.) However, it is 
highly improbable that Legrenzi used to be his teacher.’ 
 
But this instance of S1 is not felicitous in standard German. Furthermore, in our 
view, if Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s analysis were correct then we would expect 
its occurrence in such clauses to depend primarily on stylistic, rather than 
contextual, considerations. In other words, we would expect it to occur regularly in 
these clauses in formal written German, in the same way that it is regularly 
embedded under verbs such as sagen and berichten in more formal contexts. 
However, as we suggested above in section 2.2.9, the reportative subjunctive is 
generally embedded under verbs of denial in reportative contexts, as in example 
(39) (repeated below). In this case, a single person (Morgan Tsvangirai) is reported 
as having denied the embedded propositions on a specific occasion. Additionally, 
the prototypical indirect speech in the next sentence is understood as a continuation 
of the same report: 
 
(39) Vehement dementierte er, dass seine MDC in Botswana oder sonstwo in 
Afrika Militärausbildungslager unterhalte und einen gewaltsamen Sturz des 
Mugabe-Regimes anstrebe, wie es von dessen Propaganda behauptet wird. 
Die MDC sei eine demokratische Bewegung, die ihre politischen Ziele auf 
friedlichem Wege verfolge. 
 
In less obviously reportative contexts, such as example (61), where the focus is on 
the illocutionary act of denying the embedded proposition, an indicative form is more 
likely:  
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(61) Daneben     steht     der   Iran,  ein  Land,       das      zwar         offiziell  
 alongside    stands  the   Iran   a     country    which   it is true    official 
 
noch  leugnet,  dass   sein  Atomprogramm        der   Waffenproduktion 
till      denies    that     its    atomic programme    the    production of weapons 
 
dient,           aber  dessen  Ambitionen  ein   offenes  Geheimnis   sind.  
 serves.IND   but    whose   ambitions     an    open     secret           are 
 
‘There is also Iran, a country which admittedly still officially denies that its 
atomic programme serves the production of weapons, but whose ambitions 
are an open secret.’  
(Hannoversche Allgemeine: 28/05/2009) 
 
In this example no specific act of denying is reported. Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s 
account, however, predicts that a reportative subjunctive is likely to occur because 
the verb of denial leugnen presupposes that it has previously been claimed that 
Iran’s atomic programme serves the production of weapons. 
 
 
2.3.6 Existing views: Conclusions 
 
The texts we have considered above are diverse in terms of their purpose and 
scope. Some of them have a purely pedagogical purpose and are intended for 
foreign learners of German (e.g. Durrell 2011; Whittle et al. 2011) and as such are 
descriptive rather than explanatory. Some are reference works intended for native 
speakers, whilst also being informed by recent linguistic insights (Zifonun et al. 
1997; Eisenberg 2004; Fabricius-Hansen 2006) whilst a third group are essentially 
academic in spirit: these include Flämig (1959), Jäger (1971), Thieroff (1992), 
Diewald (1999) and, especially, Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004).  
None of the texts presents, in our view, a fully adequate account of the 
German reportative subjunctive. The only analysis which benefits from being 
conducted within a particular framework is that of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 
(2004). However, we have shown that the notion that the reportative subjunctive 
carries a reportative presupposition is ultimately untenable because it does not 
adequately account for its distribution, for example it incorrectly predicts certain 
usages.  
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These accounts also do not, in our view, sufficiently account for the essential 
difference between the indicative and reportative subjunctive, i.e. the notion that the 
tenses of the latter can be understood only in relation to t1 and that the subjunctive 
is restricted to indirect speech which bears the property indirectness. (However, as 
we have suggested, the authors of pedagogical texts should not be criticized for this: 
accounting for such phenomena does not fall within their remit.) 
A shortcoming which characterizes several of these works concerns the 
attitude which a reporter will convey towards the reported proposition through her 
use of the German reportative subjunctive. This is often seen as a semantic 
question, particularly when the meaning of S2 (not in its replacement function) is 
considered: S2 is often seen as indicating that the reporter considers the reported 
proposition to be false. An adequate account, however, will proceed from the 
empirically substantiable premise that the subjunctive is compatible with any attitude 
that the reporter may wish to imply contextually and that, furthermore, identifying this 
interpretive stance falls within the domain of pragmatics rather than semantics. 
 In the next chapter we shall consider a specific framework in some detail:  
that of relevance theory. This is a general theory of utterance comprehension which 
is predicated on the assumption that human beings come with an innate endowment 
which allows them to metarepresent the intentions of others and thus to engage in 
inferential communication. Within relevance theory the German reportative 
subjunctive may be seen, alongside many other linguistic expressions, as a device 
which facilitates a hearer’s process of metarepresenting the meaning which the 
speaker intends to convey, in other words it helps the hearer recover the 
interpretation intended by the speaker. More specifically, we shall show that it aids 
the hearer’s process of understanding an utterance as an instance of indirect 
speech, which is seen in relevance theory as a specific variety of a type of language 
called interpretive use. Importantly, in the case of interpretive use, ‘[…] the 
communicated information (the ‘message’) itself contains a metarepresentational 
element, which is intended to be recognised as such’ (Noh 2000: 4). Our relevance-
theoretic analysis of the German reportative subjunctive will allow us to answer, in 
cognitively plausible terms, all of the questions we posed in section 2.2.11. 
 
 
2.4 Chapter summary 
 
In the first half of this chapter we considered in some detail the form and function of 
the German reportative subjunctive in indirect speech. In section 2.2.11 we 
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presented some (relatively) uncontroversial assumptions regarding the reportative 
subjunctive which we had gleaned from section 2.2, and from which a 
comprehensive account of the reportative subjunctive needs, in our view, to 
proceed. After this we stated the five phenomena of the German reportative 
subjunctive for which we ourselves intend to account in the remainder of this study: 
if our analysis can account for these phenomena then it can be said to be adequate.  
Our first question concerns the precise nature of the distinction between the 
indicative and the reportative subjunctive. How do we account for the fact that the 
reportative subjunctive is restricted to indirect-speech which displays indirectness? 
Secondly, how do we account for the fact that the subjunctive may be embedded 
under some factive verbs, such as kritisieren and bedauern such that they are 
understood to introduce indirect speech with the property indirectness? Thirdly, how 
do we account for the fact that verbs of denial are capable of accepting a reportative 
subjunctive in their complement clause? Fourthly, in the case of reported speech, 
how does the hearer identify and construct the ellipsed matrix clause on the level of 
mental representation? Finally, how do we account for the fact that the German 
reportative subjunctive is compatible with the contextual expression of any 
interpretive stance of the reporter towards the reported proposition? 
 In the second half of this chapter, we considered what some authorities have 
previously said about the German reportative subjunctive, and in the case of each 
we identified some shortcomings in the analysis provided.  
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3 
 
Relevance theory, procedural meaning and 
interpretive use 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Relevance theory is a theory of communication which was first developed in a series 
of papers written by the French scholar Dan Sperber and the British scholar Deirdre 
Wilson between the late 1970s and 1986. In 1986, as a culmination of the previous 
years’ work, Sperber and Wilson published the first edition of their influential book 
Relevance: Communication and Cognition. The theory put forward in this book 
builds on the Gricean model of inferential communication in the sense that it takes 
as its basis a claim which is central to Grice’s concept of nonnatural meaning, 
known as meaning-NN (Grice 1989: 213-223). This claim is that the expression and 
recognition of intentions is essential to human communication. However, Sperber 
and Wilson also deviate from Grice’s theory: they attempt to identify a cognitive 
basis for the mechanisms that a hearer deploys in utterance comprehension and in 
doing so they eliminate Grice’s conversational maxims whilst privileging the concept 
of relation (relevance).  
     This chapter is structured as follows. The first part will deal with the essential 
elements of relevance theory, beginning with a critical consideration of Grice’s 
model of inferential communication. We shall look at relevance theory’s cognitive 
and communicative principles of relevance, the processes that a hearer must deploy 
in order to arrive at the meaning intended by a speaker, and the concepts of 
explicature and implicature. In the next section we shall investigate in some detail 
the relevance-theoretic concept of procedural meaning, which will be of particular 
importance to us in Chapter 3 when we look at the procedural meaning which the 
German reportative subjunctive encodes. The final part of this chapter will be 
devoted to a consideration of the distinction made by relevance theorists between 
descriptive and interpretive uses of language. The chapter will end with an 
examination of some linguistic devices associated with interpretive use. 
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3.2 Relevance theory 
 
3.2.1 Grice’s theory of conversational implicature 
  
The theory of conversational implicature proposed by Grice occupies a special 
position within the philosophy of language and pragmatics. Grice’s central idea is 
that when a speaker produces an utterance, the speaker intends ‘[…] the utterance 
of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this 
intention’ (Grice 1989: 220). Grice suggests that the hearer will be aided in his 
recovery of the speaker’s specific intention by his expectation that the speaker is 
conforming to certain standards, alongside contextual considerations and 
observations concerning the speaker’s behaviour. He expresses the standards in 
terms of nine conversational maxims, divided into four categories. These categories 
are quantity (make your contribution no more and no less informative than is 
required), quality (be truthful), relation (be relevant) and manner (be concise, 
avoiding obscurity and ambiguity of expression). Importantly, the nine maxims are 
held to be subservient to an underlying principle: the Cooperative Principle. 
     For Grice, ‘what is said’ is the truth-conditional content of an utterance, and 
he referred to any non-truth-conditional meanings carried by an utterance using the 
term implicature. The most important type of implicature is called particularized 
conversational implicature by Grice. Such an implicature can be generated in two 
ways: by observing the maxims and by flouting them. Either way, the Cooperative 
Principle is said to hold. The implicature in (1b) (below), for example, is arrived at 
when the hearer understands the speaker to have observed the third maxim of 
relation. Despite the apparent discrepancy, on purely linguistic grounds, between 
Andrew’s question and Jennifer’s response, Andrew expects Jennifer’s answer to be 
relevant, and this expectation guides him towards Jennifer’s intended meaning: 
 
(1a) ANDREW: What did you think of the hotel where you stayed? 
JENNIFER: It was miles from the beach and the air-conditioning didn’t work. 
(1b) Jennifer did not like the hotel. 
 
     Grice’s work has exerted considerable influence over the domains of 
pragmatics and philosophy of language. However, although many scholars 
(importantly Horn (1984, 1989, 2004) and Levinson (1987a, 1987b, 1991, 2000) who 
reduce Grice's maxims to two and three principles respectively) are now working 
within neo-Gricean frameworks, some criticisms can be directed against his ideas. If 
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Grice’s theory of conversational implicature is to be plausible as a pragmatic theory 
which is applicable to all human verbal communication, then it needs to be 
demonstrated that the conversational maxims are innate and therefore universal. 
However, this is one place where Grice’s theory fails; indeed, Grice himself 
suggests that they are learnt: 
 
[I]t is just a well-recognized empirical fact that people do behave in these ways; they 
learned to do so in childhood and have not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it 
would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit.  
(Grice 1989: 29)  
 
Furthermore, there exists empirical evidence that suggests that the conversational 
maxims, as Grice conceived of them, are acquired. For example, there appear to be 
cultures in which a maxim of politeness plays a role in communication, and this 
maxim overrides the other maxims, particularly those of quality and manner. One 
such culture is that of Japan, and Loveday (1982: 364) shows that in Japanese it 
can be offensive to say ‘no’, and that it can even be preferable to lie rather than use 
this word. 
     The notion that Grice’s conversational maxims are arguably ultimately 
culture-specific does not itself preclude the existence of an underlying maxim or 
principle which cannot be flouted and is thus understood to hold in all 
circumstances. However, as Wilson and Sperber (2004: 613) claim, the underlying 
principle (the ‘Cooperative Principle’) which Grice proposed is inadequate. For them, 
evidence for this is the fact one cannot use silence in conversation in order to 
implicate that one is unwilling to supply information. Rather, silence can implicate 
only inability, and then only if it results from a clash with the quality maxims. Wilson 
and Sperber continue: 
 
Unwillingness to make one’s contribution “such as is required” is a violation of the 
Cooperative Principle; and since conversational implicatures are recoverable only on 
the assumption that the Cooperative Principle is being observed, it is impossible in 
Grice’s framework to implicate that one is unwilling to provide the required 
information. 
(Wilson and Sperber 2004: 613) 
 
     The process by which a hearer derives a given implicature can also be 
challenged. When a given utterance prompts the hearer to derive an implicature, 
there will be an infinite number of potential implicatures which are not incompatible 
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with the maxims and which are not made implausible by the specific context of the 
utterance. Some of these will be easily accessible, whilst others will be recoverable 
as a result of extending the context, which is in theory infinitely extendable. For 
example, the context in which Andrew processes Jennifer’s response in (1a) 
potentially contains every assumption that one could possibly entertain about 
beaches and air-conditioning. For instance, beaches consist of trillions of grains of 
sand, whilst air-conditioning has been linked to the spread of Legionnaire’s disease. 
Each of these assumptions could itself give rise to implicatures, and any one of 
these implicatures could be understood as that intended by the speaker. What 
Grice’s model fails to explain is how the hearer selects the precise context in which 
the utterance is to be processed and thus selects from all the possible implicatures 
the implicature(s) which the speaker intends. Why is it that the remaining potential 
implicatures are normally automatically discarded, without even being entertained? 
How is it that, in a given context, answering ‘I’m driving’ in response to ‘Would you 
like another drink?’ is more likely to implicate ‘No, I would not like another drink’ than 
‘Yes, but it needs to be non-alcoholic’? Grice’s model does not explain this.   
What we are suggesting is that Grice’s approach is not adequate as a model 
of inferential utterance interpretation. Ultimately, as our last criticism suggests, Grice 
does not achieve what he set out to do: explain how we recover the speaker’s 
intended meaning. What follows is an overview of Sperber and Wilson’s relevance 
theory. This is a model of communication that is held to be genuinely universal 
thanks to its being grounded in innate features of human cognition: it recognizes, for 
example, that human beings have an innate ablity to metarepresent the intentions of 
others and that this plays a crucial role in the comprehension of utterances. Thus 
relevance theory suggests in plausible terms how hearers regularly recover the 
speaker’s intended meaning.      
 
 
3.2.2 The cognitive principle of relevance 
 
Sperber and Wilson hold that human cognition has evolved such that the search for 
relevance is one of its essential features, and this is captured in Sperber and 
Wilson’s cognitive principle of relevance. This principle states that (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/95: 262): 
    
[…] human cognition tends to be organised so as to maximise relevance.  
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But what do we mean by ‘relevance’? At any time, there will be many assumptions, 
or ‘[…] thoughts treated by the individual as representations of the actual world […]’ 
(1986/95: 2) that are manifest to an individual. An assumption is assumed to be 
manifest to an individual at a given time ‘[…] if and only if he is capable at that time 
of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true’ 
(1986/95: 39). For Sperber and Wilson, an input is relevant if when processed in a 
context of manifest assumptions a positive cognitive effect is generated. Wilson and 
Sperber (2004: 608) define ‘positive cognitive effect’ as ‘[…] a worthwhile difference 
to the individual’s representation of the world: a true conclusion, for example’.  
      Given the tendency of humans to maximize relevance, it is possible for any 
stimulus or internal representation that supplies an input to cognitive processes to 
interact at some point with manifest assumptions and thus yield a positive cognitive 
effect. For example, I might leave my house one morning and start walking down the 
street towards the corner shop. I am surrounded by a considerable number of 
phenomena to which I could pay attention. There may be a gentle breeze blowing, a 
steady flow of traffic and a number of other people in the street, none of whom I 
know. However, I pay no heed to any of these. But then I look up and notice that 
there are some black clouds in the sky. In my mind I have available a highly 
accessible assumption about black clouds, namely, that they mean that it is likely to 
rain soon. So the visual stimulus of black clouds is processed in the context of this 
assumption with the result that I form a new assumption, namely that it will quite 
possibly rain soon, and maybe other assumptions, for example I may soon need an 
umbrella. This type of cognitive effect, where an input interacts with existing 
assumptions (old information) and as a result a fresh assumption is formed, is called 
a contextual implication. There are two other types of positive cognitive effect. 
One type of positive cognitive effect is the confirmation or strengthening of 
existing assumptions. For example, later the same day I decide to visit a café for 
lunch which you have recommended to me. You have told me that the food is 
exceptionally good. The food comes to the table, and having cleared my plate, I am 
as impressed as you were. Thus an assumption I already held (that the food is very 
good) is confirmed. 
Alternatively, I might find the food mediocre, the staff rude and the café 
overpriced. In this case I am likely to abandon the assumption that I held prior to my 
visit. Abandoning an already existing assumption as a result of processing an input 
is the third type of positive cognitive effect.  
   However, as Cummings (2005) points out, ‘[c]ognition has at its disposal 
finite resources – no cognitive process has access to a memory of infinite capacity, 
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and so on’ (2005: 18). Therefore, it is not unexpected that the processing of an input 
‘[…] will proceed in a cost-benefit fashion’ (2005: 18). This means that the relevance 
of an input in the relevance-theoretic framework is measured not only in terms of the 
cognitive effects that are generated when it is processed but also in terms of the 
amount of effort that the individual must invest in order to process the input. The 
more cognitive effects generated, the greater the relevance of an input, but, 
inversely, the greater the effort required in order to process the input, the lesser its 
relevance. Wilson and Sperber formulate the relevance of an input to an individual 
thus (2004: 609):  
    
   A.   Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by 
processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at 
that time. 
   B.  Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower 
the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. 
 
     The following is a slightly condensed and adapted version of a (somewhat 
artificial) example supplied by Wilson and Sperber (2004: 609-610). Jennifer has 
been invited to a dinner party but because she is allergic to chicken she telephones 
her host beforehand to find out what will be served. Below are two ways in which her 
host could answer her query: 
 
(2a) We are serving chicken. 
(2b) Either we are serving chicken or 72 – 3 is not 46. 
 
Both of these responses to Jennifer’s query are adequate in the sense that they will 
answer Jennifer’s question, but the above definition of the relevance of an input 
predicts that the answer in (2a) will be more relevant because it requires less 
processing effort. It is thus the answer that her host is more likely to produce. Her 
host might conceivably respond with (2b) only if she believes that the extra 
processing effort it requires of Jennifer will be offset by additional positive cognitive 
effects which are worth her processing. 
     As we have seen, the cognitive principle of relevance states that human 
beings have a tendency to maximize relevance. Jennifer may exploit this natural 
tendency by modifying Andrew’s environment in order to make manifest to this 
person an assumption, but without wishing to make her intention to do so overt. 
Wilson and Sperber explain this as follows:  
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[…] I may be able to produce a stimulus which is likely to attract your attention, 
activate an appropriate set of contextual assumptions and point you toward an 
intended conclusion. For example, I may leave my empty glass in your line of vision 
intending you to notice and conclude that I might like another drink. 
(Wilson and Sperber: 2004: 611) 
 
Such a person is said to have an informative intention, a term which Sperber and 
Wilson define thus (1986/95: 58):  
 
Informative intention: to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set 
of assumptions I. 
 
However, Wilson and Sperber’s example, for the specific reason that Jennifer does 
not wish Andrew to recognize her intention to make an assumption manifest, cannot 
yet be described as an instance of communication. Precisely why this is the case 
should become clear in the ensuing discussion of the communicative principle of 
relevance. 
 
 
3.2.3 The communicative principle of relevance 
 
Scholars working within the relevance-theoretic framework refer to inferential 
communication as they understand the concept using the term ostensive-inferential 
communication. The informative intention is fundamental to this type of 
communication, but in order for a communicative act to be considered an instance of 
ostensive-inferential communication we must add a second layer of intention 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 61): 
 
Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to audience and 
communicator that the communicator has the informative intention. 
 
At this juncture we should clarify how we understand the term mutually manifest. 
Essential here is Sperber and Wilson's concept of cognitive environment, and an 
individual’s cognitive environment ‘[…] is a set of facts that are manifest to him' 
(1986/95: 39). No two people share the same cognitive environment, but there may 
be assumptions common to the cognitive environments of two people, i.e., their 
cognitive environments may intersect. The intersection of the total cognitive 
environment of two people constitutes their total shared cognitive environment. If it 
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is manifest which people share a shared cognitive environment, then this shared 
cognitive environment is a mutual cognitive environment (1986/95:41). Sperber and 
Wilson go on to suggest that the circumstance that a given assumption is manifest 
to those who share a mutual cognitive environment is itself manifest. Thus, ‘[…] in a 
mutual cognitive environment, every manifest assumption is what we will call 
mutually manifest (1986/95: 41-42)’. 
     Essential to ostensive-inferential communication is an ostensive stimulus. It 
is the purpose of an ostensive stimulus to attract a person's attention and to create 
expectations that it is worth attending to a phenomenon, i.e., expectations that a 
phenomenon is relevant. Moreover, it is not just expectations of relevance that are 
created when an ostensive stimulus is employed; rather its use generates 
expectations of a particular level of relevance. Sperber and Wilson call this level of 
relevance optimal relevance and they make the claim that (1986/95: 260): 
 
[e]very act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its 
own optimal relevance.  
 
This is their communicative principle of relevance. However, the term ‘presumption 
of optimal relevance’ requires some clarification. Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 270) 
define this as follows: 
 
Presumption of optimal relevance 
   A. The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the addressee's effort 
to process it. 
   B.  The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator's abilities and preferences. 
 
According to clause A, an ostensive stimulus should give rise to at least sufficient 
positive cognitive effects for the amount of processing effort required of the 
audience to be justified. Clause B makes allowances for the eventuality of the 
communicator being unable or unwilling to make her utterance more relevant than 
this. The role of clause B is illustrated in the case of someone who is attempting to 
communicate in a foreign language of which she has limited knowledge. The extent 
to which processing effort is minimized will ultimately depend on her imperfect 
linguistic competence. However, she is still assumed to put her hearer to as little 
processing effort as possible in recovering her intended meaning.  
When an utterance is produced, a hearer's task is to recover, on the 
assumption that the utterance has been produced in accordance with the 
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communicative principle of relevance, the speaker's intended meaning. As 
suggested in Chapter 1, this requires the hearer to attribute intentions to the 
speaker: it requires the hearer to engage in a series of metarepresentations of the 
speaker’s likely meaning and may, in the case of the hearer who is using the 
strategy of ‘Sophisticated Understanding’, require the hearer to metarepresent the 
speaker’s thoughts about her own thoughts (Sperber 1994; Wilson 1999). For the 
task of arriving at the meaning intended by the speaker, the hearer deploys the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 613): 
 
       A. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in 
order of accessibility. 
       B.    Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned). 
 
Central to this process is the identification of the propositional form of an utterance. 
This will exercise us in the next section. 
 
 
3.2.4 Identifying the propositional form of an utterance  
  
Grice recognized that the semantic representation of an utterance, or linguistically 
encoded meaning, is often incomplete and that in order to arrive at what he 
considered to be ‘what is said’, which for Grice was the truth-conditional content of 
an utterance, ambiguities must be resolved, deixis must be fixed and the meaning 
encoded by lexical items must be enriched (Grice 1989: 25). What Grice failed to 
recognize is that the recovery of this explicit content of an utterance, like that of 
implicatures, is an inferential process and thus falls within the domain of pragmatics 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 182-183). For Sperber and Wilson the fully fleshed-
out semantic representation of an utterance is the propositional form. It is the 
discrepancy between encoded linguisitically meaning and the propositional form of 
an utterance that Carston had in mind when she formulated her linguistic 
underdeterminacy thesis, touched upon in Chapter 1 (Carston 2002: 15-93).  
In relevance theory, the hearer’s first task in recovering the propositional 
form of an utterance is to derive through a process of decoding an incomplete 
logical form from the linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance. Thus the 
incomplete logical form that a hearer of (3a) will derive will be something like (3b) 
(adapted from Wilson and Sperber 1993: 10): 
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(3a) Andrew told Jennifer that he was tired. 
(3b) x told y that z was tired. 
 
According to the relevance-theoretic view, this process of identifying the incomplete 
logical form of an utterance is the only element of utterance comprehension which 
involves decoding; all other processes involved are inferential. Once an incomplete 
logical form such as (3b) has been derived, it has to be completed, inferentially, into 
a propositional form, such as (3c): 
 
(3c) Andrew told Jennifer that Andrew was tired. 
 
How can we be sure that a given propositional form, say (3c), is the intended 
propositional form? x and z in (3b) are imagined to refer to the same person in the 
propositional form (3c). But this did not have to be the case; in different 
circumstances, exactly the same utterance (3a) and incomplete logical form (3b) 
could have yielded the propositional form in (3d):  
 
(3d)  Andrew told Jennifer that David was tired. 
  
The relevance-theoretic answer to the question as to how we can be expected to 
recover the speaker’s intended meaning is that ultimately we metarepresent that 
meaning which is optimally relevant and therefore consistent with the 
communicative principle of relevance: 
 
At every stage in disambiguation, reference assignment and enrichment, the hearer 
should choose the solution involving the least effort, and should abandon the solution 
only if it fails to yield an interpretation consistent with the [communicative] principle of 
relevance. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 185) 
 
What follows is a discussion of five pragmatic processes that a hearer will deploy in 
constructing the propositional form of an utterance: disambiguation, saturation, 
reference assignment, free enrichment and ad hoc concept construction. 
Disambiguation is necessary when the linguistic system provides a given 
lexical item with two or more potential senses and we need to identify the precise 
sense intended by the speaker. An example of the kind of process involved here is 
given by Huang (2007: 189) (slightly adapted): 
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(4a)   Andrew and Jennifer passed the port in the evening. 
        a. port = harbour 
b. port = wine    
 
A hearer, presuming that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance, will assume 
that the intended meaning of the semantically ambiguous lexical item is that which is 
the most accessible in the context. If, for example, if it is mutually manifest that 
Andrew and Jennifer have been away on a cruise, then the sense of ‘port’ that will 
satisfy his expectations of relevance is likely to be that given in (4b):  
  
(4b)    Andrew and Jennifer passed the harbour in the evening. 
 
Saturation, or 'linguistically mandatory completion' (Carston 2004: 637), is 
necessary if the derivation of the propositional form involves saturating, i.e. filling, a 
given slot, position or variable in the semantic representation of the utterance. In the 
following examples from Carston (2004: 637), the need for the slots marked [Ø] to 
be saturated before a propositional form can be derived is demonstrated by the 
bracketed questions: 
 
(5a) Paracetamol is better [Ø]. [than what?] 
(5b) It's the same [Ø].  [as what?] 
(5c) He is too young [Ø].  [for what?] 
(5d) It's hot enough [Ø].  [for what?] 
(5e) I like Sally's shoes [Ø]. [shoes in what relation to Sally?] 
 
Thus, according to relevance theory, in the process of deriving the complete 
propositional form of an utterance a hearer may recognize the necessity for an 
empty slot [Ø] to be saturated by the most readily accessible item. Crucial roles are 
played here by the context and the assumption that the speaker must be aiming at 
optimal relevance.  
Saturation is the process that comes in to play in cases of reference 
assignment. The potential meanings of the ambiguous item are not provided 
linguistically; rather ‘[…] the linguistic element used – for instance, a pronoun – 
indicates that an appropriate contextual value is to be found, that is, that a given 
position in the logical form is to be saturated […]’ (Carston 2004: 637). In all cases, 
the presumption of optimal relevance ensures that the hearer understands the 
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intended referent to be that which is most accessible. Consider example (6) (taken 
from Huang 2007: 185): 
 
(6) Advice given by the government during an outbreak of salmonella in the UK 
Fried eggs should be cooked properly and if there are frail or elderly people 
in the house, they should be hard-boiled. 
 
There is nothing encoded here which instructs the hearer to understand the 
intended referent of ‘they’ to be ‘eggs’ rather than ‘frail or elderly people’. What 
guides us towards the obvious intended meaning is our assumption that the speaker 
must be aiming at optimal relevance. Specific mutually manifest assumptions come 
into play, namely that it is eggs that one hard-boils, not frail or elderly people.  
In the case of free enrichment, there is nothing more in terms of 
disambiguation and saturation that need be added to an utterance in order to derive 
a fully determinate proposition. However this minimal proposition is not normally that 
which the speaker intended to communicate. In some cases, the minimal proposition 
is trivial. Carston (2004: 639) gives the following example: 
 
(7a) She has a brain.  
 
The minimal proposition expressed here is so obvious that outside a very specific 
context (say, one where a bizarre new species has been discovered, and scientists 
are now debating whether the example they have found, which they believe to be 
female, is a plant or an animal) a speaker is unlikely to go to the trouble of 
expressing it. However, the most accessible meaning that the speaker could have 
intended, and the one that will require the hearer to expend the least processing 
effort in order arrive at it, is the proposition in (7b): 
 
(7b) She has a high-functioning brain. 
 
The final pragmatic process that we consider in this section is ad hoc 
concept construction. The notion of ad hoc concept construction was first suggested 
by Barsalou (1983) and refers to the pragmatic adjustment of a lexical concept in the 
decoded logical form. Lexical concepts used in such a way will have elements in 
common with their conventional denotation, and it is expected that the hearer, who 
assumes that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance, will be able to identify the 
salient common features and discard those which the speaker cannot have in mind. 
 112 
 
There are two essential processes involved in ad hoc concept construction: lexical 
broadening and lexical narrowing. Examples of lexical broadening provided by 
Carston (2004: 642) include the following: 
 
(8) There is a rectangle of lawn at the back. 
 
This area of lawn is unlikely to be strictly rectangular, and the speaker expects the 
hearer to understand this. Thus here we have not the encoded concept RECTANGLE 
but a broader concept RECTANGLE*. Nevertheless, this is an economical way of 
describing the rough shape of the lawn and will yield the necessary cognitive effects. 
     The following example (Carston 2004: 642), which was uttered by a witness 
at a murder trial, contains an example of lexical narrowing:   
 
(9) He was upset, but he wasn’t upset. 
 
We do not understand this as a contradiction because our expectation of optimal 
relevance ensures that we understand each occurrence of ‘upset’ here slightly 
differently. The first occurrence of the word may be said to encode the concept 
UPSET in a more literal sense. The second occurrence, however, ‘[…] carries certain 
implications (e.g. that he was in a murdering state of mind) that the first one does 
not […]’, and the witness is denying that these implications are applicable to the 
defendant.  
 This brings us to the end of our discussion of how a hearer’s assumption that 
the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance guides him towards the intended 
propositional form of the utterance. In the next section we shall consider the 
relevance-theoretic concept of explicature. 
 
 
3.2.5 Explicature, truth conditions and relevance  
 
Above we considered the propositional form of an utterance: this is its fully fleshed-
out semantic representation, whereby all semantic indeterminacies and ambiguities 
have been resolved. Another term used in relevance theory to refer to the 
propositional form of an utterance is ‘proposition expressed’; the two terms are used 
interchangeably. 
 Of particular importance to relevance theory is the concept of explicature. 
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 182) define ‘explicature’ as follows:  
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An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit [i.e. an explicature] 
if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U. 
 
We should draw the reader’s attention to the word ‘communicated’ because here 
lies a crucial distinction between the proposition expressed by an utterance and its 
explicatures: the proposition expressed is not an explicature of the utterance unless 
it is communicated in the sense that it is put forward as true or probably true (Wilson 
and Sperber 2004: 623; Carston 2002: 117). In those cases where the proposition 
expressed is communicated, it represents a type of explicature which Wilson and 
Sperber (2004: 623) call a basic explicature. Thus if the speaker of (3a) above 
wishes to communicate the proposition encoded by the propositional form (3c), then 
(3c) will also be the basic explicature of (3a): 
 
(3a) Andrew told Jennifer that he was tired. 
(3c) Andrew told Jennifer that Andrew Browne was tired. 
 
However, the proposition expressed does not necessarily constitute part of 
what is communicated by an utterance. This is true, for example, in the case of 
metaphor and ironical utterances. (10a) is an example of irony (slightly adapted from 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 224): 
 
(10a) (i) Andrew is quite well-read. (ii) He’s even heard of Shakespeare. 
 
(11a) is a metaphor: 
 
(11a) This room is a pigsty. 
 
In these cases, the propositions ‘Andrew is quite well read’ and ‘this room is a 
pigsty’ are not communicated. Thus they are not explicatures. The only obvious 
explicatures of (10a) and (11a) are (10b) and (11b), where the hearer has integrated 
them into a higher speech-act description: 
 
(10b) The speaker is saying that Andrew is quite well-read. 
(11b) The speaker is saying that this room is a pigsty.         
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Another case where the proposition expressed is not communicated is that of 
questions, for example yes-no questions. For instance, the proposition expressed by 
(12a) is (12b), but (12b) is not put forward as true or probably true: 
 
(12a) Would you like another cup of tea? 
(12b) The hearer would like another cup of tea. 
 
What is explicitly communicated by (12a) is (12c):  
 
(12c) The speaker is asking whether the hearer would like another cup of tea. 
 
The speech-act descriptions in (10b), (11b) and (12c) are examples of another type 
of explicature. This is higher-level explicature, and it is defined by Blakemore (2002: 
75) as: 
 
[…] assumptions which are derived by developing the semantic representation 
of an utterance […] so that an explicature […] is recovered and embedding it 
under a propositional attitude or speech act description.  
 
The following mini dialogue (slightly adapted from Blakemore 2002: 73) should 
illustrate the concept of higher-level explicature further: 
 
(13a) ANDREW: Why aren’t you going away this summer? 
 JENNIFER: I have to finish my book. 
 
Firstly, Andrew will need to deploy the pragmatic processes outlined in the previous 
section in order to recover the propositional form of Jennifer’s utterance (Blakemore 
2002: 75): 
 
(13b) Jennifer must finish the processes involved in preparing the book which 
Jennifer is authoring for publication. 
 
Let us assume that (13b) is not only the propositional form of Jennifer’s utterance; 
she also wishes to communicate it. Then it also functions as a basic explicature. 
(13b) may now be embedded under a propositional attitude or speech act 
description. This will produce higher-level explicatures such as (13c) and (13d) 
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(2002: 75). (Hereinafter explicatures that must be recovered inferentially will be 
placed in curly brackets): 
 
(13c) {The speaker regrets that} she must finish the processes involved in 
preparing the book she is authoring for publication. 
(13d) {The speaker says that} she must finish the processes involved in preparing 
the book she is authoring for publication. 
 
Note that whilst inference is required in the construction of such higher-level 
explicatures, they are nevertheless considered to be explicitly communicated: they 
are not implicatures.  
How are we to distinguish between the assumptions explicitly communicated 
by an utterance, i.e. its various explicatures? The earlier literature on relevance 
theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95; Blakemore 1987; Itani-Kaufmann 1990; 
Ifantidou 1993) assumed that the difference between the proposition expressed and 
higher-level explicatures could be explained in truth-conditional terms. It seems to 
have been taken for granted that the proposition expressed by an utterance was 
coextensive with its truth-conditional content whilst its higher-level explicatures were 
non-truth-conditional. Thus it was assumed that any utterance expresses a single 
proposition and has a single set of truth conditions.   
However, the current relevance-theoretic position is that in utterance 
comprehension the semantic representation of an utterance is developed by 
pragmatic inference into multiple conceptual representations (explicatures), and 
each of these conceptual representations has its own truth conditions. (Blakemore 
2002, 2004). This position is supported by a variety of evidence. Firstly, sentence 
adverbials such as ‘frankly’, ‘regrettably’ and ‘sadly’ are generally seen as making 
their contribution on the level of higher-level explicature, and were therefore formerly 
considered to be non-truth-conditional. But the higher-level explicature to which it 
contributes clearly has its own truth conditions. Evidence for this is provided by the 
fact that a speaker ‘[…] can lay herself open to charges of untruthfulness in its use 
[…]’ (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 18), as in (14): 
 
(14) ANDREW: Frankly, you’re probably going to fail the exam. 
 JENNIFER: That’s not true. You’re not being frank. 
 
Additionally, lexical items which are conventionally seen as non-truth-conditional 
may function on the level of the proposition expressed. ‘On the record’ and ‘off the 
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record’ in (15), which one might expect to be understood as non-truth-conditional 
and thus as contributing to the higher-level explicatures of the utterance, need to be 
understood as part of the proposition expressed, otherwise the result would be a 
contradiction (example, slightly adapted, from Wilson and Sperber 1993: 19): 
 
(15) ANDREW:  What can I tell our readers about your private life? 
JENNIFER: On the record, I’m happily married. Off the record, I’m about to 
divorce. 
 
If an utterance communicates multiple assumptions, each of which has its own truth 
conditions, then the question as to how we should distinguish between the 
respective contributions made by these assumptions remains as yet unanswered. 
Blakemore (2002: 76-77) uses the following (slightly adapted) example to illustrate 
her response to this question. Jennifer strenuously denies eating Andrew’s 
chocolates, before eventually uttering, in a weary tone of voice: 
 
(16a) OK, I ate them. 
 
Naturally, it will not be sufficient for Andrew to recover merely the proposition in 
(16b) in order for his expectations of optimal relevance to be satisfied; after all, he 
was already sufficiently convinced that Jennifer had eaten the chocolates: 
 
(16b) Jennifer ate Andrew’s chocolates.  
  
Instead, Andrew needs to recover the higher-level explicature in (16c), for it is in this 
explicature that the main relevance of Jennifer’s utterance lies. (From now on, in the 
case of higher-level explicatures, the part in which the main relevance lies will be 
given in bold): 
 
(16c) {Jennifer admits that} she ate Andrew’s chocolates. 
 
Thus Blakemore suggests that ‘[…] we may distinguish between the assumptions 
explicitly communicated by an utterance according to their relative contributions to 
relevance’ (emphasis mine) (2002: 77). There is therefore no need to mention truth 
conditions when distinguishing between the assumptions explicitly communicated by 
an utterance.   
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This raises the question of how ‘main relevance’ should be defined. Franken 
(1997) holds that the main relevance of an utterance lies in that communicated 
assumption which produces the greatest number of positive cognitive effects. Whilst 
this may correctly predict which communicated assumption carries the main 
relevance of an utterance, it defines main relevance in relative terms: explicature x 
carries the main relevance because it generates more positive cognitive effects than 
explicatures y and z. Instead, we propose the following definition of main relevance 
which captures the notion that the main relevance of an utterance lies in that 
assumption which satisfies the hearer’s expectation of optimal relevance: 
 
The main relevance of an utterance lies in that assumption which in the 
specific context communicates sufficient positive cognitive effects to satisfy 
the hearer’s expectation of optimal relevance.  
 
In (16c) above it is the cognitive effects yielded by the higher-level explicature which 
will satisfy the hearer’s expectations. 
In summary, given that all the assumptions explicitly communicated by an 
utterance have their own truth conditions, it is ultimately their relative contributions to 
relevance that enable us to distinguish between them. Since the main relevance of 
an utterance may reside in the proposition expressed or a higher-level explicature, 
the notion of main relevance cuts across the distinction between proposition 
expressed and higher-level explicature. The notions of higher-level explicature and 
main relevance will be of particular concern to us in Chapter 5 when we look at the 
relevance-theoretic approach to speech acts and discuss their report.  
 
 
3.2.6 Implicature 
 
There are many cases where it is necessary to do more than deploy explicature- 
derivation processes for one’s expectations of relevance to be satisfied. In such 
cases an individual needs to look beyond that which is explicitly communicated and 
consider an utterance’s implicatures. We understand an implicature to be a context-
dependent meaning which is implicitly communicated by an utterance, i.e., it results 
from the interaction between the proposition expressed and mutually manifest 
contextual assumptions. 
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Relevance theory distinguishes two chief types of implicature: implicated 
premise and implicated conclusion. Let us return to an example we used towards 
the beginning of this chapter:  
 
(1a) ANDREW: What did you think of the hotel where you stayed? 
 JENNIFER: It was miles from the beach and the air-conditioning didn’t work. 
 
The result of fleshing out the semantic representation of Jennifer’s response to 
Andrew’s question is the propositional form in (1c). However, as a basic explicature 
of Jennifer’s utterance, it does not answer Andrew’s question: 
 
(1c) The hotel in which Jennifer stayed at during her holiday was too far from the 
nearest beach to be conveniently located for Jennifer, and the air-
conditioning system in the hotel did not work during Jennifer’s holiday. 
 
Andrew, who assumes that the optimally relevant interpretation is the one that 
Jennifer intends, will need to consider the implicatures of Jennifer’s utterance. First 
he will need to process the first clause of Jennifer’s utterance in a context containing 
assumptions about hotels and beaches and the second clause in a context 
containing assumptions about air-conditioning. These contexts will contain the 
following two assumptions, which Jennifer assumes to be highly accessible to 
Andrew: 
 
(1d) → Hotels which are a long way from the nearest beach are inconveniently 
located. 
(1e) → If the air-conditioning does not work then it is too hot for comfort. 
  
Each of these assumptions functions here as an implicated premise (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/95: 195).73 However, neither of these yet provides an adequate answer 
to Andrew’s question. In order for his expectations of relevance to be satisfied, 
Andrew must take his processing one step further. Since Jennifer has made two 
negative remarks about the hotel, the most easily accessible assumption that will 
provide an adequate answer to Andrew's question is that given in (1b): 
 
(1b) ⇉ Jennifer did not like the hotel.  
                                                 
73
 Implicated premises will be marked → in the remainder of this study. 
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Such an implicature is what Sperber and Wilson call an implicated conclusion 
(1986/95: 195).74 They make the claim that ‘[a]ll implicatures […] fall into one or the 
other of these categories’ (1986/95: 195).    
      
 
3.3 Procedural meaning 
 
Relevance theory claims that a hearer is entitled to presume that a speaker is 
aiming at optimal relevance. This means that a speaker’s utterance is assumed to 
be relevant enough to be worth processing, and that the level of relevance is the 
highest that the parameters of the speaker’s abilities and willingness will allow. This 
claim of relevance theory has prompted its proponents to identify semantic devices 
whose function is to assist the hearer in recovering the interpretation consistent with 
the communicative principle of relevance. These devices achieve this by reducing 
the amount of processing effort required and guiding the hearer towards the 
intended positive cognitive effects. They ensure that the hearer recovers these 
effects by constraining the inferential computations which are performed over 
conceptual representations: these devices are therefore said to encode procedural 
meaning. Paradigm examples of lexical items which encode procedural meaning are 
discourse connectives such as ‘after all’, ‘but’, ‘however’ and ‘so’. In the following 
example, taken from Blakemore (1987: 88), the procedural expression ‘you see’ 
instructs the hearer to access, as an implicated premise, the assumption that there 
is a causal connection between ice and slipping. It therefore ensures that the hearer 
recovers the implicated conclusion in (17b) and thus understands the second 
proposition as an explanation for the event described by the first:  
 
(17a)  She slipped. You see, the road was icy. 
(17b) ⇉ She slipped because the road was icy. 
 
 Procedural meaning is to be contrasted with conceptual meaning which is 
encoded by linguistic expressions such as nouns, adjectives and verbs. They 
encode constituents of the conceptual representations which a hearer constructs in 
utterance comprehension. They thus provide an input to the decoding phase of 
comprehension.  
                                                 
74
 Implicated conclusions will be marked ⇉ in the remainder of this study. 
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     In her 1987 book Semantic Constraints on Relevance, Blakemore attempted 
to analyze the Gricean notion of conventional implicature in relevance-theoretic 
terms. She tried to show that the distinction between conceptual and procedural 
meaning was essentially a cognitively grounded version of the traditional speech-act 
theoretic distinction between describing and indicating. In doing so she argued that 
those lexical items which encode conceptual meaning were consistently truth-
conditional. Procedural meaning, on the other hand, aided the recovery only of what 
is implicit in an utterance, as in example (17a) above, and its import was therefore 
assumed to be consistently non-truth-conditional.   
This position was challenged by Wilson and Sperber (1993). They point out 
that illocutionary adverbials such as ‘frankly’, ‘regrettably’ and ‘sadly’, which should 
be conceived of in conceptual terms, do not contribute to the truth conditions of an 
utterance. Blakemore’s analysis, however, predicts that they should be truth-
conditional. This prompts Wilson and Sperber to claim that such adverbials are 
conceptual but non-truth-conditional (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 17-19). Personal 
pronouns do not themselves encode constituents of conceptual representations, but 
they do encode procedures for constructing them. Wilson and Sperber therefore 
claim that they are procedural but have truth-conditional import (1993: 19-21). In 
addition, Wilson and Sperber suggest that subject-verb inversion in English 
interrogatives can be analyzed as encoding a constraint on higher-level 
explicatures, as can the dialectal French particle ti (1993: 21). Both of these ensure 
that an utterance is understood as a yes-no question.   
However, these insights came about at a time when contributions to truth 
conditions were still seen as the key factor when differentiating between the 
assumptions communicated by an utterance. In section 3.2.5 we saw that relevance 
theory no longer views an utterance as communicating one proposition with a single 
set of truth conditions. Rather, utterance comprehension is now seen as a process 
whereby conceptual representations are developed by pragmatic inference into 
representations, all of which possess their own truth conditions. This has an 
important consequence: it no longer makes sense to distinguish between lexical 
items in terms of whether they are themselves truth-conditional or non-truth-
conditional. Rather, ‘[…] the question that matters is […] what kind of cognitive 
information it encodes – conceptual or procedural’ (Blakemore 2004: 230). With 
contributions to truth conditions out of the picture, the question arises as to how we 
should distinguish between lexical items which encode conceptual meaning and 
those which encode procedural meaning.  
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Blakemore (2002: 82-88) looks at how procedural and conceptual items 
differ in terms of the properties they display, and we shall now review some of the 
more salient differences.   
Firstly, conceptual items are easier to bring to consciousness than 
procedural items; we can form a mental representation of a tree, someone running 
or the colour blue. Additionally, we can usually think of a synonym for a conceptual 
item, and describe the extent to which the two words are truly synonymous. Even if 
we cannot think of a synonym, we may feel that we should be able to do so. 
Procedural items, however, are much harder to represent mentally, since ‘[w]e have 
direct access neither to grammatical computations nor to the inferential 
computations used in comprehension’ (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 16). Thus, if 
asked to provide a definition of a word such as ‘but’ or ‘however’, it is generally 
easier to give an example of how it is used. Furthermore, even if a synonym for a 
procedural lexical item is suggested, ‘[…] native speakers are unable to judge 
whether two of these expressions […] are synonymous without testing their inter-
substitutability in all contexts’ (Blakemore 2002: 83).    
Secondly, conceptual items display semantic compositionality in that they 
can combine with other conceptual items to form semantically complex expressions. 
This can be seen in the case of sentence adverbials which, as we have seen, 
generally make their contribution on the level of higher-level explicature. In each of 
the following examples, example (b) is semantically more complex than (a) (adapted 
from Blakemore 2002: 84): 
 
(18a) In confidence, she has been promoted. 
(18b) In total, absolute confidence, she has been promoted. 
(19a) Speaking frankly, I don’t think people ever ask themselves those kind of 
questions. 
(19b) Speaking quite frankly, I don’t think people ever ask themselves those kind 
of questions. 
(20a) Putting it brutally, you’re sacked. 
(20b) Putting it more brutally, you’re sacked. 
 
However, since we are unable to form a mental representation of an inferential 
computation, we would not expect procedural items to display semantic 
compositionality. The unacceptability of Blakemore’s example (2002: 84) 
demonstrates that this is the case: 
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(21) ? Tom likes pop art. Totally however, Anna prefers Renaissance art. 
 
Bezuidenhout (2004: 106) points out, however, that procedural items can 
display semantic compositionality and be modified by (conceptual) adjectives and 
adverbs. For example:  
 
(22a)  She is interested in our job. But we’ll have to offer her much more money. 
(22b) She is interested in our job. But, and this is a big but, we’ll have to offer her 
much more money. 
(23a) Photoshop allows us to digitally manipulate photographic images. So 
photography has become more like painting. 
(23b) Photoshop allows us to digitally manipulate photographic images. So, 
although not obviously so, photography has become more like painting. 
 
Bezuidenhout goes on to conclude that ‘[…] the compositionality test is not a reliable 
one for distinguishing the procedural from the conceptual’ (Bezuidenhout 2004: 
106). In (22b), we would argue that ‘but’ has been nominalized and as such is 
essentially treated conceptually, and itself therefore does not necessarily pose a 
challenge to the validity of this test. However, (23b) suggests that Bezuidenhout 
may have a point. The fact that ‘so’ can be modified with ‘(not) obviously so’ can be 
linked to the fact that some procedural lexical items can in some contexts be 
conceived of in conceptual terms. Significantly, Grice attempted to provide an 
essentially conceptual analysis for discourse markers such as ‘so’, ‘after all’ and ‘on 
the other hand’, suggesting, for example, that when a speaker uses ‘on the other 
hand’: 
 
[…] he is […] performing a higher-order speech-act of commenting in a certain way 
on the lower-order speech-acts. He is contrasting in some way the performance of 
some of these lower-order speech-acts with others, and he signals his performance 
of this higher-order speech act in his use of the embedded enclitic phrase “on the 
other hand”.  
(Grice 1989: 362) 
 
Blakemore (1987), however, shows that a conceptual analysis such as that 
proposed by Grice for ‘on the other hand’ is not always appropriate. For example 
whilst for Grice ‘so’ indicates (conceptually) that the speaker is performing the 
speech act of explaining, it is less clear how a conceptual account of ‘so’ in 
Blakemore’s example (24) can be provided (1987: 86): 
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(24) So you’ve spent all your money. 
 
Here, according to Wilson and Sperber, ‘[t]he speaker is not explaining the fact that 
the hearer has spent all her money, but drawing a conclusion from an observation 
she has made’ (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 15).  
The third difference between lexical items which encode conceptual meaning 
and those whose import is procedural concerns the fact that both types of lexical 
item may be used as fragmentary utterances. Example (25) consists of a single 
conceptual item (from Blakemore (2002: 85)): 
 
(25a) Coffee. 
 
Depending on the contextual assumptions which are assumed to be mutually 
manifest, the hearer will develop this using pragmatically constrained inference into 
an explicature, two suggestions for which are given in (25b) and (25c). (25b) is a 
suggestion for the basic explicature, whilst in (25c) an alternative basic explicature is 
embedded under a higher-level explicature: 
 
(25b) It is time to have a coffee break. 
(25c) {The speaker believes that} coffee needs to be bought.  
 
Significantly, the single conceptual item which enters into the inferential 
computations features in both (25b) and (25c): they are developments of the 
concept which ‘coffee’ encodes. (26a) contains an example of a fragmentary 
occurrence of a procedural item (adapted from Blakemore (2002: 85). In the 
imagined context, a secretary is informing a university professor of a student’s 
reasons for not handing in her assessed work: 
 
(26a) SECRETARY: She’s had a very difficult time this semester. 
 PROFESSOR: Nevertheless. 
 
This may prompt the hearer to recover a range of assumptions, such as (26b)-(26e): 
 
(26b) The student could have handed in some of the work. 
(26c) The student’s circumstances do not justify bending the rules. 
(26d) There are other students whose circumstances have been difficult. 
(26e) The student has not tried hard enough.  
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However, unlike ‘coffee’ in (25b) and (25c), ‘nevertheless’ does not feature in the 
conceptual representations (26b)-(26e) whose recovery it constrains; they are not 
developments of the concept encoded by ‘nevertheless’. According to Blakemore: 
 
Although there is a whole range of assumptions that the hearer of [26a] might have 
justifiably constructed, it does not matter what assumption the hearer constructs as 
long as it gives rise to the right sort of cognitive effects. More specifically, it does not 
matter what assumption the hearer constructs provided that it achieves relevance in 
the way that is prescribed by the meaning of nevertheless. In other words, the 
speaker’s intention in [26a] is simply that a hearer construct an assumption which 
gives rise to the cognitive effects consistent with the constraint encoded by 
nevertheless. 
(Blakemore 2002: 86-87 
 
 Above it was mentioned that personal pronouns are considered within 
relevance theory to encode procedural meaning. In Chapter 4 (section 4.4) we shall 
suggest that the German reportative subjunctive encodes a procedural constraint 
not unlike that of personal pronouns. It will thus be profitable to continue by 
considering the procedural import of personal pronouns.  
 For Hedley (2007) there is strong evidence that the import of personal 
pronouns is procedural rather than conceptual. He points out that ‘[t]he 
computations we perform in interpreting a pronoun relate to the identification of a 
referent, and the insertion of that referent into the proposition expressed’ (2007: 42). 
Importantly, the result of this is an output, i.e. ‘the representation that enters into the 
proposition expressed’, which differs from the original input, or the decoded linguistic 
form. For Hedley, this suggests that: 
 
[i]t is clear that we are looking at a different sort of meaning here, and one that is 
more akin in nature to that of discourse connectives than it is to that of conceptual 
lexical items. 
(Hedley 2007: 42) 
 
Hedley goes on to demonstrate that personal pronouns may, like ‘coffee’ and 
‘nevertheless’, be used as fragmentary utterances and that, furthermore, their 
interpretation is more similar to that described for cases like ‘nevertheless’ above 
than for cases like ‘coffee’. He asks us to imagine (2007: 48-49) a situation where 
the kitchen of  shared house has been left in a mess, and one housemate (A) comes 
home, followed by another a few minutes later (B). As B enters, A exclaims: 
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(27a) HOUSEMATE A: You! 
 
Here, as in the case of ‘nevertheless’, the hearer is expected to develop this 
fragmentary ‘you’ via pragmatically constrained inference into one of a range of 
conceptual representations, Hedley’s suggestions for which are given below: 
 
(27b) The speaker blames the hearer for the mess. 
(27c) The speaker holds the hearer responsible for the mess. 
(27d) The speaker expects the hearer to do something about the mess. 
(27e) The speaker has the right to threaten some consequences if such action is 
not taken. 
 
Notice that, as in the case of the procedural ‘nevertheless’, ‘[…] none of these 
assumptions could be regarded as a development of a concept encoded by you’ 
(2007: 49). Instead, for Hedley they should be seen as developments of the referent 
of you – the individual appearing in the proposition expressed’ (2007: 49). He 
remarks further that: 
 
[…] what matters are the eventual cognitive effects resulting from the computations 
and inferences, though here these are primarily related to the identification of the 
intended referent. In such cases, optimal relevance will only be reached if the correct 
referent is picked out and instantiated, with the development of the ‘individual’ in the 
context giving rise to significant contextual effects. Crucially, the representation that 
is developed is not an encoded concept, but a concept to which the hearer is pointed 
by the linguistic representation. 
(Hedley 2007: 49) 
 
Personal pronouns may thus be said to have more in common with lexical items that 
encode procedural than lexical meaning.  
The essential difference between conceptual and procedural lexical items 
may be summarized as follows. Items associated with conceptual meaning encode 
constituents of conceptual representations. Those which encode procedural 
meaning constrain the inferential computations which are performed over these 
conceptual representations, but, importantly, do not themselves encode constituents 
of the conceptual representations whose recovery they constrain. 
 We end this section by providing a concrete example of how a lexical item 
which encodes procedural meaning constrains in practice the inferential 
computations as a result of which a hearer recovers the speaker’s intended 
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interpretation. The linguistic expression we use is ‘nevertheless’, and we shall end 
our analysis by considering how it explains the fragmentary occurrence of 
‘nevertheless’ in example (26a) above.   
Blakemore (2002: 126-127) claims that an utterance prefaced by 
‘nevertheless’ will be understood as one of two assumptions which are relevant as 
answers to a question which has been raised (either explicitly or implicitly) by the 
preceding discourse, ‘[…] or which has been made relevant through the 
interpretation of the preceding discourse’ (2002: 126). She suggests that the other 
assumption which is relevant in the context as an answer to the same question will 
contradict the assumption which is introduced by ‘nevertheless’ (2002: 127).   
But what does it mean for an assumption to be relevant as an answer to a 
question? Blakemore’s response, which we shall quote below, appeals to the 
relevance-theoretic concept of interpretive use. We shall explore this concept in 
detail a little later. But for now it will suffice to mention that relevance theory claims 
that every utterance is an interpretation in the sense that its propositional form to a 
greater or lesser extent resembles the thought it represents. A question is 
understood to be ‘[…] an interpretation of a thought which is a representation of a 
thought which the speaker believes to be desirable – that is, relevant – to someone 
(not necessarily herself)’ (Blakemore 2002: 126). This puts us in a position where 
we can state what it means for an utterance to be relevant as an answer to a 
question. According to Blakemore: 
 
[a]n utterance U is relevant as an answer to a question if there is a mutually manifest 
assumption in the context which is an interpretation of some desirable proposition p 
and p is communicated (explicated or implicated) by U. 
 (Blakemore 2002: 126) 
   
Let us now apply this analysis of the procedural semantics of ‘nevertheless’ to a 
concrete example (from Blakemore 2002: 124): 
 
(28a) I am sure she is honest. Nevertheless, the papers are missing. 
 
Here, the question which appears to have been raised by the preceding discourse is 
‘Is she honest?’ The function of ‘nevertheless’ is to ensure that the hearer 
understands the following proposition, ‘The papers are missing’, to be relevant as an 
answer to this question. This proposition achieves relevance as an answer to the 
question ‘Is she honest?’ via implicature; in order to derive the implicated conclusion 
 127 
 
in (28d), ‘The papers are missing’ needs to be processed in a context which 
includes implicated premises such as those in (28b) and (28c): 
 
(28b) → If the papers are missing, then someone must have taken them. 
(28c) → People who take things they are not entitled to without saying they have 
done so are dishonest. 
(28d) ⇉ She is dishonest. 
 
Additionally, ‘nevertheless’ instructs the hearer to recover from the context another 
assumption which is relevant as an answer to the question ‘Is she honest?’ The 
preceding proposition ‘I’m sure she is honest’ achieves relevance in this way. Thus, 
all the types of assumption which ‘nevertheless’ instructs the hearer to recover from 
the context are accessible, with the result that ‘nevertheless’ in example (28a) is 
felicitous.  
 How is the use of ‘nevertheless’ in (26a) above consistent with the 
procedural semantics that we suggested for it? We repeat our example: 
 
(26a) SECRETARY: She’s had a very difficult time this semester. 
 PROFESSOR: Nevertheless. 
 
Here, the question, ‘Does she have a good reason for not handing in her assessed 
work?’ appears to have been raised implicitly by the preceding discourse. The 
secretary’s utterance achieves relevance as an answer to this question by requiring 
the hearer to derive an implicature. The proposition is processed in a context which 
includes the easily accessible implicated premise in (26f), and this results in the 
hearer recovering the implicated conclusion in (26g): 
 
(26f) → Students who have had a difficult time have a good reason for not 
handing in their assessed work. 
(26g)  ⇉ She has a good reason for not handing in her assessed work. 
 
The procedural import of ‘nevertheless’ instructs the hearer to recover an alternative 
answer to the question ‘Does she have a good reason for not handing in her 
assessed work?’ which contradicts that in (26g), i.e., ‘She does not have a good 
reason for not handing in her assessed work’. ‘Nevertheless’ does this by instructing 
the hearer to access (an indeterminate number of) assumptions such as those in 
(26b)-(26e). In each case the assumption ‘She does not have a good reason for not 
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handing in her assessed work’ is derivable as an implicated conclusion from the 
accompanying implicated premise (marked →):  
 
(26b) The student could have handed in some of the work. 
→ If a student could have handed in some of the work then the student does 
not have a good reason for not handing in her assessed work. 
(26c) The student’s circumstances do not justify bending the rules. 
→ If a student’s circumstances do not justify bending the rules then the 
student does not have a good reason for not handing in her assessed work. 
(26d) There are other students whose circumstances have been difficult. 
→ If there are other students whose circumstances have been difficult then a 
student does not have a good reason for not handing in her assessed work. 
(26e) The student has not tried hard enough. 
→ If a student has not tried hard enough then the student does not have a 
good reason for not handing in her assessed work. 
 
 This brings us to the end of our consideration of the relevance-theoretic 
notion of procedural meaning. In the next section we consider another aspect of 
relevance theory which will prove to be crucial to our analysis of the German 
reportative subjunctive: interpretive use. 
 
 
3.4 Interpretive use 
 
3.4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
Representation plays an essential role in communication. The most relevant 
ostensive stimulus for communicating a speaker’s thought will not always be 
linguistic; it may, for example, be more appropriate to describe a state of affairs 
using physical objects which resemble their referents. For instance, a pea may be 
used at the dinner table to represent a football, and an up-turned cup may represent 
a goal. The extent to which an object resembles another item will vary, with the level 
of resemblance depending on the number of properties the two items share. It is the 
task of the audience, guided by their expectation that the communicator is aiming at 
optimal relevance, to work out what the relevant shared properties are. 
 The use of language involves representation in the sense that an utterance 
has a propositional form ‘[…] which is true of some actual or conceivable state of 
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affairs’ (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 227). But language involves the use of 
representation in another sense: an utterance, like an object, may be used to 
represent not what it describes, but what it resembles (1986/95: 228). 
Relevance theory has posited a concept of metarepresentational use, which 
is defined by Noh (2000: 5) as ‘[…] the use of one representation to represent 
another in virtue of some resemblance between them, whether in content or form’. 
There are two chief subtypes of metarepresentational use. One of these, interpretive 
use, involves resemblance in propositional form, or content, and this is our primary 
concern in this section. First, however, we shall briefly consider the other subtype, 
which involves resemblance in form: metalinguistic use.  
 
 
3.4.2 Metalinguistic use 
 
Like metarepresentational use itself, there are essentially two subtypes of 
metalinguistic use. One is pure quotation, and this involves the metarepresentation 
of abstract linguistic expressions and propositions. Noh (2000: 81) provides the 
following examples: 
 
(29a) “Life” is monosyllabic. 
(29b) “Life” has four letters. 
(29c) “Life” is a noun. 
 
In these examples, the abstract linguistic expression ‘life’ is metarepresented. Thus, 
so claims Noh, they are to be understood as communicating the propositions in (30), 
where the metarepresentational use of ‘life’ is made explicit:  
 
(30a) The word “life” is monosyllabic. 
(30b) The word “life” has four letters. 
(30c) The word “life” is a noun. 
 
If the use of the word ‘life’ were not understood as a metarepresentation in each 
case, it would be understood to refer to the concept of life, which would result in 
absurdity. It is the hearer’s expectation that the speaker is aiming at optimal 
relevance which will instruct him to understand (29a)-(29c) metalinguistically.  
 The other subtype of metalinguistic use is direct speech, which ‘[…] 
metarepresent[s] an utterance or thought in virtue of shared formal properties’ (Noh 
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2000: 82). More specifically, an instance of direct speech will have the same 
semantic structure as the utterance it represents. This is the case, for instance, in 
example (31), slightly adapted from Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 228). Here, 
Jennifer employs the first-person singular pronoun. However, in spite of this, 
Andrew’s assumption that Jennifer is aiming at optimal relevance will instruct him to 
understand her utterance to be attributed to the innkeeper. Andrew will understand 
Jennifer’s utterance as direct speech because her use of ‘I’ constitutes evidence for 
him that her utterance resembles the innkeeper’s utterance in terms of it semantic 
structure: 
 
(31) ANDREW: And what did the innkeeper say? 
 JENNIFER: I looked for it everywhere. 
 
 Since the focus of this study, the German reportative subjunctive, is 
associated with indirect speech (a variety of interpretive rather than metalinguistic 
use), this is all we shall say about metalinguistic use. We now turn to a detailed 
consideration of interpretive use, a term which covers cases of quotation which 
resemble what they represent in terms of their content. 
 
 
3.4.3 Interpretive use and interpretive resemblence 
 
In section 3.3 we made a brief reference to interpretive use, and we observed that 
every utterance is an interpretation in the sense that its propositional form 
resembles the thought it represents. In other words, any utterance is said to 
interpretively resemble the thought it represents.   
Interpretive resemblance applies to any instance of resemblance in content 
between two representations which have a propositional form. A propositional form 
P will have both analytical and contextual implications. The analytical implications of 
P are those non-trivial implications which are derived when inference rules are 
applied to P using only P as an input. The contextual implications are those 
implications which result from the interaction of P with the context. A propositional 
form is a literal interpretation of another propositional form to the extent that it 
shares the same analytical and contextual implications. If the two propositional 
forms share some, but not all of the implications, then the one propositional form will 
be said to interpret the other loosely.  
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Sperber and Wilson have shown that metaphor can be explained as a case 
of loose resemblance between the propositional form of an utterance and that of the 
thought it represents. The following example is from Noh (2000: 74): 
 
(32) This computer is my wife. 
 
According to Noh, this will be understood as a metaphor since a hearer will 
recognize that it shares analytical and contextual implications with the 
corresponding thought, such as ‘I spend much time with it’, ‘I like this computer’ or 
‘This computer helps me with my work’ (2000: 74). We should add to Noh’s claims 
that it is the hearer’s expectations that the utterance in (32) is optimally relevant that 
will prompt him to identify the intended shared logical and contextual implications, 
and thus to identify how (32) is relevant as a metaphor. 
 However, it is not interpretive use in the sense that every utterance 
interpretively resembles a thought of the speaker’s which is of primary interest to us. 
Sperber and Wilson raise the question as to what the thought of the speaker’s itself 
represents (1986/95: 231). Their claim is that, on the one hand, the speaker’s 
thought can be used descriptively, and in this case ‘[…] it can be a description of a 
state of affairs in the actual world, or it can be a description of a desirable state of 
affairs’ (1986/95: 231). On the other hand, this thought can itself be used 
interpretively. Sperber and Wilson continue: 
 
When [the thought of the speaker’s] is used interpretively, it can be an interpretation 
of some attributed thought or utterance, or it can be an interpretation of some 
thought which it is or would be desirable to entertain in a certain way: as knowledge,  
for instance. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 231) 
 
In other words, in such cases the interpretive resemblance which characterizes all 
utterances will hold not only between the propositional form of the utterance and that 
of the thought it represents, but also between the propositional form of this thought 
and that either of an attributed thought or utterance, or of a desirable thought. Such 
second-order interpretive use covers the various types of reported speech such as 
indirect speech and free indirect speech, as well as echoic utterances (e.g. irony) 
and interrogative utterances. It is interpretive use in this sense to which the term 
‘interpretive use’ in the literature conventionally applies, and which will be our focus 
for the remainder of this section.  
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3.4.4 Indirect speech, irony and interrogative utterances 
 
Above we described Jennifer’s utterance in example (31) as an instance of direct 
speech; it serves to make the semantic structure of the innkeeper’s original 
utterance manifest: 
 
(31) ANDREW: And what did the innkeeper say? 
 JENNIFER: I looked for it everywhere. 
 
Alternatively, Jennifer could have responded to Andrew’s question as in (33) 
(adapted from Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 228)): 
 
(33) ANDREW: And what did the innkeeper say? 
 JENNIFER: He said he looked for your wallet everywhere. 
 
Here, the embedded proposition does not have the same semantic structure as the 
innkeeper’s original utterance because the first-person singular pronoun used by the 
innkeeper has been changed to a third-person singular pronoun, and the 
innkeeper’s pronoun ‘it’ has been replaced by a definite description (‘your wallet’). 
But the two utterances do have their propositional form in common (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/95: 228). This identity in terms of propositional form, or content, but not 
in terms of semantic structure, is what makes example (33) an instance of 
interpretive use, or more specifically, indirect speech. That the propositional form of 
Jennifer’s utterance and the original is identical need not trouble us. Sperber and 
Wilson point out that:  
 
[…] while there may be a minimal degree of resemblance below  which no 
interpretive use is possible, there need not be a maximal degree above which 
resemblance is replaced by identity and interpretation by reproduction. Identity is a 
limiting case of resemblance; reproduction is a limiting case of interpretation. When 
one representation is used to represent another which has exactly the same 
propositional form [33], this is merely a limiting case of interpretation. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 229) 
 
Alternatively, the innkeeper may have produced a long and rambling answer in 
response to Jennifer’s query regarding whether he had found Andrew’s wallet, and 
none of the innkeeper’s sentences may have had the same propositional form as 
the embedded proposition in (33). However, Sperber and Wilson’s claim is that even 
 133 
 
though the propositional forms are different, if Jennifer’s summary is faithful then the 
propositional forms ‘[…] must resemble one another: they must share some logical 
properties, have partly identical contextual implications in some contexts, for 
instance’ (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 228).  
In employing indirect speech, a speaker will require the hearer to infer 
contextually her attitude towards the attributed utterance or thought. This attitude 
may fall anywhere on the spectrum of possible attitudes. Thus in the example below, 
Andrew not only informs Jennifer of what Dean has told him; he also expresses his 
attitude towards Dean’s utterance. This attitude is not explicitly linguistically 
encoded; Jennifer will infer this attitude contextually as a result of her expectation 
that Andrew’s utterance is optimally relevant.  
 
(34) JENNIFER: Has Dean paid back the money he owes you? 
 ANDREW (frustrated and unconvinced): He said he forgot to go to the bank. 
 
According to relevance theory, indirect speech and irony are closely allied, since 
irony also involves an interpretive relation between the speaker’s thought and 
attributed thoughts or utterances. Irony involves a particular type of interpretive use 
which Sperber and Wilson term echoic use, whereby a speaker ‘echoes’ the words 
of someone else. Importantly, Sperber and Wilson remark that echoic use ‘[…] need 
not interpret a precisely attributable thought: it may echo the thought of a certain 
kind of person, or of people in general’ (1986/95: 238), and they show how a 
speaker may echo a traditional piece of wisdom such as ‘More haste, less speed’ 
(1986/95: 239). The prime purpose of indirect (and direct) speech is to inform the 
hearer that so-and-so has said such-and-such, but, as we saw above, a speaker 
may express her attitude to the attributed proposition. However, the relevance of an 
echoed utterance lies solely in the attitude that the speaker expresses towards the 
proposition expressed. On this account, irony results when the speaker expresses 
an attitude of rejection or dissociation to the attributed proposition. The examples 
below, taken from Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 239) illustrate how a speaker in 
echoing an utterance can endorse it (35a) or express a dissociative attitude towards 
it, resulting in irony (35b): 
 
(35a)  ANDREW: It’s a lovely day for a picnic. 
[They go for a picnic and the sun shines.] 
          JENNIFER (happily): It’s a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. 
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(35b)  ANDREW: It’s a lovely day for a picnic. 
[They go for a picnic and it rains.] 
            JENNIFER (sarcastically): It’s a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. 
 
    We complete this discussion of interpretive use by returning to the notion, 
which we touched upon in 2.3, that in relevance theory questions have the status of 
instances of interpretive use. There we saw that a question is understood to be ‘[…] 
an interpretation of a thought which is a representation of a thought which the 
speaker believes to be desirable – that is, relevant – to someone (not necessarily 
herself)’ (Blakemore 2002: 126).   
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 252) distinguish ‘[…] between yes-no 
questions, which have not only a logical but also a fully propositional form, and Wh-
questions, which have a logical form but no propositional form’. They claim that 
cases of asking Wh-P where Wh-P is a yes-no question and P is the propositional 
form communicate that the thought interpreted by P would be relevant if true. Cases 
of asking Wh-P ‘[…] where Wh-P is a Wh-question and P is the less-than-
propositional logical form of the utterance’ communicate that ‘[…] there is some 
completion of the thought interpreted by P into a fully propositional thought which 
would be relevant if true’ (1986/95: 252). Sperber and Wilson go on to consider to 
whom the fully propositional thought would be relevant if true, and they suggest that 
regular requests for information ‘[…] are analyzable as questions whose answers 
the speaker regards as relevant to her […]’ (1986/95: 252-253). Rhetorical 
questions, on the other hand, ‘[…] are often reminders, designed to prompt the 
retrieval of information the speaker regards as relevant to the hearer’ (1986/95: 
252). To whom the fully propositional thought would be relevant if true is viewed as 
a semantic indeterminacy which is resolved pragmatically and is thus guided by the 
hearer’s expectation that the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance. 
This brings us to the end of our overview of interpretive use. The next 
section will consider some devices which some languages employ to mark instances 
of specifically interpretive use. 
 
 
3.4.5 Means of marking interpretive use 
 
Some languages possess hearsay particles which indicate that an utterance is 
attributed to someone other than the speaker herself. Palmer (1986: 51-57, 66-74) 
suggests that these particles will generally indicate that the speaker has a 
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diminished level of commitment to the truth of the attributed proposition. Two 
particles which are possible candidates for analysis as hearsay particles are the 
Sissala particle rέ (or its variant rí),75 which is analyzed by Blass (1989, 1990), and 
the Japanese utterance-final particle tte, analyzed by Itani (1991, 1998).  
First we shall consider rέ and shall suggest that ultimately it is best analyzed 
as a marker of interpretive use. We shall then look at tte, and shall show that its 
distribution is more restricted than that of rέ, before looking at another Japanese 
particle, ka, which marks some types of interpretive use covered by rέ in Sissala but 
not by tte.  
Blass (1989, 1990) begins both her texts by proposing a minimal hypothesis 
that one could make about hearsay particles. She suggests that:  
 
[…] they should be used only for reporting actual speech. Reported thought would be 
excluded, and the status of paraphrase, or speech which is attributed to inference, 
without actually being heard, would be unclear. 
(Blass 1990: 93) 
 
Whilst this hypothesis may be applicable to hearsay particles as Palmer 
understands the term, Blass observes that an analysis of rέ as a hearsay particle will 
not account for all its uses. It is true that it does occur in what might be termed 
hearsay contexts, such as reported speech, but it also occurs in environments which 
are apparently unexpected for hearsay particles. For example, rέ may accompany 
irony, interrogatives and exclamatives. These are types of language which 
relevance theory has identified as interpretive, and this prompts Blass to suggest 
that rέ is more appropriately analyzed as a marker of interpretive use.  
According to Blass, rέ is an ‘[…] indeterminacy-reducing device, which 
operates to reduce an indeterminacy at the level of explicit truth-conditional content, 
or the proposition expressed’ (1990: 123). More specifically, the indeterminacy she 
has in mind concerns whether an utterance is to be understood as an instance of 
descriptive or interpretive use. Blass seems to be suggesting that rέ encodes 
procedural meaning in that it constrains the inferential computations by which a 
hearer comes to understand an utterance as an instance of interpretive use.  
Above we saw how in the case of reported speech and echoic use a speaker 
will require the hearer to infer contextually her attitude to the attributed utterance or 
thought. Accordingly, the notion that rέ makes explicit that an utterance constitutes 
                                                 
75
 Sissala is a Niger-Congo, Gur (Voltaic) language of the subgroup Gurunsi, which is spoken in 
Burkina Faso (Blass 1989: 299). 
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an instance of interpretive use entails that the hearer is required to infer the 
optimally relevant attitude to the attributed proposition on the basis of context.  
We shall now review some of the ways in which rέ marks those types of 
utterance which relevance theory has identified as interpretive. Firstly, rέ may be the 
only non-contextual indication that an utterance is to be understood as reported 
speech. This is the case in example (36), where the effect of the procedural import 
of rέ is to instruct the hearer to recover a higher-level explicature which resembles ‘it 
is said that’ or ‘they say that’:  
 
(36) Náƞá  sυsɛ.   Ba    kaa   konni  yo         ta       rέ. 
 some  died    they  took  cut      throw   leave  rέ 
 
 ‘{It is said that} some died and were untied and left there.’ 
 
In (37) and (38) rέ appears in complementizer position and marks an indirect-
speech-type construction and direct speech (an instance of metalinguistic use) 
respectively: 
 
(37) Ba     sɛ     rí  ɓa     yálá   há     kúé            makɛ   doƞ     pınɛ    weri    
they  said  rέ  their  aunt   who  has-come  show   sleep  lying   well   
 
pa     wͻ. 
give  them 
 
‘They say that their aunt who has come will show them how to sleep 
properly.’ 
 
(38) Ʋ     háálͻˊ  ná     líͻˊ   bυl    rí    Ƞ-ή     mύ   ƞ       bozóƞ   dihī      ní. 
his  wife      DEF  left  said   rέ    I/IPF  go     my    lover     place   SDM 
 
‘While leaving his wife said: “I am going to my lover.”’ 
 
However, in these examples rέ, which introduces an embedded clause, does not 
have the effect of constraining the recovery of a higher-level explicature like in (37). 
Itani (1998) provides an explanation for a similar phenomenon in Japanese, an 
explanation which seems equally applicable to (37) and (38): 
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Why this is so follows from the definition of higher-level explicature. Higher-level 
explicatures are recovered by embedding the whole proposition expressed, not a 
part of the proposition e.g. complement clauses to which tte [or rέ] is attached. 
(Itani 1998: 59) 
 
Thus, because the subordinate proposition rí ɓa yálá há kúé makɛ doƞ pınɛ weri pa 
wͻ in (37) is only part of the full proposition expressed, it cannot be embedded 
under a higher-level explicature. The entire utterance, including matrix clause, 
however, can be so embedded.  
The next two examples demonstrate the use of rέ in echoic utterances. In 
(39) an attitude of endorsement is expressed, and in (40) an attitude of 
dissociation: 
 
(39) A: Ba     dυla         á         wέrí. 
      they  this year  done   well 
 
 ‘They have done well this year.’ 
 
 B: Ba     ɓıέná   á        wέrí  é  rí. 
      they  really   done  well  F  rέ 
  
‘They have done really well.’ 
 
(40)  A: Ɩ        ɓınͻˊ   ná     sıέ   keƞ     susi   fέ. 
      your  thing   DEF  so    catch  pity    much 
 
 ‘Your thing (tape recorder) arouses pity.’ 
 
 B: Susi  rí.  U   má    nıısͻ    nέ. 
     pity   rέ   its  also   make  SDM 
 
 ‘Pity. It is just its make.’ (Things of that make are always small.) 
 
But rέ does not have to accompany the echo of an utterance which has 
actually been articulated; rέ may be used to make explicit that an utterance 
constitutes an instance of echoic use whereby what is echoed is an implicature of 
the original. This is the case in (41a): 
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(41a) A: Ants gather grains and take them out and leave them there. They enter 
the house again, break the grains again and take them out. 
 
 B: E!   cuƞkumó   tυƞ      rέ. 
      eh  ants           work   rέ 
 
 ‘Eh! Ants work!’ 
 
B has derived the implicature, which she then echoes, through processing A’s 
utterance in a context which includes the assumption in (41b): 
 
(41b) If ants break grains and carry them out of the house all at the same time then 
they work hard. 
 
 Blass (1990: 117) additionally provides evidence that in Sissala another 
variety of interpretive use may be marked by rέ: interrogatives. However, she points 
out that this is not obligatory and that in one dialect interrogatives are not marked at 
all by rέ. But she also points out that ‘[…] whenever the question is echoed in the 
answer, the answer is obligatorily marked by rέ’ (1990: 117). For example: 
 
(42) A: Ɩ        hé    pilwa     -      a? 
      you  put   batteries       Q 
 ‘Did you put batteries in?’ 
 
 B: Ƞ   he     pilwa        rέ. 
      I    put    batteries  rέ 
 
 ‘I did put batteries in.’ 
 
(43) illustrates the use of rέ with Wh-words, such as bɛƞmɛ rέ (‘how much/many’): 
 
(43) Nıɛ        bɛƞmɛ         rέ? 
 people  how many   rέ 
 
 ‘How many people (are there)?’  
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Blass shows that rέ occurs with a number of other types of utterance, such as 
beliefs, desires, and echoic questions, and suggests that the use of rέ with such 
linguistic expressions is to be expected if it is analyzed not as a hearsay particle, but 
as a marker of interpretive use. The distribution of rέ in Sissala thus constitutes 
evidence that Sperber and Wilson’s distinction between descriptive and interpretive 
use is, as they intend it to be, a reflection of genuine cognitive processes that a 
hearer deploys in utterance interpretation.  
The question arises as to whether particles which have been analyzed in 
other languages as hearsay markers can be reanalyzed from a relevance-theoretic 
viewpoint as markers of interpretive use. Itani (1991, 1998) considers a different 
hearsay particle, the Japanese utterance-final particle tte, and suggests that it does 
not mark general interpretive use in the same way as rέ. Rather its use is restricted 
to the report and echo of utterances. In the 1991 text, Itani suggested that tte 
marked attributive use. Subsequently, Itani (1998) suggested, rather, that it is 
specialized for a subtype of attributive use: quotative attributive use. This is because 
a reported or echoed utterance which is accompanied by tte must have been 
articulated by somebody other than the hearer herself. It cannot report or echo 
thoughts which others (are imagined to) entertain.  
Itani proposes that ‘[…] utterance-final tte linguistically encodes procedural 
information’ and suggests that it provides ‘[…] clues for constructing a conceptual 
representation, i.e. a higher-level explicature’ (1998: 65). In example (44a) the 
function of tte is comparable to that of rέ in (36) above; it ensures that the hearer 
understands the speaker to have communicated a higher-level explicature such as 
‘it is said that’ or ‘they say that’ in (44b). (All examples are from Itani (1998)): 
 
(44a) Mary ga kashikoi tte.76 
(44b) {They say that} Mary is smart. 
 
However, in (45a) the effect of tte is to instruct the hearer to construct a more 
specific higher-level explicature such as ‘Mary’s teacher says that’ (45b):  
 
(45a) A: What did Mary’s teacher say? 
 B: Mary ga kashikoi tte. 
     
 
                                                 
76
 Itani (1998) does not supply Japanese examples with gloss translations, and as I am not familiar with 
Japanese I am not in a position to supply my own. 
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(45b) {She says that} Mary is smart. 
 
Itani (1998: 59) suggests that in such cases tte functions as a ‘[…] a predicate 
complementizer which contributes to the proposition expressed’.77 In other words, 
examples such as (45a) are elliptical. This suggests that the type of contribution 
which tte makes to explicature is determined pragmatically; it is the hearer’s 
assumption that the speaker’s utterance conforms to the communicative principle of 
relevance that is responsible for resolving this indeterminacy. 
Example (46) demonstrates that, as in Sissala, any higher-level explicatures 
are not felt to be present when tte functions as a predicate complementizer which 
accompanies an embedded clause:   
 
(46) Mary is smart tte utagawashii. 
 
 ‘It is doubtful that Mary is smart.’ 
 
‘Mary is smart tte’ is merely part of the proposition expressed so, like the Sissala 
clause introduced rέ in example (37), it cannot be embedded under a higher-level 
explicature. 
In (47) and (48) utterances are echoed which are understood to have been 
articulated by someone, and at the same time an attitude is expressed towards 
them. In (47) the attitude is one of surprise, whilst in (48) the effect is ironical: 
 
(47) Mary ga kashikoi tte! 
  
 ‘Mary is smart, did she say that? Goodness!’ 
 
(48) Oh, so it can remove any stain tte. 
 
(expressing the speaker’s disgust at the overstated claims made for a new 
product) 
 
That tte is incompatible with utterances which echo, and thereby express an attitude 
towards, a thought which has not previously been articulated is demonstrated by the 
                                                 
77
 For this reason, following a convention introduced in 3.2.5, ‘she says that’ above is in bold. 
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unacceptability of the ironically intended (49). However, in Japanese, according to 
Itani (1998: 52), it is acceptable as irony without tte: 
 
(49) ? Ii ten o torimashita tte. 
 [as a teacher hands a badly scored exam to her pupil] 
 
‘So you’ve scored a good mark.’  
 
Additionally, the status of tte as a marker of quotative attributive use entails that, 
unlike Sissala rέ it cannot be used to echo an implicature of an utterance.  
However, tte can be used to report or echo the speaker’s own thoughts, 
which Itani explains as follows:  
 
We all have a kind of direct access to our own thoughts which we do not have to 
other people’s thoughts, so we may consider or think about our own (unuttered) 
thoughts in much the same way as we may think about other people’s utterances. 
(Itani 1998: 63) 
 
Hence the possibility of (50): 
 
(50) Mary ga kashikoi tte! 
  
 ‘Mary is smart! What am I thinking?’ 
 
 Tte is not compatible with interrogatives. However, Japanese has an 
alternative means of marking these, the particle ka, and this is the subject of Itani 
(1993). Itani claims that the fact that ka marks an utterance as an interrogative is 
due to the circumstance that ka indicates that ‘[…] the proposition expressed is an 
interpretation of a desirable thought’ (1993: 146). In (51) ka marks a yes-no question 
and in (52) a Wh-question. (All examples are from Itani (1993)):  
 
(51) Yamada-san  wa      gakusei  desu-o  ka? 
 Mr Yamada    topic  student   is           ka 
 
 ‘Is Mr Yamada a student?’ 
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(52) Yamada-san  wa      doko     ni   iki-mashita  ka? 
 Mr Yamada    topic   where  to   go-past        ka 
 
 ‘Where did Mr Yamada go?’ 
 
 Like tte, ka can be used to mark irony, but unlike tte, what is echoed does 
not need to have been articulated by someone: ka may be used to echo ‘[…] an 
opinion generally held by people, e.g. an old saying’ (1993: 140): 
 
(53) [CONTEXT] The speaker who thought of the proverb ‘More haste, less 
speed’ decided to rush to the station and eventually she missed the train. 
Now she ridicules the proverb. 
 
More haste, less speed ka. 
 
However, according to Itani, ka here does not seem to be responsible for the 
echoic feel. So what is the function of ka? Itani suggests that, as in the case of 
interrogatives, ka ensures that the proposition expressed is understood as an 
interpretation of a desirable thought:  
 
[Utterances such as (53)] have two possible analyses: on one, […] ka remains 
outside the scope of the proposition echoed, and functions to indicate that the 
speaker is questioning the truth of that proposition; on the second […] ka is itself 
echoed, and the speaker is ironically requesting confirmation of a proposition which 
is manifestly false. In either case […] ka has its regular interrogative function, 
encoding the information that the utterance is being put forward as an interpretation 
of a desirable thought.  
(Itani 1993: 141) 
 
 Itani (1993: 141-143) goes on to show that ka also occurs with exclamatives, 
and suggests that this is to be expected, considering that exclamatives are also 
associated within the relevance-theoretic framework with the interpretation of 
desirable thoughts. 
 Ultimately, this brief survey suggests that not all hearsay particles are 
analyzable within relevance theory as markers of (general) interpretive use. At least 
one hearsay particle (Japanese tte) conforms largely to Blass’s minimal hypothesis 
for hearsay particles: tte can be used for reporting and echoing actual speech, but 
not thoughts and implicatures. As such it is more appropriately analyzed from a 
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relevance-theoretic point of view as a marker of quotative attributive use, i.e., a 
subtype of interpretive use. Itani shows that the particle ka is also specialized for a 
subtype of interpretive use: it indicates that the proposition expressed is understood 
as an interpretation of a desirable thought. Both rέ and tte instruct the hearer to 
construct a higher-level explicature, but this explicature is not felt to be present 
when the particle functions as a predicate complementizer and accompanies an 
embedded clause. Additionally, contextual considerations may prompt the hearer to 
understand the explicature associated with Japanese tte as part of the proposition 
expressed.  
 
 
3.4.6 The marking of interpretive use in German 
  
German also has a range of linguistic devices at its disposal to mark different 
varieties of interpretive use. Here we shall consider three. Firstly we shall look at 
subject-verb inversion. Then we shall move on to a consideration of verbal means of 
indicating interpretive use; we shall investigate the modal verbs sollen (‘should’) and 
wollen (‘want’). 
Above we saw that Sissala can employ rέ in order to make explicit the 
element of interpretive use in interrogatives, and we observed that Japanese 
possesses a particle ka to indicate the precise type of interpretive use which 
interrogatives involve: the proposition expressed is understood to be an 
interpretation of a desirable thought. In both cases the interpretive use marker is 
apparently indifferent to whether the thought which is interpreted by the interrogative 
is entertained as a complete propositional form (as in the case of yes-no questions), 
or whether the thought has a logical form but a less-than-complete propositional 
form (Wh-questions). German also has a means of marking interrogatives: subject-
verb inversion. (54a) exemplifies subject-verb inversion in a yes-no question: 
 
(54a) Hast  du    das   Brot      gekauft? 
 have  you  the    bread   bought? 
 
 ‘Did you buy the bread?’ 
 
The subject-verb inversion here can be said to have procedural import; it ensures 
that the hearer recovers the higher-level explicature der Sprecher fragt, ob (‘the 
speaker is asking whether’) in (54b):   
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(54b) {Der  Sprecher   fragt,  ob}         ich    das  Brot      gekauft  habe. 
  the   speaker     asks    whether  I       the   bread   bought   have 
 
It could be claimed that, as can be the case in Sissala and Japanese, this 
interrogative marking also occurs in German Wh-questions: 
 
(55a) Was    hast   du    gekauft? 
 what   have   you  bought? 
 
 ‘What did you buy?’ 
 
Here the hearer will recover the higher-level explicature (55b): 
 
(55b) {Der   Sprecher  fragt}, was    ich  gekauft  habe. 
  the     speaker    asks    what   I      bought   have 
 
However, the subject-verb inversion in (55a) is arguably syntactically rather than 
pragmatically motivated. The Wh-word was (‘what’) appears in sentence-initial 
position as a result of syntactic Wh-fronting rules. A principle of German word order 
then comes into play: the finite verb is always the second constituent of a German 
main clause. Thus Wh-fronting necessitates subject-verb inversion. We therefore 
claim that subject-verb inversion is a procedural device which is specialized for a 
very specific subtype of interpretive use: yes-no questions. 
  Blass (1990: 96) suggests that the German modal verbs sollen (‘should’) and 
wollen (‘want’) may be analyzed as hearsay devices since the speaker may use 
them to indicate ‘[…] that she is reporting what somebody else said’ (1990: 96). As 
such, we propose that they are candidates for analysis as markers of specific 
subtypes of interpretive use.   
It could be claimed that sollen requires the hearer to supply a higher-level 
explicature such as ‘it is said/reported/believed that’ or ‘they say that’ etc. If this is 
right then the hearer of (56a) will derive a higher-level explicature similar to that in 
(56b) (example from Durrell (2011: 349)):  
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(56a) Bei  den  Unruhen  soll       es   bisher   vier   Tote    gegeben    haben. 
 in    the   riots          should  it    so far    four   dead   given         have 
 
(56b) {Es  wird          berichtet,    dass}  es  bei   den    Unruhen  bisher    vier 
 it     becomes  reported      that    it    in     the     riots          so far    four 
 
 Tote   gegeben   hat. 
 dead  given         has 
 
‘It is reported that so far four people have been killed in the riots.’ 
 
However, there is evidence that the explicature which sollen supplies is not of the 
higher-level variety. Schenner (2008a, 2008b) suggests that sollen in its reportative 
function carries a reportative presupposition: sollenREP(p) i.e. ‘it is said that p’. He 
observes that reportative sollen may be embedded under a verbum dicendi such 
that the reportative presupposition receives an assertive reading; this is the reading 
which the semantics suggested for sollen (sollenREP(p)) predicts. The presupposition 
receives such an assertive reading in (57) (taken from Schenner (2008a: 559)): 
 
(57) 90  mal     190   Zentimeter:   Das   waren   die   Abmessungen     von  
90  times  190   centimetres  that    were     the   measurements     of 
 
Goethes   bescheidenem  Bett.   Auf   den  Betrachter   wirkt      es   heute 
Goethes   modest              bed    on     the   beholder      seems  it     today 
 
ziemlich  kurz,   vor         allem            wenn    er   weiß,     dass   Goethe  
fairly       short   before    everything    if           he  knows   that     Goethe 
 
groß   von   Statur    gewesen  sein    soll. 
 big      of      stature  been         be      should 
 
‘90 x 19cm: That was the size of Goethe’s modest bed. To the beholder is 
seems quite short today, especially if he knows that it is said that Goethe 
was tall.’ 
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We do not subscribe to Schenner’s proposal that sollen introduces a reportative 
presupposition; if we are right that sollen possesses a procedural semantics which 
constrains the recovery of an explicature such as ‘it is said that’, then the notion of a 
reportative presupposition is not necessary. However, the observation that 
Schenner’s presupposition sollenREP(p) receives an assertive reading in (57) 
enables us to make an important claim about the contribution made by sollen. 
Schenner’s observation gives us reason to claim that this explicature (‘it is said that’, 
etc.), unlike that supplied by rέ, tte which is similar in its conceptual content, can be 
embedded, in this case under wissen (‘know’). This suggests that this explicature is 
not of the higher-level variety: instead it contributes to the proposition expressed by 
the utterance.  
 According to Schenner, sollenREP(p) does not always receive an assertive 
reading when embedded. Sollen may be embedded under a matrix predicate such 
that the reportative presupposition is accommodated globally (2008a: 560). In our 
relevance-theoretic terms, the hearer’s expectation that the utterance is optimally 
relevant will prompt him to infer contextually that the explicature associated with 
sollen is to be understood parenthetically and thus does not contribute to the main 
relevance of the utterance. An example from Schenner (2008a: 560): 
 
(58) Es  ist  schwer zu  glauben,  dass  ich  der  Vater   Deines     Kindes   sein  
 it    is    hard     to  believe     that  I       the   father  of your    child        be  
 
soll. 
should 
 
‘It is hard to believe that I am the father of your child, as is alleged.’ 
 
Additionally, the reportative presupposition of sollen may receive a concord reading 
when embedded (Schenner 2008a: 559-560). In such cases, our claim is that the 
explicature is pragmatically cancelled in accordance with relevance-theoretic 
principles. Again, we use one of Schenner’s examples (2008a: 560): 
 
(59a) Die  Zeitschrift   hatte  fälschlicherweise     behauptet, dass    sich        die  
the  magazine   had     wrongly                   claimed      that     herself    the  
 
Prinzessin  ihren  Adelstitel   unredlich      erworben  haben  soll. 
Princess     her     title            dishonestly  acquired   have     should 
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‘The magazine had wrongly claimed that the princess gained her title 
dishonestly.’ 
 
This is essentially indirect speech, and sollen marks the attributed, interpretively 
used proposition in a manner similar to the reportative subjunctive, which may be 
substituted: 
 
(59b) Die Zeitschrift hatte fälschlicherweise behauptet, dass sich die Prinzessin 
ihren Adelstitel unredlich erworben habe. 
 
Kaufmann (1976), Letnes (1997), Fabricius-Hansen (2006) and Schenner (2007, 
2008b) mention the use of sollen with discourse representative adverbials, such as 
nach Angaben der Polizei (‘according to the police’) and dem Präsidenten zufolge 
(‘according to the president’). Kaufmann and Fabricius-Hansen provide only 
examples where sollen does not itself add an additional layer of report to a reported 
utterance, or, in our terms, examples where the explicature ‘it is said that’ etc. is not 
felt to be present. Kaufmann (1976: 141) gives this example: 
 
(60) Der  Aussage   des     Polizisten     zufolge          soll       Hoppe    auf    seine  
 the  statement  of the  policeman   according to  should  Hoppe    at      his 
  
Verfolger  geschossen  haben. 
 pursuer    shot               have 
 
 ‘According to the policeman’s statement Hoppe shot at his pursuer.’ 
 
A hearer’s expectation that an utterance is optimally relevant may, however, prompt 
him to recover the explicature associated with sollen as part of what is 
communicated. Schenner (2007, 2008b) calls such readings whereby multiple 
evidentials are present cumulative, although he claims that ‘[i]n most contexts the 
concord reading is strongly preferred’ (2008b: 195). However, in a survey of native 
German speakers conducted by Letnes, half the respondents (24 out of 48) felt that 
in example (61) (which admittedly lacks context) sollen contributes to what is 
reported (Letnes 1997: 129), in other words for these respondents the effect of the 
multiple evidentials is cumulative: 
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(61) Nach              Aussagen    Peters      soll        Paul   der   Mörder   sein. 
 according to  statements   of Peter    should  Paul   the   murder    be 
 
 ‘According to statements made by Peter, Paul is said to be the murderer.’   
 
In conclusion, the modal verb sollen in its hearsay function has procedural import 
which ensures that the hearer recovers an explicature such as ‘it is 
said/reported/believed that’ or ‘they say that’ etc. This explicature constitutes part of 
the proposition expressed, evidence for which is supplied by the circumstance that 
the explicature can itself be embedded under a higher matrix predicate. However, 
when the explicature is thus embedded, the hearer’s expectations of optimal 
relevance may prompt him to understand it parenthetically, or the explicature may 
even not be felt to be present at all. In this latter case, sollen marks indirect speech 
in a fashion rather similar to the reportative subjunctive.  
Wollen (‘want’) in its hearsay function also requires the hearer to supply an 
explicature which functions on the level of the proposition expressed. In this case it 
will be something like ‘the speaker is saying/claiming that’, and as such this 
explicature will always be understood to be attributed to the subject of wollen. Unlike 
other interpretive use markers, the attitude which a hearer is expected to recover 
towards a proposition accompanied by wollen is essentially fixed: in using wollen a 
speaker will imply that she holds the interpretively used proposition to be untrue 
(example from Durrell (2011: 352)): 
 
(62a) Er   will      eine   Villa  auf  Mallorca  gekauft  haben. 
 he   wants  a       villa  on   Majorca   bought   have 
 
 ‘He claims to have bought a villa on Mallorca.’ 
 
The explicature that the hearer must derive will resemble (62b). Er behauptet, dass 
corresponds roughly to ‘he claims that’: 
  
(62b) {Er  behauptet,  dass}   er    eine   Villa  auf   Mallorca  gekauft  hat. 
 he  claims          that       he   a        villa   on   Majorca   bought   has 
 
Evidence that this explicature contributes to the proposition expressed is that, like 
the explicature supplied by sollen, it can be embedded under a verbum dicendi, as 
in (63): 
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(63) Jochen  sagte, dass  sein Vater   eine Villa auf Mallorca gekauft haben will. 
 Jochen  said    that    his   father  a       villa on  Majorca  bought have   wants
  
 ‘Jochen said that his father claims to have bought a villa on Majorca.’ 
 
Unlike the explicature associated with sollen, the explicature whose recovery wollen 
constrains cannot be cancelled pragmatically. Thus (63) cannot be faithfully 
translated as ‘Jochen said that his father had bought a villa on Mallorca’. This 
explicature also cannot be understood parenthetically:  
 
(64) Es   ist  schwer  zu  glauben,  dass  er   eine  Villa   auf  Mallorca   gekauft  
     It     is   hard      to   believe     that   he  a        Villa  on   Majorca    bought 
 
 haben   will. 
 have     wants 
 
 ‘It is hard to believe that he claims to have bought a villa on Majorca.’ 
 
Thus this example cannot be faithfully rendered in English as ‘It is hard to believe 
that he has bought a villa on Mallorca, as he claims’. 
 So wollen in its hearsay function, like sollen, contributes an explicature which 
contributes to the proposition expressed by an utterance. This explicature can 
therefore be embedded under a higher matrix predicate. However, unlike the 
explicature supplied by sollen, that of wollen can be neither cancelled nor 
understood as a parenthetical. Unusually for interpretive use markers, the semantics 
of wollen is such that it prompts the hearer to derive a specific interpretation of the 
attributed utterance: the speaker is understood to believe it to be untrue.    
 
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter we have provided an overview of Sperber and Wilson’s relevance 
theory, the theory which provides the framework for our research. In the first half we 
looked at some of the shortcomings of the Gricean model for utterance 
comprehension, and saw how the cognitive and communicative principles of 
relevance are to be preferred to Grice’s Co-operative Principle and attendant 
maxims. We paid special attention to the distinction between conceptual and 
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procedural meaning, which will prove to be important concepts in the final two 
chapters. In the second half of the chapter we examined in some detail the 
relevance-theoretic concept of interpretive use, and examined some German 
linguistic expressions as markers of specific varieties of interpretive use.  
Our task in the remainder of this study will be to investigate the role of the 
German reportative subjunctive as marker of interpretive use. 
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4 
 
The German reportative subjunctive as a 
relevance constraint 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 3 we considered the relevance-theoretic concepts of procedural meaning 
and interpretive use in some detail. We looked at some of the devices that speakers 
of some languages may employ in order to ensure that the hearer recovers 
explicatures associated with interpretive use. We examined the Sissala particle rέ 
and the Japanese particles tte and ka as well as some German linguistic devices 
associated with interpretive use, including the modal verbs sollen and wollen. In the 
remainder of this study we shall suggest that the German reportative subjunctive 
may also be analyzed as an interpretive use marker, albeit it one associated with a 
specific subtype of interpretive use: indirect speech. We shall show that such an 
analysis allows us to explain the various phenomena, described in section 2.2.11, 
for which we would expect an adequate analysis of the reportative subjunctive to 
account.   
We shall suggest that, apart from its association with indirect speech, the 
German reportative subjunctive has two properties in common with the particles rέ, 
tte and ka. Firstly it encodes procedural meaning and thus ensures that an utterance 
is understood as indirect speech. Secondly, as we suggested in section 2.2.10, it is 
compatible with any attitude which a reporter may wish the hearer to recover 
inferentially. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the procedural meaning 
that the reportative subjunctive encodes, i.e. the relevance constraint that it 
imposes. The recovery of reporter attitudes will form the focus of Chapter 5.   
     In this chapter, we shall firstly describe the nature of the constraint which the 
reportative subjunctive imposes on the comprehension of an utterance. We shall 
suggest that owing to this constraint the German reportative subjunctive supplies an 
explicature which functions on the level of the proposition expressed, i.e. a basic 
explicature. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to a consideration of how
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relevance theory is able to explain how a hearer of reported speech constructs the 
ellipsed matrix clause.  
 
 
4.2 The role of the German reportative subjunctive in constraining the 
interpretation of indirect speech 
 
4.2.1 The German reportative subjunctive and prototypical indirect speech  
 
In Chapter 2 we provided a comprehensive survey of how the reportative 
subjunctive is employed in indirect speech. The examples we provided all 
conformed to the preliminary description of indirect speech which was provided in 
the Introduction, repeated below: 
 
(i) Indirect speech consists of a matrix verbum-dicendi clause and a 
subordinate proposition which latter in German may or may not be 
introduced by dass. 
(ii) Pronominal deixis must be selected from the point of view of the reporter. 
Other deixis may be selected from the point of view of the original speaker. 
(iii) Indirect speech may exhibit the property indirectness. In such cases the 
reported proposition will not be understood to be presupposed.  
 
Importantly, in accordance with point (ii), all pronominal deixis in the examples of 
indirect speech in Chapter 2 reflected the point of view of the reporter: this must be 
understood as an essential characteristic of indirect speech in German. Point (ii) 
also states that other deixis may be chosen from the point of view of the original 
speaker. We showed in Chapter 2 that the tense of a reportative-subjunctive form in 
indirect speech will always be understood to reflect this point of view, in other words 
it is always understood in relation to t1. Furthermore, we showed that reportative-
subjunctive indirect speech always exhibits the property indirectness, and its effect 
when embedded under factive verbs such as kritisieren (‘criticize’) and bedauern 
(‘regret’) is to create indirect speech which displays indirectness: the matrix verb is 
understood non-factively. Our claim is therefore that the German reportative 
subjunctive is associated with a (German-specific) ‘prototype’ of indirect speech, 
and that this prototype prescribes that the tense of the embedded verb must reflect 
the point of view of the original speaker and that an instance of indirect speech must 
exhibit the property indirectness. Thus, we propose the following description of the 
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prototype of indirect speech with which the German reportative subjunctive is 
associated: 
  
(i) Prototypical indirect speech consists of a matrix clause and a subordinate 
proposition which latter in German may or may not be introduced by dass. 
(ii) Pronominal deixis must be selected from the point of view of the reporter. 
The tense of the embedded verb must be chosen from the point of view of t1. 
Other deixis may be selected from the point of view of the original speaker. 
(iii) Prototypical indirect speech must exhibit the property indirectness. Therefore 
the reported proposition will not be understood to be presupposed. 
 
Although the reportative subjunctive ensures that indirect speech is 
understood in rather a specific way, it does nevertheless allow the speaker some 
freedom: the prototypical indirect speech with which it is associated is, for example, 
indifferent to the de dicto versus de re distinction, discussed in the Introduction. (1a), 
which differs from the purported original utterance (1b) only in terms of its 
pronominal deixis (and, of course the use of S1 forms), is a repeat of the example of 
de dicto indirect speech (example (5)) provided in the Introduction:78  
  
(1a) Australiens Aussenminister  Smith  sagte  jedoch     dem     
 Australia’s  foreign minister  Smith  said    however   to the                  
 
Fernsehsender           Sky News,  er   gehe              davon  aus,  dass   der    
television broadcaster Sky News   he  assumes.S1  from it  SP    that     the    
 
27-Jährige   in   Australien ebenso  warmherzig  empfangen   werde             
27-year-old  in   Australia   just as   warmly         received        becomes.S1   
 
wie  in   Neuseeland. 
as   in    New Zealand 
 
 
                                                 
78
 It will be remembered that de dicto indirect speech is characterized by the absence of the 
conjunction dass (‘that’), whilst in de re indirect speech dass is used and the verbal cluster appears at 
the end of the clause. 
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‘However, Australia’s foreign minister Smith told the television broadcaster 
Sky News he assumed that the 27-year-old would be just as warmly received 
in Australia as he was in New Zealand.’  
 (St. Galler Tagblatt: 20.01.2010) 
 
(1b) Ich gehe davon aus, dass der 27-Jährige in Australien ebenso warmherzig 
empfangen wird wie in Neuseeland.  
 
(2a), which needs to resemble (2b) in terms of its propositional form (but the 
propositional forms need not be identical), is a repeat of our earlier example of de re 
indirect speech: 
 
(2a) Ein  CNN-Korrespondent   berichtet  aus    Port-au-Prince,  dass    Präsident 
a     CNN correspondent    reports    from   Port-au-Prince   that      president 
 
René Préval   zwar     persönlich  am      Flughafen  die   ersten  Hilfsflüge 
  René Préval   indeed  personally  at the  airport        the  first      relief flights 
 
empfangen habe,    es  aber  keine  organisierte  Verteilung   der   
  received     has.S1  it    but     no      organized     distribution  of the   
 
Hilfsgüter        gebe.  
relief supplies gives.S1 
 
‘A CNN correspondent reports from Port-au-Prince that President René 
Préval met the first relief flights personally, but there was no organized 
distribution of the relief supplies.’ 
(St. Galler Tagblatt: 15.01.2010) 
 
(2b) Präsident René Préval empfing zwar persönlich am Flughafen die ersten 
Hilfsflüge, es gibt aber keine organisierte Verteilung der Hilfsgüter. 
 
 What is the nature of the import of the reportative subjunctive? We 
hypothesize that its import is procedural, its precise function being to ensure that an 
utterance is understood as an instance of indirect speech which conforms to the 
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prototype of indirect speech described above.79 In the next section we shall provide 
some preliminary evidence for this proposal; a much more detailed examination will 
be found in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.6.  
 
 
4.2.2 The procedural import of the German reportative subjunctive: Preliminary 
observations 
 
We begin by revisiting an example which we looked at previously in Chapter 2 in our 
discussion of Eisenberg (1986/2004) and Thieroff (1992). On this occasion, the 
insight is our own: 
 
 (3a) Bild   hat   geschrieben,  dass  der   Graf     verhaftet   worden    ist. 
 Bild   has   written           that    the   count   arrested    become   is.IND 
 
 ‘Bild has written that the count has been arrested.’ 
 
This example is potentially ambiguous. On the one (more likely) interpretation, it is 
to be understood as (prototypical) indirect speech: the hearer will infer that the 
embedded proposition is attributed to Bild.80 On the other interpretation, the hearer 
is assumed already to know that the count has been arrested, i.e. this fact is 
presupposed. If the latter interpretation is the intended one, i.e. the focus is on the 
circumstance that the (known) fact that the count has been arrested has now been 
reported in Bild, then (3a) cannot be considered an instance of indirect speech with 
the feature indirectness. Note, however, that both interpretations we have suggested 
must be inferred by the hearer on the basis of context since there is no linguistic 
device which ensures that the hearer understands the utterance in one particular 
way. However, a hearer is much more likely to infer that the embedded proposition 
is presupposed if jetzt endlich (‘at last’ or ‘finally’) is added: 
 
(3b) Bild hat jetzt endlich geschrieben, dass der Graf verhaftet worden ist. 
  
                                                 
79
 From now on we shall refer to indirect speech which conforms to this description as ‘prototypical 
indirect speech’. This is simply for convenience; we do not wish to imply that indirect speech has to 
conform to this model in order to be considered indirect speech ‘proper’. 
80
 Our claim is that any German indirect speech which conforms to the prototype is prototypical indirect 
speech, even if an indicative form is used. The subjunctive ensures that the indirect speech is 
understood to be prototypical.  
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But it is still ultimately the context that ensures that the hearer understands this 
utterance as such. If, however, a subjunctive is substituted for the indicative in 
example (3a), then the hearer’s understanding of it is constrained such that the 
utterance is understood as an instance of prototypical indirect speech: 
 
(3c) Bild hat geschrieben, dass der Graf verhaftet worden sei. 
 
The subjunctive appears to have two functions here in ensuring that this is 
understood as prototypical indirect speech. On the one hand, it blocks 
interpretations which are inconsistent with such a reading: in this particular example 
it means that the interpretation according to which the embedded proposition is 
presupposed is ruled out. On the other hand, this is understood as prototypical 
indirect speech because the tense of the subjunctive has not only been selected 
from the point of view of the original speaker (Bild), the fact that it is a subjunctive 
form means that it is also understood as such, i.e. in relation to t1. 
The German reportative subjunctive also has the effect of distinguishing 
between direct discourse and indirect speech in the following examples. The 
examples themselves are taken from Hammer (1983: 268), but again the analysis is 
our own: 
 
(4a) Er sagte,  er   bewerbe    sich       um  diese  Stelle,     für   die       er   gar  
he  said    he  applies.S1  himself  for   this     position  for   which   he  really  
 
nicht  geeignet   ist.  
not       suited       is.IND 
 
‘He said he was applying for this position, which (in my opinion) he is totally 
unsuited to.’ 
 
The first subordinate clause er bewerbe sich um diese Stelle, can be understood 
only to be reported. This is to a large extent because it is immediately subordinate to 
the verbum dicendi sagte, but the subjunctive form bewerbe also plays a crucial 
role: it ensures that the embedded proposition is understood as prototypical indirect 
speech, and the hearer has no choice but to understand its tense in relation to t1. 
However, the second subordinate clause für die er gar nicht geeignet ist is 
ambiguous. There is nothing in theory that prevents it from being understood as a 
continuation of the proceeding indirect speech. But the most likely interpretation is 
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one according to which it is understood as the reporter’s own comment/opinion. If 
the second clause does not constitute part of what is understood to be reported, 
then the original utterance can be assumed to resemble (4b): 
 
(4b) Ich bewerbe mich um diese Stelle.  
 
However, in (5a) the use of the subjunctive in the clauses following da (‘as’) ensures 
that they are understood as a continuation of the indirect speech introduced by er 
sagte:  
 
(5a) Er   sagte,  er   werde   das  Buch  kaufen,   da   sein  Onkel,  dessen    
 he   said     he   will.S1  the   book  buy         as   his    uncle    whose  
 
Urteil            er   hoch     achte,           es    ihm    empfohlen        hätte. 
            judgement   he  highly    respects.S1  it      him    recommended  has.S2 
 
‘He said he would buy the book as his uncle, whose judgement (he said) he 
held in high regard, had recommended it to him.’ 
 
The reportative subjunctives in the subordinate clauses make sure that they are 
understood as indirect speech. But they also ensure that its tenses are understood 
in relation to t1 as fixed relative to t0 by the matrix verbum dicendi under which the 
subjunctive forms are ultimately embedded. Thus the original utterance must be 
understood to resemble (5b): 
 
(5b) Ich werde das Buch kaufen, da mein Onkel, dessen Urteil ich hoch achte, es 
mir empfohlen hat.  
 
Such considerations provide evidence for our hypothesis that the German 
reportative subjunctive has procedural import: it imposes a semantic constraint on 
the relevance of an utterance and constrains the inferential computations that a 
hearer performs over its conceptual content such that it is understood as an 
instance of indirect speech which conforms to the prototype described above. The 
notion that the subjunctive is procedural can be further corroborated. In Chapter 3, 
section 3.3, we saw how the semantic import of linguistic expressions which encode 
procedural meaning is difficult to conceptualize mentally. This is because, as 
pointed out by Wilson and Sperber (1993: 16), we do not have direct access either 
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to the grammatical or to the inferential computations used in utterance 
comprehension. Whilst it can be demonstrated that the subjunctive ensures that an 
utterance is understood as indirect speech and that its tenses are understood in 
relation to t1, we are not able to visualize its import in the same way that we can 
visualize, for example, a teapot or the colour blue.  
On the basis of our observations regarding examples (3), (4) and (5) and of 
our proposal for the prototype of indirect speech with which the reportative 
subjunctive is associated, we suggest that the reportative subjunctive has two chief 
tasks. Firstly, it guarantees that the utterance is understood as prototypical indirect 
speech by blocking certain interpretations which are inconsistent with prototypical 
indirect speech. In the case of example (3c) this results in the interpretation on 
which the subordinate proposition is presupposed being blocked. The other task of 
the subjunctive is to ensure that the tenses of indirect speech conform to point (iia) 
above, i.e. are understood in relation to t1. Importantly, the two aspects of the 
procedural import of the German reportative subjunctive should not be seen as 
separate constraints that it imposes. Instead, they should ultimately be seen as 
different components of one single relevance constraint, a constraint which, in 
minimizing the hearer’s processing effort, ensures that an utterance is understood 
as prototypical indirect speech.   
We shall now examine these two facets of the procedural constraint imposed 
by the reportative subjunctive in some detail, considering first the role of the 
subjunctive in blocking interpretations which conflict with a proto-typical-indirect-
speech reading.  
 
 
4.2.3 The role of the German reportative subjunctive in blocking interpretations 
which are inconsistent with prototypical indirect speech 
The effect of the German reportative subjunctive in ensuring that an utterance is 
understood as prototypcial indirect speech can be felt particularly strongly when it is 
embedded under verbs such as kritisieren, loben (‘praise’), bedauern and sich 
freuen (‘be glad’). This is because these verbs are usually factive, but the reportative 
subjunctive constrains their interpretation such that they are understood as verba 
dicendi which introduce indirect speech with the property indirectness. Furthermore, 
as we shall suggest below, when they introduce prototypical indirect speech such 
verbs need to be understood to be embedded under an additional matrix clause, 
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such as ‘X sagt, dass P’, which is constructed by the hearer on the level of basic 
explicature. 
The focus of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s 2011 paper ‘Behabitive reports’ 
is the report of speech acts such as kritisieren and loben. Apparently building on the 
insights of Fabricius-Hansen (2006), they distinguish cases where the embedded 
clause is the object of judgement and those where the embedded clause is 
analyzable as the content of judgement. They claim that ‘[…] in the O[bject] case, to 
criticize α for doing P is to say something conveying disapproval of P(α) […]’ (2011: 
86), and provide (6) as an example:  
 
(6) Einstein   kritisierte,   dass  Bohr  die   Kausalität   aufgegeben  hatte. 
            Einstein   criticized    that    Bohr  the   causality    abandoned    had 
 
     ‘Einstein criticized Bohr for having abandoned causality.’ 
 
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø are essentially saying that in (6) the notion that Bohr 
has abandoned causality is presented as a known fact which Einstein has criticized. 
In other words, the subordinate proposition will be presupposed by the matrix verb. 
Crucially, the finite verb in the content case must be an indicative form. They 
subsequently observe that instances of the object case are compatible with es-
expletive insertion (example from Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2011:86)):81 
 
(7) Platon  hat   es  kritisiert,  dass  die   Sophisten  Rhetorik   lehrten. 
 Plato    has  it    criticized  that   the   sophists     rhetoric    taught.IND 
  
‘Plato criticized the fact that the sophists taught rhetoric’ or ‘Plato criticized 
the sophists for teaching rhetoric.’ 
 
                                                 
81
 Precisely what motivates es-expletive insertion is far from clear, and Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 
quote Sudhof (2004) who remarks that ‘[s]everal proposals have been made […], none of which seem 
to be entirely conclusive’ (2004: 23). Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø themselves propose that ‘[…] es 
signals that the complement clause it correlates with is not quite discourse-new. It agrees with factives 
like bedauern ‘regret’ […] but it disagrees with verbs of saying like behaupten ‘claim’ […]; between 
these two extremes there are many verbs, including verbs of saying, where es seems to imply that the 
proposition expressed by the correlative clause is already under discussion in the discourse’ (2011: 
90). 
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A further point regarding the object case is that the subordinate clause must be 
introduced by the conjunction dass; this may be linked to Truckenbrodt’s insight that 
‘[f]active predicates do not allow embedded V-to-C […]’ (2006: 299).82, 83 
 Regarding the content case, Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2011: 86) remark 
that: ‘[…] to criticize α for doing P is […] to say P(α), thereby conveying disapproval 
of something α has done or is doing’. They point out that the content case does 
allow V-to-C, in other words the conjunction dass may be omitted, and follow 
Truckenbrodt in pointing out that ‘[…] V2 clauses [...] cannot be factive […]’ 
(2011:89). Importantly, the content case does not permit es-expletive insertion. 
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø provide the following example: 
 
(8a) Einstein  kritisierte,   dass  Bohr   voreilig          die    Kausalität  aufgegeben 
Einstein  criticized    that    Bohr   prematurely   the   causality    abandoned 
 
habe.  
 has.S1 
 
‘Einstein criticized Bohr for having abandoned causality prematurely’ or 
‘Einstein voiced the criticism that Bohr abandoned causality prematurely.’ 
 
The content case is compatible with an embedded reportative subjunctive. 
Significantly, example (8a) contains a ‘negative moral judgement predicate’ 
(voreilig), to which Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø refer formally as an evaluative 
element, ‘[…] the presence of which in the complement clause is, as it appears, 
necessary (maybe even sufficient), for the C[ontent] case’ (2011: 86). Fabricius-
Hansen and Sæbø thus imply that there is a distinction between the sort of 
embedded clause that may occur in the object case and the sort that may occur in 
the content case. We infer from their further considerations that it is not possible to 
convert (9a) below, an example of the content case with the evaluative element 
unmoralisch (‘immoral’), into an instance of the object case simply by substituting an 
indicative for the subjunctive (example (9b)): due to the presence of unmoralisch it 
will still be understood as an instance of the content case (examples from Fabricius-
Hansen and Sæbø 2011: 89):  
                                                 
82
 We understand a factive predicate to be the complement clause of a factive verb, as defined above. 
Thus a factive predicate will be presupposed.  
83
 V-to-C, i.e. the occurrence of the verb in second position, is possible only in clauses not introduced 
by a subordinating conjunction, e.g. dass. 
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(9a) Platon   kritisierte,  dass  die   Rhetorik  unmoralisch  sei. 
 Plato     criticized   that     the  rhetoric   immoral         is.S1 
 
 ‘Plato voiced the criticism that rhetoric is immoral.’ 
 
(9b) Platon kritisierte, dass die Rhetorik unmoralisch ist. 
 
Conversely, according to Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø, the object case is 
incompatible with the reportative subjunctive (2011: 89). In other words, attempting 
to convert an instance of the object case (which will lack an evaluative element) into 
the content case by substituting a subjunctive form results in infelicity. (10a) is 
satisfactory, (10b) is not: 
 
(10a) Platon  kritisierte,  dass  die  Sophisten  Rhetorik  lehrten. 
 Plato    criticized   that    the  Sophists    rhetoric    taught.IND  
 
 ‘Plato criticized the fact that the Sophists taught rhetoric.’ 
 
(10b) ? Platon kritisierte, dass die Sophisten Rhetorik lehren würden.84 
 
 Whilst there is therefore clear evidence that there are some types of 
subordinate proposition that can be understood only as the object of criticism and 
others which can be associated only with the content case, we believe that there are 
also some propositions which may be understood as either the object or the content 
of criticism. In such cases, if the verb embedded under kritisieren is an indicative 
form, then, provided that there is no expletive es, it will in our view be possible to 
understand it as an example of either the content or the object case. Consider, for 
instance, example (11a), which has an embedded subjunctive: 
 
(11a)  Schließlich  kritisiert   Erol   auch,  daß   von   den   900   Millionen   Schilling, 
 ultimately    criticizes  Erol   also    that   of      the    900   million      Schillings  
 
die       insgesamt  seit     1990  an    Altlastensanierungsbeiträgen 
 which  altogether   since  1990  on    clean-up operation contributions 
                                                 
84
 To make explicit that the embedded verb is to be understood as a(n) (infelicitous) subjunctive, we 
have substituted the würde form: lehren würden. This is because the form which the standard rules 
prescribe, the S2 form lehrten, is indistinguishable from the (acceptable) imperfect indicative lehrten in 
(10a). 
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  gezahlt  worden   sind,       bloß     elf         Prozent   für  Sanierungen  
 paid       become  are.IND  merely eleven  per cent  for  decontamination 
   
ausgegeben worden    seien [...]. 
 spent            become   are.S1 
 
‘Finally, Erol also makes the criticism that of the total of 900 million Schillings 
that have been paid in clean-up operation contributions since 1990, a mere 
eleven per cent has been spent on decontamination.’ 
 (Die Presse: 04.08.1995) 
 
Because of the S1 form (seien), this can only be understood as an example of the 
content case; it is therefore not possible to insert an expletive es. This could also be 
understood as an instance of the content clause, depending on contextual 
considerations, with an indicative form (sind). But it is possible to conceive of a 
situation where it is a known fact that only eleven per cent of the 900 million 
schillings have been spent on decontamination. In such a case, a speaker may utter 
something in criticism of this fact. The result will be an instance of the object case 
where the fact under discussion is presupposed and the indicative is obligatory 
whilst es-expletive insertion optional. An es-expletive would rule out the possibility of 
a content-case reading, which latter would otherwise be possible, as we have 
suggested: 
 
(11b) Schließlich kritisiert es Erol auch, dass von den 900 Millionen Schilling, die 
insgesamt seit 1990 an Altlastensanierungsbeiträgen gezahlt worden sind, 
bloß elf Prozent für Sanierungen ausgegeben worden sind. 
 
‘Finally, Erol also criticizes the fact that of the total of 900 million Schillings 
that have been paid in clean-up operation contributions since 1990, a mere 
eleven per cent has been spent on decontamination.’ 
 
In essence, instances of the content case constitute indirect speech. From 
our own point of view, the effect of the subjunctive is to guarantee that an utterance 
is understood as an example of the content case, i.e. prototypical indirect speech. In 
doing so the subjunctive prevents interpretations which conflict with an indirect-
speech reading, for example interpretations on which the embedded proposition is 
presupposed will be blocked.  
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Two more points regarding indirect speech which is introduced by a matrix 
verb such as kritisieren deserve mention. Firstly, Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 
remark that in the content case the matrix verb reports both a locution and an 
illocution (2011: 86). In other words, it is not only the embedded proposition which is 
reported and attributed to the matrix subject: the performance of the original 
behabitive speech act is as well. This means that the purported original utterance 
which (8a) is understood to report is likely to resemble either (8b) in terms of its 
propositional form or, alternatively, (8c) if an explicit performative is not included but 
must be recovered inferentially by the hearer on the level of higher-level explicature: 
 
(8b)  Ich kritisiere, dass Bohr voreilig die Kausalität aufgab. 
(8c) Bohr gab voreilig die Kausalität auf. 
 
Secondly, if the matrix verb itself reports part of the original utterance which 
is attributed to the matrix subject, then it follows that in cases such as (8a) the 
optimally relevant interpretation will be on which the matrix verbum dicendi is itself 
understood to be embedded under a (still) higher verbum-dicendi matrix clause 
which contributes to basic explicature, as in (8d) below. The tense of the verbum-
dicendi clause that the hearer supplies will be the same as the tense of the explicit 
verbum dicendi. In (8d) we have transposed kritisierte into the S1 form kritisiere: this 
reflects the fact that the indirect-speech construction that the hearer constructs 
mentally will in our view itself display indirectness: 
 
(8a) Einstein kritisierte, dass Bohr voreilig die Kausalität aufgegeben habe. 
(8b)  Ich kritisiere, dass Bohr voreilig die Kausalität aufgab. 
(8d) {Einstein sagte}, er kritisiere, dass Bohr voreilig die Kausalität aufgegeben 
habe. 
 
An analysis which bears similarities with that suggested for the report of 
behabitives may be provided for the use of the reportative subjunctive when 
embedded under essentially factive verbs of emotional attitude such as bedauern 
and sich freuen. We may distinguish an object case and a content case, in both of 
which α (the original speaker) is reported as regretting or being glad that P. In the 
object case, P is understood to be presupposed by the matrix verb and the 
indicative is obligatory: 
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(12a) Er  bedauerte,  dass    in  diesem  Jahr    der  traditionelle     
he  regretted     that     in  this        year    the  traditional   
     
 Weihnachtsbaum  des     Gesangvereins     fehlte. 
 Christmas tree      of the  choral society        was missing.IND 
 
‘He regretted the fact that this year the choral society did not have their 
traditional Christmas tree.’ 
(Mannheimer Morgen: 15.12.2006) 
 
An expletive es may be added to the object case without causing grammatical 
difficulty: 
 
(12b)  Er bedaurte es, dass in diesem Jahr der traditionelle Weihnachtsbaum des 
Gesangvereins fehlte. 
 
In the object case, α is likely to have said something which indicates that she regrets 
that P, and so (12a) plausibly reports an utterance which resembles (12c) or (12d). 
In (12c), the original speaker says explicitly that she regrets that P: 
 
(12c) Ich bedaure, dass in diesem Jahr der traditionelle Weihnachtsbaum des 
Gesangvereins fehlte. 
 
In (12d), that the original speaker regrets that P is implied: 
 
(12d) Schade,  dass  in  diesem  Jahr   der   traditionelle   Weihnachtsbaum  
 shame     that   in  this        year   the   traditional      Christmas tree 
 
des       Gesangvereins   fehlte! 
of the    choral society     was missing 
 
‘It is a shame that this year the choral society do not have their traditional 
Christmas tree.’ 
 
On the other hand, if the speaker wishes an utterance which consists of verb 
of emotional attitude plus subordinate proposition to be understood as an instance 
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of (prototypical) indirect speech, then the reportative subjunctive will guarantee that 
it is understood as such. Es-expletive insertion is not possible: 
 
(13a) Die  CDU - Abgeordnete  bedauerte,  dass  von  den  osteuropäischen     
 the  CDU   member          regretted     that   of     the   East European   
 
Staaten nur    Ungarn    zu   einem  Engagement   bereit       sei. 
states    only   Hungary  to   a          commitment    prepared  is.S1 
 
‘The CDU member said with regret that of the East European states only 
Hungary was prepared to commit itself.’ 
(Hannoversche Allgemeine: 20.10.2007) 
 
In this, the content, case α is likely either to have said P and thereby indicated that α 
regrets that P, or to have said that α regrets that P. Therefore, the utterance which 
(13a) purports to report is likely to have resembled either an utterance such as 
(13b), where (according to imagined contextual features) α says P and thereby 
indicates that she regrets that P:  
 
(13b) Von den osteuropäischen Staaten ist nur Ungarn zu einem Engagement 
bereit. 
 
or (13c), where α says that α regrets that P: 
 
(13c) Ich bedaure, dass von den osteuropäischen Staaten nur Ungarn zu einem 
Engagement bereit ist.  
 
In ensuring that (13a) is understood as indirect speech with the property 
indirectness, one of the effects of the subjunctive is to block interpretations on which 
the embedded proposition is presupposed, a presupposition which is plausibly 
present in (12a): 
 
(12a) Er bedauerte, dass in diesem Jahr der traditionelle Weihnachtsbaum des 
Gesangvereins fehlte. 
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Additionally, because in (13a) it is reported that the matrix subject regretted that P, 
i.e. the matrix clause itself represents part of the purported original utterance, (13a) 
needs to be explicated as (13d): 
 
(13d) {Die CDU-Abgeordnete sagte}, sie bedaure, dass von den 
osteuropäischen Staaten nur Ungarn zu einem Engagement bereit sei. 
 
In Chapter 1 we remarked that in English and German a proposition 
embedded under a factive verb such as ‘regret’ will still be understood to be 
presupposed even if ‘regret’ is itself embedded under a non-factive verb, such as 
‘say’. Thus (14a) does seem to presuppose (14b): 
  
(14a) My brother said he regretted that he did not accept the job offer. 
(14b) My brother did not accept the job offer. 
 
If (14a) is translated into German and we embed an indicative under bedauern then, 
as in English, the presupposition in (14b) appears to survive even though it is itself 
immediately subordinate to the subjunctive form bedaure: 
 
(14c) Mein  Bruder   sagte,  er   bedaure,    dass  er    das  Jobangebot  nicht  
 my     brother  said     he   regrets.S1   that   he   the   job offer       not 
 
angenommen   hat.  
accepted           has.IND 
 
However, if we substitute a subjunctive for the indicative in (14c), then the 
interpretation on which (14b) is logically presupposed is blocked: 
 
(14d) Mein Bruder sagte, er bedaure, dass er das Jobangebot nicht angenommen 
habe. 
 
Because the reported emotional attitude in (14d) is itself embedded under a verbum 
dicendi, the distinction between the object case, where the proposition which is 
subordinate to bedauern is presupposed, and the content case, where it is not, is 
obscured. On the one hand, contextual considerations may prompt a hearer to 
understand it as an instance of the content case. On the other hand the reported 
emotional attitude is understood as an instance of the object case. This might be the 
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case, for example, if the hearer of (14d) knows as fact that the original speaker’s 
brother declined the job offer concerned. Here we run into a slight problem, for if the 
latter is the case, then there plausibly is a sense in which the proposition embedded 
under bedaure is presupposed after all. On a weaker interpretation, whether or not 
this presupposition is present is left open. However, either way we propose that the 
interpretation on which the (14b) must be understood to be presupposed is not 
available. This, however, does not preclude the hearer from recovering an 
interpretation pragmatically on which the presupposition is understood to survive.  
Consequently, our claim is that a consistent feature of the prototypical 
indirect speech with which the procedural import of the German reportative 
subjunctive is associated is that interpretations on which the embedded proposition  
must be understood to be presupposed by a superordinate factive predicate are 
blocked. If the subjunctive is employed, then interpretations on which the embedded 
proposition is presupposed may still arise, but as a pragmatic effect.   
 
 
4.2.4 Not all factive verbs accept an embedded reportative subjunctive 
 
We have argued that there are a number of factive verbs which are capable of being 
understood as verba dicendi which introduce prototypical indirect speech when the 
German reportative subjunctive is embedded under them. However, it is not the 
case that the German reportative subjunctive is capable of constraining the 
interpretation of any factive verb such that it is understood as a verbum dicendi 
which introduces prototypical indirect speech. For, as Eisenberg (2006: 117) points 
out, the reportative subjunctive is ungrammatical when embedded under verbs such 
as entschuldigen (‘excuse’), vergessen (‘forget’), verstehen (‘understand’) and 
wissen (‘know’):  
 
(15) Er   wusste,  dass  sein   Sohn  in   der   Prüfung  durchgefallen   war (*sei). 
 he   knew      that    his    son     in   the   exam     failed                 was (is.S1) 
  
 ‘He knew that his son had failed the exam.’ 
 
(16) Er vergaß, dass sein Sohn in der Prüfung durchgefallen war (*sei). 
(17) Er verstand, dass sein Sohn in der Prüfung durchgefallen war (*sei). 
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We propose that the subjunctive cannot be subordinate to these verbs because in 
their case the interpretation on which the embedded proposition is presupposed 
cannot be blocked. If we are right, then why should this be the case? What is the 
essential semantic distinction between these verbs and those whereby the 
interpretation according to which the embedded clause is presupposed can be 
blocked?  
Huddleston and Pullum (2002) provide an insight which suggests a possible 
solution to this problem. They distinguish between two broad classes of factive 
verbs. On the one hand there are those factives which normally presuppose but do 
not entail their complement clause. They define ‘entail’ as follow (2002: 35): 
 
X entails Y ≡ If X is true then it follows necessarily that Y is true too.  
 
Examples of ‘presupposing’ factives which Huddleston and Pullum give include 
‘admit’, ‘confess’, ‘resent’ and, significantly, the verb of emotional attitude ‘regret’ 
(2002: 1008). As an example of ‘confess’, they provide (16) (2002: 1007): 
 
(18) Ed confessed that he murdered her husband. 
 
Of this they remark that: 
 
[t]he default assumption is that confessions are true, so that what is foregrounded is 
the act of confession, not the issue of whether the content is true. But it is perfectly 
possible to make a false confession, so it cannot be an entailment of [18] that he 
murdered her husband.  
(Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1007-1008) 
 
Significantly, the German equivalents of all these verbs accept a subjunctive and 
thus can be understood as verba dicendi. Furthermore, behabitives can also be 
placed in this broad category of verbs whose complement clause is in the normal 
case presupposed but not entailed. We repeat example (11b): 
 
(11b) Schließlich kritisiert Erol auch, dass von den 900 Millionen Schilling, die 
insgesamt seit 1990 an Altlastensanierungsbeiträgen gezahlt worden sind, 
bloß elf Prozent für Sanierungen ausgegeben worden sind. 
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In this example, it is highly probable but not necessarily true that only eleven per 
cent of the 900 million schillings have been spent on decontamination: Erol might be 
mistaken.  
On the other hand, Huddleston and Pullum propose that there is a class of 
factive verbs which not only presuppose their embedded proposition; they also entail 
it (2002: 1008). Examples include ‘find out’, ‘forget’, ‘know’, ‘point out’, ‘realize’ and 
‘remember’, i.e. generally those verbs mentioned by Eisenberg (2006: 117). Our 
suggestion is therefore that the subjunctive cannot block an interpretation according 
to which an embedded proposition is understood to be presupposed by a(n) 
(otherwise) factive matrix if that proposition is also entailed by this verb. This would 
explain why the subjunctive cannot normally be embedded felicitously under verbs 
of this type.85  
Nevertheless, there is arguably an exception to this. Eisenberg’s verbs can 
be superordinate to a reportative subjunctive if they are themselves reportative- 
subjunctive forms and as such form part of an indirect-speech report. In such cases, 
the effect of the procedural import of the reportative subjunctive is to block 
interpretations on which the embedded proposition concerned is entailed, in addition 
to being logically presupposed. For example: 
 
(19) So  kritisiert   Dirk  Schaper,  dass  die  Stadt  sehr  genau  wisse, 
 so  criticized  Dirk  Schaper   that    the  town  very  exact    knows.S1 
 
 dass   dies   vorerst      nicht  möglich   sei      und  auch  nicht    geschehen 
 that     this   at present  not    possible   is.S1  and  also    not      happen 
 
 werde. 
 will.S1 
 
‘So Dirk Schaper criticized the town for knowing only too well that this is not 
possible at present and also will not happen.’ 
(Braunschweiger Zeitung: 07.01.2010) 
                                                 
85
 The verb sich erinnern (‘remember’) can occur with a subjunctive and thus introduce indirect speech, 
for example Ein junges Mädchen erinnerte sich, dass sie in Panik geraten sei, als […] (‘A young girl 
(said that she) remembered that she panicked when […]’) (Hamburger Morgenpost: 03.02.2006). 
However, we suggest that Huddleston and Pullum are incorrect in placing this verb amongst those 
which both presuppose and entail their complement clause. The fact that it is quite possible for a 
person to remember a state of affairs incorrectly is evidence enough that sich erinnern does not entail 
its subordinate proposition. Thus the fact that the subjunctive is capable of constraining sich erinnern, 
as a factive verb, such that it is understood as a verbum dicendi which introduces prototypical indirect 
speech is not remarkable. 
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In (19) the entailment and presupposition that ‘this is not possible at present and 
also will not happen’ is blocked because this is embedded under the reportative-
subjunctive form wisse. It thus constitutes part of what is reported and so is 
ultimately attributed to Schaper. However, the default assumption is that a 
proposition embedded under wissen is presupposed, and, furthermore, there is no 
contextual reason for the hearer to suppose that the proposition embedded under 
wisse is untrue. Therefore the hearer is likely to sense intuitively that this proposition 
is presupposed. However, evidence that this is but a pragmatic effect is provided by 
the following example:   
 
(20) Das  Kind   sagte,  es  wisse,       dass   die   Erde   platt  sei. 
 the   child    said    it    knows.S1  that     the   earth  flat    is.S1 
  
‘The child said that he knew that the Earth is flat.’ 
 
Because the proposition that is subordinate to wisse is patently false, the hearer has 
no reason to understand it to be presupposed. The presupposition (and entailment) 
is blocked by the subjunctive, whilst the possibility of this presupposition being 
recovered pragmatically is blocked by the context. 
In (21) an indicative is embedded under the subjunctive form. The most likely 
interpretation, however, is one on which the presupposition and entailment that 
‘there is always an interesting selection of cultural activities on offer’ survives: 
 
(21) Die  Stadträtin           Helen Heberer  sagte  uns,   sie   sei     hier,  weil  
 the   town councillor  Helen Heberer  said    to us  she  is.S1  here  because 
 
sie wisse,      dass  es  in  der  Tulla   immer   ein  interessantes  
 she know.S1  that    it   in  the   Tulla  always  an   interesting 
  
Kulturangebot   gibt. 
 culture offer      gives.IND 
 
‘The town councillor Helen Heberer told us that she was here because she 
knew that there is always an interesting selection of cultural activities on offer 
in the Tulla.’ 
(Mannheimer Morgen: 10.04.01) 
 
 171 
 
The presupposition and entailment of the matrix verb are not blocked by the 
indicative form gibt, even though the factive and entailing verb wisse is itself a 
reportative-subjunctive form. 
 
 
4.2.5 Intermediary summary 
 
The aspect of the constraint imposed by the German reportative subjunctive that we 
have discussed so far may be summarized as follows. The subjunctive ensures that 
an utterance with the syntactic form matrix verb plus subordinate clause is 
understood as indirect speech which conforms to a specific prototype by blocking 
any interpretation which is incompatible with a prototypical-indirect-speech reading, 
and in practice this appears to mean interpretations according to which the reported 
proposition is understood to be presupposed by a matrix factive verb. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the subjunctive blocks interpretations on which the embedded 
proposition is presupposed does not preclude the possibility of the hearer recovering 
an interpretation pragmatically on which this proposition is presupposed. This seems 
to be the case if the context of the host discourse indicates that in the purported 
original utterance the corresponding proposition was presupposed. On the other 
hand, the reportative subjunctive is not capable of blocking interpretations according 
to which the embedded proposition is understood to be presupposed if the matrix 
verb not only presupposes but also entails its subordinate proposition. Therefore it 
cannot be embedded felicitously under such verbs as vergessen, verstehen and 
wissen. If, however, a presupposing and entailing verb is itself in the reportative 
subjunctive and as such constitutes part of what is reported, then the subjunctive 
may be embedded under it: in this case the subjunctive will additionally have the 
effect of blocking entailments. 
 
 
4.2.6 The role of the German reportative subjunctive in ensuring that its tenses are 
understood in relation to t1. 
 
We now come to a discussion of the other facet of the procedural import of the 
German reportative subjunctive: the notion that it ensures that its tenses are 
understood in relation to t1. Importantly, this aspect of the constraint works in 
tandem with that described above in ensuring that an instance of indirect speech is 
understood to be prototypical. However, the fact that it is possible for the tense of 
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indirect speech, like pronominal deixis, to be understood from the point of view of 
the reporter, i.e. t0 rather than t1, suggests that there is some justification in our 
investigating the two aspects separately. In other words, the fact that the reportative 
subjunctive ensures that the matrix subject is understood to be responsible for the 
reported proposition does not of necessity entail that its tenses are understood in 
relation to t1. Conversely, the fact that the tenses of the reportative subjunctive are 
always understood to be relative to t1 does not limit its distribution to indirect speech 
and thus of necessity entail that it attributes the reported proposition to the matrix 
subject. There is evidence for this: German and Russian indicative tenses may be 
understood from the point of view of the matrix subject, i.e. may be understood in 
relation to t1, when embedded under factive verbs which both presuppose and entail 
their complement clause. Thus the tense of the clause embedded under such a verb 
reflects the viewpoint of the matrix subject at the time denoted by the matrix tense. A 
Russian example: 
 
(22) Kogda  ponjal,           čto    ne    vystuplju        na  OI,                            
when    I understood  that  not   I  will perform   at   O(lympic) G(ames)   
 
slezy    ne   sxodili          tri        dnja. 
tears    not  went down   three   days 
 
‘When I understood that I would not perform (lit. ‘will not perform’) at the 
Olympics the tears didn’t stop for three days.’ 
(http://london2012.rsport.ru/london2012_weightlifting/20120827/613042167.html, 
accessed 07.11.2012) 
 
The interview from which example (22) is taken was published on 27.08.2012, 
significantly after the London 2012 Olympics, which is the Olympiad referred to. 
Thus the embedded verb vystuplju cannot be understood from the point of view of 
the weightlifter at the time of the report, but must be understood from his point of 
view at the time when he realized he would not be able to take part. Thus vystuplju 
must be understood in relation to t1. The tenses of the German indicative may also 
be understood in relation to t1 as fixed in relation to t0 by the tense of a factive matrix 
verb which entails its subordinate proposition. For example: 
 
(23) «Ich  wusste,  dass   es  nicht   leicht    sein   wird»,       sagte  Hansruedi    
  I      knew     that     it    not      easy    be      will.IND      said    Hansruedi    
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«Fidé»   der  Trainer  von  Chur  97,  nach  dem  Match.  
«Fidé»   the  coach    of     Chur  97   after  the    match 
 
‘“I knew that it would (lit. ‘will’) not be easy,” said Hansruedi «Fidé», Chur 
97’s coach, after the match.’ 
(Die Südostschweiz: 10.10.2005) 
 
In (23) the proposition Es wird nicht leicht sein is presupposed. The adverbial nach 
dem Match is significant: at the time of utterance the ‘state of not being easy’ is 
already in the past, thus Hansruedi’s future form sein wird can be understood only in 
relation to t1. These considerations constitute evidence that we are justified in 
examining both facets of the single constraint imposed by the German reportative 
subjunctive separately. 
The fact that it is impossible for the tenses of the German reportative 
subjunctive in indirect speech to be understood in any way other than in relation to t1 
is implied by Kaufmann (1976: 36) who remarks that ‘[…] the reference point for 
subjunctive forms in indirect speech is always the speaking time of the original 
speaker’.86 However, it does not necessarily have to be the case that, in a given 
language, tensed forms which as a rule take t1 as their temporal deictic centre in 
indirect speech can never be understood in relation to t0. In Russian, for example, 
the indicative mood is always employed in indirect speech, and the tense of the 
finite verb: 
 
[…] remains in the same tense as in the corresponding direct speech, i.e. there is no 
shift whatsoever. This means that tenses in indirect speech in Russian are 
interpreted not from the viewpoint of the deictic centre of the here-and-now, but 
rather with the deictic centre of the original speaker. 
(Comrie 1985: 109) 
 
Other deictic expressions, on the other hand, must be shifted such they are 
understood from the deictic point of view of the reporter. However, Comrie (1985: 
110) goes on to point out that this can result in a clash between temporal deixis and 
tense, which he illustrates with the following example. Imagine that it is 8th May and 
Kolya says: 
 
 
                                                 
86
 […] der Bezugspunkt für Konjunktiv-Formen in der indirekten Rede [ist] immer der Sprechzeitpunkt 
des Sprechers S1. 
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(24a) Ja   pridu            četyrnadcatogo     maja. 
 I     will arrive      of the fourteenth   of May  
 
 ‘I will arrive on 14th May.’ 
 
Subsequently, on 15th May this may be reported as follows: 
 
(24b) Kolya   skazal,  čto    on   pridet         četyrnadcatogo     maja. 
 Kolya   said       that  he   will arrive    of the fourteenth   of May 
 
 ‘Kolya said that he would arrive on 14th May.’ 
 
However, this cannot be reported on 15th May thus: 
 
(24c) ? Kolya  skazal,    čto    on   pridet         včera. 
   Kolya   said         that   he   will arrive  yesterday 
 
 ‘Kolya said that he would (lit. ‘will’) arrive yesterday.’ 
 
In (24c) the verb pridet is a future tense form and, in our own terms, is understood 
as such in relation to t1 whose location in time relative to t0 is indicated by the past-
tense form skazal. However, the rule which states that temporal and spatial deixis 
must be selected from the point of view of the reporter has been applied such that 
the temporal deictic adverbial včera is used to refer to 14th May. The result is that 
although pridet in this context has past-time reference, as an otherwise future-tense 
form it clashes with včera. Comrie (1985: 110) suggests that ‘[…] Russian […] has a 
constraint preventing collocation of a given tense with an adverbial whose meaning 
is incompatible with the meaning of that tense’. Essentially, a Russian tense will, 
when collocated with one of a subset of temporal deictic adverbials, strive to be 
understood in relation to the same temporal deictic centre from the point of view of 
which the temporal deictic adverbial is selected, i.e. t0. The adverbials we have in 
mind are those which refer to a time which is explicitly anterior or posterior to t0, e.g. 
‘yesterday’ or ‘tomorrow’. This causes no problem when the time reference of the 
adverbial and the time referred to by the tense of the embedded verb are both either 
in the past or in the future relative to t0. In (24d), for example, pridet is to be 
understood in relation to t1, but the event referred to is in the future from the point of 
view not only of t1 but also of t0. Therefore the future-tense form pridet collocates 
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felicitously with zavtra (‘tommorow’), which has been selected from the point of view 
of t0: 
 
(24d) Kolya   skazal,  čto     on   pridet         zavtra. 
            Kolya   said      that    he   will arrive   tomorrow 
 
 ‘Kolya said that he would (lit. ‘will’) arrive tomorrow.’ 
 
However, if the tense of the embedded verb, from the point of view of t0, refers to a 
time which is incompatible with the time referred to by any temporal deictic adverbial 
with which it is collocated, as in example (24c), then the result is a clash which 
results in an unacceptable formulation. The problem appears to be quite general 
across languages and has been noted also by Huddleston (1969: 787) and Declerck 
(1989: 61). 
In German we can end up in similar deictic difficulties if in indirect speech we 
use an indicative form which is intended to be understood to be relative to t1. 
Consider the following example (from Dieling and Kempter 1989: 63): 
 
(25a) ? Hans  hat   vorgestern                        gesagt,    dass  er    gestern  
    Hans  has  the day before yesterday  said         that   he   yesterday 
 
nach  Hamburg    fahren  wird. 
 to       Hamburg    go        will.IND 
 
‘The day before yesterday Hans said that he would go to Hamburg 
yesterday.’ 
 
The tense of the embedded proposition is the same as it was in the original 
utterance. However, the temporal deictic adverbial gestern has been selected from 
the temporal point of view of the reporter. As a result, the indicative form wird, in 
spite of its contextual past-time reference, is understood, like gestern, to be relative 
to t0. However, as such a form (which it is not intended to be!) it clashes with 
gestern, resulting in infelicity. If we substitute a reportative subjunctive then the 
utterance is deictically more satisfactory. This is because, unlike the Russian 
indicative in example (24c) above, the subjunctive blocks the possibility of its own 
tense being understood in relation to t0, even though this is the temporal deictic 
centre in relation to which gestern is understood: 
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(25b) Hans hat vorgestern gesagt, dass er gestern nach Hamburg fahren 
werde/würde. 
 
We say that this is deictically more satisfactory because there appears to be some 
contention in the literature regarding the extent to which examples such as (25b) are 
acceptable in standard German. Planck (1986: 293-294) discusses a similar 
example:  
 
(26a) Vico   telegraphierte    mir      am      vorgestrigen          Montag,   daß   er 
 Vico   sent a telegram to me  on the  before yesterday  Monday   that   he 
 
gestern       singen   werde. 
 yesterday   sing        will.S1 
 
‘Vico sent me a telegram on Monday, the day before yesterday, saying that 
he was going to sing yesterday.’ 
 
He agrees with Wunderlich that such sentences are grammatically unacceptable, 
but ‘pragmatically possibly correct’ (Wunderlich 1970: 207).87 However, Planck 
(1986: 294) suggests that in a context such as the following his example – with an 
S2 form würde instead of the S1 werde – ‘[…] is however from a grammatical point 
of view obviously not so incompatible with the time adverbial gestern [‘yesterday’] as 
the original future-tense form itself’:88  
 
(26b) Vico   telegraphierte    mir      am       vorgestrigen           Montag,  daß   er 
 Vico   sent a telegram to me  on the  before yesterday    Monday  that   he 
 
gestern       singen   würde,     und    wie   ich   gerade       im        ‚Thurgauer  
 yesterday   sing        will.S2      and    as     I      just             in the   Thurgau  
 
Volksfreund‘  lese,    hat    er   auch   gesungen. 
 Volksfreund   read    has   he  also    sung 
 
                                                 
87
 pragmatisch vielleicht korrekt 
88
 […] ist jedoch grammatisch augenscheinlich nicht so inkompatibel mit dem Zeitadverb gestern wie 
das originale Futur selbst. 
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‘Vico sent me a telegram on Monday, the day before yesterday, saying that 
he was going to sing yesterday, and as I am just reading in Thurgaur 
Volksfreund, he did sing.’ 
 
In an endnote Jäger (1971: 289) claims that his example (1971: 111) was not ‘[…] 
accepted as correct by all informants’, but ‘[t]he majority […] considered it to be 
correct’:89  
 
(27) Er   sagte   mir      vorgestern,                        dass er   gestern     kommen   
he   said     to me  the day before yesterday  that   he  yesterday  come       
 
werde. 
will.S1 
 
‘He told me the day before yesterday that he would come yesterday.’ 
 
In his discussion of Planck’s and Jäger’s examples, Thieroff (1992: 238-239) also 
agrees that example (27) is grammatically satisfactory: ‘[h]ere we agree with the 
majority of Jäger’s informants and consider [27] to be completely acceptable […]’.90 
Ultimately, it appears that such examples are not universally considered to 
be unacceptable, unlike similar examples in Russian. At least for some native 
German speakers, the fact that the German reportative subjunctive always takes t1 
as its temporal deictic centre allows tensed forms to collocate with adverbials with 
which they would clash if they were both understood in relation to t0. We therefore 
claim that this constitutes compelling evidence that it is not simply the case that the 
reportative subjunctive ensures that its tense is understood in relation to t1; rather, 
any interpretation according to which it is understood to be relative to t0 is blocked. 
The tense of a subjunctive form can be understood to be relative only to t1 
even in cases where the reported state of affairs is plausibly still valid at the time of 
the report and thus could be understood from the point of view of t0. Example (28a), 
from Fabricius-Hansen (1989: 165), whose subordinate clause contains an 
indicative form, can theoretically be understood in at least two ways:  
 
 
                                                 
89
 […] nicht von allen Informanten als korrekt akzeptiert. Die Mehrheit aber hielt ihn für richtig. 
90
 Wir schließen uns hier der Mehrheit von Jägers Informanten an und halten [27] für durchaus 
akzeptabel [...].  
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(28a) Anna  teilte        mir   heute   morgen   mit,  dass  Hans  diese Woche   
 Anna  informed  me   today   morning  SP   that    Hans  this    week      
 
verreist             ist. 
travelled away  is.IND 
 
‘Anna informed me this morning that Hans had gone away this week.’ 
 
On the one hand, the tense of ist may be understood in relation to t0 (the more likely 
interpretation); according to this interpretation Hans is understood to be still away at 
t0 (the time of report). On the other hand, it may be understood as prototypical 
indirect speech, i.e. the tense of ist may be understood in relation to t1; on this 
interpretation whether Hans is still away at t0 is not clear.91 If we substitute a 
subjunctive form, as in (28b), then the tense of the corresponding subjunctive form 
(sei) can be understood to be relative only to t1: the second interpretation which we 
gave for (28a) is the only one available: 
 
(28b) Anna teilte mir heute morgen mit, dass Hans diese Woche verreist sei. 
 
Our final piece of evidence that the German reportative subjunctive ensures 
that its tenses are understood in relation to t1 is provided by the case of temporal 
deictic projection in indirect speech: the notion that the German reportative 
subjunctive forbids such projection was mentioned in Chapter 2. Example (29) is 
made deictically infelicitous by the fact that the present-tense subjunctive form 
überschreite (‘crosses’) can be understood in relation only to t1, i.e. the time denoted 
by the tense of the matrix verb. Thus the tense of the finite verb (present) clashes 
with the adverbial im Jahre 49 v. Chr (‘in 49 B.C.’): 
 
(29) ? In  diesem  Werk   wird         berichtet,  dass  Caesar   im       Jahre  49   
    in  this         work   becomes  reported   that    Caesar  in the  year    49   
 
v. Chr. den  Rubikon    überschreite. 
B.C.    the    Rubicon   crosses.S1             
                                                 
91
 For Jäger (1971: 113), this second interpretation of a present-tense indicative is not available. He 
gives the example Mein Freund teilte mir mit, daß er krank ist (‘My friend informed me that he was ill’) 
and claims that in this example it is clear that at the time of the report he is still ill. But Thieroff (1992: 
234) claims that an interpretation according to which it is not clear whether my friend is still ill at the 
time of the report is available and that  Mein Freund teilte mir mit, daß er krank ist is therefore 
ambiguous.  
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‘In this work it is reported that Caesar crosses the Rubicon in 49 B.C.’ 
 
Thus we conclude this section by claiming that the German reportative 
subjunctive not only blocks any interpretation which is inconsistent with an indirect 
speech reading, e.g. interpretations on which the reported proposition is 
presupposed, it also ensures that its tenses can be understood in no way other than 
in relation to t1. We hope that we have provided persuasive evidence that the chief 
function of the procedural import of the reportative subjunctive is to ensure that an 
instance of indirect speech is understood to be prototypical indirect speech.  
 
 
4.2.7  The German reportative subjunctive and explicature 
 
There is one particular important phenomenon for which our discussion of the 
procedural import of the reportative subjunctive above did not account: the existence 
of so-called reported speech, i.e. cases where a proposition is understood to be 
reported but is not immediately subordinate to a verbum-dicendi matrix clause. 
Essentially, in the case of reported speech the reportative subjunctive has the 
function of ensuring that the hearer constructs a verbum-dicendi matrix clause on 
the level of mental representation. This is, in our view, a natural consequence of the 
circumstance that the tenses of the subjunctive can be understood only in relation to 
t1. A matrix tense, i.e. one which is understood in relation to t0, is essential, and this 
tense locates t1 in time in relation to t0. Without this matrix tense it is impossible to 
interpret the tense of the subjunctive. Of course, what we have suggested does not 
preclude the possibility of the matrix verb supplied on the level of mental 
representation being a factive verb which also entails its subordinate proposition, 
such as vergessen, verstehen or wissen. However, the first facet of the procedural 
import of the subjunctive which we discussed above blocks the possibility of the 
matrix verb which is supplied on the level of mental representation being one which 
both presupposes and entails its complement clause. 
The matrix clause which contains this tense marking is best described in 
relevance-theoretic terms as contributing to explicature (see section 3.2.5): it 
constitutes part of what is explicitly communicated by an utterance. But what is the 
nature of this explicature? Is it a higher-level or basic explicature? The hearer of the 
second sentence in example (30a) needs to recover a proposition which resembles 
that in (30b) if his expectations of optimal relevance are to be satisfied; the tense of 
the matrix verb in (30b) locates t1 in time relative to t0. In other words, he must 
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understand the second sentence to be embedded under a matrix clause that 
resembles that which ends the first sentence. ([Ø] in a translation indicates that the 
hearer of the original is required to supply a matrix clause inferentially in this 
position): 
 
(30a) Einen Tag  später  sei      sie   ins           Koma   gefallen,    sagte  der  
one    day   later     is.S1   she  into the   coma    fallen         said    the 
 
Staatsanwalt.        Daraus       sei     sie    im        Januar      erwacht.    
 public prosecutor  out of that   is.S1  she   in the  January     awoken    
 
‘The next day she fell into a coma, said the public prosecutor. [Ø] She awoke 
from it in January.’  
(Mannheimer Morgenpost: 28.09.2004) 
 
(30b) {Der Staatsanwalt sagte}, sie sei daraus im Januar erwacht.92    
   
On the level of mental representation, the matrix clause der Staatsanwalt sagte, 
which is recovered contextually by the hearer, has exactly the same relationship to 
the accompanying embedded proposition as does sagte der Staatsanwalt (at the 
end of the first sentence) to its associated embedded proposition. This provides 
evidence that the explicature which the German reportative subjunctive instructs the 
hearer to supply, like that associated with sollen and wollen, is a basic explicature: 
the reportative subjunctive functions on the level of the proposition expressed.   
Sometimes, the explicature whose recovery the reportative subjunctive 
constrains must from a syntactic point of view be treated parenthetically, although 
from a pragmatic perspective the explicature still contributes to the proposition 
expressed. We illustrate this using an example from Zifonun et. al. (1997: 1766). A 
suggestion for the parenthetical explicature which the hearer must understand to 
contribute to the proposition expressed if his expectation of optimal relevance is to 
be satisfied is in square brackets in the English translation: 
 
                                                 
92
 Der Staatsanwalt sagte is merely a suggestion for the nature of the matrix clause which is 
constructed by the hearer on the level of mental representation. The actual clause constructed does 
not have a specific propositional form (unless, as we have done, the hearer stops and thinks about this 
clause). Similarly, if a hearer hears the elliptical ‘Coffee?’ he will not give it a specific propositional form 
such as ‘The speaker is asking me if I would like some coffee’ in order to understand it. Admittedly, the 
suggestion Der Staatsanwalt sagte is not very idiomatic: a more elegant rendering might be Der 
Staatsanwalt fügte hinzu (‘the public prosecutor added’).   
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(31) Der  Mann    wurde     zu   fünf  Monaten   Gefängnis verurteilt,   weil         er 
 the  man       became  to   five   months     prison       sentenced  because  he 
 
die    Jugend    verderbe. 
 the    youth       corrupts.S1 
 
‘The man was sentenced to five months in prison because [as the judge 
said] he corrupts young people.’ 
 
The utterance spoken by the original speaker is likely to have resembled Ich 
verurteile Sie zu fünf Monaten Gefängnis, weil Sie die Jugend verderben (‘I 
sentence you to five months in prison because you corrupt young people’). Since for 
the reporter there is no doubt that the sentencing took place, she has reported the 
corresponding illocution using a straightforward indicative past-tense form. However, 
the reporter has chosen to present the judge’s reasoning using an indirect-speech 
construction with a reportative subjunctive: this clause is to be understood not 
specifically as the reason why the man was sentenced to five months in prison (this 
would, however be the case had an indicative been used), but as a report of the 
judge’s reasoning for sentencing the man. The tense of this clause is to be 
understood in relation not to t0, like that of the main clause, but to t1. Therefore the 
hearer is required to supply inferentially a syntactically parenthetical verbum-dicendi 
clause, a clause which is demanded by the subjunctive so that t1 can be located in 
relation to t0.  
 Example (32), also from Zifonun et al. (1997: 1766), is another instance 
where the matrix clause that is constructed must be considered parenthetical from a 
syntactic point of view. 
 
(32) Denn  er  war   ja     ein  Vetreter            der      ersten  Klasse   nach   dem 
 for      he  was  yes  a     representative  of the  first      class      after    the 
 
damaligen     Drei-Klassen-Wahlsystem  und   trat           für   die  allgemeine 
of that time    three-tier voting system      and   stood up  for   the  general 
 
Demokratie  mit   ein,  die      er   wesenhaft   als    Erziehungsaufgabe  mit  
democracy  with  SP   which  he  essentially   as    educational task        with  
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angesehen   habe. 
looked at      has.S1  
 
‘For he belonged of course to the first tier of the three-tier-voting system of 
that time and supported general democracy, which [as he said] he and 
others essentially saw as an educational task.’ 
 
Through using the indicative and thereby indicating direct speech, the reporter 
assumes responsibility for most of what is said here, including the fact that ‘he’ 
supported democracy. However, the use of the reportative subjunctive indicates that 
the final clause is to be understood to be attributed to ‘him’; the reporter says that 
‘he’ says that ‘he’ saw supporting democracy as essentially an educational task. ‘As 
he said’ or wie er sagt must be supplied on the level of basic explicature, but is to be 
treated parenthetically from a syntactic point of view. 
As a procedural device associated with interpretive use which instructs the 
hearer to construct an explicature which contributes to the proposition expressed, 
the German reportative subjunctive differs fundamentally from the sort of explicature 
whose recovery the interpretive use markers rέ (Sissala) and tte (Japanese) 
constrain: these latter ensure that a higher-level explicature is recovered.  
 
 
4.2.8 What feature of the German reportative subjunctive makes it procedural? 
 
In this section we shall argue that the chief distinction between the German 
indicative and reportative subjunctive resides in the fact that the subjunctive 
possesses a specific feature vis-à-vis the indicative. The notion that the German 
reportative subjunctive possesses a feature which distinguishes it from the indicative 
and accounts for its behaviour is not new.  
For Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) the subjunctive carries a reportative 
presupposition: this idea was discussed – and rejected – in Chapter 2. Schlenker 
(2000) suggests an alternative crucial difference between the German reportative 
subjunctive and the indicative. For him, the reportative subjunctive ‘[…] is defined as 
a logophoric tense […], and is thus lexically specified as having a feature t which it 
can only inherit from an embedded context’ (2000: 206). Thus the subjunctive must 
‘[…] appear in the scope of an attitude operator because only attitude operators 
introduce embedded contexts whose time […] coordinates bear the feature t […]’ 
 183 
 
(2000: 199). Von Stechow (2003) also makes reference to the logophoric nature of 
the reportative subjunctive. For him ‘[s]ubjunctive morphology is checked by a world 
variable with the feature log. World variables with that feature must be bound by a 
verbum dicendi vel sentiendi’ (2003: 22). Schlenker (2003) modifies his original 
analysis of the reportative subjunctive in order to account for the insight that it does 
not occur embedded under many verbs including certain factives such as ‘know’. He 
suggests that whenever it is presupposed that a proposition is in the common 
ground the use of subjunctive 1 should be precluded (2003: 86). Schlenker 
understands the term ‘common ground’ to refer to ‘the set of worlds compatible with 
the speaker’s beliefs’. 
We wish to argue that the German reportative subjunctive possesses a 
feature vis-à-vis the indicative to which we shall refer I[t1]. I stands for ‘indirectness’ 
and this refers to the fact that the subjunctive ensures that the matrix verb is 
understood as a verbum dicendi which introduces indirect speech that displays the 
crucial property indirectness, whilst [t1] ensures its tense is understood in relation to 
t1: the square brackets indicate that the tense must be understood to be embedded 
under a matrix predicate. It is thus this feature which is procedural and constrains 
comprehension such that an instance of indirect speech is understood to conform to 
the prototype.  
From a syntactic point of view, we assume that I[t1] is the spelling out of a 
functional head for mood, and this mood phrase dominates the tense phrase. Here, 
a significant role is played by c-command. Borsley (1999: 47) quotes Reinhart 
(1976) in defining the term ‘c-command’: ‘A node X c-commands a node Y iff neither 
dominates the other and the first branching node (i.e. node with more than one 
daughter) above X dominates Y’. The mood phrase will be c-commanded by the 
tense of the matrix verbum dicendi; this tense establishes the relationship of t1 to t0. 
The mood phrase will then, in turn, c-command the embedded tense and supply this 
latter with a temporal deictic centre. The relationships of c-command described in 
this paragraph are illustrated in the tree diagram below (33b), which employs a 
version of Government and Binding based on that expounded by Napoli (1995): 
 
(33a) Er  sagte,   er   esse       Frühstück. 
 he  said     he   eats.S1   breakfast 
 
 ‘He said (that) he was eating breakfast.’ 
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 (33b) 
 
 Agr’’ 
 
    N’’         Agr’ 
 
    er       
             Agr             T’’a  
            
           sagtei    
                                T’a 
 
 
                         Ta          V’’ 
               
    ti            V’       
 
                                 V           C’’ 
                                                    
                                 ti            C’ 
       
                                        C           Agr’’ 
                                   
                                     dass       N’’      Agr’ 
                                                   
 
                                         er    Agr        M’’ 
 
                                       
                                                          esse       M’ 
  
 
                                                                 M             T’’b    
  
 
                                      
                             tj (I[t
1])              T’
b    (cont.) 
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     T’b      
 
   
        Tb              V’’ 
 
                 
 
         tj               V’ 
                    
 
                  V              N’’      
 
 
                   tj        Frühstück 
 
The tense of the matrix verb sagte receives its value from the matrix context. The 
tense Ta then c-commands M and assigns a value to it. M now functions as the 
temporal deictic centre, to which the tense Tb will be understood to be relative: the 
relationship between M and Tb is also one of c-command. 
The tense of any reportative-subjunctive forms whose mood phrase is c-
commanded by the tense of the matrix verb will be understood in relation to t1 as 
fixed in time by this tense: the finite verb of the immediately preceding clause does 
not have to be the relevant matrix verbum dicendi. Thus, in example (5a) (repeated 
below), not only is the feature I[t1] of the subjunctive form werde c-commanded by 
the tense of the matrix verb sagte, that of achte and hätte in the subordinate clauses 
is as well: 
 
(5a) Er  sagte, er werde das Buch kaufen, da sein Onkel, dessen Urteil er hoch 
achte, es ihm empfohlen hätte. 
       
‘He said he would buy the book as his uncle, whose judgement (he said) he 
held in high regard, had recommended it to him.’ 
 
The past-tense form sagte thus locates the temporal deictic centre relative to which 
these three subjunctive forms are understood at a time anterior to t0. Therefore the 
reportative subjunctive has the effect of ensuring the utterance is optimally relevant. 
The comprehension process is constrained such that an interpretation according to 
which the tenses of all the subordinate clauses are understood in relation to t1, and 
according to which the embedded propositions are understood to be attributed to the 
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matrix subject (such that interpretations which are inconsistent with a prototypical-
indirect-speech reading are blocked), is the only one available. 
In (4a), however, the fact that the form ist is in the indicative does not 
necessarily block an interpretation according to which the tense of ist is understood 
in relation to t1. After all, it is ultimately c-commanded by the matrix sagte. 
Nevertheless, in view of the speaker’s use of the reportative subjunctive in the 
previous clause, this interpretation seems unlikely. The optimally relevant 
interpretation is thus likely to be one according to which the clause beginning für die 
(‘for which’) is understood as the reporter’s opinion: 
 
(4a) Er sagte, er bewerbe sich um diese Stelle, für die er gar nicht geeignet ist.  
 
‘He said he was applying for this position, which (in my opinion) he is totally 
unsuited to.’ 
 
 
4.3 Intermediary conclusion 
  
We finish this part of the chapter by considering the extent to which the above 
relevance-theoretic considerations explain those phenomena for which, as we 
suggested in section 2.2.11, a comprehensive analysis of the German reportative 
subjunctive should adequately account. 
 Our identification of a particular feature, to which we refer as I[t1], provides 
an answer to our first two questions.  
Firstly, what is the precise nature of the German reportative subjunctive? In 
spite of its ability to form all tenses, why is it restricted to prototypical indirect 
speech, i.e. indirect speech that exhibits indirectness, where its tenses can be 
understood only in relation to t1? Secondly, how does the subjunctive allow certain 
factive verbs to be understood as verba dicendi which introduce prototypical indirect 
speech?  
We have suggested that in ensuring that a clause is understood as indirect 
speech which conforms to a specific prototype, I[t1] has the function of blocking any 
interpretation which is inconsistent with such a reading. This includes (at least) any 
interpretation on which the reported proposition, whether this be represented by the 
embedded clause alone or a combination of the matrix and embedded clauses, is 
understood to be presupposed. The exception to this is cases where the embedded 
proposition is both not only presupposed but also entailed by the matrix verb. The 
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subjunctive is not capable of blocking such entailments and is thus infelicitous. Thus 
the existence of this feature explains both why the reportative subjunctive is 
restricted to indirect speech and why it has the effect of ensuring that certain factive 
verbs are understood to introduce prototypical indirect speech. 
 A fundamental property of the prototype of indirect speech with which the 
German reportative subjunctive is associated is that its tenses are understood in 
relation to t1 (the temporal deictic centre of the embedded context). Thus the tense 
of the matrix verbum-dicendi clause under which it is embedded will clarify the 
relationship between t1 and t0: we have suggested that the precise relationship 
between the matrix tense and I[t1] is one of c-command. In fact, our analysis has 
gone further than originally deemed necessary: we have also been able to explain 
the occurrence of the reportative subjunctive in examples such as Er wurde zu fünf 
Jahren verurteilt, weil er die Jugend verderbe (‘He was sentenced to five years in 
prison because he corrupts young people’). We suggested that the reportative 
subjunctive form verderbe (‘corrupts’) instructs the hearer to construct inferentially a 
clause, such as ‘as the judge said’, which has to be treated parenthetically from a 
syntactic point of view. 
 Explanations for the third, fourth and fifth phenomena have not yet exercised 
us. We shall look at the third and fifth – how we are to account for the occurrence of 
the reportative subjunctive in clauses which are subordinate to verbs of denial, as 
well as how the reportative subjunctive enables a speaker to imply contextually any 
attitude to the reported proposition – in the next chapter. A consideration of the 
fourth phenomenon, which concerns how a hearer in the case of reported speech 
constructs the ellipsed matrix clause inferentially, will be the focus of the remainder 
of this chapter. 
  
 
4.4 Reported speech: The construction of the ellipsed matrix clause 
 
4.4.1 Introduction  
 
In order to illustrate from a relevance-theoretic point of view how the hearer 
identifies the relevant contextual element(s) and thus constructs the ellipsed matrix 
clause in reported speech, in section 4.4.3 we shall revisit examples provided by 
Pütz (1989, 1994). Before that, however, we need to make some preliminary 
remarks.  
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As we have seen, the German reportative subjunctive has a feature I[t1] 
which we treat as the spelling out of a functional head for mood and must be c-
commanded by a matrix tense: this tense assigns a value to I[t1] so that the tense of 
the subjunctive has a temporal deictic centre to which it can be relative. We have 
suggested that the import of I[t1] is procedural: it constrains the inferential 
computations that a hearer must perform over an utterance such that it is 
understood as indirect speech. We propose that I[t1] is not unlike personal 
pronouns, which are also held within relevance theory to encode procedural 
meaning, in terms of its behaviour. On the subject of personal pronouns, Hedley 
remarks that ‘[t]he computations we perform in interpreting a pronoun relate to the 
identification of a referent, and the insertion of that referent into the proposition 
expressed’ (2007: 42). The same can be said of I[t1]: subjunctive morphology 
indicates that a referent, i.e. a specific point in time relative to t0, must be identified, 
and this referent contributes to the construction of a fully determinate proposition 
expressed, whereby the hearer understands when in relation to t0 the original 
utterance was produced. Furthermore, as in the case of personal pronouns, the 
identification of the referent and assigning a value to I[t1] involves in our view a 
process of saturation, i.e. a given slot, position or variable in the semantic 
representation of the utterance must be filled.  
In the case of personal pronouns, saturation is always a pragmatic process, 
and the role of personal pronouns in deriving the proposition expressed usually 
extends no further than furnishing the proposition with referents for them. However, 
in the case of indirect speech, saturation is a syntactic process: I[t1] receives a value 
from the matrix tense that c-commands it. In the case of reported speech the 
process is pragmatic because there is no explicit matrix verbum dicendi to assign 
the value to I[t1] syntactically. But unlike the (normal) case of personal pronouns, 
saturating the gap in the semantic representation which I[t1] represents involves 
much more than simply identifying a referent for it: in addition to this an entire 
propositional matrix clause must be constructed inferentially. In fact, it seems that 
I[t1] behaves somewhat like a personal pronoun when used as a fragmentary 
utterance, discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). The reader will recall Hedley’s 
example, whereby the kitchen of a shared house has been left in a mess (2007: 48-
49). Housemate A comes home, followed by housemate B shortly after. As B enters, 
A exclaims: 
 
(34a) HOUSEMATE A: You! 
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The hearer is expected to do much more than simply assign a referent to ‘you’. 
Once a referent has been assigned (i.e. ‘the hearer’), it must be further developed 
via pragmatic inference into one of an indeterminate range of conceptual 
representations, such as: 
 
(34b) The speaker blames the hearer for the mess. 
 
Likewise, the hearer of reported speech must, on the basis of pragmatically 
constrained inference and contextual considerations, develop the referent identified 
for I[t1] into a complete and fully propositional assumption that contributes to basic 
explicature. This is to be viewed as a symbiotic process: the construction of the 
explicature aids the identification of a value for I[t1], and the identification of a value 
for I[t1] aids the construction of the explicature. 
Owing to the similarities in the process of identifying the referent for personal 
pronouns and for I[t1] in the case of reported speech, it would be beneficial for us to 
continue by investigating the process of saturation which personal pronouns instruct 
the hearer to deploy. 
 
 
4.4.2 Saturation and personal pronouns 
   
In section 3.2.4 we discussed Carston’s statement that a personal pronoun ‘[…] 
indicates that an appropriate contextual value is to be found, that is, that a given 
position in the logical form is to be saturated […]’ (Carston 2004: 637). Thus the 
question arises as to what guides the hearer’s search for the referent. It is true that 
in English and many other European languages personal pronouns have certain 
lexical properties which to an extent constrain the hearer’s search for a referent. 
‘She’, for example, instructs us to search for a female referent: 
 
(35a) Jennifer and Andrew arrived at the party. He brought a box of chocolates 
and she brought a bottle of wine. 
 
But the following translation of (35a) would leave the Finnish reader, for whom 
personal pronouns do not display a gender distinction, baffled as to the referent of 
each occurrence of hän (‘he’ or ‘she’): 
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(35b)  Jennifer   ja     Andrew   saapuivat  juhliin.     Hän    toi           laatikon  
 Jennifer  and  Andrew   arrived       to party  (s)he   brought   box  
 
 suklaata,        hän     taas                          pullon   viiniä. 
 of chocolate  (s)he   on the other hand     bottle    of wine 
 
Used more carefully, however, the pronoun hän is just as effective as the English 
gender-specific pronouns ‘he’ and ‘she’ in constraining how the hearer saturates a 
slot in the logical form of an utterance. Whilst the fact that English third-person 
singular pronouns specify the gender of their referent clearly does play a role in 
hearer’s recovery of the intended referent, it is not just this gender distinction that 
aids the hearer in his quest. 
     Brown and Yule (1983: 58-67) suggest that a hearer deploys two principles 
when dealing with pragmatic problems such as reference assignment. These are the 
principle of local interpretation and the principle of analogy. The former principle ‘[…] 
instructs a hearer not to construct a context any larger than he needs to arrive at an 
interpretation’ (1983: 59), whilst, according to the principle of analogy, a hearer ‘[…] 
is constrained in his interpretation by past similar experience […]’ (1983: 64). Brown 
and Yule go on to suggest how these principles account for our understanding of 
(36): 
 
(36)  The baby cried. 
The mommy picked it up. 
 
According to them: 
 
[…] it is the reader, driven by the principles of analogy and local interpretation, who 
assumes that [this] sequence describes a series of connected events and interprets 
linguistic cues (like baby – it) under that assumption. The principles of analogy 
(things will tend to be as they were before) and local interpretation (if there is a 
change, assume it is minimal) form the basis of the assumption of coherence in our 
experience of life in general, hence in our experience of discourse as well. 
(Brown and Yule 1983: 67) 
 
     It could be said that these principles explain our understanding of (37a) and 
(37b). In (37a), the principle of local interpretation instructs us to understand the 
referent of ‘it’ to be the table. This is then corroborated by the principle of analogy: 
according to our life experience it is plausible that a (relatively flimsy) table should 
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collapse under the weight of a heavy book. In (37b) the principle of local 
interpretation might instruct us to understand ‘it’ as referring to ‘the table’. But this 
principle is then overridden by that of analogy which reminds us that tables do not 
normally collapse under the weight of delicate ornaments, but it is plausible that we 
might break a delicate ornament when placing it on a table. We thus understand ‘it’ 
in (37b) to refer to ‘the delicate ornament’: 
 
(37a)  I put the heavy book on the table. It broke. 
(37b) I put the delicate ornament on the table. It broke. 
 
However, Brown and Yule’s two principles are less helpful if we wish to recover the 
referent of ‘it’ in (38): 
 
(38)  I slammed the television down on the table. It broke. 
 
The principle of local interpretation suggests that ‘it’ refers to ‘the table’. However, 
this interpretation could plausibly be overridden by the principle of analogy. But 
because of certain assumptions about televisions and tables and their capacity to 
break which the hearer can be expected to entertain, this principle predicts that 
either the television or the table could have broken as a result of my temper tantrum, 
and  it is therefore of no help. Clearly, we require more contextual information in 
order to identify the intended referent of ‘it’. 
     Carston (2004: 638) provides the following example in order to illustrate the 
chief problem with theories of reference assignment like that of Brown and Yule, that 
is, those which proceed from the premise that ‘[…] there is a set of objective 
contextual parameters that accompanies an utterance and each indexical element 
encodes a rule which ensures that it maps onto one of these’: 
 
(39)  A: Have you heard Alfred Brendel’s version of The Moonlight Sonata? 
B: Yes. It made me realize I should never try to play it. 
 
She concedes that we could claim that: 
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[…] it [or this or that] encodes a rule to the effect that it refers to what the speaker 
intends it to refer to, and we can add to the set of contextual parameters a sequence 
of “speaker’s intended referents”, arranged in such a way that each demonstrative 
maps on to a referent as required. 
(Carston 2004: 638) 
 
However, she agrees with Récanati (2002: 111) that ‘philosophically it is clear that 
one is cheating’ (Carston 2004: 638). Carston continues: 
 
To proceed in this formal way is to avoid dealing with an undeniable cognitive reality, 
which is that the assignment of referents to the vast range of linguistic referring 
expressions relies on a wide notion of context and requires the intervention of 
pragmatic principles or strategies that are geared to the recovery of the speaker’s 
intended meaning. 
(Carston 2004: 638) 
 
     The ‘pragmatic principles or strategies’ that Carston has in mind are those of 
relevance theory: referents are assigned in accordance with the communicative 
principle of relevance; interpretive hypotheses are considered by the hearer in order 
of accessibility, and the hearer stops when his expectations of optimal relevance are 
satisfied. Hence, returning to (37a), that a table should collapse under the weight of 
a heavy book can be considered a mutually manifest assumption, that the book was 
damaged in the process is less likely, but in any case we do not normally speak in 
English of books breaking. In (37b), it is not entirely impossible that ‘it’ refers to the 
table. However, the assumption that tables are generally strong enough to support 
delicate ornaments can be expected to be highly accessible to the hearer. 
Furthermore we are told that the ornament was delicate. The optimally relevant 
interpretation which will put the hearer to no gratuitous processing effort, given the 
manner in which the speaker has chosen to phrase her utterances, is therefore one 
according to which ‘it’ refers to the delicate ornament. In (39), the first ‘it’ refers to 
the whole NP ‘Alfred Brendel’s version of The Moonlight Sonata’, whereas our 
expectations of optimal relevance instruct us to understand the second ‘it’ as 
referring to The Moonlight Sonata. It can be assumed that it is mutually manifest that 
people sit down at the piano to play The Moonlight Sonata, not normally to play 
other pianists’ versions of it. With regard to example (38), a hearer who recovers the 
intended referent of ‘it’ would have processed certain non-linguistic contextual 
factors which are mutually manifest (such as the sight of a broken table). 
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 In the next session we consider the corresponding process of saturation 
which the hearer of reported speech deploys in order to recover the intended value 
for I[t1]. 
 
 
4.4.3 The German reportative subjunctive and saturation  
 
Our claim is that in the case of reported speech the pragmatic mechanism by which 
a hearer identifies a value for I[t1] involves saturation, not unlike that associated with 
personal pronouns, and that relevance theory is able to explain this process. 
Furthermore, relevance theory is able to account for how the hearer develops I[t1], 
once saturated, into a fully determinate assumption which functions on the level of 
basic explicature. These pragmatic processes will form the focus of this section. 
Whilst it is ultimately the hearer’s assumption that the speaker’s utterance is 
optimally relevant that guides him towards the intended interpretation, personal 
pronouns, at least in European-type languages, constrain to some extent the 
hearer’s search for the intended referent. English, German and Russian personal 
pronouns, for example, specify the gender of the referent, and this plays a 
significant role in guiding the hearer of (35a), repeated below, towards the referent 
intended by the speaker: 
 
(35a) Jennifer and Andrew arrived at the party. He brought a box of chocolates 
and she brought a bottle of wine. 
 
In (35b), whilst the Finnish personal pronoun hän does not specify the 
gender of the referent, it does nevertheless instruct the hearer to identify a human 
referent; the corresponding pronoun which refers to other objects is se (‘it’):93 
 
(35b)  Jennifer   ja     Andrew   saapuivat  juhliin.     Hän    toi           laatikon  
 Jennifer  and  Andrew   arrived       to party  (s)he   brought   box  
 
 suklaata,        hän     taas                          pullon   viiniä. 
 of chocolate  (s)he   on the other hand     bottle    of wine 
 
                                                 
93
 In colloquial Finnish, even this animate-vs.-non-animate distinction breaks down: se is used as a 
general third-person singular personal pronoun (Karlsson 2008: 353). 
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 In the case of the German reportative subjunctive, however, no information 
about the clause which needs to be constructed is explicitly encoded. Thus the 
process is one which is guided by the hearer’s expectations of optimal relevance 
alone. Importantly, the essential property which the matrix clause that the hearer 
constructs mentally must possess is that it indicates the relationship of t1 to t0.  
In the remainder of this section we shall take a fresh look at some examples 
of reported speech provided in Pütz’s 1994 paper ‘Berichtete Rede und ihre 
Grenzen’ (‘Reported speech and its boundaries’). Pütz attempts to answer such 
questions as: 
 
In what way is the use of reported speech dependent on an inquit and an original 
speaker (in the broadest sense)? Is it dependent on such factors at all? Maybe there 
are conditions which limit the occurrence of reported speech, at least in relation to 
the factors given above. But which ones?
 94
 
(Pütz 1994: 24) 
 
We, however, shall attempt to supplement Pütz’s explanations by using relevance 
theory in order to show how the hearer identifies those factors on which reported 
speech may be said to depend.  
Pütz divides the types of preceding context that will make an instance of 
reported speech pragmatically acceptable into four categories. These are (i) 
‘preceding context with original speaker plus inquit’ (1994: 28-30),95 (ii) ‘preceding 
context with original speaker that must be inferred, with or without an inquit’ (1994: 
30-33),96 (iii) ‘original speaker cannot be inferred, inquit present’ (1994: 33-34)97 and 
(iv) ‘original speaker cannot be recovered, inquit not present’ (1994: 34).98 At the 
end of his paper, Pütz poses the question ‘Under what systematic conditions can 
reported speech perhaps not occur?’ (1994: 34),99 and, on the basis of the existence 
of the final category, he concludes that ‘[m]aybe from the point of view of text 
linguistics the contexts in which reported speech may occur are not limited at all’ 
(1994: 34).100 In the following discussion we suggest that the contexts in which 
reported speech does not occur are limited: we shall show how we are able to 
                                                 
94
 In welcher Art ist die Verwendung der BR [berichtete Rede] abhängig von einer Redeeinleitung und 
von einer redeeinleitenden Person (im weitesten Sinne)? Ist sie überhaupt abhängig von solchen 
Faktoren? Vielleicht gibt es Bedingungen, die die Möglichkeiten des referierenden Berichtens – 
jedenfalls in bezug auf die genannten Faktoren – einschränken. Aber welche?  
95
 Vorkontext mit Modell-Sprecher und Redeeinleitung. 
96
 Vorkontext mit erschliessbarem Modell-Sprecher, mit oder ohne Redeeinleitung 
97
 Modell-Sprecher nicht erschliessbar, Redeeinleitung vorhanden 
98
 Modell-Sprecher nicht erschliessbar, keine Redeeinleitung  
99
 Unter welchen systematischen Bedingungen kann BR [berichtete Rede] eventuell nicht auftreten? 
100
 Vielleicht gibt es under textlinguistischen Aspekten überhaupt keine Begrenzung für die 
Vorkommensmöglichkeiten der BR.  
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identify those linguistic environments in which reported speech does not occur using 
relevance theory.   
Explaining Pütz’s (1994: 28) first example of the first type of reported speech 
(‘preceding context with original speaker plus inquit’) from a relevance-theoretic 
point of view is straightforward. The optimally relevant interpretation of (40a) is one 
whereby the instance of reported speech (the second sentence) is understood to be 
subordinate to the same matrix verbum dicendi which introduces the first sentence. 
Looking around for an alternative verbum dicendi would entail unnecessary 
processing effort and would thus result in the hearer recovering the wrong 
interpretation. (Throughout this section, instances of reported speech in original 
utterances will be underlined, whilst [Ø] in a translation indicates that the hearer of 
the original is expected to supply a matrix clause inferentially): 
 
(40a) Peter  sagt,  er   sei     krank.  Er   müsse     im        Bett  bleiben. 
 Peter  said   he  is.S1  ill          he  must.S1   in the   bed   stay 
 
 ‘Peter said that he is ill. [Ø] He must stay in bed.’ 
 
Therefore, the basic explicature (proposition expressed) of the second sentence is: 
 
(40b) {Peter sagt}, er müsse im Bett bleiben.  
 
I[t1] is saturated by the tense of sagt (‘says’): t0 and t1 are thus understood to 
coincide. 
Pütz (1994: 29) points out that in the case of (41a) the element in the 
preceding discourse which aids the hearer in his construction of a matrix clause is 
für die Soziologin Arlie Russell Hochschild (‘for the sociologist Arlie Russell 
Hochschild’): 
 
(41a) Diese  Szene,  die      stets     aufs      neue  kolportiert  wird          und   sich  
 this    scene     which  always  on the  new   spread       becomes  and    itself 
 
 wechselweise  auf  einer  Pam-Am,  einer   TWA-  oder  United-Airlines-
 alternately       on   a        Pam-Am,  a          TWA   or      United Airlines-  
 
Maschine   ereignet     haben  soll,      hat   für  die  Soziologin   Arlie  Russell 
aeroplane  happened  have    should  has  for   the  sociologist  Arlie  Russell 
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Hochschild   Schlüsselcharakter:  Sie  mache […]    deutlich […]. 
Hochschild   key character            it     makes.S1      clear 
 
‘This incident, which keeps on being retold and the location of which 
allegedly keeps changing between a Pam-Am, a TWA and a United Airlines 
aeroplane, is key for the sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild. [Ø] It makes 
[…] clear […].’ 
  (Spiegel 1984(6)) 
 
The text tells the reader that the incident described is key for Hochschild, i.e. in the 
opinion of Hochschild. The interpretation which puts the hearer to no gratuitous 
processing effort is one according to which the reported speech is understood to be 
a continuation of Hochschild’s opinion.  
Whilst the prepositional phrase für die Soziologin Arlie Russell Hochschild 
makes clear who holds the opinion, it is not, of course, a finite verb form and thus 
does not itself give an indication of the tense of the matrix verb that the hearer must 
supply. However, the finite verb hat, with which the prepositional phrase under 
discussion is immediately collocated, is a present-tense form. This implies that the 
incident in question is key for Hochschild at t0. From this it follows that one aspect of 
the optimally relevant interpretation is that Hochschild is understood to hold the 
opinion conveyed by the reported speech at t0. Thus, in comprehending the reported 
speech, a present-tense matrix verbum dicendi which indicates that t0 and t1 
coincide should be supplied inferentially. The basic explicature that the hearer 
constructs is therefore likely to resemble (41b); Hochschild meint (‘Hochschild’) is 
added on the level of mental representation: 
 
(41b) {Hochschild meint}, diese Szene mache […] deutlich […]. 
  
 Example (42a) (Pütz 1994: 29) is similar to (41a). Here Pütz identifies the 
verb halten für (‘consider to be’) as the inquit. The clause Branchenkenner halten 
deshalb die Preiserhöhungs-Argumente für vorgeschoben (‘Therefore, industry 
insiders consider the arguments in favour of putting the prices up to be bogus’) 
conveys a general opinion held collectively by industry insiders. The optimally 
relevant interpretation of the reported speech is therefore one whereby the reported 
speech constitutes an example of the sort of opinion held:  
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(42a) Branchenkenner          halten   deshalb     die   Preiserhöhungs-Argumente 
 industry connoisseurs  hold      therefore   the  price-raising       arguments 
 
des Unternehmens  für  vorgeschoben.    Da     werde            bloss     die 
of the company       for   construed           there  becomes.S1   simply  the 
 
Gelegenheit   genutzt,  mitzunehmen,  was    mitzunehmen   sei. 
opportunity     used       to take with      what   to take with      is.S1 
 
‘Therefore, industry insiders consider the arguments in favour of putting the 
prices up to be construed. [Ø] On this occasion the opportunity is simply 
being used to make a quick and easy profit.’ 
(Spiegel 1988(16)) 
 
A suggestion for the basic explicature that the hearer will construct is given in (42b). 
The tense of halten für is present: this indicates that industry insiders hold their 
opinion at t0. Therefore, the interpretation which will put the hearer to no gratuitous 
processing effort is one whereby the ‘remainder’ of this opinion, represented by the 
reported speech, is also entertained at t0. Consequently, as in the previous two 
examples, a present-tense matrix verbum dicendi (our suggestion here is Die 
Branchenkenner glauben (‘industry insiders believe’)) will be supplied: 
 
(42b) {Die Branchenkenner glauben}, die Gelegenheit werde bloss genutzt, 
mitzunehmen, was mitzunehmen sei. 
 
 Pütz’s first example of the second type of context which makes reported 
speech pragmatically satisfactory and ensures that the feature I[t1] receives a value 
from the matrix tense (‘preceding context with original speaker that must be inferred, 
with or without an inquit’) is the following: 
 
(43a) US-Juristen  begrüssten  den  Freispruch.  Er  habe     den   Unterschied 
 US  jurists    welcomed    the   acquittal      he  has.S1  the    difference  
 
 zwischen  einer  Seifenoper    und     einem  fair trial  deutlich  gemacht. 
 between   a         soap opera   and     a         fair trial   clear      made 
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‘US jurists welcomed the acquittal. [Ø] It has/had101 made the difference 
between a soap opera and a fair trial clear.’ 
(Spiegel 1985(25)) 
 
All that Pütz himself says of this example is the following: 
 
In this example there is no inquit, and also no explicitly named original speaker […]. 
But it is to be inferred that the NP “US jurists” can be considered to be the original 
speaker who is responsible for the ensuing sentence of reported speech.
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(Pütz 1994: 30) 
 
Our own relevance-theoretic account is as follows. In the first sentence the reporter 
summarizes using the verb begrüssten (‘welcomed’) instances of speaking which 
are attributed to US jurists; they are presented as having produced (indeterminate) 
utterances which indicate that they welcome the acquittal in question. The 
reportative subjunctive in the next clause ensures that it is understood as reported 
speech. The interpretation which will not put the hearer to gratuitous processing 
effort in deriving adequate positive cognitive effects will be one whereby the 
reported speech is understood as a continuation of the summary begun in the 
previous sentence: the reported speech is thus also attributed to the US jurists. 
The past-tense form begrüssten indicates that the ‘acts of welcoming’ took 
place in the past. It therefore follows that the utterances on which the reported 
speech is based were also originally produced in the past. Thus the tense of the 
matrix verbum dicendi supplied by the hearer will be past and will locate t1 at a time 
anterior to t0. This means that the proposition expressed by the second sentence is 
likely to resemble (43b): 
 
(43b) {Die US-Juristen sagten}, der Freispruch habe den Unterschied zwischen 
einer Seifenoper und einem fair trial deutlich gemacht. 
 
 In the following example (44a), it is, according to Pütz, (1994: 31) the ‘[…] 
pragmatic [i.e. world] knowledge […] that Pravda is a newspaper […]’ which makes 
the instance of reported speech acceptable. In our relevance-theoretic terms, the 
                                                 
101
 The tense in the German is present, but in an English translation which explicates the ellipsed 
matrix clause a past-tense form would be required in accordance with sequence-of-tense conventions. 
Hence the alternatives ‘has/had‘. 
102
 In diesem Beispiel steht keine Redeeinleitung, ebenfalls kein explizit genannter Modell-Sprecher 
[…]. Aber es ist zu erschliessen, dass die NP “US Juristen” als Modell-Sprecher in Frage kommt für 
den nachfolgenden Satz mit BR. 
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notion that Pravda is a newspaper is assumed by the reporter to be mutually 
manifest: 
 
(44a) Der  Druck      auf  Kursänderung       beim    Militär   hält           an:  Schon  
 the  pressure  on   change of course  at the   army     continues SP  already  
 
 im       März    hatte  die “Prawda”   am      immer   noch  von  der   Glorie 
 in the  March  had     the Pravda     at the  always  still    of      the   glory 
 
 des      Großen   Vaterländischen  Krieges  getragenen    Selbstbewusstsein 
 of the  great        fatherland            war        supported       self-assuredness   
 
 der       Sowjetsoldaten gekratzt –  sie     seien      mitnichten   die     Elite  
 of the   Soviet soldiers  scratched   they  are.S1     in no way    the     elite 
 
 der       Republik. 
 of the   republic 
 
‘The pressure for a change of course in the army goes on: as early as March 
Pravda had clawed away at the self-assuredness of Soviet soldiers, which is 
still grounded in the glory of the Great Patriotic War – [Ø] they are/were in no 
way the elite of the republic. 
(Spiegel 1987(49)) 
 
A newspaper cannot literally ‘claw away’ at something; the hearer will understand 
that certain things were written in Pravda which have been interpreted by the writer 
of this text as acts of ‘clawing away’. The optimally relevant interpretation is 
therefore one whereby the reported speech is understood to be part of what was 
written in Pravda. The tense of the verb which in the previous clause hints at what 
was written in Pravda is pluperfect. This will prompt the hearer to understand the 
reported speech to be subordinate to a pluperfect matrix verbum dicendi such as in 
der Prawda war geschrieben worden (‘Pravda had written’). The tense of this will 
locate t1 at a time previous to t0: 
 
 (44b) {In der Pravda war geschrieben worden}, sie seien mitnichten die Elite der 
Republik. 
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 Mutually manifest world knowledge also plays a role in instructing the hearer 
of (45a) to construct the ellipsed matrix clause (from Pütz 1994: 31): 
 
(45a) Der  bullige  Mann  auf  dem   Zeugenstuhl   gab    sich       auch     nach 
 the  burly     man    on   the     witness chair  gave  himself  even     after 
 
fünfstündiger   Vernehmung  noch   gelassen – obwohl     die   auf      ihn  
five-hour          questioning    still     relaxed       although  the    on to   him 
 
niederprasselnden  Fragen      immer   neue  Ungereimtheiten  in  seinen 
 beating down          questions  always  new    inconsistencies   in  his 
 
Aussagen   zutage  brachten.  Er  habe     sich         gar      nichts  
 statements  to day  brought     he  has.S1  himself    at all    nothing  
 
vorzuwerfen,  ja     vorbildich    gehandelt. 
to reproach    yes   exemplary  acted 
 
‘Even after being questioned for five hours, the burly man in the witness 
chair still seemed relaxed – even though the questions which had rained 
down on him had revealed more and more inconsistencies in his statements. 
[Ø] His conscience is/was completely clear, indeed his behaviour has/had 
been exemplary.’  
(Spiegel 1989(3)) 
 
Since the ‘burly man’ is sitting in a witness chair and he is answering questions, it is 
mutually manifest that he is speaking. The hearer is thus put to no unjustifiable 
processing effort in recovering an interpretation according to which the reported 
speech is understood to be attributed to him. The tense of the text is past relative to 
t0: if the events described took place in the past, then an interpretation according to 
which the man’s statements were also made in the past will achieve optimal 
relevance. Consequently, the hearer will construct the following explicature on the 
level of mental representation, the tense of whose matrix verb locates t1 in the past 
in relation to t0: 
 
(45b) {Der bullige Mann sagte}, er habe sich gar nichts vorzuwerfen, ja 
vorbildlich gehandelt. 
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 Our final example of Pütz’s second type of reported speech (1994: 32) is 
relatively simple. As Pütz himself remarks, ‘[i]f somebody rings the bell, he generally 
says something. This knowledge helps […] in the comprehension of the following 
example’.103 In other words, if somebody is standing at a door or gate having just 
rung the bell, then it can be assumed to be mutually manifest that that person has 
something to say: 
 
(46a) Kurz  bevor   der  Firmenchef,  wie  jeden  Morgen,  zu  seiner   Zentrale 
 short before  the  manager       as    every  morning  to  his         head office 
 
 in München-Allach  aufbrechen  wollte,   klingelte  es.  Am 
 in Munich-Allach     set off           wanted  rang       it     at  the 
 
 schmiedereisernen  Gartentor      stand  eine  junge   Frau,     blass  und 
 wrought-iron            garden gate  stood  a      young   woman  pale    and 
 
 von  schmächtiger   Statur:   Sie   habe    einen  persönlichen   Brief   zu 
 of     slight                stature   she  has.S1 a         personal         letter   to  
  
überbringen. 
 deliver 
 
‘Just as the manager was about to set off for his headquarters in Munich-
Allach, as he did every morning, somebody rang the bell. At the wrought-iron 
garden gate there stood a young woman, pale and of slight build: [Ø] She 
has/had a personal letter to deliver.’ 
(Spiegel 1985(6)) 
 
The tense of the verbs which describe the actions that form the context of the 
reported speech is past relative to t0. It is thus implied that the young woman uttered 
something resembling Ich habe einen persönlichen Brief zu überbringen (‘I have a 
personal letter to deliver’) in the past, so the tense of the matrix clause that the 
hearer supplies inferentially will also be past: 
 
(46b) {Die junge Frau sagte}, sie habe einen persönlichen Brief zu überbringen. 
                                                 
103
 Wer klingelt, sagt meist was. Dieses Wissen hilft […] weiter beim Verständnis des folgenden 
Beispiels. 
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 Pütz’s first example of his third type of reported speech, ‘original speaker 
cannot be inferred, inquit present’, involves the epistemic use of the modal verb 
sollen (‘should’) (1994: 33): 
  
(47a) Im   Kunartal         östlich   von  Kabul    sollen    sie    die    Felder  mit     
the  Kunar Valley  east       of     Kabul   should   they  the   fields    with  
  
ätzenden Chemikalien  unfruchtbar  gemacht,    Bewässerungsgräben   
corrosive chemicals      infertile         made,        irrigation canals            
    
planiert    und Schafherden        mit   Maschinengewehren   niedergemäht    
 levelled   and  herds of sheep    with  machine guns              mown down 
 
haben.  20 Jahre   werde  es  dauern    bis     im      Kunartal   wieder   
     have     20 years   will.S1   it    last         until   in the Kunartal   again     
  
 Menschen  leben  könnten. 
 people        live     can.S2 
 
‘In the Kunar Valley to the east of Kabul the fields are said to have been 
made infertile by corrosive chemicals, irrigation canals have been levelled 
and herds of sheep are said to have been mown down by machine guns. [Ø] 
It will be twenty years before people can live in the Kunar Valley again.’ 
(Spiegel 1981(10)) 
 
For Pütz, reported speech which is made pragmatically satisfactory by the 
occurrence of sollen in the preceding discourse is an example of the third type of 
reported speech because ‘[…] the standard opinion of the literature is that in 
sentences with this verb [sollen] the original speaker is not named’ (1994: 33-34).104 
However, as elsewhere, whilst he explains that epistemic sollen may make reported 
speech pragmatically satisfactory, he does not suggest how it is recognized as an 
inquit.  
 In section 3.4.6 we saw how sollen in its epistemic function is analyzable as 
a marker of interpretive use that instructs the hearer to construct a basic explicature 
such as man sagt, dass (‘it is said that’). In example (47a), having been instructed 
                                                 
104
 […] [D]ie Standardmeinung der Literatur geht dahin, dass der Modell-Sprecher in Sätzen mit diesem 
Verb eine nicht genannte Quelle ist. 
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by the reportative subjunctive to construct the ellipsed matrix clause, the hearer will 
test in order of accessibility interpretive hypotheses regarding the nature of this 
matrix clause. Since the preceding sentence constitutes indirect discourse, albeit 
attributed to unknown, or at least unmentioned, persons, the most accessible (and 
thus optimally relevant) interpretation is one whereby the reported speech is 
understood to be a continuation of this indirect discourse. It is therefore understood 
to be subordinate to the same basic verbum-dicendi explicature as that associated 
with sollen. (47b) exemplifies the (basic) explicature which sollen in the first 
sentence instructs the hearer to recover, and in (47c) the reported speech is 
embedded under this same explicature: 
 
(47b) {Man sagt}, sie hätten die Felder im Kunartal östlich von Kabul mit ätzenden 
Chemikalien unfruchtbar gemacht, Bewässerungsgräben planiert und 
Schafherden mit Maschinengewehren niedergemäht. 
(47c) {Man sagt}, es werde 20 Jahre dauern, bis im Kunartal wieder Menschen 
leben könnten. 
 
The present-tense verb sollen ensures that the hearer supplies a present-tense 
verbum dicendi. The matrix clause in (47b) is therefore also present tense and thus 
indicates that t0 and t1 are understood to coincide. 
 The hearer’s quest for optimal relevance may result in him identifying an 
occurrence of wollen (‘want’) in the preceding discourse as the element which 
makes an instance of reported speech pragmatically acceptable. We have in mind 
the reportative use of wollen which we considered in section 3.4.6. In such cases, 
wollen functions as a marker of interpretive use which indicates that the subject of 
wollen claims the embedded proposition; the implication is that the reporter believes 
this proposition to be false. The following example is from Pütz (1989: 198):105 
 
(48a) Entgegen den       Aussagen   der      Pflegekräfte,  die    ihr       das 
 contrary   to the    statements  of the  care staff        who  to her the 
 
Medikament   verabreicht     haben,  will       Berzewski   nun   Lydia  
medication     administered  have     wants   Berzewski   now  Lydia 
 
                                                 
105
 Strictly speaking, (48a) is an example of Pütz’s first type of inquit: ‘preceding context with original 
speaker plus inquit’. However, we discuss instances with wollen here because of the similarities in 
terms of explicature with examples with sollen. 
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Hagemann  nur  “in     die   Voruntersuchung”            miteinbezogen   haben. 
Hagemann  only  into the    preliminary investigation  included             have  
 
Und  sie   sei     nicht  genehmigungspflichtig.  
and  she  is.S1  not     requiring official approval 
 
‘Contrary to statements made by the care staff who administered the 
medication to her, Berzewski claims to have involved Lydia Hagemann only 
“in the preliminary investigations”. And [Ø] it does not require official 
approval.’ 
(Stern 1986: (4)) 
 
In this case, the third-person singular present-tense form will (‘wants’) instructs the 
hearer to construct a present-tense basic explicature such as: 
 
(48b) {Berzewski behauptet}, er habe nun Lydia Hagemann nur “in die 
Voruntersuchung” miteinbezogen. 
  
Looking around for a contextual feature which will enable him to construct the 
ellipsed matrix clause inferentially, the hearer finds that the optimally relevant 
interpretation is one whereby the reported speech is a continuation of the claim 
made by Berzewski. The reported speech is thus understood on the level of mental 
representation to be subordinate to the same basic explicature which wollen 
instructs the hearer to recover: Berzewski behauptet. Since behauptet is present 
tense, t0 and t1 are understood to coincide:  
 
(48c) {Berzewski behauptet}, sie sei nicht genehmigungspflichtig. 
 
 The next example of Pütz’s third type of reported speech includes the 
passive form angezweifelt werden (‘be doubted’) (Pütz 1994: 33): 
 
(49a) Angezweifelt werden   plötzlich    Piechs   Führungsqualitäten.  Mit     seinem 
 doubted        become  suddenly  Piech’s   leadership qualities   with    his 
 
ruppigen  Führungsstil        habe     der  Audi-Entwicklungschef  
rough       leadership style  has.S1  the  Audi head of development  
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scharenweise    wertvolle    Mitarbeiter     vergrault. 
in droves           valued        colleagues     scared off 
 
‘Piech’s leadership qualities are suddenly being doubted. With his rough 
leadership style, [Ø] the head of development for Audi has scared off droves 
of valued colleagues.’ 
(Spiegel 1986(2)) 
 
Here, the first clause Angezweifelt werden plötzlich Piechs Führungsqualitäten 
(‘Piech’s leaderships qualities are suddenly being doubted’) essentially summarizes 
the propositional content of indeterminate comments made by people who doubt 
Piech’s leadership qualities. In other words it refers to an indeterminate number of 
speech acts. On encountering the reported speech, the hearer will attempt to 
construct on the basis of context a matrix clause which satisfies his expectations of 
optimal relevance. The optimally relevant interpretation will be one whereby the 
reported speech is understood to report an example of the sort of proposition which 
Angezweifelt werden plötzlich Piechs Führungsqualitäten subsumes. Thus it is 
understood to be attributed to those unnamed people who doubt the leadership 
qualities of Piech. This means that the hearer will construct a matrix verbum-dicendi 
clause with an indeterminate subject, such as man sagt (‘one says’), and, since the 
‘doubting’ is reported as taking place in the present, the tense of the matrix clause 
will be present and thus indicate that t0 and t1 coincide: 
  
(49b) {Man sagt}, der Audi-Entwicklungschef habe mit seinem ruppigen 
Führungsstil scharenweise wertvolle Mitarbeiter vergrault. 
 
 We give just one example of Pütz’s fourth and final type of reported speech 
‘original speaker cannot be recovered, inquit not present’: 
 
(50a) Gänzlich   unhygienisch  geht        es   bei   einer   Unterbrechung  in  der 
 totally        unhygienic     happens  it    in     a          break                in  the  
 
engen   Teeküche     zu,  wo        einen  “überall           der   feuchtwarme 
narrow  tea kitchen   SP   where  one       everywhere   the   humid  
 
Atem    der       Kollegen”     anwabere. 
 breath  of the   colleagues   wafts.S1 
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 ‘Things are totally unhygienic during a break in the narrow tea kitchen, where 
[Ø] “the humid breath of the colleagues wafts around everyone from all 
directions”.’ 
(Spiegel 1988(22)) 
 
The use of the speech marks and the reportative subjunctive indicates that this is 
mixed reported discourse: partly direct and partly indirect speech. But there is 
neither any indication regarding to whom the proposition Überall wabert einen der 
feuchtwarme Atem der Kollegen an is attributed, nor any indication of when this was 
uttered in relation to t0. The optimally relevant interpretation seems to be one 
whereby the reported proposition is attributed to a non-specified person or group of 
people, and the use of the present-tense form zugeht (‘happens’) in the previous 
clause indicates that this proposition has validity at t0; t1 thus coincides with t0. In 
addition, it seems that the ellipsed clause that the hearer must construct on the level 
of mental representation must from a syntactic point of view be treated 
parenthetically; in (50b) we suggest that this parenthetical verbum-dicendi clause, 
the tense of which locates t1 in relation to t0, could be wie gesagt wird (‘as is said’): 
 
(50b)  […] wo, {wie gesagt wird}, einen “überall der feuchtwarme Atem der 
Kollegen” anwabere.  
 
Thus, although for Pütz the text contains nothing which may be described as an 
inquit, it is still possible to construct a matrix verbum-dicendi clause, the tense of 
which satisfies the demands of I[t1] to be saturated, on the basis of context.  
We conclude this section by providing an answer to Pütz’s question: ‘under 
what systematic conditions can reported speech perhaps not occur?’ (1994: 34). It 
seems that these linguistic environments should be defined in relevance-theoretic 
terms by exclusion: the reported speech does not occur in those cases where 
constructing the ellipsed matrix clause on the basis of context (having been 
instructed to do so by the reportative subjunctive) does not justify the amount of 
processing effort required. In other words, whenever reported speech does occur, 
recovering the ellipsed matrix clause will justify the processing effort required in 
order to so. 
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4.5 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter we have attempted to show that using the relevance-theoretic 
framework we are able to advance substantially in explaining three of the various 
phenomena, listed in section 2.2.11, for which we expect an adequate analysis of 
the German reportative subjunctive to account. Our chief claim has been that the 
German reportative subjunctive possesses a specific feature, I[t1], which has 
procedural import which ensures that an utterance is understood to conform to a 
specific prototype of indirect speech. This prototype is characterized in part by 
tenses which are always understood in relation to t1 as fixed relative to t0 by the 
tense of the matrix verbum dicendi (indirect speech) or by the tense of a matrix 
verbum-dicendi clause that must be supplied via pragmatically constrained inference 
on the level of mental representation (reported speech). Furthermore, in ensuring 
that an utterance is understood as prototypical indirect speech, the German 
reportative subjunctive has the effect of blocking interpretations which are 
inconsistent with prototypical indirect speech, e.g. ones on which the reported 
proposition is presupposed. 
  In the second half of the chapter, we considered the pragmatic process of 
saturation which a hearer must deploy in furnishing an instance of reported speech 
with its ellipsed matrix clause. We suggested that this process is similar to that 
which personal pronouns instruct the hearer to deploy. There is, however, an 
important difference. In the case of personal pronouns, the hearer usually need do 
no more than supply them with a referent. In the case of reported speech, on the 
other hand, the hearer must (as in the case of the fragmentary use of personal 
pronouns) pragmatically develop the value supplied for I[t1] into a fully determinate 
assumption that functions on the level of basic explicature. 
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5 
 
German indirect speech and the 
expression of reporter attitudes  
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 we considered the concept of indirect and reported speech in German 
from an essentially descriptive grammatical point of view. In Chapter 4, having in 
Chapter 3 considered in some detail the salient claims of relevance theory, we 
considered, using relevance theory, the role played by semantics when a hearer 
understands an utterance as an instance of indirect speech. More specifically, we 
investigated the constraint that the German reportative subjunctive places on how 
an utterance is understood. We identified a specific feature to which we referred as 
I[t1] which has procedural import that operates on the level of basic explicature. This 
feature ensures that the utterance is understood to be an instance of prototypical 
indirect speech: the reported proposition is understood not to be presupposed and 
its tenses can be understood only in relation to t1.  
In this chapter we shall continue to consider indirect speech in German from 
the point of view of relevance theory. Our primary purpose is to investigate from a 
relevance-theoretic point of view another essential aspect of the German reportative 
subjunctive as a marker of interpretive use, in addition to those discussed in the last 
chapter. This concerns the compatibility of the subjunctive with the contextual 
recovery of any attitude, or interpretive stance, of the reporter towards the reported 
proposition. Importantly, in referring to the compatibility of the subjunctive with any 
reporter attitude, we imply that the subjunctive does not itself control the attitude 
recovered: this is the task of contextual considerations. 
 In particular, we shall investigate how the hearer recovers this attitude. The 
fact that the reportative subjunctive is compatible with any interpretive stance of the 
reporter, may be linked directly to the fact that it ensures that an utterance is 
understood to represent prototypical indirect speech. The chief type of interpretation 
that the subjunctive blocks in doing so, i.e. those on which a reported proposition is 
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presupposed, is characterized by the fact that the speaker is of necessity committed 
to the truth of the proposition. But if this type of interpretation is blocked, then the 
reporter cannot be understood to be committed to the truth of the reported 
proposition. Thus she is free to hold her own attitude towards it, an attitude which 
she will expect her hearer to infer on the basis of context.  
In order to investigate the attitude which is implied towards a reported 
proposition, it is necessary to have a clear conception of which component(s) of an 
indirect-speech construction report(s) the purported original utterance. The fact that 
indirect speech consists of two components, a matrix verbum-dicendi clause and a 
subordinate clause, is important here. In many cases the embedded proposition 
alone will be understood to be attributed to the matrix subject. We refer to this as 
type A indirect speech. Intuitively this is the case, for example, with those verbs 
which Caldas-Coulthard (1994) describes as ‘neutral’ verba dicendi such as 
berichten (‘report’) and sagen (‘say’), those which she terms  ‘paralinguistic’ verbs 
such as flüstern (‘whisper’) and schreien (‘scream’), and finally ‘transcript’ verbs, i.e. 
those which indicate the relationship of a quotation to the surrounding discourse. 
Examples are fortsetzen (‘continue’) and hinzufügen (‘add’).  
In Chapter 4 we investigated how the reportative subjunctive is capable of 
constraining verbs which report behabitives and emotional attitudes – which have in 
common the notion that their complement clause is normally understood to be 
factive – such that they are understood to introduce prototypical indirect speech 
which bears the feature indirectness. We pointed out that when these verbs 
introduce prototypical indirect speech they themselves report part of the original 
utterance, e.g. the purported original illocution. In our view, these verbs belong to a 
much wider group of verba dicendi which themselves report part of the purported 
original utterance, and this group includes all verbs that report speech acts as well 
as those that report propositional attitudes, such as ‘think’ and ‘believe’. Importantly, 
since these verbs report the purported original illocution, they will purport to have 
been selected from the point of view of the original speaker rather than the reporter. 
As such, they should not normally be understood to reflect the attitude towards the 
original utterance that the reporter intends the hearer to recover. This, however, is 
not to say that cases where they have been supplied by the reporter, and they thus 
reflect the latter’s interpretive stance, do not exist.  
This group of verbs may itself be divided into two broad subgroups. On the 
one hand, the main relevance of the original utterance will often be understood to 
have consisted in what is presented as the embedded proposition (type B indirect 
speech). This is always the case when propositional attitudes are reported, 
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examples being denken (‘think’) and meinen (‘think’ or believe’). It is also the case 
when speech acts such as prophezeien (‘predict’ or ‘prophesy’), vermuten (‘guess’ 
or ‘suppose’) and warnen (‘warn’) are reported. In section 5.4.2.2 we shall consider 
the report of two such speech acts: schließen (‘conclude’) and the behabitive 
kritisieren (‘criticize’).   
But there is another possibility when a speech act is reported: the verbum 
dicendi itself may be understood to report (part of) the main relevance of the original 
utterance. This is type C indirect speech. In section 5.4.3.2 we shall examine two 
examples of this: the report of the speech acts garantieren (‘guarantee’) and 
zustimmen (‘agree’).   
Whether an instance of indirect speech is of type A, B or C depends on the 
nature of the verbum dicendi, i.e. semantics, or on pragmatic considerations. For 
example, in the case of ‘neutral’ verba dicendi such as berichten and sagen, the 
embedded proposition alone will always be understood to be attributed to the matrix 
subject; this circumstance arises from the semantics of the verb. The same is true of 
paralinguistic verbs, such as flüstern and schreien. But when the speech act of 
admitting is reported, the main relevance of the original utterance may be 
understood to have consisted in either the original speech act or in what is 
presented as the embedded proposition of the reported version. This indeterminacy 
is resolved along pragmatic lines which relevance theory is able to explain. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. We begin with a consideration of an 
example of type A indirect speech, and we shall pay attention to how the hearer 
recovers contextually the attitude implied to the reported proposition by the reporter. 
Before we look at some examples of type B and type C indirect speech it will be 
necessary for us to investigate in some detail Sperber and Wilson’s distinction 
between communicated and non-communicated speech acts. This investigation will 
take up the majority of the first half of this chapter. The second half of the chapter 
will constitute a relevance-theoretic consideration of some German examples of type 
B indirect speech, i.e. the report of non-communicated speech acts, and of type C 
indirect speech, i.e. the report of communicated speech acts. We finish by 
considering the report of speech acts of denial, and shall suggest that such reports 
are essentially instances of type C indirect speech.  
In each case of type B and type C indirect speech we shall investigate in 
some detail the role of the reportative subjunctive as a marker of interpretive use in 
prompting the hearer to recover the attitude which the reporter contextually implies 
to the reported proposition. 
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5.2 Type A indirect speech: The embedded proposition alone is understood to 
be attributed to the matrix subject 
 
In many cases, a hearer who understands an utterance as prototypical indirect 
speech, constrained as such by the reportative subjunctive, may understand the 
embedded proposition alone to represent that which is attributed to the matrix 
subject. If this is the case, then the matrix verbum dicendi will have been selected by 
the reporter from her own point of view. For example, those verbs which Caldas-
Coulthard (1994) considers to be neutral, such as berichten, and sagen, inform the 
hearer merely that the matrix subject uttered the embedded proposition. They do not 
indicate whether the reporter considers it to be true, how it was uttered, or how the 
reported utterance relates to the accompanying discourse. Paralinguistic verbs, 
such as flüstern and schreien indicate how the proposition was uttered, but this 
detail does not have any bearing on how the embedded proposition itself is to be 
understood. For example, an utterance might be whispered in order not to wake 
somebody, but this extra-linguistic circumstance will not have any effect on the 
proposition communicated itself. Transcript verbs, such as fortsetzen and 
hinzufügen, indicate how the reported proposition relates to the surrounding 
discourse. However, like neutral and paralinguistic verbs, they do not influence how 
the reported proposition itself is understood. 
  Since it is the embedded proposition alone for which the original speaker, i.e. 
the matrix subject, is understood to be responsible, the interpretive stance of the 
reporter will concern only the embedded proposition. More precisely, this stance will 
concern the extent to which the reporter considers the embedded proposition to be 
true, or plausible in the case of an opinion. As an example of indirect speech 
whereby it is the embedded proposition alone that is understood to be attributed to 
the matrix subject we give (1a) (repeated from Chapter 2, section 2.2.10): 
 
(1a)  [CONTEXT] Mainz police are warning people of tricksters who pretend to be 
police officers in order to gain access to other people’s homes. The most 
recent victim was an 86-year-old woman who was spoken to by two men in 
Parcus Street, just before 17:50 on Tuesday.106 
 
 
                                                 
106
 Die Mainzer Polizei warnt vor Trickdieben, die sich als Polizeibeamte ausgeben und sich so Eintritt 
in fremde Wohnungen verschaffen.Jüngstes Opfer war eine 86-jährige Frau, die am Dienstag gegen 
17.50 Uhr in der Parcusstraße von zwei Männern angesprochen wurde. 
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  Die   falschen  Polizisten           gaben an,   in  ihre  Wohnung  sei 
  the  false         police officers     stated         in  her   flat            is.S1 
 
  eingebrochen  worden   und   sie     müssten   feststellen,   was    gestohlen 
  broken in         become  and   they   must.S2     establish     what   stolen 
 
  worden     sei. 
  become    is.S1 
 
‘The bogus police officers stated that her flat had been broken into and that 
they must establish what had been stolen.’ 
 
[FURTHER CONTEXT] The old lady checked her cash. Then she was lured 
into the bedroom. The second man took advantage of this and stole 1300 
Marks as well as three savings books. […] Police are warning people 
urgently not to let anyone into their homes and to call 110 if they have any 
suspicions.107 
(Rhein-Zeitung: 06.05.1999) 
 
  The purported original utterance, which the embedded proposition in (1a) 
must be understood to resemble in terms of its propositional form, is given in (1b): 
 
(1b)  In Ihre Wohnung ist eingebrochen worden, und wir müssen feststellen, was 
gestohlen worden ist. 
 
The original speakers themselves intended the victim of the crime reported to 
understand (1b) to be true. Significantly, the matrix verbum dicendi itself does not 
suggest any reporter attitude towards the reported proposition. However, it is clear 
from the context that the reporter believes the embedded proposition to be untrue, 
and the reportative subjunctive, as a marker of interpretive use, is compatible with 
this attitude. The perpetrators are described as ‘tricksters’ (Trickdiebe), and since it 
can be assumed to be mutually manifest that tricksters are criminals who use deceit 
in order to take advantage of vulnerable people, this label alone is sufficient for the 
hearer to infer contextually that the relevant embedded proposition is considered to 
                                                 
107
 Die alte Dame kontrollierte ihr Bargeld. Dann wurde sie ins Schlafzimmer gelockt. Dies nutzte der 
zweite Mann aus und stahl 1300 Mark sowie drei Sparbücher. [...] Die Polizei warnt eindringlich: 
Lassen Sie niemanden in die Wohnung, und wählen Sie im Verdachtsfall die Nummer 110. 
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be false. The notion that the men are tricksters who were lying when (1b) was 
uttered is reinforced by further contextual details. The woman is described as a 
‘victim’ (Opfer): she was taken in by the deceit of the bogus police officers. The 
actions of the men once they had gained access to the woman’s house are then 
described (they stole money and savings books) using indicative finite verbs: the 
effect of this is that the circumstances described are put forward as (probably) true. 
Finally, a warning is issued by the police; this warning is felicitous because the 
notion that people must be suspicious of people who wish to gain access to people’s 
houses is assumed to be mutually manifest.108 
  Since it is the embedded proposition alone for which the original speaker is 
understood to be responsible, it is possible to employ an Übergangsform (Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.7) and postpose the matrix clause such that it appears in a marked 
position after the embedded clause: 
 
(1c)  In ihre Wohnung sei eingebrochen worden und sie müssten feststellen, was 
gestohlen worden sei, gaben die falschen Polizisten an. 
 
(1c), which topicalizes the embedded clause rather than the matrix subject, is 
arguably a little odd from the point of view of information structure. Nevertheless, a 
reporter who orders the clauses like this could not face accusations of unfaithful 
reporting. As a genuine example where the reported proposition is postposed we 
give (2); here the proposition is embedded under the neutral verbum dicendi 
berichtet: 
 
(2) [CONTEXT] Augsburg baby Emil Mukarim, who has cancer, has supposedly 
been abducted and taken abroad by his parents again. Augsburg 
prosecutors yesterday applied for a warrant to arrest the parents of the eight-
month-old.109 
 
Sven  Maerzke   sei    das     letzte   Mal    am    Montagmittag      gesehen 
 Sven  Maerzke  is.S1  the     last       time   on     Monday midday  seen 
 
worden,    die    Mutter    Lamia   am   Samstag,     berichtete   die  
 become    the    mother   Lamia   on    Saturday     reported      the 
                                                 
108
 We do not intend ‘felicitous’ here to be understood in an Austinian/Searlean sense. 
109
 Das krebskranke Baby Mukarim Emil aus Augsburg ist von seinen Eltern vermutlich erneut ins 
Ausland entführt worden. Die Staatsanwaltschaft Augsburg hat gegen die Eltern des acht Monate alten 
Kindes gestern Haftbefehl beantragt.  
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Polizeidirektion          Augsburg.  
 police headquarters   Augsburg 
 
‘Augsburg police headquarters reported that Sven Maerzke was last seen at 
midday on Monday, the mother Lamia on Saturday.’ 
(Mannheimer Morgen: 29.04.1999) 
 
Again, this positioning of the matrix clause is felicitous because it is the embedded 
clause alone which is understood to report the original utterance.  
In this section we have suggested that when some verba dicendi are 
employed, only the embedded proposition is understood to be attributed to the 
matrix subject. The verbum dicendi itself does not report any element of what the 
original speaker herself is understood to have said. Therefore any interpretive 
stance which is expressed with the aid of the reportative subjunctive will concern the 
extent to which the reporter believes the embedded proposition to be true or 
plausible. Finally, because it is the embedded proposition alone that is being 
reported, a speaker cannot be accused of unfaithful reporting if the matrix clause is 
moved to a marked position after the embedded proposition. 
 Before we investigate types B and C indirect speech, both of which have in 
common the circumstance that the matrix verbum dicendi reports part of what is 
attributed to the matrix subject, we need to consider in some detail an aspect of 
relevance theory which we did not look at in Chapter 3: Sperber and Wilson’s 
distinction between communicated and non-communicated speech acts. 
 
 
5.3 Relevance theory and speech acts 
 
5.3.1 The distinction between communicated and non-communicated speech acts 
 
In their 1986/95 text Sperber and Wilson begin their discussion of speech acts by 
calling into question Levinson’s assumption that ‘[…] in linguistic pragmatics, speech 
acts remain, along with presupposition and implicature in particular, one of the 
central phenomena that any general pragmatic theory must account for’ (Levinson 
1983: 226). In particular, they question the traditional speech-act-theoretic 
assumption that many of the various types of speech act form a crucial part of what 
a speaker intends to communicate and therefore play a necessary role in 
communication. Whilst, as Sperber and Wilson concede, there is a genuine place in 
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pragmatics for the study of non-declaratives such as imperatives and interrogatives 
(1986/95: 243), the role played by many so-called assertive speech acts is less 
clear. For example, Blakemore, in her relevance-theoretic discussions of speech 
acts (1991, 1992), considers the speech act of warning (example from Blakemore 
1991: 201): 
 
(3a) The path is slippery here. 
 
According to the traditional speech-act-theoretic point of view, a speaker who 
intends this to be understood as a warning does not necessarily have to include a 
performative prefix such as ‘I warn you that’, but she does nevertheless require the 
hearer to understand that she intended to communicate the proposition in (3b):  
 
(3b) The speaker of (3a) is warning the hearer that it is slippery in the place 
indicated.  
 
But, according to Blakemore, this cannot be the case: 
 
A speaker who intends [3a] to be interpreted as a warning simply intends the hearer 
to process the utterance in a particular way. More specifically, she expects the 
hearer to recover certain sorts of contextual implications – ones that have to do with 
the dangerous or unpleasant consequences of the situation the utterance describes. 
(Blakemore 1991: 201) 
 
Blakemore adds that ‘[i]f she does identify the speaker’s intentions in this way, it is 
because she has already understood the relevance of the utterance’ (1991: 201). 
However, we would be wrong to claim that the recovery of an explicature such as 
the one in (3b) never plays a role in the process of comprehending of an utterance 
such as (3a). Sperber and Wilson themselves remark that: 
 
[…] this is not to say that it would never be desirable for the speaker of [3a] 
simultaneously to communicate the assumption in [3b] […]. Our claim is simply that 
even where [3b] is manifestly true, its recovery is not essential to the comprehension 
of an utterance such as [3a]. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 245)
110
 
 
                                                 
110
 Sperber and Wilson’s quotation concerns predicting. However, their comments concern all speech 
acts which, their view, do not have to be identified by the hearer, and so this quotation is equally valid 
for warnings. 
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Sperber and Wilson refer to those so-called speech acts, which do not 
necessarily have to be understood by the hearer as speaker-intended, as non-
communicated speech acts. Other examples of non-communicated speech acts, 
according to Sperber and Wilson, are asserting, hypothesizing, suggesting, 
claiming, denying, entreating, demanding, threatening and predicting (Sperber and 
Wilson: 1986/95: 245). 
     On the other hand, there do exist speech acts which have to be recognized 
as having been ostensively communicated by the speaker in order to be understood 
by the hearer. For Sperber and Wilson these are mostly institutional and thus their 
study belongs principally to the study of those institutions with which they are 
associated, rather than to the study of verbal communication (Sperber and Wilson 
1986/95: 245). For example, a hearer must understand the speaker of (4a) and (4b) 
as having communicated (4c) (examples from Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 245) if 
he is to understand the speaker as having performed the speech act of bidding two 
no trumps in a game of bridge. Ultimately, however, the study of this speech act 
belongs to the study of the institution of bridge: 
 
(4a) I bid two no trumps. 
(4b) Two no trumps. 
(4c)  The speaker is bidding two no trumps. 
 
Further institutional speech acts which need to be understood as having been 
ostensively communicated include promising and thanking. This is because ‘[…] 
they […] can be performed only in a society with the requisite institutions, and which 
must be recognised as such in order to be successfully performed’ (Sperber and 
Wilson 1986/95: 245). Furthermore, some speech acts, such as baptizing babies 
and naming ships, according to Blakemore ‘[…] do not really have anything to do 
with communication, and hence pragmatics, at all’. Blakemore’s reasoning for this is 
that ‘[…] they can be successfully performed in the presence of an 
uncomprehending audience or in the presence of no audience at all’ (1992: 92). 
     There are, however, some speech acts which must be recognized as part of 
what is ostensively communicated by the speaker, but which are not associated with 
specific institutions and arguably occur in all human societies. An example provided 
by Blakemore (1991, 1992) is admitting. Imagine a situation whereby you know, or 
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at least suspect, that I watch EastEnders.111 After strenuously denying this for 
several minutes, I eventually give up and produce the utterance in (5a): 
 
(5a) OK. I watch it.  
 
Since you already believe the proposition in (5b) below to be true, this cannot itself 
yield adequate contextual effects for your expectations of optimal relevance to be 
satisfied. Your expectations of relevance will not be satisfied unless you recover the 
higher-level explicature in (5c); it is in this explicature that the main relevance of (5a) 
lies: 
 
(5b) The speaker of (5a) watches EastEnders. 
(5c) {The speaker of (5a) is admitting that} she watches EastEnders. 
 
Sperber and Wilson refer to these speech acts which do need to be 
understood as having been communicated ostensively by the speaker as 
communicated speech acts.  
 
 
5.3.2 Speech acts, parentheticals and explicature 
 
Blakemore (1991, 1992) follows Urmson (1966) in observing that in English many 
so-called performatives have in common with propositional-attitude verbs, such as 
‘think’ and ‘believe’, the circumstance that they may be used not only in sentence-
initial position, as in (6a) below: 
 
(6a) I think you are wrong. 
 
but also in parenthetical position. The reason for this is that in the case of 
propositional-attitude verbs and many verbs associated with non-communicated 
speech acts the main relevance of the utterance is understood to lie in the 
embedded proposition. Example (7a) instantiates the use of ‘I predict’ in 
parenthetical position:  
 
 (7a) Jennifer will, I predict, leave the room.  
                                                 
111
 EastEnders is a British soap opera, set in London, which has been broadcast by the BBC since 
1985. 
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Blakemore goes on to suggest that performatives which denote non-
communicated speech acts, indeed verbs which may be used parenthetically in 
general, are best treated as semantic constraints on relevance since they reduce 
processing costs, thereby constraining the hearer’s choice of context. In this sense 
they resemble discourse markers such as ‘but’ and ‘nevertheless’, as well as the 
German reportative subjunctive itself, all of which encode procedural meaning. 
However, the problem for Blakemore is that performatives of the type under 
discussion ‘[…] contribute to the truth conditions of the utterances that contain them’ 
since they ‘[…] represent states of affairs, and the speaker may be regarded as 
giving evidence that the state of affairs they represent obtains’ (Blakemore 1991: 
205).112 Consequently, Blakemore suggests that when a speaker produces an 
utterance consisting of a verb which may be employed parenthetically and an 
embedded clause, she is engaging in two acts of communication. On the one hand 
there is the expression of the embedded proposition, and on the other the act of 
communication associated with the matrix or parenthetical verb. For example, in 
uttering (7b) (slightly adapted from Blakemore 1991: 205) a speaker is providing 
evidence that not only the notion that ‘Jennifer will leave the room’ obtains, but also 
that the state of affairs described by (7c) obtains: 
 
(7b) I predict that Jennifer will leave the room. 
(7c) The speaker is predicting that Jennifer will leave the room. 
 
Blakemore continues: 
 
[…] [T]he relevance of the second act of communication lies in the way it helps the 
hearer understand the first act. More specifically, it leads the hearer to understand 
that the proposition that the speaker is presenting is relevant as an assumption for 
which she holds less than conclusive evidence. 
(Blakemore 1991: 207)  
 
Ultimately, since performatives which are associated with non-communicated 
speech acts ‘[…] focus on the inferential aspect of utterance interpretation’ (1991: 
207) yet represent states of affairs and thus may be conceived of in truth-conditional 
terms, they may be considered conceptual, rather than procedural, constraints on 
relevance. 
                                                 
112
 In her 1987 book Semantic Constraints on Relevance, Blakemore suggested that procedural 
semantic constraints are always non-truth-conditional, whilst lexical items that encode conceptual 
meaning are consistently truth-conditional. This correlation has since been challenged and revised 
(Wilson and Sperber 1993; Blakemore 2002, 2004). 
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Performatives associated with non-communicated speech acts and 
propositional-attitude verbs can be also said to have in common the notion that they 
function on the level of higher-level explicature when in parenthetical position (Itani-
Kaufmann 1990; Ifantidou 1993; Carston 2002). This is because, as we saw in 
section 3.2.5 of Chapter 3, a higher-level explicature is a propositional attitude or 
speech-act description under which the proposition expressed by an utterance is 
embedded. Thus the purpose of the parenthetical is to indicate the higher-level 
explicature to be recovered. In those cases where there is no explicit performative or 
propositional-attitude verb, any matrix verb under which the hearer embeds the 
proposition will function as a higher-level explicature. For instance, the higher-level 
explicature which the hearer of (3a) may recover (although it will be remembered 
that this is not essential for the comprehension of the utterance) is (3c):  
 
(3c) {The speaker of (3a) is warning the hearer that} it is slippery in the place 
indicated.  
 
Had he been familiar with and found plausible the concepts of basic and 
higher-level explicature, Urmson would have likely proposed that verbs which may 
appear in parenthetical position generally contribute to higher-order explicature even 
when their position is sentence-initial. This is because: 
 
[i]n some contexts it will be virtually indifferent, on all but stylistic grounds, whether 
the verb occurs at the beginning, middle or end of the indicative sentence with which 
it is conjoined; this will not always be so, but when it is the verb will be said to be 
used purely parenthetically.  
(Urmson 1966: 193) 
 
However, Itani-Kaufmann (1990) and Ifantidou (1993) have suggested that it is not 
the case that such matrix verbs in sentence-initial position are essentially 
parenthetical and thus that it is not the case that their import functions on the level of 
higher-level explicature. This seems a logical position for relevance theorists as it 
follows from Sperber and Wilson’s definition of ‘explicature’, repeated below 
(1986/95: 182): 
 
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit [i.e. an explicature] 
if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.
113
 
                                                 
113
 According to Carston an explicature is a development of a (not the) logical form because in cases of 
ambiguity, more than one logical form will be encoded (Carston 2002: 116). 
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Sentence-initial matrix verbs and the complement clause are seen as constituting a 
single logical form, which is then developed into single explicature, i.e. propositional 
form. 
For Itani-Kaufmann (whose discussion focusses on propositional-attitude 
verbs), whilst the main relevance of (8a) resides in (8b), ‘[…] Relevance Theory 
predicts that I suppose in [8a] functions descriptively i.e. contributes to the truth-
conditional content as it is part of the propositional form’ (1990: 56): 
 
(8a) I suppose that your house is very old. 
(8b) The hearer’s house is very old. 
 
Thus, as part of the propositional form of an utterance, a non-parenthetical 
propositional-attitude verb can be said to make its contribution on the level of the 
proposition expressed. Ifantidou (1993) demonstrates the non-parenthetical nature 
of such sentence-initial verbs using a standard test for truth-conditionality: 
 
The core mechanism of the test consists in embedding into a conditional the 
sentence which includes the expression to be tested, and seeing if this expression 
falls within the scope of the ‘if’. If it does, it is truth-conditional; if it is not, it is non-
truth-conditional […]. 
(Ifantidou 1993: 198) 
 
Ifantidou’s somewhat artificial and contrived example is as follows: 
 
(9a) If I think that John is in Berlin, he will not come to the meeting. 
 
If ‘I think’ made no contribution to the truth conditions of (9a), then, according to 
Ifantidou, we would expect it to be synonymous with (9b): 
 
(9b) If John is in Berlin, he will not come to the meeting. 
 
But, according to Ifantidou, (9a) and (9b) are not synonymous; ‘I think’ does fall, 
from the point of view of formal logic, within the scope of the operator ‘if’. For 
Ifantidou this is proof that sentence-initial ‘parentheticals’ contribute to the 
proposition expressed.  
Ultimately, Itani-Kaufmann and Ifantidou subscribe to the former relevance-
theoretic point of view, discussed in section 3.2.5, according to which the proposition 
expressed by an utterance is its truth-conditional content, whilst its higher-level 
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explicatures are consistently non-truth-conditional on the level of the sentence as a 
whole.114 However, as we also saw in section 3.2.5, the current relevance-theoretic 
position is that we need to distinguish between the assumptions explicitly 
communicated by an utterance not in terms of their contributions to truth conditions, 
but in terms of their contributions to relevance (Blakemore 2002, 2004). We 
observed that the notion of main relevance crosscuts the distinction between 
proposition expressed and higher-level explicature: the main relevance of an 
utterance may reside in a higher-level explicature that has to be recovered through 
inference alone. 
 As we have seen, the main relevance of an utterance associated with a 
propositional attitude or a non-communicated speech act is (usually) understood to 
reside in the embedded proposition. If we take contributions to relevance, rather 
than truth conditions, as the main factor in distinguishing between the assumptions 
explicitly communicated by an utterance, then there is nothing standing in the way of 
us claiming that verbs which denote non-communicated speech acts and 
propositional attitudes have the same status in terms of the explicature to which they 
contribute. Whether they appear in sentence-initial or parenthetical position does not 
play a role. Thus from the point of view of main relevance, not only do parentheticals 
make their contribution on the level of higher-level explicature, verbs associated with 
non-communicated speech acts and propositional attitudes in sentence-initial 
position usually do so as well. 
 There is, however, a problem here. Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/95) 
definition of ‘explicature’, quoted above, does not allow for a parenthetical 
interpretation of main-clause parentheticals: it predicts that they will always 
contribute to the proposition expressed. Nevertheless, in our view, a parenthetical 
interpretation of examples such as the main-clause ‘I suppose’ in (8a) is predicted 
by a minor adjustment to the definition of ‘explicature’ that Carston (2002) comes to 
see as necessary. In Chapter 3 (section 3.2.5) we saw that sentential adverbs such 
as ‘frankly’ contribute to higher-level explicatures. However, (10a) (below) is 
problematic for Carston because ‘frankly’ modifies an embedded clause, ‘[…] which 
is certainly not a development of the logical form of the utterance, but is rather a 
constituent (a proper subpart) of the logical form of the utterance […]’ (Carston 
2002: 121-122) (example adapted from Carston (2002: 121)): 
 
                                                 
114
 It will be remembered, though, that relevance theory has long seen all the explicatures 
communicated by an utterance as having truth conditions in their own right; this realization lies at the 
heart of Blakemore’s (1991) claim that performatives provide conceptual constraints on relevance. 
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(10a) Jennifer shouldn’t pass the course, because she, frankly, hasn’t done the 
work. 
 
 According to Carston, the problem also arises in the case of and-conjunction 
(example adapted from Carston (2002: 122)): 
 
(11a) Andrew went to a party and Jennifer watched a DVD. 
(11b) Andrew went to a party. 
(11c) Jennifer watched a DVD. 
 
Carston points out that ‘[…] intuitions seem to be unequivocal that an utterance of 
[11a] communicates not only the conjunctive proposition but also the two constituent 
propositions, [11b] and [11c]’ (2002: 122). 
In order to account for examples such as (10a) and (11a) (there are a 
number of other cases where a similar problem arises), Carston (2002: 124) 
proposes the following amended definition of ‘explicature’: 
 
An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an ‘explicature’ 
of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically encoded 
logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of a logical form.  
 
Carston’s modified definition differs from the previous one essentially through the 
addition of clause (b). On the previous definition, an explicature was simply seen as 
a development of the intended logical form of an utterance (there may be 
ambiguity). On the revised definition, the logical form from which an explicature is 
derived may may be the whole sentence or a sentential subpart.  
It follows from this revised definition that (10a) should have explicatures 
which include the following. (10b) is the proposition expressed: 
 
(10b)  Jennifer shouldn’t pass the course because she hasn’t done the work. 
(10c) {The speaker is saying that} Jennifer shouldn’t pass the course because she 
hasn’t done the work.  
(10d) Jennifer shouldn’t pass the course. 
(10e) Jennifer hasn’t done the work. 
(10f) {The speaker is telling the hearer frankly} that Jennifer hasn’t done the work. 
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So how does this definition predict the possibility of a parenthetical interpretation of 
(8a)?:   
 
(8a) I suppose that your house is very old. 
(8b) The hearer’s house is very old. 
(8c) {The speaker supposes that} the hearer’s house is very old. 
 
In (8a) the logical form of the subordinate clause ‘your house is very old’, as a 
sentential subpart of the utterance, is developed into the (basic) explicature in (8b). 
This thus allows (8c) to be classified as a higher-level explicature. Thus, a 
parenthetical interpretation of main-clause performatives associated with non-
communicated speech acts and propositional attitudes is both predicted by 
considerations of relevance and permitted by the current definition of ‘explicature’.  
Significantly, Blakemore (1992: 98) observes that performatives which 
denote communicated speech acts do not typically occupy parenthetical positions. 
To illustrate this she uses the following infelicitous example, provided by Récanati 
(1987): 
 
(12) ? Belle d’Azur will win the race, I bet $100. 
 
However, Blakemore (1991: 202-203) notes that there are cases where 
performatives associated with communicated acts do occur parenthetically. Whilst 
example (12) is clearly unacceptable, ‘I bet’ sits quite comfortably in a parenthetical 
position in (13) (from Blakemore 1991: 203): 
 
(13) He’ll forget to come, I bet. 
 
Similarly, returning to our EastEnders example, the supposedly communicated ‘I 
admit’ seems acceptable as a parenthetical in (5d) (1991: 204): 
 
(5d) I do, I admit, watch EastEnders. 
 
It seems that the parenthetical occurrences of ‘I bet’ and ‘I admit’ in examples (14) 
and (5d) do not have quite the same force as when in sentence-initial position, as in 
example (14):  
 
(14) OK, I admit that it was me who ate the chocolates. 
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Blakemore (1991) develops this point in a footnote: 
 
[…] [T]he example in [13] might be regarded as what Sperber and Wilson call a loose 
use. The hearer is expected to derive some but not all of the contextual implications 
she would derive from a genuine bet. For example, although she is expected to 
derive the implication that the speaker is convinced that she is right about the truth of 
the proposition expressed, she is not entitled to derive the implication that she would 
be entitled to collect money should the speaker be wrong. 
(Blakemore 1991: 203) 
 
Thus Blakemore suggests that some communicated speech acts have a 
non-communicated variant which may appear in parenthetical position and whose 
function is merely to ensure that the hearer loosely recovers some, but not all, of the 
cognitive effects associated with the communicated variant. Like other 
parentheticals it makes its contribution on the level of higher-level explicature and as 
such does not constitute any part of the main relevance of the utterance.  
In this section we have seen how Sperber and Wilson’s distinction between 
communicated and non-communicated speech acts finds reflection in the 
circumstance that non-communicated-speech-act performatives, such as ‘I 
conclude’ and ‘I warn’, in common propositional-attitude verbs may in English occur 
parenthetically; this is explained by the circumstance that they do not contribute to 
the main relevance of an utterance. Those performatives which denote 
communicated speech acts, such as ‘I admit’ and ‘I promise’ on the other hand, 
cannot occupy parenthetical positions. We have shown how those verbs which may 
occur parenthetically both function on the level of higher-level explicature and 
provide a semantic constraint on the relevance of an utterance when explicitly 
encoded. We have suggested, contra Itani-Kaufmann (1990) and Ifantidou (1993), 
that they usually contribute to higher-level explicature even when the verb is in a 
non-parenthetical e.g. sentence-initial position.  
 
 
5.3.3 Alternative views on the distinction between communicated and non-
communicated speech acts 
 
The suggestion that speech acts may be classified as communicated and non-
communicated has not failed to attract some criticism. At this point it would be 
profitable to describe and challenge some of the criticisms which have emerged in 
order to show that they are ultimately groundless and that the relevance-theoretic 
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distinction between the two types of act is well-founded. We shall consider the work 
of Bird (1994) and Nicolle (2000).  
Nicolle argues that there are no non-communicated speech acts and 
proposes that all speech acts are communicated, not only in the sense that the 
hearer is required to recover them in order to comprehend an utterance, but also in 
the sense that: 
 
[a]n act can […] be described as communicated from the speaker’s perspective; that 
is, it is communicated in the sense of being an act which the speaker intends the 
hearer to recover. (emphasis mine) 
(Nicolle 2000: 235)   
 
Nicolle suggests that those speech acts which from the point of view of mainstream 
relevance theory are non-communicated fall into two categories. On the one hand 
there are those which convey socially relevant information, such as warnings, and 
on the other there are those which indicate the strength of the associated 
assumption, such as predictions and guesses. 
According to Nicolle, speech acts such as ‘warn’ must necessarily be 
considered to be communicated acts rather than non-communicated acts because a 
speaker who employs such a speech act requires the hearer to recognize her 
intention to convey socially relevant information. His example of a warning is the 
same as that provided by Blakemore (1991): 
 
(3a) The path is slippery here. 
 
Nicolle follows Jary (1998) in the latter’s observation that human cognition has 
evolved such that it is able to: 
 
[…] form and maintain alliances, to keep track of one’s relative status and that of 
others, to calculate the likely effect of one’s actions on the way others think of you 
and their likely responses to your actions […]. 
(Jary 1998: 165) 
 
Thus, although it is a hugely complex procedure, socially relevant information is 
processed with deceptive ease and is as such inherently relevant. 
     Our challenge to Nicolle’s position that speech acts such as warning are 
communicated acts concerns an apparent misunderstanding which his text betrays 
regarding the concept of the communicated speech act. He explains the speaker’s 
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need for the hearer to recognize her intention to communicate socially relevant 
information as follows: 
 
When the speaker warns the hearer that the path is slippery, the speaker is acting 
altruistically and the hearer is thereby placed in the debt of the speaker. Failure to 
respond appropriately, for example by thanking the speaker, has the potential to 
impair the social relationship between speaker and hearer. It seems that in such 
situations hearers cannot help but recognise the intention to warn and, in cultures 
where it is appropriate, the offering of thanks happens virtually automatically. 
(emphasis mine) 
(Nicolle 2000: 239) 
 
But a little later he (correctly) observes that the hearer will be able to recover the 
chief intended cognitive effects through processing the proposition expressed alone: 
 
Failure to process such information may not impair the recovery of contextual 
implications derivable from the proposition expressed, but it may adversely effect 
[sic] the maintenance of social relations between the interlocutors. (emphasis mine)  
(Nicolle 2000: 240) 
 
Nicolle fails to recognize the following: what unites those speech acts that Sperber 
and Wilson and Blakemore have identified as communicated acts is the 
circumstance that the intended speech act contributes to the main relevance of the 
utterance. Nicolle may be correct in suggesting that a hearer will not fail to recover 
socially relevant information associated with a warning, but recovering this 
information is not an element of recovering the main relevance of the utterance. As 
we saw in example (5a), however, the hearer is required to understand the hearer to 
have communicated (5c) in order to have his expectations of optimal relevance 
satisfied: 
 
(5a)  OK. I watch it.  
(5c)  {The speaker of (5a) is admitting that} she watches EastEnders. 
 
Warning is clearly a non-communicated speech act in Sperber and Wilson’s sense 
after all.  
In his discussion of the other type of non-communicated speech act, i.e. 
those which convey the strength of the associated proposition, Nicolle links the 
notion that they must necessarily be understood by the hearer to be speaker-
 227 
 
intended to the three ways, discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2 in which an 
utterance can yield positive cognitive effects: 
 
Knowing whether an utterance […] is a prediction, hearsay, a meteorological 
forecast, or a guess will have a bearing on whether an utterance […] succeeds in 
strengthening or contradicting an existing assumption, or whether it gives rise to a 
strongly or weakly held contextual assumption. 
(Nicolle 2000: 237) 
 
Thus, unless the speaker is understood to be performing a specific speech act (such 
as predicting or guessing), the hearer will not be able to infer the speaker’s degree 
of commitment to the proposition. Sperber and Wilson, however, do not deny that a 
speaker always communicates her degree of commitment to a proposition. Their 
point is that the speaker does not need to be understood to have performed a 
discrete speech act, associated with a more or less inflexible set of cognitive effects, 
if her degree of commitment to the proposition is to be inferred. Furthermore, as in 
the case of speech acts which convey socially relevant information, the main 
relevance of a proposition which is associated with a speech act which indicates the 
strength of the embedded proposition will reside in the embedded proposition itself. 
We thus conclude that speech acts which convey the strength of an assumption, like 
those associated with socially relevant information, are also truly non-communicated 
acts. 
     Bird’s (1994) chief objection to the notion that many speech acts are non-
communicated suggests that he too has misunderstood what all communicated 
speech acts ultimately have in common. For Sperber and Wilson, a speaker makes 
a prediction if she ‘[…] she ostensively communicates an assumption with a certain 
property, that of being about a future event at least partly beyond her control’ 
(1986/95: 245). Bird points out that these conditions are not adequate to make an 
utterance a prediction (1994: 301), but he concedes (1994: 302) that this does not 
necessarily pose a problem for relevance theory: 
 
[…] [I]f the conditions are adequate, then the classification is recoverable from the 
ostensive communication, and then there is no obstacle to the classification’s being 
an essential part of what is ostensively communicated. 
(Bird 1994: 203) 
 
Thus, it follows from Bird’s considerations that if the conditions for a prediction are 
ostensively communicated, then it can be said that the speech act of predicting is 
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ostensively communicated. Whether or not Bird is right in this assumption need not 
exercise us here. However, the notion that the conditions for a given speech act are 
always ostensively communicated is not sufficient for us to assume that the speech 
act itself is an essential part of what is ostensively communicated, i.e. that the 
speech act is communicated in the relevance-theoretic sense. Like Nicolle, Bird has 
either overlooked or failed to understand that for a speech act to be of Sperber and 
Wilson’s communicated variety, it is not sufficient for the conditions for that speech 
act merely to be ostensively communicated. This is because the main relevance of 
the utterance which contains it must at least to some extent reside in those 
ostensively communicated conditions.   
     The correlation which Blakemore (1991, 1992) draws between non-
communicated speech acts and their capacity to appear in parenthetical positions 
provides Nicolle (2000) with grounds in addition to those cited above on which to 
challenge the conventional relevance-theoretic distinction between communicated 
and non-communicated speech acts. Nicolle (2000: 241) argues that some speech 
acts which relevance theorists hold to be non-communicated cannot be used 
parenthetically. ‘I claim’ is an example: 
 
(15a) ? Jennifer will, I claim, leave the room. 
 
However, for me, ‘I claim’ is odd not because it occupies a parenthetical position; it 
is odd because ‘I claim’ sounds a little infelicitous in this utterance in any position, at 
least in my informal register: 
 
(15b) ? I claim that Jennifer will leave the room. 
 
Furthermore, there appears to be a specific reason why ‘I claim’ is not quite 
convincing as a performative: it can be argued that it is semantically transparent. 
Jary (2007) uses the example ‘I hereby claim that it is going to rain’ in order to 
explain the type of semantic transparency at issue: 
 
The case for transparency goes as follows: if it does not rain, the speaker cannot 
defend herself against the accusation that what she said was false by saying “What I 
said was that I claim it is going to rain, and that’s true.” Rather, the fact that it is not 
raining is enough to make it the case that the speaker […] said something false. It 
can therefore be argued that the performative prefix makes no contribution to the 
semantic content of the utterance. 
(Jary 2007: 214) 
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Therefore, it is the specific nature of the speech act of claiming that makes ‘I claim’ 
pragmatically strange in (15a) and (15b). It is not the case that claiming is a non-
communicated speech act whose performative prefix can occur in sentence-initial 
position but not parenthetically. 
This is not the only evidence which for Nicolle can be used to challenge the 
notion that non-communicated speech acts can always be employed parenthetically, 
whilst communicated speech acts can never appear in such a position. ‘I promise’, 
which denotes a communicated speech act, does not have to sit in sentence-initial 
position; it can also be placed in parenthetical positions (example from Nicolle 2000: 
242): 
 
(16a)  I promise I’ll be there. 
(16b)  I’ll be there, I promise. 
 
In response to this, Blakemore might refer Nicolle to a footnote in her 1991 paper 
where she remarks that such occurrences of ‘I promise’ are truly parenthetical, like 
example (6b) above, and as such (16b) have ‘[…] much more the quality of a 
reassurance than a promise’ (1991: 203). Yet this is not quite convincing. A hearer 
would be quite justified in expressing annoyance with a speaker who uttered (16b) 
but then failed to turn up. After all, she promised! This suggests that ‘promise’ has in 
all cases the force of a communicated speech act. 
      We believe that there are two different analyses which explain the 
parenthetical occurrence of the communicated speech act ‘promise’ in (16b), whilst 
not weakening the more conventional relevance-theoretic account of the two types 
of speech act.  
     The first possible analysis is as follows. For Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) it 
is necessary to include the performative prefix ‘I promise’ in order to perform the 
communicated speech act of promising: 
 
We take it that promising is different from merely asserting that one will do something 
that the hearer wants one to do. In the latter case, someone who fails to do what she 
said she would and is accused of not keeping her promise would be quick to deny 
having promised, and would be quite right to do so.  
(Sperber and Wilson 1986/95: 290) 
 
For Searle (1969), on the other hand, the speech act of promising (like admitting) 
can be performed without including the explicit performative: 
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It is possible to perform the act without invoking an explicit illocutionary force-
indicating device […]. I may only say “I’ll do it for you”, but that utterance will count as 
and will be taken as a promise in any context where it is obvious that in saying it I am 
accepting (or undertaking, etc.) an obligation. Seldom, in fact, does one actually 
need to say the explicit “I promise”.  
(Searle 1969:68) 
  
If Searle is right, then the notion that ‘I promise’ can be used parenthetically is not 
unexpected. If it is possible for one’s intention to perform a given communicated 
speech act to be recognized without the need to utter the explicit performative, then 
it ought to be possible to include the explicit performative parenthetically. This would 
ensure that the hearer recovers the speaker’s intention to perform the speech act. 
Indeed in the case of the communicated speech act of admitting, which certainly can 
be performed without including ‘I admit’, the performative may be placed in a 
parenthetical position (although the insertion of the personal pronoun ‘it’, which 
stands for the embedded clause, is essential). For example: 
 
(5e)  OK. I watch it, I admit it. 
 
If this is right, then it seems that the correlation which Blakemore (1991, 1992) 
posits between the status of a speech act as a communicated or a non-
communicated act and its ability to be used parenthetically needs to be slightly 
revised. Those performatives which can be used parenthetically are not only those 
that denote non-communicated speech acts, but also those (such as admitting) that 
denote communicated speech acts which can be performed without the need to 
name the speech act explicitly. 
    An arguably less plausible analysis would be that ‘I promise’ in example 
(15b) above in reality occupies a non-parenthetical main-clause position and 
introduces a deleted subordinate clause which repeats the preposed clause: 
 
(16c)  I’ll be there, I promise I’ll be there. 
 
The advantage of this analysis, however, is that if we accept it then the notion that 
there is a correlation between the status of a speech act as a non-communicated act 
and its capacity to occupy a parenthetical position can be maintained. 
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5.4 The report of speech acts  
 
5.4.1 Introductory remarks 
 
In the remainder of this chapter we shall consider the implications of the 
observations made thus far for indirect speech, focussing on German. Although we 
shall make reference to the report of propositional attitudes, we shall for reasons of 
space concentrate on instances of the report of speech acts. We shall first look at 
non-communicated speech acts (type B indirect speech), and then at the report of 
communicated speech acts (type C indirect speech). 
 Crucially, by ‘reported speech act’ we mean speech acts which are reported 
as indirect speech. Examples are the report of behabitives, such as kritisieren and 
loben (‘praise’) which we considered in Chapter 4. Thus we are interested in cases 
which have a reportative subjunctive finite verb which makes explicit that the 
utterance is to be understood as an instance of prototypical indirect speech. The 
reportative subjunctive is not always essential for the indirect-speech reading to be 
available, but since our purpose is to investigate from a relevance-theoretic point of 
view the semantic/pragmatic effect of the reportative subjunctive, all examples of 
reports of speech acts will contain an embedded subjunctive.   
(17a) is an example of the type of speech-act report which is of interest to 
us: 
  
(17a) Bei  der  Gründung  versprach  Erdogan,   die  neue  Partei  werde    
at    the  founding    promised    Erdoğan   the  new    party    will.S1 
 
demokratischer     sein.  
 more democratic   be 
 
‘At the foundation ceremony, Erdoğan promised that the new party would be 
more democratic.’ 
(St. Galler Tagblatt: 16.08.2001) 
 
The reportative subjunctive in (17) ensures that it is understood as an instance of 
indirect speech. Thus it guarantees that the reported proposition is understood to be 
attributed to the matrix subject and in so doing blocks the (potential) interpretation 
on which the embedded proposition is presupposed by the matrix verb. 
Furthermore, since the original speech act is itself reported (by the matrix verb), the 
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hearer will supply a matrix clause which reflects this on the level of basic 
explicature:  
 
(17d) {Erdoğan sagte bei der Gründung}, er verspreche, die neue Partei werde 
demokratischer sein. 
 
As indirect speech, (17a) purports to report actual words attributed to Erdoğan, such 
as (17b) or (17c):  
 
(17b) Ich verspreche, dass die neue Partei demokratischer sein wird  
(17c) Die neue Partei wird demokratischer sein:115 
 
Example (17a) contrasts with (18) which is an example of the type of 
speech-act report which is not of interest to us, i.e. the object case, discussed in 
relation to the report of behabitives and emotional attitudes in Chapter 4: 
 
(18) Die  Warnemünder  Tourismuszentrale  hatte  es   versprochen,   dass  noch 
 the  Warnemünde   tourist office             had    it     promised         that    still 
 
 vor        dem  Saisonstart               2009   alle  Strandzugänge          wieder 
 before   the    start of the season   2009   all    beach access points  again 
 
frei     geschoben    werden. 
 free    pushed          become.IND 
 
 ‘The Warnemünde tourist office had promised that all beach access points 
would be unblocked before the start of the 2009 season.’ 
(http://www.der-warnemuender.de/dwm_3978.shtml: accessed 25.06.12)  
 
The use of the expletive es in the matrix clause and concomitant embedded 
indicative indicate that this is an instance of the object case. Thus the possibility of 
(18) being understood as prototypical indirect speech is ruled out; as such it does 
not purport to report the precise words of the Warnemünde tourist office.  
                                                 
115
 It will be remembered from section 5.3.3 above that it can be argued that promising is one of those 
communicated speech acts in the case of which the performative may be supplied inferentially on the 
level of higher-level explicature. 
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(19a), however, is ambiguous between the two types of reading (as example 
(11a) would be in Chapter 4 if it contained an embedded indicative116). Whether or 
not the precise words of the original utterance are reported seems to be irrelevant 
for the writer’s purpose; there is thus no need to use a linguistic device, such as the 
reportative subjunctive or an expletive es (and embedded indicative), in order to 
constrain the hearer’s comprehension procedure: 
 
(19a) […] Wagenseil […]  versprach,   dass  die  Veranstaltungsreihe   deshalb   
        Wagenseil         promised    that    the  series of events          therefore  
 
 auch  im       kommenden  Jahr   fortgesetzt  wird. 
 also   in the  coming          year   continued    becomes.IND 
  
‘Wagenseil promised that the series of events would therefore continue next 
year as well.’ 
(Frankfurter Rundschau: 13.08.1999) 
 
Substituting a subjunctive for the embedded indicative, as in (19b), would ensure 
that the prototypical-indirect-speech reading is the only one available: 
 
(19b) Wagenseil versprach, dass die Veranstaltungsreihe auch im kommenden 
Jahr fortgesetzt werde. 
 
Adding an expletive es and maintaining the indicative mood, on the other hand, 
would rule out the possibility of a prototypical indirect-speech reading: 
 
(19c) Wagenseil versprach es, dass die Veranstaltungsreihe auch im kommenden 
Jahr fortgesetzt wird. 
 
 We shall continue to speak of the purported original utterance and shall often 
make reference to the purported original speech act. This is because with no access 
to the original utterance or indeed to the original context we can only assume that a 
given reported utterance is faithful and that the matrix verbum dicendi reports the 
                                                 
116
 Example (11a) in Chapter 4 is ‘Schließlich kritisiert Erol auch, dass von den 900 Millionen Schilling, 
die insgesamt seit 1990 an Altlastensanierungsbeiträgen gezahlt worden sind, bloß elf Prozent für 
Sanierungen ausgegeben worden seien’. We claim that this would be ambiguous between a 
prototypical-indirect-speech reading and an object-case reading if the embedded verb were the 
indicative form sind.  
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actual original speech act. The verbum dicendi thus cannot be understood to have 
been selected from the point of view of the reporter herself. Furthermore, our 
judgements regarding whether the speech act reported is of the communicated or 
non-communicated variety can rely solely on the context of the host discourse within 
which the relevant instance of indirect speech occurs. As we have seen, some 
speech acts, e.g. ‘admit’, have in direct discourse both a communicated and a non-
communicated variant. Just because we claim that an instance of the speech act of 
admitting is reported as, for example, a non-communicated act does not preclude 
the possibility that the original speaker actually intended it to be understood as a 
communicated speech act. As we pointed out in Chapter 1, host-discourse 
considerations are paramount. 
 
 
5.4.2 Type B indirect speech: The report of non-communicated speech acts 
 
5.4.2.1 Preliminary remarks 
 
Relevance theory claims that some utterances to which classical speech act 
theorists would have assigned a specific speech-act description can in reality 
achieve optimal relevance without the hearer having to understand the speaker to 
have performed a specific speech act. This is because the main relevance of the 
utterance is not understood to consist in the notion that such-and-such a speech act, 
such as warning or predicting, is being performed. We have suggested that similar 
remarks may also be made about utterances associated with propositional attitudes, 
such as those denoted by ‘think’ and ‘believe’; the notion that the speaker 
specifically thinks that such-and-such is the case does not contribute to the main 
relevance of the utterance. If the hearer understands the speaker to have 
communicated that she is issuing e.g. a warning implicitly in the sense that this 
information is not explicitly encoded, then it will operate on the level of higher-level 
explicature. In those cases where an explicit performative or propositional-attitude 
verb is included, this also contributes to the higher-level explicatures of the 
utterance, even, contra Itani-Kaufmann (1990) and Ifantidou (1993), when in 
sentence-initial position. It should be remembered that if information associated with 
a specific speech act is communicated, either implicitly or explicitly, the speech act 
is still of the non-communicated variety if this information is not understood to 
contribute to the main relevance of the utterance. 
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It follows that when an utterance associated with a non-communicated 
speech act or a propositional attitude is transposed into indirect speech, the main 
relevance of the original utterance will generally be understood to have consisted in 
the assumption which is presented in the reported version as the embedded 
proposition. The function of the verbum dicendi will be to report a higher-level 
explicature of the original utterance.  
For each of our examples in the next section we shall supply two pieces of 
evidence which support our claim that the speech act reported is reported as a non-
communicated act. Firstly, since the explicature which is reported by the matrix 
verbum dicendi is not understood to have contributed to the main relevance of the 
original utterance, we hyopothesize that one should be able to place such verba 
dicendi in marked i.e. interposed or postposed positions (Übergangsformen). (20a), 
which exemplifies the report of the non-communicated behabitive loben (‘praise’), 
provides evidence that this is the case. The circumstance that for the reporter’s 
purposes the main relevance of the original utterance is understood to have 
consisted in the proposition Schüler ist ein Glücksfall für das hessische 
Archivswesen (‘Schüler is a stroke of luck for the Hessian archives’) means that the 
matrix clause can be placed after the reported utterance:  
 
(20a) Schüler   sei       ein   Glücksfall        für   das   hessische   Archivwesen, 
 Schüler   is.S1    a      stroke of luck  for   the    Hessian      archives 
 
lobte      der    Staatssekretär        im       Ministerium    für      Wissenschaft 
praised  the    Secretary of State  at the  ministry          for       science 
 
und   Kunst, Frank Portz  (FDP) den    promovierten             Historiker  und 
 and   art       Frank Portz  (FDP) the     holding a doctorate   historian    and 
  
Germanisten. 
 Germanist 
 
‘Schüler is a stroke of luck for the Hessian archives, said the Secretary of 
State at the Ministry for Science and Art, Frank Portz (FDP) in praise of Dr 
Schüler, who is an historian and Germanist.’ 
(Frankfurter Rundschau: 22.07.1999) 
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This may be considered a corollary of the notion that in direct speech those 
performatives and propositional-attitude verbs which do not carry part of the main 
relevance of the utterance may in English appear in a parenthetical position, as in 
(7a) (repeated below): 
 
(7a) Jennifer will, I predict, leave the room. 
 
In this sense, propositional-attitude and non-communicated-speech-act verba 
dicendi resemble neutral verba dicendi such as berichten and sagen, whose 
complement clause may also be postposed (see section 5.2).  
 The second piece of evidence that we are dealing with reports of non-
communicated speech acts is as follows. If the non-communicated speech act 
reported by the matrix verbum dicendi is not understood to have contributed to the 
main relevance of the original utterance, then it ought to be possible, without being 
accused of unfaithful reporting, to substitute for the matrix verb a neutral linguistic 
expression (neutral in the sense that it is not associated with a specific non-
communicated speech act) which is entailed by the matrix verb. For example 
‘warning’ necessarily involves saying something, and so ‘warn’ entails ‘say’. 
Importantly, a verbum dicendi which reports a non-communicated speech act will 
indicate a specific degree of factivity which the original speaker assigned to what is 
presented as the embedded proposition. For instance ‘warning’ indicates that the 
original speaker held that the assumption which is presented in the reported version 
as the embedded proposition is true, in other words she assigned the value [-non-
factive]. Thus the speech-act neutral verbum dicendi will be entailed by the matrix 
verb only if it is capable of indicating the same degree of factivity that the original 
speaker assigned to the original proposition. Speech-act neutral expressions which 
indicate that the original speaker assigned the value [-non-factive] include sagen 
and adverbial constructions such as laut Polizeiberichten (‘according to police 
reports’). On the other hand, neutral expressions which indicate that the original 
speaker assigned the value [non-factive] include meinen. Evidence that we are right 
is provided by example (20b). Here sagte has been substituted for lobte since the 
former is an entailment of the latter in this case, but because the main relevance of 
the original utterance is understood to have consisted in the subordinate proposition, 
the report cannot be said to be unfaithful: 
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(20b) Schüler sei ein Glücksfall für das hessische Archivwesen, sagte der    
Staatssekretär im Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kunst, Frank Portz  
(FDP) den promovierten Historiker und Germanisten. 
 
As we saw above in section 5.3.2, Blakemore (1991) suggests that 
performatives which denote non-communicated speech acts may, like discourse 
markers, be treated as semantic constraints on relevance (albeit conceptual rather 
than procedural) since they constrain the hearer’s choice of context. Blakemore 
(2010) follows Wilson and Sperber (1993), Rieber (1997), Bach (1999) and Potts 
(2005) in observing that ‘[…] certain discourse markers which have been analysed 
in procedural terms may fall within the scope of indirect thought reports’ (Blakemore 
2010: 584). The following example has been adapted from Wilson and Sperber 
(1993: 15). In (21a), which is to be understood as direct speech, Andrew uses ‘so’ in 
order to constrain his hearer’s comprehension process such that the proposition ‘I 
should have a holiday’ is understood as a conclusion that follows from ‘Jennifer has 
had a holiday’: 
 
(21a) Jennifer has had a holiday, so I should have one too.  
 
In (21b), however, the reporter is not responsible for this inference; as part of the 
reported utterance it is attributed to Andrew: 
 
(21b) Andrew thought that Jennifer had a holiday, so he should have one too. 
 
We propose that similar comments may be made about verba dicendi which 
report higher-level explicatures whose recovery is constrained in direct speech by 
corresponding performatives which denote non-communicated speech acts. Like the 
inferential computations which the discourse marker so in (21b) instructs the original 
hearer to perform, the reported higher-level explicature is understood to be 
attributed to the matrix subject. In reporting this explicature, the matrix verb makes 
explicit, in conceptual terms, those inferential computations which the reporter 
intends the original speaker to be understood as having intended the original hearer 
to perform over the conceptual content of her original utterance. Consequently, in 
making explicit that an utterance is to be understood as prototypical indirect speech, 
the German reportative subjunctive has the effect, when used in the report of a non-
communicated speech act, of ensuring that the original speaker is understood to be 
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responsible for the inferential computations associated with the reported non-
communicated speech act. 
Type B indirect speech has in common with type A indirect speech the 
circumstance that the embedded clause reports the main relevance of the original 
utterance (in the case of type A indirect speech it may be said to report the only 
relevance). We would therefore expect a reporter to be able to imply contextually 
any attitude towards this embedded proposition in the same way that she may imply 
any attitude towards the embedded proposition of type A indirect speech. We shall 
show in the next section (5.4.2.2) that this is the case.  
In direct speech it is possible for a hearer to challenge a higher-level 
explicature which he understands his interlocutor to have intended to communicate, 
as in (22). In (22) Jennifer facetiously queries Andrew’s use of the parenthetical 
sentential adverbial ‘frankly’ which contributes to a higher-level explicature:   
 
(22) ANDREW: Frankly, you’re probably going to fail the exam. 
JENNIFER: That’s not true. You’re not being frank.  
 
From this it follows that in the case of the report of a non-communicated speech act 
it should also be possible for a reporter to imply contextually not only an attitude 
towards the embedded proposition, but also an additional attitude towards any 
higher-level explicature of the original utterance which she reports. Unlike 
assertions, a speech act cannot be described as true or false, and this point is 
illustrated by Jary (2007: 213) who gives the example of a private uttering (23) to a 
general: 
 
(23) I hereby order you to clean the latrines. 
 
Jary points out that the general cannot respond to this by saying ‘That’s not true’, 
rather what she might plausibly say is ‘You can’t order me: you don’t have the 
authority’ (2007: 213). We hold that the notion that a speech act cannot be judged in 
terms of truth or falsehood is true of both communicated and non-communicated 
speech acts in the relevance-theoretic sense, which differ primarily in terms of their 
respective contributions to relevance. But when a speech act is reported as indirect 
speech, it is possible to judge the reported act in terms of truth and falsehood. We 
repeat (17a): 
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(17a) Bei der Gründung versprach Erdogan, die neue Partei werde 
demokratischer sein.  
  
On hearing (17), a person could respond, ‘That’s not true, Erdoğan didn’t promise 
that’. However, the speaker is assumed to be a rational communicator and thus 
(17a) will in the normal case be assumed to be a faithful report of Erdoğan’s original 
utterance: the reporter will have adequate reason to believe that Erdoğan did 
perform the speech act of promising (either explicitly or implicitly). Therefore the 
interpretive stance which the reporter contextually implies will not concern whether 
or not it is true that the embedded proposition was promised. Instead we suggest 
that a reported non-communicated speech act may be assessed in terms of whether 
the reporter believes the original proposition to have been justifiably associated with 
the non-communicated speech act in question.117 For example, did the original 
speaker have good reason to intend an utterance to be understood as a warning? Is 
the embedded proposition valid as a conclusion in the sense that it follows logically 
from its premises, or does it represent a valid criticism? This attitude towards the 
reported non-communicated speech act will be implied contextually by the reporter. 
Thus relevance theory is able to explain how the hearer recovers this attitude: 
interpretive hypotheses are considered in order of accessibility and the 
comprehension procedure stops when the hearer’s expectation of optimal relevance 
is satisfied (or abandoned). 
 
 
5.4.2.2 The report of the non-communicated speech acts of concluding, and 
criticizing  
 
We are now in a position to examine in detail some examples of the report of non-
communicated speech acts. In this section we shall look at two examples: one 
example of the non-communicated act of concluding, and one of the non-
communicated act of criticizing. Whilst it is possible that the matrix verbs schließen 
and kritisieren have been supplied by the reporter, and thus reflect the reporter’s 
own interpretation of the original utterance (which in this case would be represented 
by the embedded clause alone), these verbs in our view (at least) purport to report 
an illocution of the original speaker. We thus do not consider them to reflect the 
                                                 
117
 We shall consider the implications of this for the report of communicated speech acts in section 5.4 
below. 
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interpretive stance of the reporter. Instead, the reporter implies contextually an 
attitude towards the original speaker’s performance of this speech act.  
Our analysis of each example will consist of two elements. We shall firstly 
supply evidence that the speech act reported is of the non-communicated variety, 
and this will involve showing that the matrix clause can be moved to a marked 
postposed position and that a speech-act neutral verbum dicendi may be substituted 
for the matrix verbum dicendi. We shall then investigate the attitudes which the 
reporter implies contextually towards the embedded proposition and the original 
non-communicated act, reported by the verbum dicendi. 
 Our first example which the reporter intends the hearer to understand as the 
report of a conclusion is (24a):  
 
(24a) [CONTEXT] Ladenburg police have accused an as yet unknown man of fish 
poaching. He ran away when officers arrived, leaving his catch behind, which 
consisted of two large asps.118  
 
 An  der   Neckar-Staustufe   bei      Ladenburg     hatte   ein    Zeuge    den  
 at   the    Neckar  barrage    near    Ladenburg     had      a      witness  the 
 
 Angler   beobachtet,   wie    er   die     fangfrischen          Fische   ziemlich 
 angler   noticed           as     he   the    freshly caught       fish        fairly 
 
  unwaidmännisch   in      seinen  Taschen      verstaute   und     daraus         
 unsportsmanlike   in      his         pockets       put             and     from that 
 
geschlossen,  dass    es    sich     hier     wohl            kaum       um       einen    
            concluded      that      it      itself    here    probably     hardly      about   a        
   
legalen    Vorgang         handeln     könne. […]  Von   dem  Flüchtigen 
 legal        procedure       deal          can.S1         of       the   fugitive 
 
 ist  […]   ein  Autokennzeichnen   bekannt, die   Ermittlungen    dürften 
 is            a    number plate            known    the   investigations   should 
 
                                                 
118
 Fischwilderei wirft die Polizei in Ladenburg einem noch unbekannten Mann vor, der unter 
Zurücklassung der aus zwei großen Rapfen bestehenden Beute beim Eintreffen der Beamten das 
Weite suchte.  
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 also              über   kurz    oder  lang   zum     Erfolg      führen. 
 therefore      over   short   or      long   to the   success   lead 
 
‘At the Neckar barrage near Ladenburg a witness noticed the angler putting 
the freshly caught fish in his pockets in a rather unsportsmanlike manner, 
and concluded from this that the man could hardly be acting legally. […] The 
number plate of the escaping man’s car is known and so the investigations 
should sooner or later end with a positive result.’ 
                                       (Mannheimer Morgen: 22.09.2007)  
 
As this is an example of indirect speech, the hearer will supply on the level of 
basic explicature a matrix clause which reflects the fact that the matrix verbum 
dicendi itself reports part of the purported original utterance: 
 
(24b) {Der Zeuge sagte}, er schließe daraus, dass er sich hier wohl kaum um 
einen legalen Vorgang handeln könne. 
 
We believe that the speech act of concluding in example (24a) is reported as 
a non-communicated act, and thus that we are right in considering it to be an 
example of type B indirect speech, for the following reasons. In the context of a 
suspected crime which is being investigated, it is the notion that a crime has 
possibly been committed that is of most interest to those investigating, for example 
the police. The main relevance of the original utterance is thus understood to have 
resided in (24c): 
 
(24c) Es kann sich hier wohl kaum um einen legalen Vorgang handeln.  
 
 As a result, the communicative effect of the report is not noticeably 
weakened if the matrix verbum-dicendi clause is postposed.  
 
(24d) An der Neckar-Staustufe bei Ladenburg hatte ein Zeuge den Angler   
beobachtet, wie er die fangfrischen Fische ziemlich unwaidmännisch in      
seinen Taschen verstaute. Es könne sich hier wohl kaum um einen 
legalen Vorgang handeln, schloss der Zeuge daraus. 
 
Furthermore, it is possible to substitute for the verbum dicendi a speech-act neutral 
verbum dicendi which the former entails. In (24e) gemeint (‘thought/believed’), which 
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is the past participle of meinen, has been substituted for daraus geschlossen 
(‘concluded from that’): 
 
(24e) An der Neckar-Staustufe bei Ladenburg hatte ein Zeuge den Angler   
beobachtet, wie er die fangfrischen Fische ziemlich unwaidmännisch in      
seinen Taschen verstaut und gemeint, es könne sich hier wohl kaum um 
einen legalen Vorgang handeln. 
 
Meinen, like the original schließen, is capable of indicating that the original speaker 
assigned the value [non-factive] to the proposition which is now being reported.119 
The use of gemeint does not necessarily prevent the hearer from understanding the 
original utterance to have been spoken aloud. 
Having provided evidence that a non-communicated speech act is reported 
in (24a) we are in a position to investigate the attitudes which the reporter implies 
contextually towards the embedded utterance and reported speech act. The 
relationship between a proposition and its status as a conclusion can be described 
as symbiotic. On the one hand, the truth or plausibility of a proposition which is 
concluded depends in part on the extent to which it is justifiable as a conclusion. On 
the other hand, the extent to which the proposition is a valid conclusion rests on the 
assumption that the concluded proposition itself is plausible.  
In this specific case the notion that the man was probably doing something 
illegal (A) can be said to follow logically from the fact that he was seen putting fish in 
his pockets (B) and is thus plausible, whilst the fact that this is plausible implies in 
turn that it follows logically from its premise, i.e. that it is a justified conclusion. In 
order to understand that A follows logically from B, however, it is necessary for a 
further assumption to be manifest: fish poaching is illegal.  
 Whether the reporter herself considers this logical relationship between 
premise and conclusion to hold and thus believes the embedded proposition, (24c), 
to be both plausible as an opinion and justified as a conclusion depends on some 
contextual considerations. Firstly, the man has been accused by police, an 
institution of authority which must have had good reason to accuse him. In other 
words they must have found the notion that the man had been fish poaching 
plausible, which implies that they believed it to follow as a conclusion from the fact 
that he had been seen putting fish into his pocket. Secondly, the man ran away and 
left his catch when officers arrived. The reason why this functions as evidence that 
                                                 
119
 Whilst the original speaker feels he has adequate evidence for his conclusion, he cannot be certain 
that his conclusion is true. Thus the value assigned is [non-factive]. 
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the embedded proposition is held to be plausible and justified as a conclusion is that 
the reporter assumes that the assumption in (24f) was manifest: 
 
(24f) People who run away when the police arrive may have committed a crime. 
 
Thirdly, the assumption that the man may be guilty is confirmed in the final 
sentence: because the man’s number plate is known he is expected to be convicted 
eventually. 
 Ultimately, the text contains no contextual features which prompt the hearer 
to infer that these three states of affairs do not correspond to reality. Thus the 
interpretation that the hearer will recover contextually is one according to which the 
embedded proposition is understood to be a true and valid conclusion. 
 Our next example concerns the report of the non-communicated speech act 
of criticizing: 
 
(25a) [CONTEXT] BERLIN. German minister for trade and commerce Werner 
Müller is in a good mood as he looks to the future. Three per cent economic 
growth over the next few years is definitely forecast, he says at the 
presentation of his economic report for the year 2000 – and this growth will 
be achieved ‘almost in the absence of inflation’. ‘If we do nothing wrong, then 
we will have a good chances a period of persistent economic boom like in 
America’. However, he did not neglect to issue a warning as well: only if all 
reforms are completed, above all the revision of the tax law, can these 
dreams come true, he said. He remarked further that if the tax reform fails 
500,000 jobs with be in jeopardy. […] Above all, Müller puts his trust in new 
technologies. According to the study, urged on by companies all over the 
internet, by 2010 750,000 additional jobs will be created in the IT sector 
alone. […] The opposition’s reaction to the report was highly critical.120 
 
 
                                                 
120
 BERLIN. Bundeswirtschaftsminister Werner Müller blickt gut gelaunt in die Zukunft. Drei Prozent 
Wirtschaftswachstum seien in den nächsten Jahren auf jeden Fall drin, sagte er bei der Vorstellung 
seines Wirtschaftsberichts 2000 - und das auch noch "praktisch ohne Inflation". "Wenn wir nichts falsch 
machen, haben wir die Chancen auf einen dauerhaften Aufschwung wie in Amerika." Allerdings 
unterließ er es auch nicht, zu warnen: Nur falls alle Reformprojekte vollendet würden, vor allem die 
Neuregelung des Steuerrechts, könnten die Träume wahr werden. Falls aber die Steuerreform 
scheitere, seien 500 000 Jobs gefährdet. […] Müller vertraut vor allem auf die neuen Technologien. 
Angetrieben durch die Unternehmen rund um das Internet, würden bis 2010 allein in der IT-Branche 
750 000 zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze entstehen, heißt es in der Studie. […] Die Opposition reagierte mit 
scharfer Kritik auf den Bericht. 
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 CDU  und  CSU   kritisierten, es   fehle        ein   klares  Konzept    wie 
 CDU  and  CSU  criticized      it    lacks.S1   a      clear   concept     how 
 
die   Chancen    zu   nutzen  seien.   Der FDP-  
the   prospects   to   use        are.S1  the FDP    
 
Wirtschaftspolitiker                            Rainer   Brüderle   sprach  gar     von   
minister for trade and commerce      Rainer   Brüderle   spoke    even  of      
 
 einem    "überflüssigen  Bericht   eines  machtlosen  Ministers”. 
a             pointless        report     of a     powerless     minister 
 
 ‘The CDU and CSU made the criticism that a clear concept of how we should 
take advantage of these prospects is lacking. The FDP minister for trade and 
commerce Rainer Brüderle even spoke of a “pointless report by a powerless 
minister.”’ 
(Rhein-Zeitung: 11.07.2000) 
  
The basic explicature which the hearer recovers will resemble that in (25b): 
 
(25b) {CDU und CSU sagten}, sie kritisierten, es fehle ein klares Konzept, wie 
die Chancen zu nutzen seien. 
 
As we saw in Chapter 4, section 4.2.3, Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø observe 
that in the case of the report of a criticism, the embedded proposition is used in 
order to convey ‘disapproval of something α has done or is doing’ (Fabricius-Hansen 
and Sæbø 2011: 86). We further saw that this proposition will usually contain what 
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø describe as a negative ‘evaluative element’. This 
evaluative element alone may have prompted the original hearer to understand the 
utterance as a criticism, without being explicitly instructed to do so by a 
performative. Criticizing is therefore analyzable as a non-communicated speech act. 
In (25a) this negative evaluative element is Es fehle ein klares Konzept, and 
the main relevance of the reported act of criticism in (25a) above, which is best 
understood as a summary of indeterminate utterances attributed to the parties 
concerned,  is understood to have consisted in (25c): 
 
(25c)   Es fehlt ein klares Konzept, wie die Chancen zu nutzen sind. 
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Since the main relevance of the purported original utterance is understood to have 
consisted in (a) proposition(s) which resemble (25c), the matrix clause may be 
moved to a marked postposed position with little influence over the overall 
communicative effect: 
 
(25d) Es fehle ein klares Konzept, wie die Chancen zu nutzen seien, kritisierten 
CDU und CSU. 
 
 As in the case of example (24a), it is possible to substitute a speech-act 
neutral verb for kritisierten. The fact that the embedded proposition is to be 
understood as a criticism is not only implied by the negative evaluative element; this 
is made explicit by the preceding context which tells us that the opposition’s reaction 
to the report was critical. In (25e) we have substituted laut CDU und CSU 
(‘according to the CDU and CSU’) for the original kritisierte. Laut is appropriate since 
as well as being ‘speech-act neutral’ it is often employed in media language to 
introduce an opinion. Accordingly, we have substituted indicatives for the 
subjunctive forms, although subjunctives would not be impossible in this context 
(Carlsen 1994).  
 
(25e) Laut CDU und CSU fehlt ein klares Konzept, wie die Chancen zu nutzen 
sind.121  
 
What attitudes are implied contextually towards the embedded proposition 
and purported original act of criticizing in (25a)? Naturally, the reporter may imply 
contextually any attitude regarding whether she considers the embedded proposition 
to be true or false. We hypothesize that when the non-communicated speech act of 
criticizing is reported, if the reporter implies contextually that she believes the 
subordinate proposition to be true, then the optimally relevant attitude regarding 
whether this proposition is valid as a criticism may fall anywhere along the spectrum 
of possible attitudes. For example, she may imply contextually that she considers 
the embedded proposition to be true and also that it is valid as a criticism. 
Alternatively, the embedded proposition may be undeniably true, yet not seem 
worthwhile to the reporter as a criticism. On the other hand, we hypothesize that if 
the reporter believes the embedded proposition to be untrue, then the speaker is 
                                                 
121
 Following German rules of dummy-es insertion, the es in (25e) has been deleted. 
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likely to imply an attitude whereby the embedded proposition is not understood to 
constitute a worthwhile criticism. 
 This specific text provides an overview of the contents of the German 
business secretary’s economic report. The bulk of the text is made up of quotations 
which are attributed to Müller. These are presented using direct speech and 
reportative-subjunctive indirect speech, the predominant reporter attitude which is 
implied contextually being one of impartiality. There are at least two factors which 
prompt the hearer to recover this attitude. Firstly, the reporter does not explicitly 
comment on what Müller says. Secondly, the indirect speech is accompanied by 
essentially neutral linguistic expressions which do not imply the extent to which the 
reporter considers them to be true. These include the verbum dicendi sagen and the 
matrix clause heißt es in der Studie, adequately rendered in English by ‘according to 
the study’.  
The function of the strong criticisms of Müller’s report provided at the end is 
to ensure that a sense of balance is maintained. As in the case of the utterances 
attributed to Müller, the reporter does not comment on what the CDU, CSU and 
Brüderle have said. Consequently, the hearer is likely to recover contextually an 
interpretation on which the purported original utterance, (25c), is reported 
impartially. This means that, in keeping with the dominant objective tone of the text 
there is no reason for the hearer to understand the reporter’s attitude concerning 
whether the embedded proposition is justifiable as a criticism to be one of anything 
other than impartiality.  
This brings us to the end of our discussion of the report of non-
communicated speech acts. In the next section we shall look in some detail at the 
report of a class of speech acts which themselves contribute to the main relevance 
of the utterances with which they are associated: communicated speech acts.  
 
 
5.4.3 Type C indirect speech: The report of communicated speech acts 
 
5.4.3.1 Preliminary remarks 
 
In section 5.4.2 we examined in detail the notion that when a non-communicated 
speech act is reported the main relevance of the original utterance is understood to 
have consisted in the embedded proposition. We saw how in making explicit that the 
utterance constitutes indirect speech the function of the reportative subjunctive, as a 
marker of interpretive use, is partly to enable the reporter to imply contextually her 
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attitude towards the embedded proposition in terms of whether she considers it to 
be true or false. Additionally, the subjunctive is compatible with any attitude that the 
reporter may imply contextually towards the reported non-communicated speech 
act.  
We propose that when a communicated speech act is reported, the speech 
act denoted by the matrix verb is itself understood to have contributed to the main 
relevance of the original utterance. A straightforward example is (17a) (repeated 
from above) which may be understood as a report of an utterance that resembles 
(17b): 
 
(17a) Bei der Gründung versprach Erdoğan, die neue Partei werde 
demokratischer sein. 
(17b) Ich verspreche, dass die neue Partei demokratischer sein wird. 
 
It is not only in the notion that Erdoğan has said that the new party will be more 
democratic that the main relevance of the original utterance is understood to have 
consisted; equally important is the notion that Erdoğan promised this. We further 
propose that the interpretive stance which is implied contextually towards a reported 
communicated speech act will concern chiefly the reporter’s view of the performance 
of the speech act – the extent to which she considers it to have been 
sincere/performed with good reason/worthwhile etc. – rather than whether the 
embedded proposition is true or plausible. As in the case of the report of non-
communicated speech acts, it is not impossible that the matrix verbum dicendi has 
been selected by the reporter and thus ultimately reflects her own interpretive 
stance towards the reported proposition. However, we believe that this verb will 
purport to report an illocution which is attributed to the original speaker, and thus, 
from the point of view of the host discourse, the choice of verbum dicendi does not 
normally reflect the attitude of the reporter.  
 In section 5.4.2.1 we suggested that when a non-communicated speech act 
is reported, it is possible to postpose the matrix clause. We might therefore expect it 
not to be possible to postpose a matrix clause which reports a communicated 
speech act; an assumption which is understood to have contributed to the main 
relevance of the purported original utterance winds up being separated from the 
embedded proposition. However, in the next section we shall suggest that this is not 
actually always the case. Nevertheless, we shall show that it is not possible to 
substitute a speech-act neutral verbum dicendi for a matrix verb which reports a 
communicated speech act (even though the speech-act neutral verbum dicendi will 
 248 
 
arguably be entailed by the verbum dicendi which reports a communicated act). This 
is because the matrix verbum dicendi is understood to report at least part of the 
main relevance of the original utterance. If it is not possible to substitute a neutral 
verbum dicendi, then this can be said to constitute evidence that the speech act 
reported is communicated. 
 In (17b), the performative ich verspreche contributes to the proposition 
expressed by the utterance, or basic explicature. Thus the matrix verb versprach in 
(17a) reports an element of the basic explicature of the purported original utterance. 
Sometimes, however, when a communicated speech act is reported, the matrix 
verbum dicendi will report a higher-level explicature which must be recovered 
inferentially by the hearer and is understood to have contributed to the main 
relevance of the original utterance. This will often be the case, for example, when 
the communicated speech act of admitting is reported. Returning to our EastEnders 
example above, a speaker may utter (5a):  
 
(5a) OK. I watch it.  
 
But in our imagined context, the notion that I watch EastEnders is already strongly 
suspected; the assumption in which the main relevance of (5a) lies is the higher-
level explicature (5c): 
 
(5c) {The speaker of (5a) is admitting that} (s)he watches EastEnders. 
 
Thus it is this higher-level explicature which (5g) reports: 
 
(5g) David admitted that he watches EastEnders.122 
 
 Thus, when a communicated speech act is reported the matrix verb will 
report either a higher-level explicature of the purported original utterance, but in 
either case this explicature will have contributed part of the main relevance of the 
original utterance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122
 He doesn’t. 
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5.4.3.2 The report of the communicated speech acts of guaranteeing and agreeing 
 
If somebody guarantees that a given state of affairs obtains, she does not merely 
say that such-and-such is the case; she indicates that she is thoroughly confident of 
the truth of what she is saying. A hearer would be quite justified in expressing his 
dissatisfaction if it subsequently transpired that what the speaker had guaranteed 
was not actually honoured. Thus the circumstance that a guarantee is being issued 
constitutes part of the main relevance of what the speaker has to say: guaranteeing 
is a communicated speech act in the relevance-theoretic sense. Therefore, when an 
act of guaranteeing is reported, the fact that a guarantee was being issued will be 
understood to have contributed to the main relevance of the purported original 
utterance. We give (26a) as an example: 
 
(26a) [CONTEXT] The CLC, which in the medium term is planning a stock market 
launch, has set itself similarly ambitious aims. ‘We estimate the annual 
turnover of our competitors to be between 550 and 600 million schillings and 
our plan is to be able to deal with 20 per cent of all calls to directory 
enquiries as early as next year’ [says Cevdet Canar]. According to Cevdet 
Canar, at the moment around 40 employees work at CLC, which operates 
call centres in Linz, Vienna and Burgenland, and a further 150 telephonists 
are required short-term.123 
 
Zwar      "garantiert"   CLC   in   einer  Aussendung, "dass  jeder   Anruf 
 it is true  guarantees   CLC  in   a         statement      that    every  call 
 
innerhalb  von  50  Sekunden   vollständig    abgewickelt"  werde,  
 inside        of     50  seconds     completely    dealt with       becomes.S1 
 
 auf  Grund    der       enormen     Nachfrage   in  den  ersten   Tagen, 
 on   ground   of the  enormous    demand       in  the   first       days 
 
 die       die   Erwartungen   der       Betreiber    um   das  Dreifache  
which   the  expectations    of the   operators   by    the   three times 
                                                 
123
 Ähnlich ehrgeizige Ziele hat sich die CLC, die mittelfristig einen Börsengang plant, gesetzt: "Wir 
schätzen den jährlichen Umsatz unserer Mitbewerber auf 550 bis 600 Millionen Schilling und planen 
bereits im nächsten Jahr, 20 Prozent aller Telefonauskünfte abwickeln zu können." Derzeit seien bei 
CLC, die Call-Center in Linz, Wien und dem Burgenland betreibt, rund 40 Mitarbeiter beschäftigt, 
kurzfristig werden weitere 150 Telefonisten gesucht. 
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übertroffen   hätten,     sei     es  jedoch      zu  Engpässen    gekommen,  
exceeded     have.S2   is.S1  it    however    to  bottlenecks    come   
 
bedauert  der  CLC-Manager. 
regrets     the  CLC manager 
 
‘It is true that the CLC “guarantees” in a statement “that every call will be 
dealt with completely within 50 seconds”, but CLC’s manager regrets that 
because of enormous demand in the first few days, which exceeded the 
expectations of the operators threefold, there have however been cases of 
bottlenecks.’ 
(Salzburger Nachrichten: 03.11.2000) 
  
As in the previous examples where a speech act is reported, the hearer will recover 
the basic explicature in (26b) on the level of mental representation: 
 
(26b) {Zwar sagt CLC in einer Aussendung}, sie garantiere, dass jeder Anruf 
innerhalb von 50 Sekunden abgewickelt werde. 
 
The main relevance of the original utterance is understood to have consisted in the 
proposition in (26c), including the performative wir garantieren: 
 
(26c) Wir garantieren, dass jeder Anruf innerhalb von 50 Sekunden abgewickelt 
wird. 
 
It is therefore not possible to substitute for the matrix verbum dicendi garantiert a 
speech-act neutral verbum dicendi. In (26d) we have substituted einer Aussendung 
zufolge (‘according to a statement’) for the orginal Zwar "garantiert" CLC in einer 
Aussendung and accordingly replaced the reportative subjunctive with an indicative: 
 
(26d) Einer Aussendung zufolge wird “jeder Anruf innerhalb von 50 Sekunden 
abgewickelt”. 
 
The hearer of (26d) cannot understand CLC to have guaranteed that they will deal 
with all calls within 50 seconds. (26d) therefore cannot be said to constitute a faithful 
report of an original utterance that must have resembled (26c). However, it appears 
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that it is possible to move the matrix verbum dicendi to a position after or within the 
embedded proposition: 
 
(26e) “Jeder Anruf” werde “innerhalb von 50 Sekunden abgewickelt”, “garantiert” 
CLC in einer Aussendung. 
 
We propose that this is possible because the embedded proposition, in (26f) below: 
 
(26f) Jeder Anruf wird innerhalb von 50 Sekunden abgewickelt. 
 
is itself discourse-new in the host discourse. Birner (2004) defines discourse-new 
information as ‘[…] that which has not been previously evoked’ whilst discourse-old 
information is ‘[…] that which has been explicitly evoked in the prior discourse (or its 
situational context […]’ (2004: 45). Thus the hearer of (26e) is able to derive 
adequate positive cognitive effects (albeit ones not associated with a guarantee) 
from the embedded proposition alone. The effect of postposing the matrix clause is 
possibly to reduce the force of the guarantee a little, but not so much that the notion 
that the original speaker guaranteed the truth of the embedded proposition is no 
longer understood to have contributed to the main relevance of the original 
utterance. These considerations corroborate our claim that the speech act of 
guaranteeing reported in (26a) is of the communicated variety. 
What sort of attitude is implied contextually towards the reported speech act 
of guaranteeing in (26a)? The hearer is not able to infer contextually a specific 
reporter attitude to some of the facts reported in the first paragraph of (26a), neither 
is he prompted to supply, on the level of mental representation, the instance of 
reported speech with a verbum dicendi which indicates the reporter’s degree of 
commitment to the reported proposition. Thus these facts, i.e. the notion that around 
40 employees currently work at CLC and that a further 150 telephonists are being 
recruited, are reported impartially. However, the notion that CLC plans to be able to 
deal with 20% of calls to directory enquiries by the following year, which is reported 
using direct speech, is described as ‘ambitious’ (ehrgeizig); the reporter attitude that 
the hearer will recover towards this aim, which is reported as direct speech, is thus 
one of slight scepticism. 
 An attitude of scepticism is also implied contextually towards the report of the 
guarantee. The guarantee is reported as mixed direct/indirect speech, significantly 
with a reportative subjunctive finite verb: because of this we shall treat it as indirect 
speech. Importantly, the guarantee is followed by the claim that the CLC has not 
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been able to fulfil it. There are no contextual features which prompt the hearer to 
infer that this claim, which is presented as indirect speech attributed to the manager 
of CLC, is untrue. Therefore the reporter attitude towards the guarantee which the 
hearer will infer will be one whereby the original speech act of guaranteeing is not 
held to have been entirely sincere.  
In the case of the report of the speech act of agreeing, the matrix subject is 
often presented as agreeing with an assumption which is discourse-old in the host 
discourse, since the host discourse provides the clue as to whether a given 
proposition (the proposition with which the matrix subject agrees) is assumed to be 
already known. In such cases the main relevance of the original utterance is 
understood to have resided not in the proposition represented by the subordinate 
clause of the reported version, but in the original speech act, which the verbum 
dicendi reports. In other words, it is not P that is reported (P is already (assumed to 
be) known), but that the original speaker agrees that P is the case. Agreeing, like 
guaranteeing, is a communicated speech act. Our example is (27a): 
 
(27a) [CONTEXT] Klingebiel: “We can do only what is most necessary, not what is 
desirable.” […] Despite its good transport links, Salzgitter is almost bottom of 
the league in comparison with other commercial settlements. How should we 
create the conditions that will encourage businesses to settle and remain 
here?” In particular, he says, marketing must be improved. He also says that 
the town’s low investment ratio is obvious because of the poor budgetary 
position. Michael Jakubke, who manages the economic development of the 
town, is proud that Salzgitter is much more productive than towns such as 
Braunschweig, and he says that incomes are also higher. The registration 
and deregistration of businesses must be considered over a longer period of 
time than was the case in the study. “There are fluctuations. We are making 
a great effort to encourage entrepreneurs.”124 
 
 Jakube   stimmt  zu,  dass  mehr   Marketing  gemacht   werden    müsse.  
 Jakube  agrees   SP   that   more  marketing  done          become  must.S1 
                                                 
124
 Klingebiel: “Wir können nur das notwendigste [sic.] tun, nicht das Wünschenswerte.” [...] “Salzgitter 
ist trotz seiner guten Verkehrsanbindung beinahe Schlusslicht bei den Gewerbeansiedlungen. Wie 
schaffen wir die Voraussetzungen, dass sich Betriebe ansiedeln und halten?” Insbesondere das 
Marketing müsse verbessert werden. Die niedrige städtische Investitionsquote liege wegen der 
schlechten Haushaltslage auf der Hand. Michael Jakubke, Geschäftsführer der städtischen 
Wirtschaftsförderung (Wis), ist stolz, dass Salzgitter viel produktiver sei als beispielsweise 
Braunschweig, auch die Einkommen seien höher. Die Gewerbean- und abmeldungen müsse man über 
einen längeren Zeitraum als in der Studie betrachten: „Da gibt es Schwankungen. Wir geben uns alle 
Mühe, Existenzgründer zu fördern.“ 
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“Doch  das   kostet  Geld.” 
  but      that  costs   money 
 
‘Jakube agrees that more marketing must be done. “But that costs money.”’ 
(Braunschweiger Zeitung: 16.11.2006) 
 
The hearer will recover the basic explicature in (27b): 
 
(27b) {Jakubke sagt}, er stimme zu, dass mehr Marketing gemacht werden 
müsse.  
 
 Towards the beginning of this text Klingebiel is reported as remarking that 
‘marketing must be improved’ (Das Marketing muss verbessert werden). 
Consequently, when it is reported that Jakubke agrees that ‘more marketing must be 
done’, it is not the proposition in (27c) that in the purported original context must 
have satisfied the hearer’s expectation of optimal relevance; this proposition is 
already discourse-old, at least in the host discourse: 
 
(27c) Mehr Marketing muss gemacht werden.  
 
Rather, the original hearer’s expectation of optimal relevance must have been 
satisfied by the purported original utterance in (27d): 
 
(27d) Ich stimme zu, dass mehr Marketing gemacht werden muss. 
 
 Whilst the reportative subjunctive has the effect of blocking the interpretation 
on which the matrix verb zustimmen must be understood to presuppose that mehr 
Marketing muss gemacht werden, the fact that this latter proposition is discourse-old 
in the host discourse means that the hearer will recover inferentially an interpretation 
on which it is presupposed. Furthermore, since this proposition is discourse-old, it 
seems that it would be pragmatically odd in the context of (27a) as a whole to 
postpose the matrix verbum dicendi: 
 
(27e) ? Mehr Marketing müsse gemacht werden, stimmt Jakubke zu. 
 
This is because the hearer reads the preposed embedded proposition as though it 
were discourse-new, although it is already manifest to him. It is only subsequently 
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that he reads stimmt Jakubke zu and his expectation of optimal relevance is 
satisfied.  
In (27a) it would also be inappropriate to substitute for the matrix Jakubke 
stimmt zu a speech-act neutral verbum dicendi in either preposed or postposed 
position. This would cause the notion that Jakubke agrees that more marketing must 
be done to be forfeited in the report completely, and in so doing would result in a 
discourse-old proposition being reported as though it were discourse-new: 
 
(27f) Jakubke sagt, dass mehr Marketing gemacht werden müsse. 
 
This brings us to a discussion of the attitude which is implied contextually 
towards the reported speech act of agreeing in (27a). If a specific reporter attitude 
were implied contextually towards this indirect speech, then this would likely depend 
on the reporter’s opinion of the embedded proposition, i.e. the object of agreement. 
If the reporter herself agreed that more marketing must be done, then the attitude 
contextually implied towards the reported speech act would be one of endorsement. 
On the other hand, a negative attitude, such as one of disapproval, would be implied 
contextually if the reporter appeared not to agree with the subordinate proposition.  
In practice, the reporting is impartial: the example consists entirely of 
indirect, reported and direct speech. The first instance of direct speech is 
accompanied by no verbum dicendi, merely the name of the speaker and a colon. 
There are then a number of sentences which constitute reported speech whose 
ellipsed subordinate clauses must be supplied on the level of mental representation; 
no indication is given as to the nature of the intended verba dicendi. In this context, 
the attitude which is contextually implied to the reported speech act of agreeing is 
also non-specific: it is reported objectively.  
 
 
5.4.4 The report of speech acts of denial 
 
The third question which this study seeks to address is the frequent occurrence of 
the reportative subjunctive in clauses which are embedded under what we have 
referred to as verbs of denial. Examples are ableugnen, abstreiten, bestreiten, 
dementieren, leugnen and verneinen, each of which corresponds in some sense to 
English ‘deny’: 
In Chapter 2, section 2.2.9 we suggested that the occurrence of the 
reportative subjunctive in such contexts is arguably unexpected because the 
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relationship between the matrix verb and the embedded proposition is (at first 
glance) not the same as the equivalent relationship when the matrix verb is, for 
example, a neutral verbum dicendi such as berichten. Consequently, whilst (28a) 
constitutes a plausible report of (28b), (29a) does not report (29b):  
 
(28a) Der  «SonntagsBlick»  berichtete    in  seiner   letzten   Ausgabe, dass  der 
The   SonntagsBlick     reported      in  its         latest      edition     that   the 
 
neue  Zug   aber  noch   gar    nicht   ausreichend  getestet  worden    sei. 
 new   train  but     yet     at all  not      sufficient        tested     become   is.S1 
 
‘The SonntagsBlick reported in its latest edition that the new train has not yet   
been sufficiently tested at all.’ 
(Die Südostschweiz: 09.06.2009) 
 
(28b)   Der neue Zug ist noch gar nicht ausreichend getestet worden. 
 
(29a) Uhde  verneint   aber,  dass    eine   Prüfung    der       Räume  durch      die 
Uhde  denies      but     that     a        check       of the   rooms    through   the 
 
  Heimaufsicht           der       Stadt   stattgefunden     habe.  
 home supervision    of the   town    took place          have.S1 
 
‘But Uhde denies that the rooms have been checked by the local authority.’  
(Braunschweiger Zeitung: 26.02.2009) 
 
(29b) Eine  Prüfung der Räume durch die Heimaufsicht der Stadt hat 
stattgefunden. 
  
In section 2.3.5 we considered Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s (2004) 
approach to instances of the German reportative subjunctive when embedded under 
verbs of denial. We showed their analysis to be inadequate since it is predicated on 
the view that the subjunctive carries a reportative presupposition, the notion of 
which, we argued, incorrectly predicts the distribution of reportative-subjunctive 
forms. For example, Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s analysis apparently ignores the 
fact that the subjunctive is employed in clauses which are subordinate to verbs of 
denial primarily in contexts of report. Additionally it incorrectly predicts that 
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structures such as *Ich bestreite, dass das Gemälde eine Fälschung sei (‘I deny that 
the painting is a forgery’) should be grammatically acceptable. 
However, in this subsection we argue that cases where the reportative 
subjunctive is embedded under a verb of denial should be properly analyzed in 
exactly the same terms as reported communicated speech acts. As in the case of 
reported communicated speech acts, it is not the embedded proposition alone in 
which the main relevance of the original utterance is understood to have consisted, 
but in a combination of the original speech act, reported by the verbum dicendi, and 
the embedded clause. Therefore, when the reportative subjunctive is embedded 
under a verb of denial, the hearer will recover a(n) (additional) verbum-dicendi 
matrix clause on the level of basic explicature which reflects the fact that the matrix 
verb itself reports part of the purported original utterance: 
 
(29c) {Uhde sagte}, er verneine, dass eine Prüfung der Räume durch die 
Heimaufsicht stattgefunden habe. 
 
As a result of the embedded subjunctive, (29a) may be understood as an 
indirect-speech report of an utterance which resembles (29d) in terms of its 
propositional form. Uhde verneint reports the purported original performative ich 
verneine:  
 
(29d) Ich verneine, das eine Prüfung der Räume durch die Heimaufsicht der Stadt 
stattgefunden hat. 
 
But a performative such as ich verneine or ich leugne ab does not have to be 
included in order to deny a proposition. This is because a speaker can be 
understood to perform the speech act of denying in a non-communicated sense if 
she simply states that such-and-such is not the case. For example, in a given 
context (29e) with its negated finite verb may achieve optimal relevance as a speech 
act of denial: the speaker does not need to state specifically, i.e. by using a 
performative, that she denies the proposition in question. It could therefore be 
understood as an alternative original utterance which (29a) purports to report: 
 
(29e) Eine Prüfung der Räume durch die Heimaufsicht der Stadt hat nicht 
stattgefunden. 
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 If the reporter implies contextually a specific attitude to the reported 
utterance, then this, as in the case of the report of communicated speech acts, will 
concern the speech act reported rather than the embedded proposition. As a fully 
contextualized example of indirect speech whose verbum dicendi is a verb of denial 
we provide (30a): 
 
(30a) [CONTEXT] A pregnant woman has been killed in an illegal motor race, in 
which she was not involved, in Frankfurt. Another woman was injured. Now 
both drivers involved are having to answer before Frankfurt district court. […] 
At the beginning of the trial, the driver of the car that caused the accident 
said that he could not remember anything.125 
 
Der  Mitangeklagte  bestritt,    dass  er   sich        mit    dem  Techniker   ein 
the  co-defendant    denied     that   he   himself   with  the    technician  a 
 
Wettrennen   geliefert     habe.    Zeugen       bestätigten   jedoch      die 
race               delivered  has.S1   witnesses   confirmed    however    the 
 
Version   der       Anklage. 
version   of the   prosecution 
 
‘The co-defendant denied that he had had a race with the technician. 
However witnesses confirmed the version of the prosecution.’  
(Rhein-Zeitung: 19/03/2009) 
 
 The purported original utterance must have resembled (30b) or maybe (30c) 
in terms of its propositional content:  
 
(30b) Ich bestreite, dass ich mir mit dem Techniker ein Wettrennen geliefert habe. 
(30c) Ich habe mir nicht ein Wettrennen mit dem Techniker geliefert.  
 
Since the negative element, which is ‘incorporated’ into the verbum dicendi bestritt 
in (30a), is an indispensable component of the proposition in which the main 
relevance of the original utterance resided, regardless of whether it resembled (30b) 
                                                 
125
 Bei einem illegalen Autorennen in Frankfurt ist eine unbeteiligte Schwangere ums Leben 
gekommen und eine andere Frau schwer verletzt worden: Nun müssen sich die beiden beteiligten 
Autofahrer vor dem Amtsgericht Frankfurt verantworten. […] Zum Prozessauftakt sagte der 
Unfallfahrer, er könne sich an nichts mehr erinnern. 
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or (30c) more closely, the matrix clause of (30a) is unlikely to be postposed. Hence 
(30d) is pragmatically improbable:126 
 
(30d) ? Er habe sich mit dem Techniker ein Wettrennen geliefert, bestritt der 
Mitangeklagte. 
 
It is, of course, impossible to substitute a neutral verb for a matrix verb of 
denial without reversing the polarity of the reported utterance. (30a) cannot be 
reported as (30e) in which we have used teilte mit (‘informed’ or ‘reported’):127 
 
 (30e) Der Mitangeklagte teilte mit, dass er sich mit dem Techniker ein Wettrennen 
geliefert habe.   
 
 This brings us to a discussion of the attitude which is contextually implied 
towards the reported speech act of denial. The first two sentences are impartial in 
tone; they simply state some facts. However, in the third sentence, one of the 
defendants says that he does not remember anything about the incident. Claiming a 
memory lapse in judicial situations is arguably a cliché, and provided that the 
assumption in (30f) is mutually manifest, implies that the defendant is being 
untruthful: 
 
(30f) People who claim not to remember certain facts in court have something to 
hide.  
 
The following sentence includes the reported speech act of denial. In the 
context of the defendant’s convenient attack of amnesia, it seems likely that the co-
defendant is being less than honest in denying that they were racing. Our suspicions 
                                                 
126
 It is, however, possible to postpose the matrix clause in non-indirect-speech contexts with an 
indicative, where dass must be included, e.g. Dass er sich mit dem Techniker ein Wettrennen geliefert 
hat, bestritt der Mitangeklagte. In this case, that the co-defendent had a race with the technician is 
presupposed, either in the sense of Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 41) or, following Fabricius-Hansen 
and Sæbø (2004: 232-233), it is presupposed that someone else has uttered the embedded 
proposition. (It will be remembered that for Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø it is the notion that someone 
else has uttered the embedded proposition that satisfies the reportative presupposition that they 
believe the reportative subjunctive to carry. The fact that we find the notion of this reportative 
presupposition untenable is not inconsistent with the possibility of it being presupposed that someone 
else has uttered the subordinate proposition.) In our view, the reportative subjunctive has the effect of 
blocking not only Huddleston and Pullum’s presupposition, but also that of Fabricius-Hansen and 
Sæbø, i.e. the very presupposition which for the latter authority motivates the subjunctive. However, 
interpretations on which either type of presupposition is present may still be recovered inferentially. 
127
 It is of course possible to employ a neutral verbum dicendi and reverse the polarity of the embedded 
clause, in this case by adding nicht (‘not’): Der Mitangeklagte teilte mit, dass er sich nicht mit dem 
Techniker ein Wettrennen geliefert habe. However, the extent to which such an utterance is truly 
comparable with (30a) is questionable. 
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are largely corroborated in the last sentence where we are informed that witnesses 
have confirmed the defendants’ involvement in the alleged incident. Thus the hearer 
will contextually infer that the reporter believes that the Mitangeklagter did not 
perform the original speech act of denial sincerely, the subjunctive being compatible 
with this attitude. 
Ultimately, a reported speech act of denial strongly resembles any reported 
communicated speech act: the main relevance of the original utterance is 
understood to have consisted in what is presented in the reported version as a 
combination of the matrix verbum dicendi and embedded proposition. Consequently, 
any reporter attitude which the reportative subjunctive plays a role in encouraging 
the hearer to infer will concern not the extent to which the embedded proposition is 
considered to be true, but the performance of the original speech act, for example 
the extent to which the original speaker is considered to have performed the original 
speech sincerely. 
 
 
5.5 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter we have examined another aspect of the German reportative 
subjunctive as a marker of interpretive use: the circumstance that, like Sissala rέ 
and Japanese tte, it is compatible with any reporter attitude towards the reported 
proposition, which latter is ultimately recovered on the basis of context. But, 
importantly, we have also suggested that it is essential to understand precisely what 
is understood to be attributed to the original speaker, represented in indirect speech 
by the matrix subject. On the one hand, the embedded proposition may alone be 
understood to be attributed to the matrix subject. We referred to such indirect 
speech as type A indirect speech. If the reporter implies a particular attitude towards 
the embedded proposition, then this attitude will concern whether the embedded 
proposition is true or false, or plausible in the case of an opinion. On the other hand, 
the assumption represented by the matrix clause may also constitute part of what is 
reported. In other words, the subjunctive may have scope over the matrix verbum 
dicendi as well as the subordinate proposition.  
When it is both an assumption reported by the matrix verb and the 
embedded proposition which are understood to be attributed to the original speaker, 
the indirect speech will be understood in one of two ways. The matrix verbum 
dicendi may report a higher-level explicature of the original utterance which is not 
understood to have contributed to the main relevance of the purported original 
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utterance (type B indirect speech). This is the case when the matrix verb reports a 
non-communicated speech act or a propositional attitude. In such cases, the 
reporter may imply contextually an attitude not only towards the embedded 
proposition, but also towards the higher-level explicature which is reported by the 
matrix verbum dicendi. This latter attitude will concern the extent to which the 
reporter considers the embedded proposition to be, for example, justifiably 
associated with the attendant non-communicated speech act or propositional 
attitude.  
Alternatively, the matrix verbum dicendi may report an explicature of the 
purported original utterance which is understood to have contributed to its main 
relevance (type C indirect speech); this is the case when communicated speech 
acts, including speech acts of denial, are reported. In such cases, if a specific 
reporter attitude is contextually implied then this will concern primarily the extent to 
which the reported communicated speech act is considered to have been performed 
sincerely or, the extent to which the reporter endorses the performance of the 
purported original speech act.  
We ended the chapter by considering cases where the reportative 
subjunctive is embedded under verbs of denial. We argued that such occurrences 
are to be analyzed in exactly the same terms as reported communicated speech 
acts. 
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6 
 
  Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 The German reportative subjunctive imposes a single relevance constraint 
 
The five research questions which this study ultimately sought to address were as 
follows. Firstly, what is the essential semantic difference between the indicative and 
the reportative subjunctive? How do we account for the consistent association of the 
reportative subjunctive with indirect speech which displays the property 
indirectness? Secondly, how do we account for the fact that the subjunctive may be 
embedded under some factive verbs such that they are understood to introduce 
indirect speech which exhibits indirectness? These verbs include behabitives, such 
as kritisieren (‘criticize’) and verbs of emotional attitude, such as bedauern (‘regret’). 
Thirdly, how do we account for the occurrence of the reportative subjunctive in 
clauses which are subordinate to verbs of denial? Fourthly, in the case of reported 
speech, how does the hearer identify and construct the ellipsed matrix clause that 
he is required to supply on the level of mental representation? Finally, how do we 
account for the fact that the German reportative subjunctive is compatible with any 
attitude that the reporter may hold towards a reported proposition? 
This study has shown that the single relevance constraint imposed by the 
feature I[t1] of the German reportative subjunctive, whose function is simply to 
ensure that an utterance is understood as an instance of what we have described as 
prototypical German indirect speech, allows us to provide satisfactory answers to all 
these questions. The description of prototypical indirect speech that we provided in 
Chapter 4, section 4.2.1, was as follows:  
 
(i) Prototypical indirect speech consists of a matrix clause and a subordinate 
proposition which latter in German may or may not be introduced by dass. 
(ii) Pronominal deixis must be selected from the point of view of the reporter. 
The tense of the embedded verb must be chosen from the point of view of t1. 
Other deixis may be selected from the point of view of the original speaker. 
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(iii) Prototypical indirect speech must exhibit the property indirectness. Therefore 
the reported proposition will not be understood to be presupposed. 
  
This constraint has the effect of blocking interpretations which conflict with 
prototypical indirect speech (characterized by indirectness), such as ones on which 
the reported proposition is presupposed. Thanks to this particular facet of the 
constraint, the interpretation of certain essentially factive verbs, such as kritisieren 
(‘criticize’) and bedauern (‘regret’), is constrained such that they are understood to 
introduce prototypical indirect speech. Thus, we have a solution to the first two of 
our research questions: prototypical indirect speech is characterized by non-
presupposition of the subordinate proposition, and the subjunctive ensures that the 
reported proposition is understood not to be presupposed. 
The matrix verb itself often reports part of the original utterance, for instance 
a speech act, and in such cases an effect of the reportative subjunctive is to ensure 
that the indirect-speech construction as a whole, i.e. both the matrix and subordinate 
clauses combined, are understood to be embedded under a still higher matrix 
verbum-dicendi clause which the hearer must supply inferentially. Like the matrix 
clause which is mentally constructed in the case of reported speech, this clause 
contributes to basic explicature. Hence a hearer will understand (1a) as (1b): 
 
(1a) Bei der Gründung versprach Erdoğan, die neue Partei werde 
demokratischer sein.  
(1b) {Erdoğan sagte bei der Gründung}, er verspreche, die neue Partei werde 
demokratischer sein.  
 
Additionally, the constraint in question insists that the tenses of the 
subjunctive be understood in relation to t1, and this has the effect of ensuring that in 
the case of reported speech the requisite matrix clause is constructed, as a basic 
explicature, on the level of mental representation.The construction of this ellipsed 
clause formed the focus of our fourth question. The hearer is required to identify a 
temporal value for the feature I[t1], so that it is clear how t1 relates to t0. Once this 
value has been identified, I[t1] is then developed via pragmatically constrained 
inference into a fully determinate matrix clause under which the reportative-
subjunctive form must be understood to be embedded on the level of basic 
explicature. 
The construction of this matrix clause is principally a pragmatic process. 
Pragmatics also plays a role in the identification of the interpretive stance that the 
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reporter holds towards a reported utterance (our fifth research question), inferring 
whether a reported speech act is understood as a reported communicated or non-
communicated act and, to some extent, inferring whether or not the matrix verb itself 
is understood to report part of the original utterance. However, the need to resolve 
these indeterminacies arises directly from the reportative subjunctive’s function of 
ensuring that an utterance is understood as prototypical indirect speech. 
Significantly, relevance theory is capable of explaining in cognitively plausible terms 
the lines along which these pragmatic processes proceed,  
Finally, the fact that the German reportative subjunctive frequently occurs in 
clauses which are subordinate to verbs of denial can be attributed to the nature of 
the feature I[t1]. As in the case of the report of communicated speech acts, the 
subjunctive ensures that the matrix verb and embedded proposition combined are 
understood as the report of an original utterance. In doing so, the subjunctive blocks 
interpretations on which the embedded proposition is understood to be (logically) 
presupposed, whilst ensuring that the indirect-speech construction as a whole is 
understood to be embedded under a matrix verbum dicendi on the level of the 
proposition expressed. Thus we have an adequate solution to our third research 
question. 
Ultimately, the German reportative subjunctive is an interpretive use marker 
which is restricted to a specific type of interpretive use: indirect speech. Like 
interpretive use markers in other languages it encodes procedural meaning: it 
constrains the inferential computations that a hearer performs over those conceptual 
representations which are delivered by linguistic decoding and whose constituents 
are said to encode conceptual meaning. The result is that an utterance with a finite 
verb in the reportative subjunctive can be understood only as indirect (or reported) 
speech. However, there is a fundamental difference between the German 
reportative subjunctive and markers of interpretive use in other languages such as 
Japanese and Sissala, in addition to the fact that the subjunctive has a much more 
restricted use. Whilst the Japanese particle tte (Itani 1991, 1998) and the Sissala rέ 
(Blass 1989, 1990) make their contribution on the level of higher-level explicature, 
we have shown in this study that the reportative subjunctive contributes to the 
construction of a basic explicature, both in the case of reported speech and when a 
speech act or propositional attitude is reported, as in example (1b) above. 
Significantly, we showed in Chapter 2 that the modal verbs sollen (‘should’) and 
wollen (‘want’) also function on the level of basic explicature in their evidential 
functions. 
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6.2 Implications of our conclusions and recommendations for further research 
 
In our view, our claims have implications within relevance theory for the analysis of 
interpretive use markers in other languages on the one hand and the wider study of 
indirect speech cross-linguistically on the other.  
As an an interpretive use marker which is associated only with indirect 
speech, the German reportative subjunctive is much more restricted in use than, 
say, the Japanese interpretive use marker tte or the Sissala marker rέ. However, we 
hypothesize that the pragmatic effect of the subjunctive is similar to that of tte and rέ 
in indirect-speech-type constructions, where these particles have the function of a 
complementizer. An example from Sissala, previously used in Chapter 3 section 
3.4.5: 
 
(2) Ba     sɛ     rí  ɓa     yálá   há     kúé            makɛ   doƞ     pınɛ    weri    
they  said  rέ  their  aunt   who  has-come  show   sleep  lying   well   
 
pa     wͻ. 
give  them 
 
‘They said that their aunt who has come will show them how to sleep 
properly.’ 
 
We leave it to future research to ascertain whether these particles have in 
such constructions the effect of blocking interpretations on which a reported 
proposition is presupposed, i.e. whether in a specific syntactic environment these 
particles become associated with a specific prototype of indirect speech (or an 
indirect-speech-type construction). Future research could also investigate whether, 
in cases where the reporting verb itself reports part of the original utterance, the 
hearer may recover a matrix clause which corresponds to that in (1b) above on the 
level of mental representation. Furthermore, the notion that tte and rέ are plausibly 
used to imply the reporter’s attitude towards any original speech act (as well as the 
complement proposition), in the sense that they are compatible with any attitude, 
suggests that across languages the question of the attitudes which are implied 
towards a reported proposition is arguably more complex than has thus far been 
acknowledged in the literature. 
The German-specific prototype of indirect speech with which the reportative 
subjunctive is associated differs quite considerably from German indirect speech 
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with an indicative and indirect speech in languages such as English and Russian 
which employ the indicative in both direct and indirect speech. Whilst English and 
Russian indirect speech is syntactically comparable to the corresponding German 
construction with a subjunctive, it is clearly not the case that potential interpretations 
on which a given embedded proposition is presupposed are blocked in indirect 
speech. Compare the German (with an indicative), English and Russian examples 
below ((3a), (3b) and (3c)), which presuppose (3e), with the subjunctive German 
version (3d) which does not (although such an interpretation may be recovered 
pragmatically): 
 
(3a) Mein Bruder sagte, dass er bedauert, dass er das Jobangebot nicht 
angenommen hat. 
(3b) My brother said he regretted that he did not accept the job offer. 
 
(3c) Moj  brat       skazal,  čto    žaleet,       čto    ne     prinjal       predloženie            
 My   brother  said      that   regrets       that   not   accepted   offer 
  
 o             rabote.  
 about      work 
 
(3d) Mein Bruder sagte, er bedaure, dass er das Jobangebot nicht angenommen   
habe. 
(3e) My brother did not accept the job offer. 
 
These considerations provide evidence that indirect speech in English and 
Russian as well as indicative indirect speech in German is less homogeneous than 
German reportative-subjunctive indirect speech. These considerations also raise the 
question of whether a wider, typological programme of research into indirect speech 
and indirect-speech-type constructions may be worthwhile. Such research would 
need to consider not just the syntactic make-up of such constructions, but would 
also consider questions relating to presupposition, the attitudes which may be 
semantically encoded or pragmatically implied towards a reported proposition and, if 
conducted from a relevance-theoretic perspective, the role of interpretive use 
markers.  
Other issues which remain to be clarified concern the distinction between 
communicated and non-communcated speech acts. In Chapter 5 we suggested that 
in cases where the matrix verbum dicendi is speech-act neutral or reports a 
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propositional attitude or non-communicated speech act, it is possible to move the 
verbum dicendi to a marked, postposed position, e.g. schließen (‘conclude’), 
kritisieren and zugeben (‘admit’). Verba dicendi which report communicated acts, on 
the other hand, either cannot be postposed or cannot be moved without weakening 
the communicative effect of the reported illocution, e.g. garantieren (‘guarantee’) 
and zustimmen (‘agree’). However, further research is in our view required in order 
to ascertain the extent to which the relevance-theoretic distinction between 
communicated and non-communicated speech acts truly finds reflection in the 
positioning of the matrix clause when they are reported. This could also be 
investigated cross-linguistically within the programme of typological research 
suggested above (though bearing in mind that the position of the matrix clause does 
not display flexibility in all languages). If it should turn out to be a widespread 
phenomenon that the potential positions of the matrix verb within indirect speech are 
determined by the type of illocution which it reports, then this would further 
corroborate the distinction that relevance theory draws between communicated and 
non-communicated acts. 
This study has not considered the question of reported interrogatives and 
imperatives. According to Wilson and Sperber (2004: 623) the higher-level 
explicature communicated by (4a) is (4b): 
 
(4a) Will you pay back the money by Tuesday? 
(4b) {Andrew is asking Jennifer whether} she will pay back the money by 
Tuesday.  
 
Obviously, Jennifer must understand (4a) as a question, in other words she must 
recover (4b). Thus it follows that if we transpose (4a) into indirect speech, not only 
the proposition ‘Jennifer will pay back the money by Tuesday’ is understood to be 
attributed to Andrew, the original speech act of asking is as well: 
 
(4c) Andrew asked Jennifer whether she would pay back the money by Tuesday. 
 
Or in German: 
 
(4d) Andrew  fragte  Jennifer,  ob           sie   ihm      das  Geld      bis    Montag  
Andrew  asked  Jennifer   whether  she  to him  the   money  until  Monday 
 
 
 267 
 
zurückzahlen werde/würde/wird. 
 pay back        will.S1.S2.IND 
  
We hypothesize that any reporter attitude implied contextually will concern the 
reporter’s view of the original question, for example, was it a sensible or justified 
question? 
 An analysis of reported imperatives would proceed along similar lines, with 
the original speech act constituting a crucial part of what is understood to be 
attributed to the matrix subject. However, unlike the case of interrogatives where 
there are no communicated and non-communicated speech acts, such an analysis 
would need to pay attention to this distinction. We hypothesize that one could not be 
accused of unfaithful reporting if a non-communicated speech act, such as advising, 
were reported using a neutral verbum dicendi as follows: 
 
(5) Der  Lehrer   sagte  ihm,     dass  er   nach  Hause   gehen   solle. 
 the  teacher  said    to him   that   he  to        house   go         should.S1 
 
 ‘The teacher told him to go home/said to him that he should go home.’ 
 
But communicated acts, such as ordering, need to be reported using a verbum 
dicendi which reports the specific purported speech act: 
 
(6) Der  Lehrer   befahl     ihm,      dass  er   nach  Hause   gehen   solle. 
 the  teacher  ordered  to him   that    he  to       house    go         should.S1 
 
 ‘The teacher ordered him to go home.’ 
 
We have also not paid attention to the question of the German reportative 
subjunctive when embedded under a negated verbum dicendi. In Chapter 2 we 
mentioned briefly the distinction which for Thieroff (1992) holds to exist between 
(7a), with an indicative and (7b), which has the subjunctive form sei:  
 
(7a) Bild  hat   nicht  geschrieben,  dass  der  Graf    verhaftet   worden    ist. 
 Bild  has  not    written             that   the   count  arrrested   become   is.IND 
 
(7b) Bild hat nicht geschrieben, dass der Graf verhaftet worden sei. 
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In (7a) the focus is on the notion that Bild has not reported a presupposed 
proposition, whilst (7b) should be understood ‘[…] as a contradiction of the claim 
that Bild has announced the arrest of the count’ (Thieroff 1992: 254).  
 In our own relevance-theoretic terms, (7a) achieves optimal relevance 
through contradicting a specific assumption which the hearer is believed to 
entertain, namely, that Bild has reported that the count has been arrested. It is 
therefore not to be understood as negated prototypical indirect speech. In cases of 
negated prototypical indirect speech such as (7b), however, the reported 
assumption is attributed to the matrix subject in the sense that it is the sort of 
assumption that one would expect the matrix subject at least to entertain and 
possibly express. The purpose of negated indirect speech is then to make manifest 
to the hearer that this person, contrary to expectations, does not entertain or has not 
expressed the assumption concerned, or an assumption that resembles it. For 
example, (8) might be relevant if Einstein had not made the criticism that Bohr 
abandoned causality early, yet, in view of all the mutually manifest assumptions 
about him, one might expect him to have done so: 
 
(8) Einstein kritisierte nicht, dass Bohr voreilig die Kausalität aufgegeben habe. 
 
Crucial here, in our view, is that the assumptions about the matrix subject, which 
would prompt one to expect him at least to entertain the assumption concerned, be 
mutually manifest. In example (9), where a verb of denial is negated, the assumption 
that one would not expect the original speaker to deny the embedded proposition is 
made mutually manifest by the subsequent context: 
 
(9)  Sein  Verteidiger         bestritt   nicht,   dass   mehr   Indizien 
 his    defence lawyer  denied    not       that    more   circumstantial evidence 
 
 für  die   Täterschaft   seines  Mandanten    sprächen  als      für 
 for  the   guilt              of his   client               speak.S2   than   for 
 
jene  der       Frau:    «Doch  blosse  Wahrscheinlichkeit  genügt   nicht  
 that   of the   woman  but      mere    probability                suffices  not 
 
für  einen   Schuldspruch –  es   braucht  Beweise.» 
 for  a          guilty verdict       it    needs     proof 
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‘His defence lawyer did not deny that more pieces of circumstantial evidence 
suggested the guilt of his client than that of the woman: “But mere probability 
is not sufficient for a guilty verdict – proof is needed.”   
(St. Galler Tagblatt: 17.12.2010) 
 
In view of the comment that probability is not enough for a guilty verdict, one might 
expect the defence lawyer to deny that the evidence suggests that his client might 
be guilty. But, contrary to this expectation, he does not deny this. Hence the first 
sentence above is pragmatically felicitous as an instance of negated indirect 
speech. 
 We hypothesize that in all cases of negated indirect speech, regardless of 
the nature of the original speech, the reporter attitude implied will concern whether 
the reporter considers the original speaker to be justified in not producing or to have 
good reason not to produce the utterance concerned.  
 We wish to make two more suggestions for further research. Firstly, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, one device that often marks reported discourse is discourse 
representative adverbials: adverbials which consist of laut, nach and zufolge 
(‘according to’) followed by the source. These adverbials are discussed in detail in 
Carlsen (1994). She observes that in the majority of cases these are collocated with 
the indicative. However, in a very small proportion of cases, the reportative 
subjunctive occurs. This is most common in relative clauses where either nach or 
zufolge is coupled with a pronoun (laut does not occur in such constructions), such 
as wonach or dem zufolge (example from Carlsen (1994: 467)): 
 
(10) Scotland Yard  dementierte  einen  Bericht,  dem     zufolge            Experten  
 Scotland Yard  denied          a         report     which  according to     experts 
 
  nach  einem  Besuch  in  Sambia   deutlich  erklärt       haben   sollen, 
 after   a         visit        in   Zambia   clear      explained  have     should 
 
 die  Sicherheit  der     Königin  könne   dort    nicht  garantiert     werden. 
 the  safety        of the Queen    can.S1  there  not    guaranteed   become 
 
‘Scotland Yard denied a report in which, following a visit to Zambia, experts 
are said to have made clear that the safety of the Queen there cannot be 
guaranteed.’ 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung: 04.07.1979) 
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In this case it is very clear that the source of the reported utterance is the report 
concerned: dem zufolge contributes to the proposition expressed, and analysts such 
as Itani-Kaufmann (1990) and Ifantidou (1993) would maintain that it is truth-
conditional. However, the subjunctive does sometimes occur in cases where one of 
these three prepositions governs a noun phrase (example from Carlsen (1994: 
467)): 
 
(11) Nach  wie  vor       ungeklärt  bleibe          nach                Ansicht    des 
 after  as    before  unsolved   remains.S1  according to    opinion     of the  
 
Ministers  die   Bedarfs-   und   Wirtschaftlichkeitsfrage. 
minister    the   demand   and   question about cost-effectiveness 
 
‘In the opinion of the minister the question of demand and cost-effectiveness 
still remains unsolved.’ 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung: 30.06.1979) 
 
We suggest that adverbials of the type under discussion are ambiguous between 
parenthetical and non-parenthetical use when collocated with the indicative. It is true 
that they indicate the source of the utterance and can thus be a handy device in 
journalistic writing where there is the risk of litigation if unsubstantiated claims are 
made. However they cannot necessarily be said to contribute to the main relevance 
of the utterance, especially if placed in an unstressed sentence position. Whether 
such an adverbial is understood to be parenthetical or non-parenthetical is ultimately 
determined by considerations of relevance. We hypothesize that when accompanied 
by the reportative subjunctive, such adverbials always contribute to the main 
relevance of the utterance, regardless of their positioning in the sentence. This is 
because examples such as (11) above are, in our view, instances of a type of 
reported speech: the source of the utterance corresponds to the subject of the 
matrix clause under which the subjunctive must be understood to be embedded on 
the level of mental representation. Precisely how t1 relates to t0, i.e. the question as 
to when the source mentioned in the discourse representative adverbial uttered the 
reported proposition, is solved pragmatically. Whether we are right requires further 
investigation. 
 Finally, we propose a similar analysis for wie-clauses, such as wie ein 
Sprecher mitteilt (‘as a spokesperson informs us/announces/makes known’). For 
Fabricius-Hansen (2006: 534), such clauses are parenthetical and are used to back 
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up a claim made by the speaker. The example she provides is accompanied by an 
indicative: 
 
(12) Wie  die  Thurgauer  Polizei  mitteilt,     schossen    die    Jugendlichen  
 as     the  Thurgau     police   informed  shot.IND      the    youths 
 
 aus     Langweile  und   Übermut    auf   die   vorbeigehende  Frau.  
 out of  boredom    and   mischief    on    the   passing              woman 
 
‘As Thurgau police reported, the youths shot at the passing woman out of 
boredom and mischief.’ 
(SZ 1997) 
 
A similar view to that of Fabricius-Hansen is that of Pittner (1993). She considers the 
subjunctive to occur ‘very rarely’ in the accompanying main clause (1993: 319).128 
On the other hand, Carlsen (1998) considers wie-clauses to introduce reported 
discourse regularly, even when the finite verb in the accompanying clause is an 
indicative. It seems that some further empirical corpus-based research is required in 
order to establish the extent to which wie-clauses are used to substantiate claims of 
the speaker on the one hand and to introduce reported discourse on the other. 
However, Pittner and Carlsen do agree that such clauses always introduce reported 
discourse when the verb of the accompanying clause is an unambiguous reportative 
subjunctive form (example from Carlsen (1998: 63)): 
 
(13) Wie  die  „New York Times”  am      Samstag   unter   Berufung   auf  
 as    the   New York Times   on the  Saturday  under  appeal       on  
 
 Regierungsbeamte    berichtete,  habe    der   Mann  die   Informationen 
 government officials  reported      has.S1 the   man    the   information 
  
 nicht  an  die   amerikanische  Botschaftlerin  in   Guatemala  weitergegeben.  
 not     to   the  American          ambassador    in   Guatemala   passed on 
 
                                                 
128
 sehr selten 
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‘As the New York Times reported on Saturday citing government officials, the 
man did not pass the information on to the American ambassador to 
Guatemala.’ 
 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: 31.03.1995) 
 
We hypothesize that in such cases the wie-clause is never parenthetical and as 
such always makes its contribution on the level of the proposition expressed. 
Importantly, the tense of the wie-clause makes explicit the relationship of t1 to t0. 
 If the hypotheses we have made over these few paragraphs should turn out 
to be correct, then this will throw even greater weight behind our claim that 
relevance theory is able to account fully for the various phenomena which 
characterize the German reportative subjunctive. 
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